

UNITED STATES/SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE

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AUTHOR:

Collins, John M.

Senior Specialist in National Defense

Severns, Elizabeth Ann

Reference Assistant, Office of Senior Specialists

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ISSUE DEFINITION

American military competence spanned a much larger functional and geographic sphere in support of security interests than Soviet armed services could cover for the Kremlin before the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. U.S. forces have registered many improvements since that time, but their relative decline has been dramatic when compared with Soviet counterparts.

President Kennedy told Moscow in 1962 to remove its ballistic missiles from Cuba or face U.S. military action. Soviet Premier Khrushchev complied. President Carter, who flatly stated that "the status quo is not acceptable," asked Moscow to remove its combat brigade in October 1979, and Soviet President Brezhnev refused. Those confrontations, of course, are not strictly analogous, but the shift in strength since the first showdown has clearly reinforced U.S. risks around the world and reduced our room for maneuver.

This brief sketches the situation in 1960 before the Soviet buildup began, depicts the present balance, and identifies some significant issues for U.S. defense decisionmakers. (See statistical tables at the end of this text.)

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

BALANCE BEFORE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The U.S./Soviet military balance was not bad from our standpoint in 1960. This country's deterrent threats and defensive contingents were credible in most respects.

America's main aim, called containment, accepted the status quo at that time. We lacked means to retake lost territory, but U.S. military services, in concert with allies, were sufficient to safeguard the Free World from Soviet armed aggression.

Strategic Air Command (SAC) possessed unparalleled powers, when ballistic missiles on both sides were neither numerous nor very accurate. Its bombers could burst through the pervious screen that protected our opponent, but the small force of Soviet Bears and Bisons would have found U.S. defenses-in-depth much more difficult. Medium-range Badgers could strike American targets on one-way suicide missions only if they flew high to conserve fuel. That shortcoming kept them vulnerable, in full view of U.S. and Canadian surveillance systems. Our "short-legged" B-47s, which were forward-based or programmed for in-flight refueling, could make fairly lengthy low-level bomb runs beneath Soviet radar fans and below the best fields of fire for their surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

Nuclear supremacy also underpinned U.S. strategy in Europe. No pressing Soviet military threat was apparent in other theaters. Moscow could not employ medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, IRBMs)

against NATO's tempting center sector without risking retaliatory strikes against critical targets in Russia. NATO, conversely, could tolerate conventional inferiority in land formations, because theater nuclear weapons still could take up the slack.

Inflexible Soviet forces were clearly outclassed in every other category. U.S. tactical air forces were far superior to Frontal Aviation, which promised poor support for fast-moving offensive operations if Red Army logistics failed to fold first. Gorshkov's coastal navy could not yet contest our control of the seas. His submarines might have been able to cut U.S. lines of communication to Europe, but with minor implications, because NATO's reinforcement and resupply requirements reputedly were of reduced moment. Massive nuclear retaliation would conclude any conflict quickly, according to U.S. concepts, without resort to costly attrition in the air or on the ground.

In short, U.S. Armed Services, assisted by allies, held Soviet forces in check across the conflict spectrum. Reserves were on tap to contend with contingencies where the Kremlin could not reach.

BALANCE IN 1981

Few trends that typify the U.S./Soviet military balance from America's perspective have been positive for the past two decades.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRENDS

U.S. nuclear capabilities have passed through three distinct stages since 1960. Each was less adaptable than its predecessor.

The current version features far fewer realistic options than its first forerunner, largely because we now lack any credible means of controlling escalation and can no longer protect either the American people or our production base. U.S. threats of massive retaliation comprised a believable brake when our side enjoyed nuclear superiority in almost every sense, but whether we mean business is a big question today.

U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers are more vulnerable to attack than ever before. That condition erodes the stability of our national security, even though no current combination of Soviet assaults could smother the two systems simultaneously. Soviet counterparts are comparatively secure, because of our second-strike strategy. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on both sides are still safe at sea, given the current state of the art in antisubmarine warfare (ASW), although that situation conceivably could change with little notice.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The present and projected balance between U.S. and Soviet ICBMs creates two central consequences. One involves the pre-launch survival of undefended American missiles. The other concerns comparative capabilities to attack and destroy land-based ICBMs.

Pre-Launch Survival Prospects

Most authorities agree that Soviet ICBMs will pose substantial threats to Titan and Minutemen missiles in the 1980s. The key questions are not whether the Soviets could eventually crush them with a first strike, only when they could achieve that capability, and how seriously that situation affects U.S. security.

Installing more U.S. ICBMs would prove impractical, because the Soviets could add hard target warheads much faster than we could build silos and fill them with missiles, at a fraction of the cost. Reinforcing U.S. silos faces finite limitations, such as the ultimate compressive strength of concrete. Launch-on-warning would improve survivability only if our alert system remained intact. Should it fail for any reason, including Soviet action, chances are slim that any decision to launch could be made, much less implemented, in the few minutes available.

Substituting some sort of semi-mobile land-based missile system for all or part of our stationary ICMBs, therefore, is under active consideration. Costs would be considerable but, because mobile missiles are more difficult to hit than those in silos, there would be no need to replace Minutemen on a one-for-one basis.

Deterrent properties of all concepts under consideration depend on proliferating, rather than removing, aim points. Rivals, faced with prospects of expending huge numbers of nuclear weapons without assurance of preventing U.S. response, presumably would find risk-versus-gain ratios poor. Should that assumption, however, prove false, the side effects of saturation attacks, especially fallout, could create more problems than they solve.

The search for a faster, cheaper, more effective fix thus may remain in the offing. Fresh looks at free mobility models, land, sea, and air, could be among the options. See Issue Brief 77046 for detailed discussion.

Countersilo Capabilities

America's ICBMs, constrained by our second-strike strategy, would not likely match Moscow's countersilo capabilities, even if we deployed bigger missiles, more multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and greater accuracy, all of which are properties of MX.

Should the Soviets, after conducting a first strike, choose to launch reserve ICBMs on warning, our warheads could destroy superhard silos, but not before the missiles in them took flight. Such action actually could invite additional devastation in the United States. Catching a few Soviet reserves in their silos and preventing refirings from "cold launch" facilities would afford slight comfort in such circumstances. "Essential equivalence," is short, would remain elusive even if U.S. and Soviet ICBM holdings were precisely the same in quantities and technical characteristics.

Strategic Air Power

The U.S. accent on strategic air power is still strong. Soviet stress has been slight since the Cuban missile crisis, although supersonic Backfire bombers, which began to deploy in 1975, cause increasing controversy. The

present bomber balance affects U.S. force requirements in two significant ways: one concerns perceptions; the other concerns security.

Backfire Bombers Related to U.S. Bombers

Soviet Backfire bombers may have some bearing on U.S. needs for improved air defense, but are unrelated to our offensive force requirements. Backfire squadrons, which currently contribute less to Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities than forward-based fighters add to ours, could double in number or disappear without diluting any advantages that accrue from Strategic Air Command's aircraft. Manned bombers may indeed be a legitimate leg of the U.S. triad, but maintaining superiority, essential equivalence, or any other balance with Backfires would serve some symbolic purpose, nothing more.

Bombers Replaced by Cruise Missiles

President Carter on June 30, 1977, disclosed his decision to cancel prospective production of B-1 bombers, which were scheduled to strengthen our triad in the 1980s. The Pentagon anticipates converting 151 B-52Gs to carry 20 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) apiece, for a total of 3,020 weapons. Only about 75 B-52s will be modernized to improve penetration probabilities against future Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and interceptor aircraft.

Implications of that determination are subject to debate. Cruise missile technology tactics are still uncertain. Proposed B-52 modification programs present many problems. Most important, abilities of U.S. ALCMs to penetrate Soviet defenses-in-depth is in dispute.

In the final analysis, therefore, U.S. security will be well served by substituting ALCMs for aircraft only if satisfactory capabilities can be deployed at acceptable costs in time to support stated strategy. If not, our deterrent could suffer.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROBLEMS

CONUS (Continental United States) defense plays almost no part in U.S. nuclear strategy. Deterrence depends almost entirely on powers to survive preemptive strikes, then savage the aggressor. The Soviets conversely seek to develop credible safeguards. A "vulnerability gap" of disputed proportions consequently grows.

Analysts at one end of the spectrum contend that Soviet air and civil defense abilities, abetted by detailed plans, psychological conditioning, and physical preparations, already degrade U.S. deterrence and place this country in peril. Some noted U.S. specialists speculate that crisis relocation procedures would limit Soviet fatalities to 4 or 5% during a general war, under worst-case conditions. Official estimates indicate that almost half the American people would die, and another 35 million would require medical attention. If those casualty ratios were even close to correct, U.S. capability to deter attack would indeed be "a myth," as some claim, since U.S. deterrence is predicated on an "assured destruction" capability, meaning the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor. draw less drastic conclusions. Most concede that the

Skeptics draw less drastic conclusions. Most concede that the Kremlin stresses city defense, but doubt that U.S. deterrence is in danger. One faction, for example, sees this as a spurious issue. Its followers believe that nuclear blasts can break through the best protection. Others, whose opinions are widely shared, suspect that Soviet defensive capabilities, while significant, are overstated. U.S. over-reaction, they contend, could be just as ruinous as complacency.

Nevertheless, students of the subject seem to agree that Soviet active and passive defenses in combination are beginning to create a survivability imbalance that favors the Soviets. Assertions that they soon could survive a general war appear premature, but long-term consequences could be severe if the trend proceeds too far. Civil defense would assume a completely different connotation, if accompanied by Soviet breakthroughs in antisubmarine or antiballistic missile (ASW, ABM) warfare. Active defense in that case would provide the primary shield. Civil defense, as part of a strategic defensive triad, would simply serve as a backstop.

Any amalgam that allowed the Soviets to evade "assured destruction," while America still could not, would, in fact, allow them to satisfy the true aim of strategy, which is "not so much to seek battle as to seek a...situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the desired decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this."

Stated succinctly, the side that solves defensive equations first would attain true nuclear superiority, expressed in terms of survival prospects despite the rival's raw destructive power. Supremacy without defense appears to be unattainable regardless of offensive numbers, as long as each side can devastate or destroy the other.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE TRENDS

U.S. general purpose forces have developed quite differently than Soviet counterparts.

Soviet leaders, who implicitly prefer a Principle of War called "Mass," rarely reduce force levels, and winnow out stocks only when they cease to serve useful purposes. U.S. defense decisionmakers are partial to "Economy of Force." Quality, not quantity, is considered essential. America's armed services consequently are cut severely after every war. Outmoded weapons customarily retire when new ones enter the inventory.

Soviet strength thus dilates, even when ours declines. U.S. quality at this stage can no longer compensate completely for the lack of flexibility caused by quantitative inferiority.

GROUND FORCE PROBLEMS

Huge conscript ground forces are the traditional source of Soviet general purpose force strength. Other services are subsidiary, despite the emergence of a modern air force and navy. The much smaller U.S. Army and Marine Corps currently consist of volunteers. Quantitative gaps that favor the Soviet Union are great in nearly every category.

U.S. Strengths

Our Army has access to firepower unprecedented in the past. Tanks with stabilized turrets and night sights can attack targets on the move, in daylight or darkness. What they see, they can generally stop. Our TOW antitank weapons not only exceed the range of Soviet tank cannons, but possess penetration powers that outpaced opposing armor by the mid-1970s.

Improved artillery ammunition can cause up to four times as many personnel casualties per round as conventional high explosives could in past conflicts. Projectiles with time-delay submunitions extend suppression capabilities for protracted periods after impact. Laser range finders for forward observers reduce target estimation errors from 400 meters to about 10, hugely increasing probabilities of first-round hits. Response times have been cut from minutes to seconds. Precision-guided artillery projectiles, when perfected, should cause a quantum jump in destructive power. Land mine lethality has increased dramatically in this decade.

U.S. Shortcomings

There are points, however, beyond which mass matters more than excellence. The U.S. Army has just 16 active divisions. The Marine Corps has three. A fourth of our Army divisions lack one regular brigade. Others lack one or more active maneuver battalions. Readiness is reduced, even though reserve component "roundouts" train part time with Regular Army divisions. Only a few of those 19 divisions are free for contingency purposes without slighting commitments and spreading the force very thin.

Eight Army National Guard and one Marine Corps Reserve divisions complete the U.S. complement of major maneuver units. Nine or ten weeks of post-mobilization training would be needed to bring armored and mechanized divisions up to minimum combat standards, after they were called to active duty following the declaration of a national emergency, which can be designated only by the President or Congress. Consequently, they are poorly prepared to participate in any "come as you are party," such as those contemplated by our Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

Soviet ground forces, in contrast, retain a comfortable cushion of reserves that could create multiple contingencies on call. Seven airborne divisions in first-class shape afford special flexibility. U.S. decisionmakers would find it difficult to determine priorities if the Politburo brought things to a boil around Berlin, encouraged a crisis in Korea, and simultaneously made military motions toward the Middle East. Successful feints could spoil U.S. plans to support friends under fire, or forestall U.S. action until too late, if we feared premature commitment of our few divisions in strategic reserve would expose the true point of decision.

The Doctrinal Dilemma

Few forces, coupled with second-strike, selective containment policies, dictate a defensive doctrine for our Army at the onset of any conflict against numerically superior Soviet forces or the Warsaw Pact. U.S. commanders are advised to concentrate winning combinations at proper times and places, "using reserves from the rear" and forces "from less threatened

flanks," which remain lightly covered. Should concentration occur at the wrong spot, the mission is to redirect mobile elements immediately. Delaying actions, the most difficult of all ground combat operations, would be in demand.

Critics, who deplore doctrinal accommodations of that sort, suggest that U.S. decisionmakers would do well to "redesign ...our military force posture and possibly our diplomatic commitments," rather than encourage a "can-do" attitude in the Army that risks almost certain defeat if committed against massed Soviet forces in Europe or the Middle East.

TACTICAL AIR FORCE PROBLEMS

America's tactical air combat assets furnish flexibility not available to the Soviet Union, whose Frontal Aviation (roughly equivalent to our Tactical Air Command, U.S. Air Force Europe, and Pacific Air Force) is largely confined to the Eurasian land mass. Our clear qualitative edge is still evident in most respects, although the gap is closing.

Small size, however, creates an "Achilles heel" for America. A fairly small proportion of our active forces remain unfettered. Reserves can respond in most cases only after congressional approval. U.S. tactical air combat power consequently could cope with a single large-scale conflict against any non-Soviet foe, but this country's critical interests elsewhere could start to come uncovered.

Quantitative shortages could prove critical in a showdown with the Soviet Union, since "many-on-one" seems to be Moscow's rule. The few U.S. aircraft, compared with Frontal Aviation, will find it increasingly perilous to compete if current trends continue. Soviet mobile air defenses further undercut our capabilities.

Projected U.S. procurement programs do little to brighten the picture.

GENERAL PURPOSE NAVY PROBLEMS

Sea power is a necessity for the United States. Soviet naval needs, by and large, are less compelling.

Commerce, always a U.S. tradition, assumes a salient role as dwindling natural resources increase our dependence on other countries for critical supplies. Petroleum products are most publicized, but foreign minerals are also important to America. Routes must therefore be secured for friendly merchant ships under adverse conditions. Essential sea lines of communication must also be kept open in wartime to ensure the free flow of military forces and logistic support between America, its allies, and/or contested areas.

The Soviet Union, with far fewer requirements for foreign raw materials and intrinsic interests that center on the Eurasian land mass, has only recently begun to break out of its continental cocoon. Its Navy is still cast as a spoiler that emphasizes negative sea denial, rather than positive sea assertion capabilities.

The "New" Soviet Navy

The modern Soviet Navy is an innovative Service consciously designed to serve Soviet purposes rather than match its U.S. counterpart. Its focus since the early 1960s has shifted from coastal defense to sea-based deterrence in peacetime and power projection in event of nuclear war. Such a transformation in such a short space of time is close to unprecedented.

The "new" Soviet Navy suffers from several chronic shortcomings that it shares with the "old". All Soviet surface ships, for example, would have to contend with lack of air cover if they swept far from friendly shores. Land-based bombers for area defense are poor substitutes for defenses-in-depth that feature carrier-based fighters.

Soviet naval forces are also short on stamina, except for late-model ships such as Kiev, Kara, and Krivak. Small surface combatants, lacking large fuel capacities or nuclear power, have limited ranges. Restricted space for rations, ammunition, and other stores prohibit prolonged operations without resupply. Merchant tankers routinely refuel Soviet ships at sea, and trawlers serve some logistic purposes, but underway replenishment procedures are substandard compared with U.S. skills. Lengthy, large-scale operations would be next to impossible in sea areas remote from friendly port facilities.

Strengths, however, may well outweigh those weaknesses.

Tactical strike capabilities of the new Soviet Navy center on cruise missiles, which Fleet Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov feels are "practically unstoppable" against floating targets. As he sees it, not even well-screened, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers could withstand assaults "delivered by a group of ships armed with cruise missiles."

Soviet attack submarines outnumber U.S. contingents by more than 3:1. Most are diesel-powered, and many are well past their prime, but 76 were fitted to fire anti-ship cruise missiles in January 1981. Tubes totalled 432. Papa and Charlie classes can shoot from submerged positions. All classes carry torpedoes for close combat. Thirty-three U.S. submarines mounted 132 Harpoon launchers. They are substantially outranged.

Cruise Missile Threat to U.S. Surface Navy

More than fifteen sorts of Soviet surface warships, submarines, and aircraft carry at least one kind of cruise missile. Soviet strategy seems designed to seize and secure initiative with a single killing salvo. Missile-carrying surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, moving without tactical formation, could trigger surprise, preemptive strikes on signal, converging on targets from many directions, and perhaps from point-blank range.

U.S. sea control tactics traditionally try to destroy enemy weapons before they endanger our ships. First strike assaults by Soviet cruise missiles, launched at close range, could make that approach obsolete.

Our Navy as yet has no satisfactory solution. Current ship-launched SAMs would be essentially ineffective against concerted attacks. The time from detection to target engagement is excessive and coordination among missile batteries on different ships is poor. These difficulties are compounded by

SAM vulnerability to electronic counter-measures. Even Phoenix-armed F-14s, which can engage six targets simultaneously, are subject to easy saturation if large-scale attacks box the compass.

Threats to Merchant Shipping

Successful ASW operations depend on abilities to find, fix, and finish enemy undersea raiders before they can wreak heavy damage. Prospects for U.S. success are more favorable than they were a few years ago, but breakthroughs in detection are still in the blueprint stage. Beyond that, the small size of America's specialized force causes concern. ASW is mainly a time-consuming matter of attrition, in which numbers count more and more as friendly losses mount. Some authorities conclude that America at most might sink 20% of all opposing submarines before the Soviets took serious toll among merchantmen. Consequently, Soviet capacities to interfere with U.S. lifelines at sea could prove to be low-cost, low-risk operations under certain circumstances, at least as long as a "Mexican standoff" persists at strategic nuclear levels.

The Upshot

America's Navy, which matches a three-ocean mission with a one-and-a-half-ocean capability, is marginally capable of carrying out its mission in support of national strategy. Its forces are stretched so thin that further peacetime forward deployments could be attained only at great expense to personnel and equipment by drawing down reserves to a dangerous extent or uncovering existing commitments. Wartime attrition is an unpropitious prospect.

Serious students of naval strategy sum up the current situation with one succinct statement: the U.S. Navy now enters an era of reduced options and reinforced risk.

AMPHIBIOUS ABILITIES

The U.S. Marine Corps, with a total personnel strength slightly exceeding 188,000, comprises three active and one reserve divisions, together with associated air wings and combat/service support. Six naval infantry regiments, the closest Soviet counterpart, contain fewer than 2,000 men each, with minimum fire support.

Comparative power projection possibilities, however, are not quite as lopsided as that picture seems to paint.

U.S. amphibious assault abilities are strictly abridged by the shortage of specialized sealift. Current assets are confined to 61 ships, of which 15% are normally in overhaul. That level is sufficient for short-notice landings by battalions and brigades, but a single Marine division/wing team would absorb all but four operational ships, which are scattered from Manila to the Mediterranean. Lead times for assembly would be long, and combat losses irreplaceable. Prepositioned supplies on ships alleviate lift requirements to some extent, but are no substitute for amphibious assault capabilities.

Amphibious sealift for Soviet naval infantry features coastal landing craft, along with the Ivan Rogov (an LPD) and 25 LSTs. That shortcoming makes long-distance operations infeasible for the full force, but the combination is well-suited for commando-style raids and amphibious assaults close to Soviet flanks. Reinforcements, if required, could arrive on merchant ships.

MOBILITY TRENDS

Intercontinental lift over open oceans is a U.S. essential. Russian requirements thus far have been more regional. Dissimilar demands, coupled with policy peculiarities and geographic circumstance, consequently foster mobility force structures that are quite different in size as well as composition.

U.S. AIRLIFT PROBLEMS

America's air mobility means are still peerless, in large part because our Defense Department has accented "airlift enhancement" programs since the early 1960s. Soviet counterparts are improving, but present capabilities are comparable only along that country's periphery.

Still, 70 C-5s, the only aircraft that can carry outside cargo, constrain our abilities to meet NATO reinforcement/resupply schedules or to support rapid deployment forces, say, in the Middle East. They are complemented by 234 C-141s. No more of either type are being manufactured. Losses from combat attrition or maintenance failures thus are irreplaceable. U.S. tactical airlift assets, long the world's best, are showing signs of age.

U.S. SEALIFT PROBLEMS

U.S. sealift consistently gets short shrift. Interest in the 1960s centered on quick reaction instead of sustained support, but few funds were forthcoming for forces afloat, even for that purpose. Assets, which reached their apogee during World War II, consequently have been on a for three decades.

The conversion has been from many ships to few; from military ships to civilian carriers; from U.S. ships to foreign flags; from general cargo to container ships; from small, adaptable ships to large ones whose applications are limited. Our "mothball" fleet, which served well during the Vietnam War, is seriously depleted. Those trends in combination make it infeasible for Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the U.S. Merchant Marine to satisfy large-scale contingency requirements without massive aid from allies. Sealift "deenhancement" continues as a long-term trend.

The balance between Soviet strategic airlift and sealift is precisely opposite. Moscow's merchant fleet, already much larger than our own, is increasing capabilities at a rapid rate. Ship characteristics are chosen carefully to serve politico-military as well as economic purposes, especially in areas where large, specialized vessels can not conveniently venture.

COMPARATIVE FLEXIBILITY

Composite Soviet mobility forces are sufficient to influence a range of low-key contingencies in widely-separated areas, from Angola to Afghanistan, but airlift/sealift shortages are still strong limiting factors for major military operations almost anywhere outside the home country or contiguous satellites.

Quick and efficient logistic support for allies is a U.S. airlift specialty. MAC's squadrons also afford laudable (although limited) means of reinforcing forward deployed forces rapidly or shifting sizable combat power anywhere in the world. Apparent flexibility, however, is conditioned by the dearth of merchant shipping, which makes it almost impossible to sustain major efforts without allied assistance. That combination calls for caution under most conceivable circumstances, since aid is not assured.

OVERARCHING POLICY PROBLEMS

Two overarching policy problems inhibit solutions to U.S. shortcomings just described.

BUDGETARY BREAKOUTS

The price tag for U.S. manpower dedicated to defense has been the dominant budgetary factor influencing the configuration and flexibility of America's conventional forces during the past decade, given fiscal constraints imposed by official policy. Inflation, coupled with attempts to compete with domestic pay scales, caused most of the problem. A retiree population expanding exponentially also contributed. The biggest budgetary boost came in Nov. 1971, to start our All-Volunteer Force (AVF) off on the proper foot. Pay and allowances alone (including civilians) absorbed more than half of DOD's money for several years, before that proportion subsided somewhat. Percentage expenses for manpower, including outlays devoted to recruiting, construction, and dependent care, have stabilized, but costs continue to climb in response to periodic pay raises. (Pay for an entry-level enlisted man or woman now is \$501 a month, as opposed to \$21 for counterparts in the pre-World-War-II AVF. Soviet recruits receive an amount roughly equivalent to \$5.50 a month.) Cumulative consequences currently cause personnel to consume about 50 cents of every defense dollar.

Inescapable expenditures for non-manpower-related operations and maintenance (O&M) approximate 15 cents more, a percentage that has proved inadequate, given budgetary restrictions in recent years. U.S. readiness to implement contingency plans is subject to serious criticism as a consequence.

The remaining third must be split between procurement programs, which shape our present posture, research and development (R&D) which, in large part, determines our strength tomorrow, and military construction. The implications are inimical, because the Soviet Union devotes a much smaller proportion of its defense budget to manpower than the United States. Perhaps 20% is a fair approximation. Moscow, therefore, could afford a larger force and modernize at more rapid rates if its total defense budget were exactly the same as that of the United States, since a much greater share of its money can be spent on machines.

DECLINING DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY

The United States starts with the world's richest reservoir of scientific resources. Constant feedback between civil and military markets encourages entrepreneurship and technological chain reactions not remotely equalled by our Russian rival. As a result, options still closed to the Soviets are completely open to us.

This country's predominance, however, shows signs of perishability that makes many intellectuals lament our lack of momentum.

Causes include uncertain goals that make it troublesome to chart a sound course for defense technology. Insistence on practical products is pronounced. Fund requests for abstract research are frequently cut or cancelled. Sharp fiscal caution extends to other R&D sectors. Consequent tendencies to tolerate few failures sometimes impede rapid progress.

Basic Research

U.S. superiority in basic research still seems substantial. This country clearly excels in 24 bellweather programs, the Soviets in 14:

Present Status

<u>United States Superior</u>		<u>Soviet Union Superior</u>	
Lead Solid	13	Lead Solid	14
Lead Shaky	<u>11</u>	Lead Shaky	<u>0</u>
Total	24	Total	14

America's temporary purchase, however, is no cause for complacency. The U.S. lead is solid in only slightly more than half of those cases (13 out of 24). Opposing scientists, who are closing the gap in 11, protect Soviet primacy in every instance.

Relative U.S./Soviet ranks would reverse if straight-line projections of those trends continued:

Projected Status

<u>United States Superior</u>		<u>Soviet Union Superior</u>	
Present Lead Solid	13	Present Lead Solid	14
Subsequent Gain	<u>0</u>	Subsequent Gain	<u>11</u>
Total	13	Total	25

Soviet enterprise would take the technological lead by 25 to 13, where it now lags by much that same margin. Assuming that six entries currently carried as "parity" or "uncertain" shifted in U.S. favor, we still could not reach Russia's level in basic research (19 to 25).

Applied Technology

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish fundamental superiority (a function of creativity) from design philosophy and restraints imposed by funds when assessing applied technology. This study makes no attempt to differentiate. It concentrates instead on practical products that are now, or soon could, influence the U.S./Soviet military balance. Supremacy that might have been, has no practical value. Each nation either applies technology effectively, or it does not.

Soviet forces presently deploy a smorgasbord of brand-new systems based on technology well known in the West, but slightly exploited. Significant samples include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with "cold launch" capabilities; mobile air defenses that can move with ground troops; satellite intercept and surveillance craft; armored vehicles and surface ships engineered expressly to operate in chemical/biological warfare environments; rapid-fire rocket launchers; and fire-control systems unmatched either by this country or other NATO members.

U.S. preeminence is undisputed in 35 signal instances, the Soviets in 28, but the situation promises to become increasingly unstable as the 1980s progress, given opposing prospects:

Present Status

<u>United States Superior</u>		<u>Soviet Union Superior</u>	
Lead Solid	18	Lead Solid	23
Lead Shaky	<u>17</u>	Lead Shaky	<u>5</u>
Total	35	Total	28

America's present lead is solid in about 50% of the cases (18 out of 35). The Soviet side, gaining relative strength in the remaining 17, safeguards its top-flight ratings in all but five instances.

U.S./Soviet ranks would more than reverse if straight-line projections of those trends continued:

Projected Status

<u>United States Superior</u>		<u>Soviet Union Superior</u>	
Present Lead Solid	18	Present Lead Solid	23
Subsequent Gain	<u>05</u>	Subsequent Gain	<u>17</u>
Total	23	Total	40

Moscow would take the technological lead by 40 to 23, where it now lags by much less than that margin. Assuming four entries currently classified as "parity" or "uncertain" crossed into U.S. columns, we still would be behind by 40 to 27.

CAPSTONE

It is possible to quibble about classifications in the foregoing assessment, contesting whether proper categories have been included. Conclusions drawn are debatable at best, because one weakness may outweigh a dozen strengths, or vice versa. Some lags on each side are deliberate,

caused at least as much by different missions and developmental styles as by asymmetries in competence or failures to foresee demands.

Still, if Soviet skills are overstated by, say, 25%, the day has passed when the United States could be smugly sure of unquestioned scientific and technological superiority, which has sustained this country in the past and is the key to future capabilities.

Positive steps will be required to retain the present U.S. stance, let alone improve our posture. Gray matter is more important than money when it comes to closing gaps. Success depends on strategists who understand the competition working in tandem with technologists to pick priorities that make research and requirements match, while reducing blind leads that waste time and resources. Perhaps most of all, the potential for superiority will prove meaningless, if we fail to compete.

CULMINATING COMMENTS

Quantitative changes since the Cuban missile crisis favor the Soviet Union. U.S. qualitative superiority, less pronounced than in the past, is slipping away.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

Two legs of our strategic nuclear triad are shaky. SLBMs, according to widespread belief, may become the only secure mainstay for some interim period, at least until air-launched cruise missiles enter the U.S. inventory in large numbers about the mid-1980s.

U.S. nuclear strategy disregards defense. The American people and production base are exposed completely to ballistic missile attack. Their ability to survive a full-scale nuclear assault by the Soviet Union is nearly nil.

Resultant vulnerabilities drastically reduce the credibility of U.S. promises to provide a nuclear "umbrella" for allies. We no longer could unleash assured destruction strikes against the Soviet Union to defend NATO or Asian friends without risking reciprocal devastation.

U.S. theater nuclear weapons were practical deterrent and defensive tools two decades ago, when we could clamp a lid on local escalation by threatening to level the Soviet Union if its leaders employed counterpart systems. NATO allies in particular would have little to gain and a lot to lose today if we turned loose the theater nuclear genie, since war would take place largely on their home territory, where both people and possessions are unprotected.

Plans predicated on nuclear options in the absence of effective defense for ourselves or affiliates thus fail to inspire desired degrees of confidence at any employment level.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

America's chemical/biological warfare (CB) capabilities, never

considerable, are now next to nonexistent. We have no offensive forces in that medium which might make the Kremlin fear starting a fray it could not finish. U.S. defense is diffident.

CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Quantitative asymmetries are important when similar systems on each side (such as divisions) compete with each other in combat. Quality counts, but a prudent statistical balance must be maintained, because there are points beyond which mass matters more than excellence. Land, sea, and air forces alike lack flexibility if numbers are too few compared with competitors and commitments.

Our All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is too small to dispose of even one extensive contingency without reducing the required CONUS rotation base and/or uncovering commitments in other regions. It cannot absorb many more tanks, ships, and planes, because members are scarcely sufficient to maintain and operate machines now in service. The number of U.S. divisions, aircraft squadrons, and carrier task forces would remain close to constant if the AVF were filled to authorized capacity with high performance personnel.

Attrition could take its toll quickly in all four U.S. military services and the U.S. Merchant Marine, which is also at a low level. Planned employment of Army reserve components or the National Defense Reserve Fleet to reinforce active strength and replace combat casualties early in any high-intensity conflict appears impractical, given depleted ranks and rather low states of readiness.

COLLECTIVE IMPLICATIONS

In short, current trends curtail U.S. freedom of action. The upshot abridges abilities of U.S. armed services to deter attacks on the United States, defend this country effectively if deterrence should fail, and safeguard associates whose security is closely linked with our own.

Those trends will be hard to reverse because:

- High manpower costs inhibit force modernization much more in the United States than in the Soviet Union.
- U.S. technological supremacy shows signs of perishability that results more from policies than potential.

Most corrective options are politically and economically unattractive, but some current courses could prove unacceptable in the absence of change.

Step One in the process of obtaining a better balance between American and Soviet military strength is to ascertain our true requirements, based on imperative U.S. interests, objectives, and commitments. Step Two is to reshape U.S. interests, objectives, and may be essential, but bolstering budgets would produce few benefits unless coupled with sound strategy.

Sound conclusions would allow the Congress and the executive branch in concert to chart a course that assures America's ability to deter and, if need be, defend successfully against any sort of Soviet armed aggression into the Twenty-first Century.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY
(1960)

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S. Standing
MANPOWER	2,476,000	3,623,000	-1,147,000
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR			
Offense			
Bombers			
Long-Range	540	160-190	+350-380
Medium-Range	1,775	1,000	+775
Cruise Missiles (1)	30	A Few	About +30
Ballistic Missiles			
ICBMs	12	Under 50	About -38
SLBMs (2)	48	48	Par
Warheads	60	Under 100	About -40
Defense			
ABM	0	0	Par
Interceptor Aircraft (3)	2,700	5,000	-2,300
Surface-to-Air Missiles (3)	4,400	4,800	-400
THEATER NUCLEAR			
MRBM/IRBM4	51	200	-149
Other	Many	A Few	+ Many
LAND POWER			
Manpower			
Army/Ground Forces	873,000	2,250,000	-1,377,000
Marines/Naval Infantry	170,600	A Few	+170,600
Divisions			
Army/Ground Forces	14	136	-122
Marines/Naval Infantry	3	0	+3
Tanks (5)	12,975	35,000	-22,025
TACTICAL AIR FORCES			
Fighter/Attack			
Land Based (6)	1,805	4,000	-2,195
Carrier-Based	1,300	0	+1,300
Medium-Range Bombers (7)	0	1,000	-1,000
NAVAL FORCES			
Aircraft Carriers	23	0	+23
Cruisers (8)	13	23	-10
Destroyers	226	124	+102
Frigates/Other Escorts	41	13	+28
Attack Submarines	111	404	-293
Amphibious Ships (9)	113	0	+113
Land-Based Bombers (10)	0	500	-500
MOBILITY FORCES			
Airlift (11)	1,725	1,065	-660
Sealift	954	873	+81

-
- (1) Short-range Soviet SS-N-1 cruise missiles deployed on Kilden and Krupny destroyers were primarily anti-ship weapons, but also had a nuclear capability against shore targets. U.S. cruise missiles were in a Snark squadron at Presque Isle, Maine. Their range was about 5,500 nm.
 - (2) Six Soviet Zulu-V submarines, with two SS-N-4 SLBMs apiece, were deployed in the late 1950s. Ten Gulf-I and two Hotel-I companions, each with three SS-N-4 missiles, had been commissioned by 1960. All had to surface for firing.
 - (3) U.S. figures include interceptor aircraft and SAM systems in Army and Air Force reserve components.
 - (4) Includes two Jupiter squadrons in Italy (total 25 missiles) and one in Turkey (26 missiles). Excludes Thor IRBMs, sent to Great Britain, because they passed to Royal Air Force (RAF) control after becoming operational.
 - (5) U.S. tanks included 12,500 Army and 475 Marine.
 - (6) U.S. fighter aircraft included 1,180 Air Force and 625 Marine.
 - (7) The same Soviet medium-range bombers show in strategic nuclear and tactical air force categories.
 - (8) Khrushchev's plan to scrap cruisers, resisted by Fleet Admiral Gorshkov, was still in gestation when the 1960s started. Retirements reduced the total to 19 by 1964.
 - (9) Soviet naval infantry, which saw service during World War II, were nonexistent in 1960. Small regiments were reactivated in 1961-1962. Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) were the largest available lift.
 - (10) Soviet land-based naval aircraft, which exceeded 1,000 in the late 1950s, reduced rapidly after fighter squadrons shifted subordination to the PVO (air defense). Those shown above are all anti-ship bombers.
 - (11) Excludes U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Soviet Aeroflot. Includes active, reserve, strategic, and tactical airlift. Soviet aircraft are 140 AN-12 Cubs, 150 AN-8 Camps, and 775 LI-2s.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY
(January 1981)

	Current Status		U.S. Standing
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR			
Offensive/Retaliatory Systems			
ICBMs	1,052	1,398	-346
Ballistic Missile Submarines 1	(36)	(84)	(-48)
SLBMs	576	986	-410
Bombers 2	<u>376</u>	<u>215</u>	<u>+161</u>
Total Launchers	2,004	2,599	-595
Nuclear Weapons			
ICBMs	2,152	5,002	-2,850
SLBMs	5,040	1,306	+3,734
Bombers 3	<u>2,534</u>	<u>290</u>	<u>+2,244</u>
Total	9,726	5,598	+3,128
Strategic Defensive Systems			
ABM Launchers 4	0	32	-32
SAM Launchers 4	0	9,300	-9,300
Interceptor Aircraft 5	<u>269</u>	<u>2,550</u>	<u>-2,281</u>
Total	269	11,880	-11,613
LAND POWER			
Armies/Ground Forces			
Active Military Manpower 6			
Deployable 7	525	1,690	-1,165
Total 8	776	2,450	-1,674
Divisions			
U.S. Active, Soviet Cat. I-II			
Armor/Tank	4	25	-21
Mechanized/Motor Rifle	6	50	-44
Infantry	4	0	+4
Air Assault	1	0	+1
Airborne	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>-6</u>
Total	16	82	-66
U.S. Natl. Gd., Soviet Cat. III			
Armor/Tank	2	20	-18
Mechanized/Motor Rifle	1	70	-69
Infantry	5	0	+5
Airborne	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-1</u>
Total	8	91	-83
Grand Total	24	175	-151

Category	Current Status		U.S. Standing
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	
Tanks			
Heavy, Medium	10,985	48,000	-37,015
Light	<u>1,560</u>	<u>2,000</u>	<u>-440</u>
Total	12,545	50,000	-37,455
APC/AFV 10	15,120	65,000	-49,880
Artillery	4,866	19,300	-14,434
Antitank Guided Missiles	16,545	25,000	-8,455
Heavy Mortars 11	2,825	6,700	-3,875
Tactical Ballistic Missiles 12	226	1,380	-1,154
Tactical Air Defense			
Missiles	1,246	3,500	-2,254
Guns	600	8,950	-8,350
Marines/Naval Infantry			
Active Military Manpower 6			
Deployable 13	97	12	+85
Total	158	12	+146
Divisions			
Active	3	0	+3
Reserve	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>+1</u>
Total	4	0	+4
Tanks			
Medium	576	0	+576
Light	<u>0</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>-200</u>
Total	576	200	+376
Armored Carriers			
LVTPs 14	854	0	+854
APC/AFV 10	<u>0</u>	<u>750</u>	<u>-750</u>
Total	854	750	+104
Artillery	276	0	+276
Antitank Guided Missiles	648	90	+558
Heavy Mortars	0	180	-180

Category	Current Status		U.S. Standing
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	
NAVAL FORCES (General Purpose)			
Active Military Manpower 6	506	432	+74
Surface Combatants			
Aircraft Carriers			
Attack	12	0	+12
Antisubmarine Warfare	0	2	-2
Helicopter	<u>12</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>+10</u>
Total	24	4	+20
Cruisers			
SSM	20	26	-6
Other	<u>7</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>-3</u>
Total	27	36	-9
Destroyers			
SSM	46	6	+40
Other 15	<u>50</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>-8</u>
Total	96	64	+32
Frigates 16			
SSM	47	28	+19
Other	<u>25</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>-120</u>
Total	72	173	-101
Small Combatants 17			
SSM	1	146	-145
Other	<u>2</u>	<u>485</u>	<u>-483</u>
Total	3	631	-628
Attack Submarines			
SSM	33	67	-34
Other	<u>51</u>	<u>211</u>	<u>-160</u>
Total	84	278	-194
Naval Aircraft			
Afloat			
Fighter/Attack	696	60	+636
ASW			
Fixed Wing	110	0	+110
Helicopter	171	150	+21
Ashore			
Bombers	0	425	-425
ASW			
Fixed Wing	220	195	+25
Helicopters	<u>0</u>	<u>195</u>	<u>-195</u>
Total	1,197	1,025	+172

Category	Current Status		U.S. Standing
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	
TACTICAL AIR FORCES			
Active Military Manpower 18	484	420	+64
Fighter/Attack 19			
Air Force	2,237	3,725	-1,488
Marine	<u>430</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>+430</u>
Total	2,667	3,725	-1,058
Bombers	252	525	-273
Grand Total	2,919	4,250	-1,331
Helicopter Gunships	1,023	700	+323
AIRLIFT			
Strategic	304	150	+154
Tactical			
Active	218	500	-282
Reserve	<u>368</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>+368</u>
Total	586	500	+86
Utility/Cargo Helicopters 20	4,846	2,000	+2,846
SEALIFT			
Merchant Cargo Ships 21			
Active	278	1,425	-1,147
Reserve	<u>161</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>+161</u>
Total	444	1,425	-981
Tankers 20			
Active	558	375	+183
Reserve	<u>15</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>+15</u>
Total	573	375	+198
Grand Total	1,017	1,800	-783
Amphibious Ships 22	61	76	-15

NOTES:

1. Includes 15 Soviet G-class diesel submarines.
2. Strategic bombers include B-52, FB-111, Bear, Bison, and Backfire (less those assigned to Soviet naval aviation).
3. U.S. bomber loads are based on an average of 2 bombs per FB-111; 4 bombs per B-52, plus a variable number of SRAMs (1,150 from

1976-1980). One large bomb or air-to-surface missile (ASM) per Bear and Bison; 2 ASMs per Backfire.

4. All Hawk and Nike Hercules SAMs number zero as of Apr. 9, 1979.
5. U.S. interceptor aircraft include Air National Guard.
6. Manpower figures are in thousands.
7. U.S. Army deployable manpower includes mission-oriented base operating support. Soviet strengths exclude command and general support.
8. U.S. Army manpower excludes strategic nuclear forces. Soviet strengths exclude paramilitary Border Guards and internal security troops, which total 459,000.
9. U.S. light tanks include Sheridan armored assault vehicles.
10. U.S. entries exclude wheeled vehicles. Soviet figures include them, since the characteristics are quite different.
11. Heavy mortars include U.S. 4.2-inch, Soviet 120mm and 240mm.
12. Tactical ballistic missiles include U.S. Pershing, Lance, and Honest John, Soviet FROG, SCUD, Scaleboard, and SS-21.
13. U.S. Marines exclude air wings.
14. Landing Vehicle Tracked Personnel (LVTP).
15. U.S. destroyer figure counts 16 in Naval Reserves.
16. 47 U.S. frigates were armed with Harpoon missiles as of January 1981
17. Soviet small combatants include Nanuchka and Sarancha SSM boats, and Grisha and Pots. U.S. figures exclude 116 Coast Guard cutters and patrol boats.
18. Air force manpower figures for both sides exclude strategic nuclear forces and include airlift forces.
19. Includes Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Marine Corps Reserve.
20. U.S. cargo/utility helicopters include 4,550 Army and 296 Marine.
21. U.S. merchant cargo ships and tankers include those in Military Sealift Command, the rest of our Merchant Marine, the Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet, and National Defense Reserve Fleet.
22. U.S. amphibious ships include 12 helicopter carriers. Soviet figures count 50 air cushion vehicles.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 97-39, S. 694

Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization Act, 1981. Authorizes the appropriation of additional funds for FY81 for the use of the armed forces for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles and for research, development, test, and evaluation. Increases the active duty personnel and strengths of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Increases the number of reserve component members authorized to serve on full-time duty with the Marine Corps Reserve. Increases the number of civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense. H.R. 2614 introduced Mar. 18, 1981; referred to the Committee on Armed Services. Reported to the House (H.Rept. 97-20), with amendment, Apr. 9. S. 694 introduced Mar. 12, 1981; referred to the Committee on Armed Services. Reported to the Senate (S.Rept. 97-35), with amendment, Apr. 1. Passed Senate, amended, May 7, 1981. Passed the House, amended, June 23, in lieu of H.R. 2614. Conferences held; conference report filed in the House (H.Rept. 97-204) July 27, to which both Houses agreed. Signed into law Aug. 14, 1981.

P.L. 97-86, S. 815

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. Authorizes appropriations for the armed forces for procurement for aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, for research, development, test, and evaluation, and for operation and maintenance. Prescribes authorized end strengths for active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel. H.R. 2970 introduced Apr. 1, 1981; referred to Committee on Armed Services. Clean bill H.R. 3519 reported to the House (H.Rept. 97-71, part 1), with amendment, May 12. Referred to the Committees on the Judiciary and on Government Operations. S. 815 introduced Mar. 26, 1981; referred to the Committee on Armed Services. Reported to the Senate (S.Rept. 97-58), with amendment, May 6. Called up by unanimous consent in Senate; passed the Senate, amended, May 14, 1981. Passed the House, amended, July 16, in lieu of H.R. 3519. Conferences held. Conference report filed in the House (H.Rept. 97-311) Nov. 3, to which both Houses agreed. Signed into law Dec. 1, 1981.

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Jan. 12, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 23 p.

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

11/20/81 -- President Reagan's proposal for the withdrawal of U.S.
and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe was

called a "welcome change" to his earlier "bellicose" statements, according to Soviet Communist Party official Vadim Zagladin.

- 11/18/81 -- President Reagan proposed cancelling deployment of 572 new cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe if the 600 Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 intermediate-range missiles deployed in the western Soviet Union are dismantled.
- 11/06/81 -- Secretary of State Haig asserted that the Soviet Union has a three-to-one numerical advantage over the United States in missiles and aircraft in Europe. This came in response to Leonid Brezhnev's statement that "approximate parity" exists between the two superpowers in the European theater.
- 10/31/81 -- "We have a real necessity to increase the size and strength of all our military forces," said Secretary of Defense Weinberger. "We need to do it by rearming ourselves to meet the serious and very imminent danger" of the Soviet military threat.
- 09/30/81 -- Pravda rejected as "routine fabrication" the new DOD report Soviet Military Power. According to the Communist Party newspaper, the booklet intends to "fool" U.S. allies and disguise American efforts to gain strategic superiority.
- 09/23/81 -- Defense Secretary Weinberger testified that the Administration's defense budget cuts will necessitate eliminating an army combat division, 30 ships, all Titan ICBMs, and the oldest B-52 bombers.
- 09/20/81 -- Ex-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that the Reagan Administration's campaign to modernize U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be to the detriment of the United States' ability to wage conventional war. In an interview Brown said, "If we engage in a fruitless search for strategic superiority, we will escalate strategic force expenditures unnecessarily, and deprive our conventional forces."
- 09/05/81 -- According to a Defense Intelligence Agency report to Congress, the Soviet Union outproduces the United States as much as 3:1 in "most" strategic and tactical weapons. This assessment includes tanks, fighter planes, short-range ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles.
- 07/17/81 -- Marshal Ogarkov, Soviet armed forces chief of staff, indicated the Soviet Union has begun a buildup of strategic nuclear forces in response to U.S. attempts to gain military superiority. In an article in Kommunist, he said, "special attention is being given to... the strategic nuclear forces, which serve as the basic factor to deter an aggressor."

- 06/28/81 -- The Navy proposed an expanded shipbuilding plan which calls for the construction of 143 ships, including two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. This proposal is 75% larger than the last 5-year construction plan of President Carter.
- 04/15/81 -- The Soviet Union is "plainly ready to apply force in support of political aims," according to a study by the British Ministry of Defense. The report proclaimed "broad parity" between the East and West in strategic nuclear weapons.
- 02/06/81 -- "The U.S. Navy is unable fully to meet its peacetime commitments," according to Chief of Naval Operations Thomas Hayward. Testifying before Congress Hayward stated "I'm not saying we're inferior to the Soviet Navy. But I am saying that the gray area between superiority and inferiority is large enough today that it is ambiguous in terms of a professional assessment of who's ahead and who's behind. Our margin of comfort is totally gone."
- 01/29/81 -- "Detente's been a one-way street the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims," President Reagan asserted when asked about future U.S.-Soviet relations. "...the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat."
- 01/28/81 -- "In a simplistic way the Soviets are ahead" militarily, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs David Jones stated in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The United States is not strong enough to repel a Soviet invasion in the Persian Gulf region, according to Jones, who advocates retaliating to attack in a theater where the United States has a military advantage.
- 09/18/80 -- The United States and its allies are trailing the Soviet Union and its satellites in nuclear and conventional weapons, according to The Military Balance 1980-81, compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- 09/08/80 -- Only four of the Army's ten CONUS-based divisions are combat-ready, according to a confidential Pentagon report. Three of the four are rated combat-ready, but with major deficiencies. The 82nd Airborne is ready-for-combat with minor deficiencies. Two of the three divisions earmarked as potential components of the Rapid Deployment Force, the 101st Air Assault and 24th Infantry, were rated unready for combat.
- 08/21/80 -- The United States could win an arms race with the Soviets, President Carter stated in defense of his military policies. "We have strengthened every single element of our strategic deterrent... and if

an unlimited nuclear arms race should be forced upon us, we will compete and compete successfully."

- 06/18/80 -- The DOE announced it will not be able to produce all the nuclear weapons the President has requested unless it receives an additional \$250 million in FY81. According to one DOE official "The Defense Department gives orders for warheads but they don't have to pay for them. We are the ones who have to trade them off against civilian requirements."
- 06/16/80 -- An oil shortage seriously hampers U.S. armed forces readiness, according to a report issued by the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee. DOD petroleum stocks fell 6% from '78 to '79, which resulted in drawing from war reserve stocks to sustain peacetime operations.
- 03/20/80 -- The Soviet Union announced that it is going to dismantle half of its existing antiballistic missile defense sites around Moscow. Within the guidelines of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, a component of SALT I, the Soviet Union has deployed 64 ABM launchers around Moscow. The Soviet representative making the announcement did not say, however, whether Moscow intends to modernize the 32 launchers to accommodate new missiles, or to abolish them altogether.
- 03/17/80 -- About half of the United States' first-line warplanes cannot fly because the Pentagon has concentrated on buying new aircraft rather than procuring spare parts to maintain existing ones, according to a study by the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. The study found that only 53% of the F-15 Eagle and F-14 Tomcat were ready for combat at any given time in 1979. Rep. Jack Edwards, ranking minority member of the Subcommittee stated "It makes no sense whatsoever to buy all these very costly aircraft without also buying all the other necessary parts and weapons that make these aircraft an effective combat system."
- 02/28/80 -- The first XM-1 Main Battle Tank rolled off the production line in Lima, Ohio. Although the tank is in production, it will retain an experimental status until it has completed its operational test about a year from now. During the 1980s, 7,058 XM-1s are scheduled to be built.
- 02/20/80 -- Gen. Richard Ellis, Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command, testified that "an adverse strategic imbalance" favoring the Soviet Union has developed. Gen. Ellis stated that the imbalance exists when American forces are in a day-to-day alert posture as well as when ready for operations.
- Defense Under Secretary William Perry said that the Soviet Union is at least 5 years behind the United States in electronics technology. Testifying before a Senate subcommittee, Perry stated, "In fields

which are of critical importance to our military capabilities... we are more than 5 years ahead of the Soviets."

- 01/30/80 -- National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 1138-79 indicates that the Soviets could have 14,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads by 1989 if the SALT Treaty is disapproved. The level will otherwise be limited to about 6,000 in 1985, when the pact, if approved, expires.
- 01/29/80 -- Defense Secretary Brown, presenting his annual posture statement to the House Armed Services Committee, admitted that the U.S. "1-1/2 war" capability is only a "theory". As he put it, "our practices have not been entirely consistent with that policy. We have never fully acquired the agility and mobility required by such a reinforcement strategy." Moreover, he maintained, "we have economized on the nuts and bolts needed to sustain a non-nuclear conflict in a particular theater for more than a relatively short time."
- A Pravda editorial, on the same day that Defense Secretary Brown began reporting to Congress on the military balance, bluntly stated that the United States can no longer count on clear, worldwide military dominance, because Soviet power now can block U.S. moves and accomplish its own purposes. Waning U.S. power and increasing Soviet military might is a fact of life. Pravda is the official Soviet Communist Party newspaper.
- 06/25/79 -- The Soviet Union is developing two new types of strategic bombers and modifying the Tupelov Backfire, according to a Soviet negotiator for SALT II. The disclosure was made to American representatives at Geneva during technical talks that preceded the signing of SALT II.
- 00/00/62 -- Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov agreed to remove Soviet missiles and bombers from Cuba, but warned: "Never will we be caught like this again."

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