In December 1979, the United States and 12 NATO partners agreed to modernize NATO's theater nuclear forces by replacing existing Pershing I ballistic missiles with a more accurate and longer range Pershing II (P-II) while adding new ground launched cruise missiles. The deployment was seen as necessary to: (1) solidify the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Europe; (2) respond to Soviet modernization of its theater nuclear forces; (3) replace obsolescent Western systems; and (4) provide bargaining leverage for negotiations with the Soviet Union. The decision was linked, technically and politically, to a commitment to attempt to deal with the threat posed by the new Soviet systems by negotiating limits on theater nuclear systems within the SALT framework.

Developments since December 1979 have eroded the political base for the decision, and anti-nuclear sentiment in a number of European countries has called into question the original deployment plan. Furthermore, the P-II missile's test failures led the 97th Congress to deny procurement funds for the missile until its viability is demonstrated.

With deployment of the new NATO missiles scheduled to begin by the end of 1983, U.S.-Soviet negotiations in Geneva are in a critical phase. If negotiations do not move toward agreement, the ability of the West to deploy the new missiles could depend on whether the United States or the Soviet Union is viewed as responsible for the failure to reach agreement.
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BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

NATO'S December 1979 Decision

In December 1979, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to modernize the Europe-based U.S. nuclear arsenal by deploying (in 1983 at the earliest) a total of 572 new ground-launched systems capable of reaching Soviet territory from West European sites. The deployment would consist of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles, all with single nuclear warheads. The missiles would be deployed in five European countries: P-11s and cruise missiles in West Germany; cruise missiles only in the U.K., Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The allies also agreed to attempt to negotiate with the Soviet Union East-West limitations on theater nuclear forces in the context of SALT. The NATO decision, therefore, was an integrated or dual-track approach involving both modernization and arms control. (For a detailed discussion of the decision see the CRS report, entitled The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces, published by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Dec. 31, 1980, C.P. 1156.)

The communique issued following the NATO decision stated that "all the nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will participate in the program." The consensus represented by this statement had been achieved through a process of intense preparation and consultation during the two years preceding the decision. But the apparent unanimity of the communique concealed serious reservations on the part of several smaller countries, caused by widespread uneasiness among significant sections of their public and parliamentary opinion toward the introduction of additional nuclear weapons into Europe. Governments of two countries selected for deployment, Belgium and the Netherlands, agreed to the decision but both submitted reservations concerning the deployment of missiles on their territory.

The proposal to modernize NATO's nuclear forces revived two basic issues confronting the Alliance: first, how to sustain the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee given differing American and European attitudes toward the role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy; and second, how to reconcile the demands of NATO's dual policy of defense and detente, particularly how to determine the appropriate role for arms control negotiations in ensuring Western security.

NATO'S Nuclear Dilemma

Almost since its inception the alliance has struggled with the problem of how most effectively to extend the protection of American strategic nuclear power to the defense of Western Europe. The United States is committed to assist in the defense of its European allies, though the ultimate fulfillment of this commitment could result in the destruction of American society. This situation has inevitably produced different perceptions between Europe and the United States concerning what constitutes an appropriate and credible strategy of deterrence, and the forces needed to support it.
Europeans, conscious that any war, nuclear or conventional, could devastate Europe, have tended to advocate a strategy of absolute deterrence through the immediate threat of all-out nuclear war. They have looked with suspicion at any development that appeared to distract from this ultimate threat, or that appeared to "decouple" Europe from the American strategic nuclear guarantee.

The United States, equally conscious of the awesome consequences for American territory of strategic nuclear war, has sought to avoid being faced with the choice of all-out nuclear war or defeat. American officials have increasingly emphasized the need to deter conflict at all possible levels through the provision of a wide range of capabilities and options. They have endeavored to look "beyond" deterrence, and, in the event that deterrence should fail, to facilitate the satisfactory termination of any conflict short of all-out nuclear war. This approach has led to a search for flexibility and "credible," or more usable options.

The NATO decision attempted to deal with these conflicting perspectives by providing more flexible nuclear systems -- in response to the American requirement -- which nonetheless, in their ability to strike Soviet territory, could be seen as strengthening the link between the European theater and the strategic nuclear standoff -- in response to the European requirement.

According to the decision's rationale, deterrence for Europe would be strengthened because the Soviet Union, in contemplating any attack on Western Europe, would be forced to calculate that the West might respond by striking Soviet territory with the new systems. And, in using the systems, the West would know that the Soviet Union might respond by striking American, not European, targets. Therefore, both sides would be aware that hostilities in the European theater might escalate rapidly to a strategic exchange that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would desire.

**Toward Preliminary Negotiations**

As NATO moved toward its decision, Soviet President Brezhnev announced, on Oct. 6, 1979, a package of arms control initiatives including an offer to limit deployment of SS-20 missiles if NATO would defer its decision to deploy new Western systems. When NATO went ahead in any case, Moscow said that the decision had destroyed any possibility for negotiations on theater nuclear systems.

The potential for negotiations received another serious setback when, on December 24, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. As part of the American response, President Carter asked the Senate to suspend consideration of the SALT II treaty, effectively putting U.S.-Soviet arms control discussions in limbo.

The Soviet Union for the next six months continued to assert that the NATO decision had removed all prospects for theater nuclear arms control. But, on July 1, 1980, during a visit by West German Chancellor Schmidt to Moscow, President Brezhnev relented and said that the Soviet Union was prepared to enter negotiations at any time. Subsequent contacts between U.S. and Soviet representatives led to preliminary negotiations in October 1980.
On Oct. 16, 1980, U.S. and Soviet representatives met in Geneva for preliminary negotiations. The talks continued for about a month but resulted only in agreement to meet again in the future to continue the discussions. As expected, the two sides disagreed from the outset concerning which weapons systems should be included in the negotiations. The U.S./NATO position was that, on the Western side, only the planned GLCM and Pershing 2 units were negotiable, and called for limitations on the Soviet Union's LRTNF potential -- primarily the SS-20 but also including the older SS-4 and SS-5 -- and on the Backfire bomber. The Soviet Union said that all American systems capable of striking Soviet territory from European bases, such as FB-111 bombers stationed in the U.K., or from aircraft carriers in the European region, should be included in the negotiations.

The Geneva talks closed in the wake of the victory of Ronald Reagan over Jimmy Carter in the U.S. Presidential elections. The talks had clearly confirmed that negotiations on theater systems would be complex and potentially prolonged. The fact that the next President of the United States had opposed the SALT II treaty and was openly skeptical about arms control raised even more serious questions about the viability of the NATO December 1979 decision.

Anti-Nuclear Sentiment in Europe: U.S. and Soviet Responses

The resurgent anti-nuclear movement in Europe has been a major factor affecting prospects for implementation of the NATO LRTNF decision. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was an active anti-nuclear movement in Great Britain and in some other West European countries. The movement receded as protest movements first switched in the 1960s to Vietnam issues and then virtually disappeared from sight with the advent of the era of detente and the beginning of SALT negotiations.

In advance of the NATO decision, the movement was attracting support mainly from traditional anti-nuclear quarters including a spillover assist from the protest against peaceful uses of nuclear power. But by early 1981, the anti-nuclear forces could claim significant popular support in a number of crucial West European countries.

A number of factors have encouraged sentiment against new missile deployments. The failure of the SALT II agreement, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and subsequent escalation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union led many Europeans to conclude that it was no longer prudent to depend solely on the United States and the Soviet Union to control the accelerating arms race. Furthermore, American pressures for increased European defense spending against a background of stagnant economic growth have called attention to the cuts in social programs that might be required to square the budgetary circle. The nuclear issue has provided a clear and emotive focus for that attention.

Two additional developments during the Carter Administration increased European concern that U.S. strategy was moving toward a nuclear warfighting posture for Europe. First, the on-and-off again decision of the Carter Administration concerning deployment of enhanced radiation weapons ("neutron bombs") in Europe suggested to many Europeans that American weapons technology was moving in a nuclear warfighting direction. Second, the announcement in 1980 of a new U.S. nuclear strategy featuring more flexible
targeting options (PD 59) tended to confirm that strategy as well as weapons development were moving toward a posture unacceptable to many Europeans.

In 1981, these doubts received additional impetus from the deliberate pace that characterized the new American Administration's approach to developing arms control policies. This approach suggested to many Europeans that the United States was not serious about reducing nuclear armaments, reinforcing the arguments made by the leaders of the anti-nuclear movement. President Reagan's remarks on Oct. 16 concerning the potential for limited nuclear war in Europe provided additional ammunition for Soviet propaganda, as did subsequent statements by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger. Soviet leader Brezhnev responded that, unlike President Reagan, he could not imagine a nuclear conflict being limited to Europe.

The Soviet Union has actively sought to encourage the growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in Western Europe. In his report to the 26th Party Congress on Feb. 23, 1981, the late Soviet President Brezhnev proposed a moratorium on deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear facilities of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union. In a second major initiative, the Soviet Union for the first time suggested that it might be willing to include some Soviet territory in a nuclear free zone in the Scandinavian region.

In addition, a number of Soviet commentaries have emphasized the potentially destabilizing aspects of the Pershing II missile. The Soviets argue that, while modernization of their theater forces constitutes no threat to the viability of U.S. central strategic capabilities, the extended-range Pershing II missile will be a "first-strike" weapon, capable of striking Soviet targets in less than five minutes flying time from West Germany. (While the Pershing II deployment could not take out a significant portion of Moscow's strategic forces, it could threaten Soviet command and control and, with changes in the payload configuration to extend the missile's range, put in jeopardy the Russian national command authority. Configured as planned, Moscow would not be within the range of Pershing II missiles fired from West Germany).

At the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting on May 4-5, 1981, U.S. Secretary of State Haig reported a decision by President Reagan which, according to some sources, was reached virtually on the eve of the meeting following bloody infighting within the Administration. This decision was incorporated in the NATO communiqué which announced that the United States would "begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the SALT framework by the end of the year." On Sept. 24, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that negotiations would begin on Nov. 30 in Geneva.

On Nov. 18, President Reagan announced in a major foreign policy address that the United States would in the Geneva negotiations seek total elimination of Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles in return for cancellation of NATO's deployment plans -- a so-called "zero-option." The President said that American negotiators would be willing to listen to and discuss Soviet proposals. He also said that his administration would seek to open Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the Soviet Union "as soon as possible" in 1982.
POLICY QUESTIONS AND VARIABLES

Implementation of the December 1979 decision remains the most sensitive security issue on the NATO agenda. The issue touches the core of the U.S. commitment to the alliance, exposes the differing American and European perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy, is a severe test of Western solidarity, and could have long-term ramifications for the future of European arms control and East-West relations. There are a number of countervailing pressures on the decision, the combination of which raises serious questions about how the decision will be implemented.

WHAT ROLE DOES THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE PLAY?

No attempt is made here to analyze the balance. The purpose is simply to refer to the differing perspectives on the nature of the balance and to suggest some of the factors that make defining the balance a highly subjective process.

First, theater nuclear weapons serve different purposes in NATO nuclear strategy than they do in Warsaw Pact strategy. Given different strategic assumptions about the purposes such weapons would serve and what missions they would be assigned, neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact have in the past attempted to develop systems that mirror those of the opposition.

In Soviet strategy, the systems probably are intended to ensure that no future war is fought on Soviet territory, to help deter Western use of nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact, and to ensure the best possible ratio of Eastern and Western forces in peacetime as well as to provide coverage of key West European targets in a war. Nuclear weapons are fully integrated into Soviet doctrine and force structures.

Only in recent years has NATO attempted to develop concepts and plans that integrate nuclear weapons into the potential battlefield. NATO planning has remained a compromise between deterrence and warfighting requirements. Western sources frequently explain the new NATO LRTNF as a response to the SS-20 deployments (now estimated at 340 missiles with some 1,020 warheads). This is misleading. The new U.S. systems are intended in no way as direct military counters to the SS-20. Rather, they are designed to serve NATO strategy by strengthening the linkage to the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee while providing Western authorities with a more flexible range of options with which to deal with any Warsaw Pact attack. The new systems are a response to the SS-20 primarily in a symbolic political sense.

Second, it is impossible to talk about the theater balance in isolation from the overall strategic balance. To the Soviet Union, the new NATO systems would constitute a strategic threat in that they could strike targets on Soviet territory. From the Western perspective, all the targets that could be struck by the new Western theater systems could be (or are) targetted by U.S. central strategic systems as well. And, a small portion of the U.S. submarine ballistic missile force is dedicated to NATO theater missions in time of war.

Furthermore, President Reagan's strategic weapons program includes the stationing of large numbers of nuclear-armed cruise missiles at sea. Depending on where the carriers of such missiles are patrolling, these
missiles could become an important element of the European theater balance. This element in particular illustrates the intimate relationship between theater and strategic systems.

The analyses on which NATO has based its deployment plans and arms control approaches have concluded that the numerical advantage in the theater now enjoyed by the Soviet Union is a severe threat to NATO's ability to deter a conflict in Europe or to control nuclear escalation should a conflict begin. This judgment derives in part from the conclusion that NATO's conventional forces might be insufficient to blunt a determined Warsaw Pact assault and that NATO might be forced early in a conflict to choose between sacrifice of large portions of the Federal Republic or the initiation of a theater nuclear exchange. In the opinion of NATO experts, without the new Western systems the Alliance is in no position to initiate the use of theater nuclear systems without receiving a more damaging counter blow from Soviet theater systems.

Most Western analyses accept the premise that the theater nuclear balance is shifting in favor of the Warsaw Pact. Western analysts find this shift disturbing, particularly given the Warsaw Pact's traditional advantages over NATO in conventional forces and the disappearance of the U.S. edge over the Soviet Union in strategic systems. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in its most recent analysis of the balance concluded that:

even with the inclusion of Poseiden/Trident allocated by the U.S. to NATO on the Western side and the continued exclusion of Soviet strategic systems, the balance is distinctly unfavorable to NATO and is becoming more so.

(The IISS as well as most other analyses include the British and French nuclear capabilities in their balance calculations.)

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, contends that a theater nuclear balance already exists and that Soviet deployment of new systems has not upset that balance. President Brezhnev, in his October 1979 speech said that:

The number of medium-range nuclear delivery weapons on the territory of the European portion of the Soviet Union has not been increased by even one missile, or one airplane, over the past 10 years. On the contrary, the number of launchers of medium-range missiles and also the yield of the nuclear charges of these missiles, have even been somewhat reduced.

Moscow also argues that both France and Great Britain will be adding significantly to their nuclear striking capability in the next 10 years and that these systems must be counted in Western theater forces.

In conclusion, rather than asking whether an hypothetical "theater nuclear balance" can be achieved, it may be more important to ask whether or not various possible outcomes of the NATO deployment/arms control decision will contribute to a more stable military situation in the European theater -- which, of course is affected by the balance of conventional forces as well. In any case, because of the intimate relationship between theater and
strategic nuclear systems and doctrines -- for the United States and the
Soviet Union -- both questions can only be answered in the context of a
stable relationship between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. U.S. and
Soviet strategic force planning and the fate of strategic arms negotiations,
therefore, will be essential components in the evolution of the theater
nuclear equation.

WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION?

The December 1979 decision was taken by all the allies participating in
NATO's integrated command structure, but only six countries are directly
involved in the deployment: the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, the U.K., and
West Germany, which were designated to accept stationing of the systems on
their territory; and the U.S., which is developing and will control the
systems. A number of factors, some unique to individual countries, and
others shared in common, could raise serious problems for the current
deployment plans.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands is the weakest link in the plan for deployment of new
nuclear systems, even with the advent late in 1982 of a center-right
government which favors making preliminary preparations for eventual
deployment in Holland. The Dutch make consistently high quality
contributions to NATO military programs and public opinion in the Netherlands
strongly supports continued membership in NATO. But there is equally strong
traditional opposition to nuclear weapons in Holland. This sentiment was
taken into account in the original Dutch agreement to the plan in the sense
that Dutch participation was made contingent on the ratification of the SALT
II agreement and the outcome of negotiations on theater nuclear systems.

The Dutch government has applauded the zero-option initiative, but it has
postponed a final deployment decision pending results of U.S.-Soviet
negotiations. Barring unforeseen upheavals in European threat perceptions,
the only way that cruise missiles could be deployed in the Netherlands would
likely be in the context of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the
United States which limited such systems and offered the prospect for future
reduction or elimination of theater nuclear weapons.

Belgium

The Belgian government has also postponed a final decision on accepting
cruise missiles and is committed to review the question every six months.
Belgium nonetheless apparently has taken some initial steps toward
implementation of the plan. Coalition government, led by Wilfried Martens, a
Flemish Social Belgium's coalition government has confirmed its adherence to
 NATO's December 1979 decision. The government will reassess the situation
every six months based on developments in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations.
Given that deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium is unpopular with the
public and is objected to by the socialists, the main opposition to the
government in parliament, the government will likely postpone a final
decision as long as possible.

Italy
Italy still seems likely to accept stationing of new cruise missiles on its territory, and work toward implementation of the deployment decision is underway. The program of the coalition government formed in the fall of 1982 by Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, a Christian Democrat, includes adherence to the December 1979 decision. The anti-nuclear movement has not yet posed a serious threat to Italy's continued willingness to accept cruise missiles, even though some public opinion surveys show that Italian opposing deployment of cruise missiles in Sicily outnumber those in favor by a narrow margin. The Italian Communist Party opposes the deployment. The PCI's opposition has been muted by its continuing desire to be regarded as a trustworthy partner in some future Italian government, but the growth of the anti-nuclear movement in northern Europe among non-communist parties appears now to have emboldened the PCI. The Socialist Party is participating in the government and supports the NATO decision.

United Kingdom

In spite of strong anti-nuclear opposition, work has begun toward preparation of cruise missile deployment sites. The participation of the U.K. in NATO's deployment plans coincides with the decision by the Thatcher government to modernize Britain's nuclear deterrent with the Trident missile system. These two decisions against the backdrop of a guns-versus-butter debate in the economically hard-pressed U.K. have revitalized the anti-nuclear movement. The movement finds political support primarily within the Labour Party which in recent years has moved distinctly to the left. The commitment of a government formed by Labour to the deployment would be uncertain, at best. The term of the current parliament runs until May 1984, but Mrs. Thatcher, riding the crest of a wave of renewed electoral strength following victory in the Falklands, is widely expected to call elections early, perhaps in the fall of 1983. In sum, it would appear that deployment plans will be able to proceed in the U.K. The government, however, cannot afford to be insensitive to public pressure and would no doubt be pleased if U.S.-Soviet negotiations led to limitations on the deployment of cruise missiles in the U.K.

Federal Republic of Germany

The German government has begun preparations for stationing cruise and Pershing II missiles on German territory. As in so many NATO issues, Germany is the pivotal participant in the long-range theater nuclear force deployment. While other states are scheduled to receive only cruise missiles, Germany is supposed to host both cruise missiles and the full deployment of the Pershing II missiles. A number of elements in the NATO decision were designed to take German requirements into account. West German leaders did not want the Soviet Union to be able to single Germany out as the target for a campaign against the new systems. Bonn therefore required that the NATO decision be unanimous and that at least one other continental European non-nuclear weapons country accept stationing of systems. Bonn also said that it did not want to participate in a two-key system of control for the weapons.

Germany already is host to the highest concentration of nuclear and conventional weapons of any NATO country other than the United States. It also provides the territory that would be the major battleground for any future war in Europe. It is no surprise, therefore, that the NATO decision
remains an emotional and divisive issue in Germany.

All three major West German political parties continue to support the NATO dual-track decision, although clear differences have surfaced concerning how that decision should be implemented. These differences have become an important element in the campaign for the parliamentary elections scheduled for Mar. 6, 1983. If the radical "Green" party should replace the Liberals (FDP) as the pivotal third party in the Bundestag, the political context for the INF could change fundamentally.

The ruling Christian Democrats, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, strongly support the decision, with some emphasis on the requirement for proceeding with the deployment in view of the rapid Soviet deployment of SS-20s. The Free Democratic Party, junior partner in the governing coalition, is led by Foreign Minister Genscher, who has been a strong supporter of the decision but who now is encouraging attempts at compromise in the Geneva negotiations. A significant minority in Genscher's party sympathizes with the anti-nuclear movement and the party strongly favors an arms control solution to the Soviet theater nuclear threat.

The opposition Social Democratic Party has been badly divided over the deployment issue. Former Chancellor Schmidt, who can personally claim at least partial credit for the evolution of NATO's decision, remains firm in his support for the dual track approach. To his left within the party, however, there is increasing resistance to the deployment of new nuclear weapons on German territory. In opposition, the party's position has become more critical of deployment plans. The party's candidate for the Chancellorship, Hans Jochen Vogel, returned from a trip to Moscow encouraged that Soviet flexibility should make some arms control agreement possible.

Given the special security relationship between Germany and the United States, the West German government would find it difficult to renege on its commitment to accept new systems. But a political imperative for any German government, even one led by the Christian Democrats, would be an alliance policy which places a high priority on arms control.

Furthermore, given the mounting concern in Germany about uncertain prospects for arms control and increasing risks of nuclear war, it seems unlikely that any German government could afford politically to accept more systems than those already programmed for deployment in Germany. Therefore, should the Netherlands (and possibly Belgium) not accept cruise missile deployment, it currently seems unlikely that those systems could be shifted to German sites.

United States

Prior to 1982, there had been relatively little political opposition in the United States to the deployment of new theater nuclear systems in Europe. The potential for a more general peace movement was demonstrated in November 1981 when anti-nuclear meetings were held at universities across the country. And, in March 1982, proposals for a nuclear "freeze" gained support among a substantial minority in the Congress and at the grass roots level in town meetings in a number of States. Whether such a movement develops significant support will likely depend on the credibility of the Administration's arms control efforts.

There are technical problems, however, that could affect the timing of the
new deployment. The Pershing II missile has yet to enjoy a successful test flight, and the 97th Congress denied funds for procurement of the missile in FY83. The cruise missile has also experienced technical problems in its development. (For a discussion of the cruise missile program see IB81080.)

In Sum

It remains an open question whether the Netherlands will accept stationing of new cruise missiles on its territory any time in the foreseeable future. There is also some question about stationing in Belgium. Deployments in these two countries, however, are not scheduled until later in the deployment program. Anti-nuclear sentiment in the U.K. and West Germany does not presently threaten their participation in the deployment, but a decision by either government to accept additional systems is probably out of the question. In West Germany, elections in March 1983 could have a crucial effect on German policy toward deployments. Possible shifts in the policy of the Social Democrats and the growing strength of the anti-nuclear "Green" movement are important variables, but for the time being Bonn's commitment to NATO deployment plans remains firm. It is uncertain whether Italy would be willing and/or able to accept additional cruise missile deployments. It is clear that all the governments involved would welcome the negotiation of limits on or elimination of Soviet and American long-range theater nuclear forces, and they need a credible U.S. negotiating performance to help keep anti-nuclear sentiment within politically manageable limits.

THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK

It is a fact of life in Western democracies that important decisions relating to national security must ultimately stand the test of popular acceptance, if not approval. This is without question true in the case of NATO's dual track decision. In the ensuing months, a number of factors could affect the NATO decision -- some could reinforce the political viability of the decision; others could undermine its validity.

U.S. and Soviet Positions

Perhaps the most important variable currently affecting the deployment decision is U.S. and Soviet policy toward arms control negotiations. This question has two aspects: first, the intrinsic political importance of negotiations for European public opinion; and second, the prospects for the negotiations themselves.

From the perspective of West European public opinion, the Soviet Union has since mid-1980 asserted its willingness to engage in substantive negotiations and has made a number of proposals which, while substantively of limited interest to the West, have nonetheless increased the credibility of Moscow's position. The Reagan Administration, however, came into office promising to review the entire range of U.S. arms control policy and to give arms control a lower priority relative to defense programs. This approach, combined with the Administration's deliberate pace in shaping arms control policy, produced considerable skepticism in Western Europe concerning the intentions of the Administration.

In 1981, President Reagan chose a negotiating approach that was responsive to some of the concerns of the anti-nuclear protestors. But those in the
movement who are firm in their conviction that there should be no new Western deployments and who remain skeptical about U.S. intentions undoubtedly will continue to agitate against the new systems. Their ranks could once again swell if the Administration does not appear forthcoming in its response to Soviet arms control overtures.

What now are the prospects for control of theater nuclear arms? It was always anticipated that negotiations on theater nuclear systems would be even more complicated and difficult than on central strategic systems. The Reagan Administration has taken a "simple" approach in selecting the zero-option proposal. And, the negotiations began with both sides emphasizing their intention to negotiate seriously and their desire to reach agreement. But it was always hard to believe that the Soviet Union would agree to dismantle all of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles in return for cancellation of the NATO deployment decision.

In January 1982, both sides formally presented proposals for an eventual agreement. The United States put on the table a draft treaty incorporating the zero-option proposal. The Soviet Union proposed a phased reduction of "all medium-range nuclear weapons, i.e., with a range (the combat radius) of action of 1,000 KM and more deployed in the territory of Europe and in the adjacent waters or intended for use in Europe."

While the details of the negotiations are secret, both sides have made available basic information concerning their proposals. The following lines summarize the initial negotiating positions of the two sides, as far as they are publicly known, on critical issues.

1. **Starting assumptions on balance**
   - U.S.: Soviet Union has 5-1 advantage.
   - Soviet: Approximate balance exists.

2. **Coverage by systems**
   - U.S.: First-stage agreement limited to U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles; inclusion of aircraft viewed as too complicated; noncircumvention clause regarding shorter range Soviet missiles.
   - Soviet: Include medium-range missiles and "forward-based nuclear capable aircraft."

3. **Coverage by territory**
   - U.S.: Global limits.
   - Soviet: Only systems in Europe (west of Ural mountains).

4. **Coverage by nationality**
   - U.S.: Limited to U.S. and Soviet systems.
   - Soviet: British and French systems included on Western totals.

5. **Scope (and timing) of reductions**
   - U.S.: Destruction of all Soviet SS-20, SS-4, SS-5 missile systems; U.S. forgoes deployment of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II ballistic missiles.
   - Soviet: Starting from current position of balance, both sides reduce to total of 600 medium-range systems by 1985, 300 by 1990; Soviets willing to eliminate all nuclear weapons from Europe if West
would agree; Soviets willing to make unilateral reductions while negotiations in progress if NATO will defer new deployments.

(6) Verification --
Soviet: Provisions assuring "adequate control" over compliance with commitments.

On Mar. 16, 1982, Soviet President Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union would unilaterally freeze deployments of new medium-range armaments in the European part of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev also said that during 1982, "unless there is a new aggravation of the international situation," the Soviet Union would "reduce a certain number of its medium-range missiles on its own initiative." The Soviet moratorium would be in force "either until an agreement is reached" in the Geneva negotiations or until the United States begins "practical preparations to deploy Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles in Europe."

This marked the first time that a Soviet freeze proposal had not asked for a reciprocal action by the West, such as postponing its deployment decision. It was also the first time that Moscow has threatened to put U.S. territory in jeopardy if new U.S. missiles are deployed. Brezhnev said that Western deployments "would compel us to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position." This could be accomplished by stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba, for example, or by extending the patrols of Soviet nuclear submarines closer to U.S. territorial waters.

At the same time, Brezhnev argued for the resumption of strategic nuclear arms talks and said that the Soviet Union was ready to expand "confidence building" measures to naval operations, for example, by limiting the patrol patterns of nuclear missile submarines. While neither side has formally changed its negotiating position in Geneva, there have been attempts to reach agreement and signs of flexibility.

In mid-1983, U.S. and Soviet chief INF negotiators -- Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky -- reportedly discussed a compromise proposal which would have permitted a reduced deployment of new U.S. missiles while requiring the Soviet Union to reduce its intermediate missile force. The approach reportedly was rejected in Moscow as well as in Washington.

In December 1982, Yuri Andropov, the new Soviet leader, proposed that SS-20 deployments in the European portion of the Soviet Union be reduced to around 162, approximating the number of British and French missiles. This proposal was rejected by the United States, France, and Great Britain for a number of reasons. One criticism was that the Soviet Union had not offered to reduce the number of SS-20s, only to redeploy them to Asian locations from where they could be returned to Europe in a crisis. In response to this criticism, Soviet officials reportedly told a visiting American congressional delegation in January 1983 that the Soviet Union would consider destroying some SS-20 missiles in an arms control agreement.

Prospects

In the final analysis, the major problems confronting the negotiations
relate to the asymmetries between the two sides. The United States and the Soviet Union have or are developing different weapons systems with unique capabilities designed to serve strategies based on dissimilar assessments of security requirements. Illustratively, the United States needs to ensure extended war deterrence for allies from which it is geographically separated. The Soviet Union faces no such problem. On the other hand, the Soviet Union faces numerous potential enemies, the NATO allies, China, and Japan as well as some European neutrals, and at least three nuclear powers -- France, the U.K., and China -- in addition to the United States. The United States, meanwhile, faces only the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies and no nuclear power other than the Soviet Union.

Finally, perhaps the greatest uncertainty is created by the current status of strategic arms control. Negotiations on theater nuclear systems cannot likely conclude without the framework of a new U.S.-Soviet strategic arms agreement. This is true simply because there is a military and strategic continuum between long-range theater and strategic nuclear forces. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could know what theater nuclear force levels would be acceptable until they knew with some greater certainty what the balance would look like at the strategic level. Until strategic negotiations proceed toward a new agreement, there will likely be no final outcome in theater arms control negotiations.

WHAT IS THE OUTLOOK FOR THE NATO DECISION?

The NATO dual-track decision was the product of a number of compromises which attempted to rationalize competing military, political, and economic requirements and constraints. Followed through to its conclusion, successful implementation of the decision would reduce the Soviet theater nuclear threat to NATO and yet permit deployment of sufficient new Western systems to strengthen extended deterrence.

The choice by President Reagan of the "zero-option" as the U.S. goal in negotiations illustrates the complexity of the problem. This objective, while politically attractive, is not fully consistent with the original rationale of the NATO decision which sought to reestablish credible linkage between the European theater and American strategic systems.

Nuclear weapons issues have severely strained NATO unity in recent years. The advent of negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic as well as intermediate nuclear weapons has reduced the pressure on allied governments, at least temporarily. The anti-nuclear movement will not go away, but its growth may be slowed as long as negotiations seem to offer some possibility of reducing nuclear systems.

Perhaps the most important variable in the European nuclear equation is the political viability of American positions and performance. The Western allies will follow the United States, even down the road to deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, if U.S. positions accommodate European concerns. Overstatements of the threat, and failure to take into account European perceptions of constraints on the Soviet will or ability to attack Western Europe (for example, the questionable reliability of their Polish ally) will tend to undermine U.S. credibility in European eyes.

Given that President Reagan's zero option proposal is widely recognized as unacceptable to the Russians, an inflexible American defense of that approach would eventually undermine support of the U.S. negotiating position. By the
spring of 1983, there may be significant pressure in Western Europe for modification of the U.S. arms control offer. The Reagan Administration perhaps could ensure continued allied support of the 1979 decision by offering to present some compromise approaches in Geneva in return for renewed allied commitments to proceed with deployment plans. Without some such sign of flexibility, it may become increasingly difficult to present a united NATO front as the time for initial deployments draws near.

In any case, the debate on nuclear weapons has raised a number of questions which the theater nuclear and START negotiations will not address and which allied governments will not be able to sweep back under the carpet. These issues relate in particular to NATO's strategy of flexible response, the role of shorter range and battlefield nuclear weapons, and NATO's conventional capabilities. It therefore seems likely that pressure will mount within the alliance for a full examination of NATO nuclear posture and strategy. Combined with the U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations, this process of negotiation within the alliance will be of crucial importance to the future of U.S.-European relations.

THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS

The Congress has played a limited role to date with regard to the NATO decision, although President Reagan's zero-option speech was widely applauded by Democrats as well as Republicans. In 1982, increased congressional interest in the subject was suggested by debate on nuclear freeze proposals and House and Senate hearings on the European nuclear weapons issues. And, the changes early in 1983 in the Administration's arms control management team have provoked increased congressional interest in the potential implications of these changes for U.S. arms control policy.

Furthermore, the Congress denied funding in FY83 defense appropriations for procurement of Pershing II missiles. The action was in response to dissatisfaction with the P-II's testing performance and the Senate and House conferees agreed that funding might be restored "following successful completion of full flight testing."

LEGISLATION

P.L. 97-377, H.J.Res. 631

HEARINGS

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. The 
modernization of NATO's long-range theater nuclear 
forces. Prepared by the Congressional Research 
At head of title: 96th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Interim report on nuclear weapons in Europe. Prepared by 
the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. NATO 
At head of title: 97th Congress, 2d session. Committee print.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Subcommittee on European Affairs. SALT and the 
print)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

01/23/83 -- Frans Josef Strauss, leader of the Bavarian-based 
Christian Social Union in West Germany said in a 
radio interview that he no longer supported the 
zero-option negotiating approach.

01/21/83 -- The Pershing II reportedly completed its first 
successful test flight.

01/20/83 -- A faulty computer that monitors safety conditions 
at Cape Canaveral and bad weather forced a 
postponement of the third test firing of the P-I1 
missile.

-- Reagan Administration source were reported to have 
said that Soviet negotiators had told their American 
counterparts at the START negotiations in Geneva in 
Nov. 82 that strategic arms negotiations would be 
halted if a single new intermediate range missile 
were deployed in Europe.

01/18/83 -- Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, visiting Bonn, 
West Germany, accused the United States of trying
"to kill an agreement" in Geneva rather than trying to achieve one. Gromyko confirmed the Soviet Union's willingness to destroy some SS-20 missiles in an arms control agreement while redeploying others "behind a line in Siberia where they could no longer hit targets in West Europe."

01/16/83 -- Eugene Rostow, former head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, acknowledged that U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Geneva had last year developed an informal compromise approach to limiting U.S. and Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. The approach, developed between U.S. representative to the INF negotiations, Paul Nitze, and Soviet representative Yuli Kvitsinsky, reportedly would have permitted a reduced deployment of new U.S. missiles while requiring the Soviet Union to reduce its intermediate range missiles. The approach was rejected by both Moscow and Washington.

01/13/83 -- Secretary of State George Shultz met with the press one day following the ouster of Eugene Rostow as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to dispute claims that the Administration's arms control policies were in disarray and to reaffirm "the president's firm dedication to pursue arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

-- Hans Jochen Vogel, head of West Germany's opposition Social Democratic Party, returning from talks in Moscow with Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, said that the Soviet Union was prepared to negotiate on the number of warheads, not just the number of missiles, in the INF negotiations.

01/11/83 -- Soviet arms control negotiators reportedly told a visiting U.S. congressional delegation that the Soviet Union would consider destroying, rather than simply re-deploying to Asia, SS-20 missiles in the context of an arms control agreement with the United States.

01/09/83 -- President Reagan announced that he would send Vice President Bush on a 12-day trip to Europe starting on January 30 to consult with the allies and address the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

01/02/83 -- French President Mitterrand said that France would not reduce the number of its nuclear missiles and called the U.S.-Soviet Geneva negotiations "none of our affair."

12/23/82 -- The U.S. Army announced that a flight test of the Pershing II missile scheduled for December had been postponed until January 1983.

12/21/82 -- Soviet leader Andropov, in a major Kremlin speech, made public a proposal under which the Soviet Union would reduce the number of medium-range missiles
in Europe to about 152, equal to the number of missiles deployed by France and Great Britain. The United States, France, and Great Britain all rejected the proposal as unacceptable.

12/19/82 -- House and Senate Conferees agreed to provide no funds for procurement of Pershing II missiles. The conference report, however, said that "The conferees nevertheless remain firmly committed to modernization of the theater nuclear forces" and agreed that "Pershing II procurement funds may be requested by reprogramming or budget supplement following successful completion of full flight testing."

12/07/82 -- The Danish parliament froze Denmark's contribution to NATO infrastructure expenses associated with the planned deployment of new intermediate-range missiles.

11/23/82 -- The Army revealed that the Pershing II missile test of Nov. 19 had not been a complete success as initially claimed. According to the Army, the warhead failed to maneuver properly and "did not achieve the desired accuracy."

11/22/82 -- The new Dutch center-right coalition announced that it would proceed with "preparation for the deployment" of U.S. medium range missiles. Prime Minister Lubbers told the Dutch parliament that arms control talks would be a "very important factor" influencing whether the missiles would ultimately be deployed in the Netherlands.

11/16/82 -- The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee voted to deny funding for procurement of the Pershing II missile.

11/12/82 -- Yuri Andropov succeeded Leonid Brezhnev two days following Brezhnev's death.

10/01/82 -- The West German parliament voted to unseat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's government and elected Christian Democratic leader Helmut Kohl to succeed him. Kohl formed a coalition with the Free Democratic Party (Schmidt's former coalition partner) and with Bavaria's Christian Social Union, led by Franz Joseph Strauss. The new government pledged continued West German support for NATO's two-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

09/30/82 -- U.S. and Soviet negotiators resumed talks in Geneva on medium-range missiles in Europe.

09/29/82 -- Britain's opposition Labour Party voted overwhelmingly to abolish the U.K.'s nuclear weapons if the party wins the next election (anticipated in the autumn of 1983) and to reject the deployment of any American nuclear cruise missiles in England.
09/10/82 -- In a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, ACDA Director Eugene V. Rostow gave a detailed analysis of U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions in Geneva, concluding that "It is clear that a potentiality exists for accommodating the analytic concepts used by both sides. What is not yet clear is whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept agreement based exclusively on the principle of deterrence."

09/08/82 -- NATO accused the Soviet Union of having completed three new SS-20 bases since mid-March, bringing the total of SS-20 missiles deployed to 324 with 972 warheads, according to U.S. estimates.

07/22/82 -- Seventeen seconds into the first full test flight of the Pershing II missile, its first stage malfunctioned and the missile destroyed itself.

07/01/82 -- The Soviet Union denied that it had deployed new SS-20 missiles west of the Ural Mountains since announcing a freeze on such deployments last March. (The denial came in response to charges made on June 30 by Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State-designate for European Affairs, that the Soviet Union had recently completed additional SS-20 bases in spite of the freeze.)

06/29/82 -- U.S. and Soviet negotiators began talks in Geneva on reducing strategic nuclear weapons.

-- A peace caravan arrived in Rome from Sicily with petitions signed by 1 million Italians protesting plans to station U.S. cruise missiles in Comiso, Sicily.

06/14/82 -- The Pentagon formally notified Congress that it plans to sell Trident submarine-launched missiles to the U.K. in a $3.9 billion purchase intended to modernize Britain's strategic nuclear forces.

06/10/82 -- More than 300,000 persons rallied in opposition to U.S. defense policies in Bonn across the Rhine from the site of the NATO summit meeting. (The summit session reaffirmed allied commitments to the December 1979 modernization and arms control program for intermediate nuclear forces.)

05/20/82 -- The U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediate nuclear weapons resumed in Geneva following a two-month recess.

05/19/82 -- The U.S. Air Force announced that it had successfully launched a Tomahawk cruise, the fourth of 11 planned tests before scheduled deployment beginning in 1983. The missile flew for 906 miles after being launched at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah.
05/18/82 -- Soviet President Brezhnev, in a Moscow speech, accepted President Reagan's call for strategic arms control talks but expressed skepticism about the "ideas" included in the U.S. reduction proposal. Brezhnev also announced that the Soviet Union had begun to reduce its intermediate-range missiles in the Western USSR and confirmed his offer to halt construction of missile launch positions. He again rejected the West's call for limitations on Soviet intermediate range missiles "beyond the Urals" but said that such missiles would not threaten Western Europe and that no additional missiles would be deployed that are capable of reaching Western Europe.

05/09/82 -- President Reagan, in a speech at Eureka College, proposed reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear intercontinental missiles by approximately one-third.

04/22/82 -- The national congress of West German Chancellor Schmidt's Social Democratic Party defeated a proposal to halt preparations for deployment of new American intermediate range weapons while arms control negotiations are underway in Geneva. The motion on security eventually adopted called for a review of the question at a special convention in 1983.

04/15/82 -- Press reports from Rome indicated that preparations had begun at Comiso in Sicily on the projected base for U.S.-built cruise missiles. On April 4, anti-nuclear demonstrators mounted a large protest march to the Magliocco military airport near Comiso where the base is to be constructed.

04/09/82 -- Spokesman for both the German Social Democratic party and the opposition Christian Democrats expressed reservations about the proposal by four former American officials (McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, George Kennan, and Gerard Smith) that NATO should renounce first use of nuclear weapons in defending Europe against conventional attack.

04/07/82 -- Press reports indicated that the U.S. Army wants to build substantially more Pershing II missiles than it needs to fulfill the NATO requirement of 108. The Army reportedly would like to sell a "reduced range" version to West Germany to replace existing nuclear-armed Pershing I missiles deployed with the West German Air Force.

03/29/82 -- A West German official confirmed in an interview that preparations are underway for the siting of new American intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Germany.

03/16/82 -- The Geneva negotiations recessed, as scheduled, for two months to permit both sides to evaluate the status of the talks.
-- In a major address to a trade union congress in Moscow, Soviet President Brezhnev announced a moratorium on Soviet deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union and promised reductions in those systems in the course of 1982. According to Brezhnev, the moratorium will last until the Geneva negotiations produce results or the United States begins "practical preparations for deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Europe." Brezhnev also suggested that should NATO deploy the new systems, the Soviet Union would be compelled to "take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position."

03/11/82 -- The Reagan Administration attacked proposals for a freeze on nuclear weapons, arguing that adoption of the proposal would leave the Soviet Union in a position of superiority, particularly in Europe. One of the leaders of the freeze movement in the Congress, Senator Kennedy responded the next day that the freeze could not be disadvantageous to the United States because it leads the Soviet Union by 9,000 to 7,000 nuclear warheads.

02/23/82 -- In testimony before a joint hearing of the House Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East, Eugene Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said that he had no progress to report on the Geneva negotiations.

02/09/82 -- The Soviet Union, in an authoritative statement provided by Tass, outlined its formal proposals for the Geneva talks, calling for staged reductions of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe to "300 units on each side" by 1981. The statement spelled out in greater detail the offer made public a week earlier by President Brezhnev.

02/04/82 -- President Reagan announced that the United States had presented the Soviet Union with a draft treaty in Geneva based on the President's "zero-option" proposal.

01/28/82 -- U.S.-Soviet negotiations on medium-range nuclear arms resumed in Geneva following a review of the talks earlier in the week between Secretary of State Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

01/25/82 -- The executive board of West-Germany's ruling Social Democratic Party approved a motion to be presented to the party conference in April that rejects any "automatic link" between deployment and lack of progress in arms control negotiations. The motion says that a special party conference should convene in the autumn of 1983 to decide "what conclusions in the question of the stationing" of the new nuclear missiles "it will draw from the state of the talks
12/28/81 -- In a column published in the New York Times, Flora Lewis reported that the Geneva negotiations had "gotten off to a good start" with Soviet negotiators putting their own estimates of each side's arsenal on the table -- an uncommon practice for the Soviet Union. Lewis also reported that "The Russians are talking about meeting U.S. demands for better verification by the mutual exchange of tamper-proof 'black boxes', instruments to be installed by each side on the other side's launchers and then checked against cheating."

12/25/81 -- In a televised interview, President Reagan claimed that anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe were "bought and paid for by the Soviet Union."

12/18/81 -- The new Belgium government led by Flemish Social Christian Wilfried Martens announced its continued support for NATO's 1979 deployment decision but said that Belgian acceptance of cruise missiles would still be examined every six months on the basis of developments in arms control negotiations.

12/17/81 -- Soviet and American negotiators recessed their talks on intermediate nuclear weapons systems in Europe and scheduled resumption for January 1982.

12/12/81 -- In talks with West German Chancellor Schmidt, East German leader Erich Honecker said that the future of inter-German relations was linked to West Germany's position on deployment of new American nuclear weapons. Honecker asserted that "good neighborliness cannot flourish in the shadow of U.S. atomic missiles."

12/06/81 -- Anti-nuclear demonstrations were held in a number of West European cities.

12/05/81 -- An estimated 300,000 protestors rallied in Bucharest, Romania, to demonstrate for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe.

12/01/81 -- Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the United States had no "fallback" position if the Soviets reject the zero-option proposal. Perle also said that any agreement must also limit other Soviet theater systems to prevent circumvention of the agreement. On verification, Perle said that "any treaty agreed upon must include verification measures that will almost certainly go beyond the national technical means of
verification on which the less complex agreements of the past have relied."

11/30/81 -- The United States and the Soviet Union began talks in Geneva on reducing nuclear weapons in Europe. Paul Nitze, leader of the U.S. delegation, characterized the meeting as "cordial and businesslike" and his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, said that the meeting had been "very constructive."

11/26/81 -- Soviet President Brezhnev left Bonn, concluding talks with West German officials that began on Nov. 22. Brezhnev reiterated Moscow's proposal for a moratorium in new deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and said that the Soviet Union was willing to make "radical" cuts in its forces but viewed the Reagan "zero-option" proposal as inequitable to the Soviet Union. At the conclusion of the talks, it was announced that West Germany and the Soviet Union would consult regularly about nuclear weapons in Europe during the course of U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

11/21/81 -- An anti-nuclear demonstration in Amsterdam reportedly attracted over 300,000 demonstrators.

11/18/81 -- President Reagan, in a major foreign policy speech at the National Press Club, announced that the United States would seek total elimination of Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles in return for cancellation of NATO's deployment plans -- a so-called "zero-option." The President said that American negotiators would be willing to listen to and discuss Soviet proposals in the negotiations scheduled to begin in Geneva on Nov. 30. He also said that his administration would seek to open Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the Soviet Union "as soon as possible" in 1982.

11/11/81 -- Anti-nuclear teach-ins were held at more than 100 universities around the United States.

11/05/81 -- The government of Sweden said that it believed there were nuclear torpedo warheads aboard the Soviet Whiskey-class submarine that went aground in Swedish territorial waters on Oct. 27, presumably in the course of a spy mission near a Swedish military facility.

-- Secretary of Defense Weinberger, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that the idea of a nuclear warning shot was only a "suggestion" of military planners in the 1960s and that "there is no precise NATO military plan" for a nuclear demonstration shot. Later in the day, the White House, State Department, and Defense Department issued statements saying that "NATO a number of years ago identified the so-called demonstration use as a possible option." The statement said that while "Secretary Haig was correct in noting that a demonstrative use is an option that has been considered by NATO, Secretary Weinberger is correct in saying that it has never been transferred
11/04/81 -- Secretary of State Haig, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, NATO might fire off a nuclear "demonstration" shot to warn Moscow of the risks of continuing the conflict.

10/31/81 -- Soviet leader Brezhnev was quoted in the West German magazine Der Spiegel as saying that "even though there are some who hope that a nuclear war could be contained on European territory... a limited nuclear war is not possible." According to Brezhnev, any nuclear war, in Europe or elsewhere, "would inevitably and inescapably take on a worldwide character." Brezhnev also commented on the prospects for a "zero option" outcome in TNF negotiations, saying that while reductions in SS-20s could be contemplated, it was "absurd" to expect that the Soviet Union would scrap all of its SS-20 missiles in return for no new Western deployments.

10/25/81 -- Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, on the eve of a visit by West German President Karl Karstens to Romania, called in interviews with two West German Newspapers for the Soviet Union as well as the United States to remove nuclear weapons from Europe. Ceausescu, advocating an end to the nuclear arms race, said that "This applies just as much to stopping the stationing of rockets produced by the United States as to withdrawing the Soviet rockets."

10/25/81 -- Anti-nuclear demonstrations were held in Brussels, Paris, Oslo, and East Berlin. The Brussels demonstration reportedly attracted over 200,000.

10/24/81 -- Anti-nuclear demonstrations attracted an estimated 200,000 protestors in Rome and 150,000 in London.

10/21/81 -- Following a strong reaction in Europe against President Reagan's comments on the prospects for limited nuclear war in Europe, the White House issued a statement to clarify the President's thoughts on the subject. The statement said that "in a nuclear war, all mankind would lose." Further, "The essence of United State nuclear strategy is that no aggressor should believe that the use of nuclear weapons in Europe could reasonably be limited to Europe."

-- The Defense Ministers of the Members of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, reaffirmed plans for deployment of new NATO LRTNF. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in response to the urging of some European defense minister, went along with the group's endorsement of a "zero-option" as the ideal objective of negotiations with the Soviet Union on theater nuclear systems. In such an approach, the United States would forego deployment of new LRTNF in return for Soviet dismantling of its medium-range nuclear missile systems.

10/16/81 -- President Reagan, at a meeting with newspaper editors,
was asked whether he believed that a nuclear weapons exchange with the Soviet Union could be limited to Europe or would inevitably escalate. The President responded: I don't honestly know. I think again, until someplace -- all over the world this is being, research going on, to try and find the defensive weapon. There never has been a weapon that someone hasn't come up with a defense. But it could -and the only defense is, well, you shoot yours and we'll shoot ours. I could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button."

10/10/81 -- An anti-nuclear demonstration in Bonn, West Germany attracted an estimated 250,000 participants, including one member of the Presidium of Helmut Schmidt's Social Democratic Party.

10/05/81 -- NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Bernard Rogers, commenting on President Reagan's decision to place nuclear armed cruise missiles on attack submarines, said that the decision would be used by European anti-nuclear forces to argue in favor of modernizing NATO's theater nuclear capabilities by deploying new systems at sea, not on land.

10/02/81 -- The Italian Chamber of Deputies approved by a 244 to 225 vote the Italian government's plan to allow deployment of American cruise missiles in Sicily if U.S.-Soviet arms reduction negotiations should fail.

-- President Reagan announced a series of strategic weapons decisions including scrapping the multiple protective shelter system for the MX missile, constructing the B-1 bomber, and basing nuclear-armed cruise missiles on U.S. attack submarines.

09/24/81 -- In a terse U.S.-Soviet joint announcement, worked out the day before by Secretary of State Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the two countries pledged "to spare no effort" to reach an agreement on reducing medium-range theater nuclear forces in Europe. Negotiations were scheduled to begin on Nov. 30 in Geneva. The announcement noted that the U.S. negotiating team would be led by Paul Nitze and the Soviet side by Ambassador U.A. Kvitinsky.

09/23/81 -- In an address to a conference in Brussels, Richard Burt, the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department, said that the U.S. agreed to the NATO LRTNF decision "in the full knowledge that the Soviet Union would most likely respond to an attack on its homeland by U.S. systems in Europe with an attack on the United States. Thus the emplacement of long-range U.S. cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe makes escalation of any nuclear war in Europe to involve an intercontinental exchange more likely, not less."

09/16/81 -- According to a report published in the Washington
Post, the West German government asked the United States to consider postponing the first deployment of Pershing II missiles on German territory to coincide with the initial stationing of cruise missiles on Italian territory. (Both were scheduled to take place in December 1983, but some have suggested that technical factors might delay the Italian deployment until April 1984.) Secretary of State Haig, on Sept. 14 in Bonn, denied that the U.S. had agreed to any delay in the Pershing deployments and said that the missile deployment program was on schedule.

09/01/81 -- A research memorandum published by the U.S. International Communication Agency based on new West European public opinion data concluded that there is hard-core opposition to the stationing of new long-range theater missiles in Western Europe but that the data do not support the "conventional wisdom of many journalists" analyses that there is little popular support for LRTNF stationing in Western Europe.

09/21/81 -- West German Chancellor Schmidt reaffirmed his support for stationing of enhanced radiation warheads in Europe providing that his earlier-stated three conditions were met. The three conditions are that the Federal Republic not be the only NATO country which accepts stationing of such weapons, that the decision be taken by NATO as a whole, and that the deployment take place only if arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union fail to achieve results.

08/06/81 -- President Reagan authorized full production of enhanced radiation warheads for the Lance missile and 8-inch artillery shells. The President ordered that the weapons be stockpiled in the United States and said that any future deployment in Europe would be done only after full consultation with the allies.

07/23/81 -- A West German government spokesman announced that President Reagan had sent Chancellor Schmidt a letter pledging that negotiations on LRTNF with the Soviet Union would begin between mid-November and mid-December 1981.

07/13/81 -- Secretary of State Haig, in a major policy speech, outlined the principles of Reagan Administration arms control policy. Haig said that arms control "cannot be the political centerpiece or the crucial barometer of U.S.-Soviet relations" and that under the Reagan Administration arms control efforts "will be an instrument of, not a replacement for, a coherent Allied security policy." Haig reiterated the American commitment to begin TNF negotiations with the Soviet Union between
mid-November and mid-December 1981.

07/01/81 -- During the visit to Moscow of West German Social Democratic Party Chairman Willy Brandt, Soviet President Brezhnev reiterated his offer to declare a moratorium on deployment of new theater nuclear missile systems during negotiations with the United States if the West will agree also not to deploy new systems during the course of the negotiations.

06/30/81 -- In an interview with Frankfurter Rundschau, a West German newspaper, Chancellor Schmidt acknowledged that his government had originally favored basing new NATO theater nuclear systems at sea but had abandoned the position in view of financial and arms control considerations.

06/27/81 -- Soviet President Brezhnev, in response to questions posed by a Finnish newspaper, softened Moscow's traditional opposition to inclusion of Soviet territory in a nuclear free zone in Northern Europe. Brezhnev reportedly said that the USSR "does not preclude the possibility of considering the question of some other measures applying to our own territory in the region adjoining the nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe." The shift was interpreted by many Western observers as another element in a Soviet campaign to encourage splits between the United States and European countries on nuclear issues.

05/22/81 -- In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Eugene Rostow, designated by President Reagan to head the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, suggested that the Administration might not be prepared to resume strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union until March 1982.

05/21/81 -- Over 120,000 leaders and members of West Germany's major Protestant federation concluded a four-day meeting in Hamburg which featured demonstrations for a nuclear-free Europe and against NATO's TNF modernization plans.

05/17/81 -- At the eighth meeting of NATO's "Special Consultative Group" which is responsible for developing and coordinating the Western approach to TNF negotiations, the United States reported on the status of U.S.-Soviet preparatory contacts on the issue.

06/09/81 -- At a Kremlin dinner for the visiting Algerian president, President Brezhnev questioned the sincerity of the Reagan Administration's pledge to begin negotiations on theater nuclear
systems. Brezhnev said that Administration statements are "mere words" designed to "lull its allies and public opinion." He charged that the United States had yet to take "a single real step" toward negotiations and accused Washington of embarking on an "unprecedented" arms race.

06/05/81 -- The New York Times reported that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to begin talks in Washington in "the next few weeks" to prepare for negotiations later in the year on limiting medium-range theater nuclear forces.

-- The West German magazine Der Speigel published an interview with Vadim Zagladin, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which Zagladin said that once negotiations on medium-range missiles started, the Soviet Union would be prepared to refrain from deploying new weapons and to call a halt to all deployment programs. He also said that the Soviet Union favored making Europe a denuclearized zone.

05/13/81 -- The NATO defense ministers concluded a meeting of the Defense Planning Committee with a communique that noted NATO's intention to "move ahead with its planned schedule of long-range theater nuclear force (LRTNF) modernization whilst at the same time making efforts to reach balanced, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements limiting such forces..." The ministers also "welcomed the intention of the United States to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union by the end of the year on theater nuclear force arms control within the SALT framework..."

05/05/81 -- NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Rome, emphasized in their communique that "in light of increasing Soviet LRTNF deployments which in the case of the SS-20 already exceed the total LRTNF deployment planned by NATO, the modernizing of NATO's LRTNF is more essential than ever, and offers the only realistic basis for parallel TNF arms control..."

05/04/81 -- It was reported that President Reagan had sent a letter to Soviet President Brezhnev signaling his administration's willingness to begin talks this year on limiting theater nuclear systems in Europe.

04/19/81 -- An estimated 6,000 anti-nuclear demonstrators representing a number of West European countries
Defence Ministers of countries participating in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Bonn reaffirmed willingness to open negotiations with the Soviet Union on theater nuclear systems but warned that Soviet intervention in Poland "would gravely undermine the basis for effective arms control negotiation."

A report issued by the General Accounting Office concluded that Pershing II testing to date had produced "encouraging" results but that most of the critical hardware tests were still to be accomplished in a schedule which has been compressed to meet NATO deployment commitments. The report also noted that several technical problems with the Ground Launched Cruise Missile remain to be resolved and have delayed the start of operational tests and production of the system.

In his report to the 26th Soviet Party Congress, President Brezhnev proposed a moratorium on deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missile facilities of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union. According to Brezhnev, "This moratorium could come into force immediately as soon as negotiations on this question commence, and would be effective until a permanent treaty on limitation or, even better, on reduction of such nuclear facilities in Europe is concluded."

Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in a press conference, said that the Reagan Administration might go ahead with production of enhanced radiation warheads (the so-called neutron bomb.)

NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels took note of preliminary discussions held between U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Geneva during October and November on theater nuclear force reductions. They agreed that "A date for resumption of U.S.-Soviet exchanges next year will be set through mutual consultations." The ministers also noted that the withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe as an integral part of the LRTNF modernization and arms control decision had been completed.

The United States and the Soviet Union opened preliminary talks in Geneva on theater nuclear force limitations.
09/13/80 -- The Belgian government indefinitely postponed a final decision on whether or not to accept stationing of cruise missiles on Belgian territory pending the development of arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The government said that it would reexamine the question every six months.

08/27/80 -- It was reported that Soviet President Brezhnev had sent letters to President Carter and other NATO leaders complaining that the West had not responded to his offer to begin negotiations on theater nuclear systems.

08/10/80 -- It was reported that Secretary of Defense Brown had sent a message to the NATO allies assuring them that the new U.S. nuclear strategy outlined in Presidential Directive 59 did not represent a major break in the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy and was intended to enhance deterrence. (Reports of a more flexible U.S. targeting doctrine had led some Europeans to believe that the United States was moving toward a greater willingness to contemplate fighting limited nuclear war in Europe.)

07/01/80 -- During talks in Moscow, Soviet President Brezhnev told Chancellor Schmidt that the Soviet Union would not persist with its insistence that NATO renounce its LRTNF deployment plans before U.S.-Soviet negotiations could begin to seek East-West limitations on such systems.

01/24/80 -- NATO established a Special Consultative Group on Arms Control involving Theater Nuclear Forces (to succeed the special study group formed in 1979.)

01/05/80 -- It was reported that the Soviet Union had sent a note to the United States claiming that NATO's decision to deploy new theater nuclear systems in Europe had "destroyed the basis for negotiations" on limiting theater nuclear arms.

01/03/81 -- The White House announced that it had requested a postponement of the Senate debate on the SALT II treaty in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

12/24/79 -- The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

12/12/79 -- At a special meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers, the NATO countries decided to go ahead with modernization of the West's
Europe-based long-range theater nuclear systems by deploying (in 1983, at the earliest) a total of 572 new systems (108 Pershing II and 464 ground launched cruise missiles capable of striking Soviet territory). The decision recommended deployment in 5 European countries: 108 Pershing II launchers and 24 GLCM launchers (96) missiles in West Germany; 40 GLCM launchers (160) missiles in the United Kingdom; 28 GLCM launchers (112 missiles) in Italy; 12 GLCM launchers (48 missiles) in Belgium; and 12 GLCM launchers (48 missiles) in The Netherlands. At the same time, NATO expressed its willingness to negotiate limits on this deployment in exchange for reciprocal Soviet limitations, particularly on the new mobile and accurate SS-20 missile system based in the Soviet Union. The NATO allies also announced that the United States would unilaterally withdraw a total of 1,000 obsolescent nuclear warheads from Western Europe.

10/06/79 -- Soviet President Brezhnev offered to limit deployment of SS-20 missiles if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would defer a decision to deploy new Western systems.

06/18/79 -- The SALT II treaty was signed by President Carter and President Brezhnev in Vienna.

04/11/79 -- NATO established a Special Group to study arms control aspects of theater nuclear systems.

10/28/77 -- West German Chancellor Schmidt, in a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, argued that the new reality of strategic parity, as codified by SALT, magnified the significance of disparities in theater nuclear and conventional weapons. He emphasized that strategic arms limitations confined to U.S. and Soviet central systems would inevitably impair the security of the West European NATO allies. He concluded that disparities of military power in Europe would have to be removed in parallel with the SALT negotiations.

10/12/77 -- NATO established a "High Level Group (HLG)" to study deficiencies in NATO's theater nuclear posture. The group was directed to study implications for NATO's strategy of three factors: the condition of strategic parity; the ongoing modernization of Soviet theater forces; and the growing obsolescence of existing NATO theater forces.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES


Nuclear weapons and preventing war; introduction by John Nott. Essay from the U.K. statement on the defense estimates for 1981 NATO review, v. 29, June 1981: 24-33. See in same issue: Documentation: (1) North Atlantic Council final communique; (2) Extracts for publication from the minutes of the ministerial meeting of the council; (3) Defense Planning Committee final communique; (4) NATO Nuclear Planning Group final communique; (5) Eurogroup communique.


----- Enhanced radiation weapons (the "neutron bomb") by Harry L. Wrenn. Washington 1981. Issue brief 81148

CRS Report 82-1365
SOVIET AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON THE BALANCE*

United States Assessment of Intermediate Range Nuclear Balance

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<th>U.S.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-111 fighter-bombers</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>SS-20s</td>
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<td>F-4s</td>
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<td>SS-4s and SS-5s</td>
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<td>SS-12s and SS-22s</td>
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<td>FB-111s</td>
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<td>560</td>
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<td></td>
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Soviet Union Assessment of Intermediate Range Theater Balance

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* From various sources including U.S. State Department, New York Times, Arms Control Association.