

MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

(ARCHIVED--09/01/81)

ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB77032

AUTHOR:

Goldich, Robert L.

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM

DATE ORIGINATED 04/06/77
DATE UPDATED 09/01/81

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700

0127

ISSUE DEFINITION

Between the actual end of the draft in December 1972 and late 1976, the level of controversy about the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) dropped considerably. In early 1977, however, concerns were voiced in the Congress, the press, the Department of Defense (DOD), and elsewhere about the ability of the AVF as currently recruited and managed to provide sufficient military manpower of needed quality at reasonable cost. These concerns rose sharply beginning in 1979, and public debate over military manpower issues has continued to occupy a prominent position in the media and in government since then. This revived debate on military manpower policy has been stimulated by perceived growth in Soviet military power and general international instability, as well as problems in meeting DOD-established quantitative and qualitative requirements for the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces. To assist in enabling the All-Volunteer Force to be rapidly augmented with draftees in time of war or national emergency, standby draft registration began in July 1980. Other options are also being discussed: a major modification of military recruiting and manpower management policies to attract and retain more volunteers; and a possible return to actual peacetime conscription.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1968-1975

Disenchantment with the Southeast Asia conflict coupled with traditional American antipathy to conscription resulted in increasing pressure in the late 1960s to abolish the draft and establish an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). In February 1969, soon after assuming office, President Nixon appointed a commission chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to examine the subject. In February 1970 the Gates commission recommended that the country complete the transition to an AVF by July 1, 1971. Though President Nixon accepted the goal of an All-Volunteer Force in principle, the pressures of the Vietnam War and the need for a more orderly transition to an AVF necessitated deferral of the target date from July 1, 1971, to July 1, 1973. Actual inductions of men into the Armed Forces ended on Dec. 31, 1972, and on June 30, 1973, with certain minor exceptions, the authority of the President to induct men into the Armed Forces expired. Standby draft registration continued until April 1975, when it was terminated by executive order of President Ford.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING U.S. MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT POLICIES

U.S. military manpower procurement policies are based on a variety of strategic assumptions and broad national security policies.

The principal manpower-intensive military emergency involving U.S. forces which is discussed in official DOD literature is a major war with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, with ancillary air and naval action worldwide. DOD has asserted that such a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict would involve exceptionally intense

combat resulting in high casualties, and would require the mobilization of U.S. civilian industry and manpower to continue the conflict as long as necessary. Such a war would require massive manpower mobilization, particularly to meet ground force requirements for replacements and force expansion.

This DOD scenario for a U.S./Soviet war in Europe has been challenged, however, principally by persons who feel that such a conflict would quickly lead to a strategic nuclear exchange between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and that such an exchange would be so catastrophic for both sides as to render a conventional and/or tactical nuclear campaign in Europe irrelevant. These challenges have in turn been countered by those who argue that (1) a conventional and/or tactical nuclear war in Europe need not automatically escalate to the strategic nuclear level or (2) with proper active and passive defensive measures, strategic nuclear war, if it does occur, need not result in the total destruction of the major combatants' warmaking capability and economic infrastructure.

Using this scenario as a starting point, a series of assumptions shape current military manpower policies:

1. The United States needs large conventional forces to permit responses to threats without resorting to strategic nuclear war (both U.S. and Soviet conventional forces have tactical nuclear capabilities). Most American analysts consider conventional military power to be a more credible deterrent and a more controllable military instrument than nuclear forces.

2. The United States faces a long-term challenge from the presence of large Soviet conventional forces in Europe and the USSR that are configured to pose a direct threat to NATO forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, and to U.S. national interests elsewhere in the world.

3. Current active duty strength of approximately 2.1 million, backed up by combat-ready and responsive Reserve components, is at best an absolute minimum with which to meet initial U.S. national security commitments worldwide, and in fact may be inadequate. The Reagan Administration plans to expand active duty military strength to approximately 2.3 million over the next several years to meet what it regards as minimum requirements to man its expanded force structure.

4. Major military manpower assets would be furnished by our NATO allies in the event of a conflict in Europe.

5. The manpower requirements for any contingencies more limited than a full-scale U.S./Soviet conflict would be less than those for the broader contingency.

6. Any military action anywhere in the world other than a comparatively minor show of force would almost certainly require the augmentation of active duty forces with Reserves and/or draftees.

Since 1972 the basic strategy of policies designed to provide adequate military manpower to meet anticipated contingencies has been that of manning both the active and Reserve forces with volunteers in peacetime, with a responsive standby draft system theoretically capable of quick reactivation to provide manpower needed for an emergency.

The active, Reserve, and draftee military manpower requirements discussed

in this Issue Brief are generated by the aforementioned DOD scenario and general national security policies. Acceptance of this scenario and these policies for analytical purposes in this Issue Brief does not imply either agreement or disagreement with them.

MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT ISSUES

This issue brief discusses quantitative and qualitative trends in active force and Selected Reserve strengths and recruiting, and then notes proposed methods of dealing with active force and Selected Reserve recruiting problems within the context of an All-Volunteer Force. The report then addresses the role of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Armed Forces in military manpower mobilization, current and projected IRR strengths and requirements, and possible ways of insuring adequate IRR force levels. Issues relating to maintenance of a standby draft system are discussed. Finally, alternatives relating to the reinstatement of peacetime conscription for both the active and Reserve forces are examined.

ACTIVE FORCE RECRUITING AND STRENGTH RESULTS, FY73-PRESENT

The active Armed Forces faced numerous quantitative and qualitative recruiting problems during FY73 and FY74. (See tables appended to this issue brief.) Adequate numbers of volunteers were barely obtained. Recruit quality was comparatively poor, resulting in legislative action that temporarily restricted for FY74 the percentage of recruits with substandard intelligence or education that could be enlisted (Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1974, sec. 718; P.L. 93-238, approved Jan. 2, 1974; 87 Stat. 1041). During the latter half of FY74, FY75, and the first half of FY76, active force recruiting improved greatly. A nationwide recession and consequent rise in unemployment, a continuing decline in authorized force levels, and the passage of enlistment bonus legislation all contributed to this improvement. Quantitative goals were met with ease and the quality of incoming recruits increased to the point that the services were able to substantially raise their minimum quality standards for enlistment.

However, some decline in the rate of unemployment, the stabilization of active duty military strength at approximately 2.1 million, and (according to DOD) congressional reductions in recruiting funds and manpower resulted in increasing recruiting difficulties in FY76-77. During FY78-80, the services struggled to meet qualitative and quantitative goals, helped periodically by lowered quality standards and higher unemployment rates. All four services failed to meet their recruiting objectives during FY79, the first such across-the-board shortfall since the AVF began on Jan. 1, 1973. FY80 recruiting objectives were met because of increased unemployment and lower recruiting standards. FY81 first-half results were the most encouraging in several years for reasons not yet clear but which may include major increases in military compensation during 1980, the psychological spur of the resumption of draft registration, and increased recruiting resources.

QUALITY PROBLEMS

It appears that faulty intelligence testing methodology and procedures caused DOD to radically underestimate the number and proportion of below-average mental category personnel enlisted during FY76-80. In April 1980 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) testified that serious errors had been made in calibrating intelligence recruit test scores. In July 1980, DOD released a report which stated that the actual proportion of Mental Category IV recruits (the lowest category currently acceptable for enlistment into the Armed Forces) during FY79 was much higher than previously stated figures, and that the actual proportion of Mental Category III recruits (average intelligence level) was much lower. The proportions of Mental Category I and II (superior and above average intelligence) were apparently recorded somewhat more accurately by the old tests; DOD found fewer drastic errors in their case. Further analysis revealed that recruits enlisted from the second half of FY76 (January-June 1976) through FY80 were tested incorrectly, and that the proportions of recruits in Mental Category IV for these 4 1/2 years was radically higher than previously stated by DOD, especially in the Army. This would appear to confirm impressionistic reports by officers and NCOs -- hitherto discounted by DOD and especially the Office of the Secretary of Defense -- that recruit quality declined drastically in the late 1970s. A new test designed to correct the faulty procedures went into effect for recruits enlisted in FY81 and later.

The first half of FY81 showed that recruit quality as measured by mental category had improved markedly over FY76-FY80 figures. The use of the new mental test, however, requires caution in excessive optimism about these results. It is probably too early to tell whether the new test is free of the problems that its introduction was intended to correct.

Due to congressional concern over the quality of All-Volunteer Force recruits, section 302 of the FY81 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act (P.L. 96-342), as amended by section 9, P.L. 96-584, Military Pay and Allowances Benefits Act of 1980, placed statutory restrictions on enlistment quality for the first time since FY74. These were as follows:

- No more than 35% of Army male nonprior service enlistees during FY81 can be non-high-school graduates.
- No more than 25% of DOD enlistees during FY81 and FY82 can be in Mental Category IV.
- No more than 20% of DOD enlistees during FY83 can be in Mental Category IV.

Also, the Secretary of Defense is required to report to the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate at the end of each quarter of FY81 on whether the mental category limitations have had a negative impact on combat readiness.

There is a concern -- one officially rejected by DOD -- that the proportion of blacks in the All-Volunteer Force which is much higher than of the U.S. population as a whole, could have problematic social and political consequences. Other observers feel that the Armed Forces, and the Army and Marine Corps in particular, have become highly unrepresentative of general American social indicators such as education, income level, and urban/rural origins. DOD and DOD-funded contract studies reject these assertions or regard the trends as irrelevant if they acknowledge them. There are also some indications that recent incidents of recruiting malpractice and fraud

are related, not to isolated cases of individuals acting improperly, but to pressure placed on recruiters to achieve recruiting results which may be unattainable.

Some of these recruiting trends are statistically documented in Tables "A" showing active force quantitative, qualitative, and race/sex recruiting and/or strength trends since FY73 (data from FY64, the last pre-Vietnam war fiscal year in which the draft was operating, are furnished for comparative purposes). See tables appended to this issue brief.

ACTIVE FORCE RETENTION PROBLEMS

In addition to recruiting problems, there has been increasing concern for the retention of skilled officers and noncommissioned officers in all services, especially the Navy and Marine Corps. Although first-term reenlistments have risen under the AVF, career (second- and later-term) reenlistments have dropped considerably. Reenlistment rates of Navy career enlisted personnel, for example, dropped from 92% of those eligible in FY73 -- the first year of the All-Volunteer Force -- to 67% in FY80. Marine Corps career enlisted retention dropped from 82 to 50% during the same period. (See Table "D," attached to hard copies of this issue brief.) Navy retention problems in particular appear to be based in large part on dissatisfaction with long family separations resulting from an increased frequency of overseas deployments. This increased operating tempo, according to the Navy, has resulted from a decreased number of ships in the Fleet being required to shoulder the same level -- or an increased level -- of naval deployments worldwide. It has become difficult to find crews for some ships so they can put to sea as scheduled, or to man newly commissioned ships.

There are other more specialized recruiting and retention problems in the military services as well. All services continue to have difficulty recruiting and retaining physicians, although this problem is slowly diminishing. DOD anticipates that increased medical officer bonuses, more competitive medical scholarships, and an increased inflow of graduates of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences will help alleviate this problem by the mid-1980s. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps have experienced substantial declines in pilot retention rates. This appears to be related directly to increased hiring by civilian airlines to replace the massive cohort of World War II-trained pilots now reaching airline retirement age. However, because pilot retention is related directly to airline hiring rates, and recent problems of the airline industry have reduced pilot hires, the pilot retention problem is bottoming out and beginning to improve. The Air Force is also having a particular problem in recruiting and retaining engineering officers in the face of stiff competition for engineers from the civilian sector, and is exploring a variety of incentive and bonus programs to attract more college engineering majors.

Compensation levels -- both absolute amounts and the increases that come with promotions -- are believed to contribute substantially to retention problems. Pay caps coupled with inflation, according to an October 1979 DOD study on the adequacy of military compensation and an early 1980 study by former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, have decreased the purchasing power of military pay since the AVF was first established. Other less tangible reasons cited for decreased career retention include the lower quality of junior enlisted personnel who careerists are required to supervise; the lack of sufficiently rigorous disciplinary procedures that can be applied against

substandard performers or malcontents; and deterioration in non-monetary benefits such as health care, recreational facilities, and commissary/exchange services. Lack of public appreciation for the military's role in society is also mentioned.

COSTS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The All-Volunteer Force has resulted in some increased expenditures. The most recent cost estimates, contained in Senate Appropriations Committee hearings on the FY81 DOD appropriations bill, state that a return to conscription -- 100,000 draftees yearly, presumably those required to maintain current force levels -- would save approximately \$370 million in FY80, assuming current pay levels were maintained. In its December 31, 1978, report on the AVF, DOD estimated costs at between \$250 million and \$2.5 billion annually. The lower figure is the increased cost resulting from the AVF excluding the cost of a major 1971 junior enlisted pay raise and subsequent junior enlisted compensation increases designed to attract volunteers. The larger figure is the increased cost including these junior enlisted compensation and benefit increases. The same DOD study estimated that reducing the pay of the junior three enlisted pay grades to minimum wage levels (assuming the maintenance of present force levels) would save approximately \$1.3 billion per year. A General Accounting Office study released in February 1978 estimated total AVF costs during the FY71-77 period as \$18.4 billion, and costs for FY73 and each fiscal year thereafter as over \$3 billion. This figure included Selective Service cost savings, recruiting costs, enlistment costs and savings, compensation and benefit costs, training and education costs, recruit attrition, staffing policies and assignment costs, civilian personnel costs and policy changes, military construction, and retirement and separation pays.

Another measure of the cost impact of the AVF that has been suggested is the potential cost involved in increasing military force levels, if such an increase should become necessary. Such costs could involve either the increased compensation levels that would be required to attract more volunteers or the cost of paying an enlarged military force composed partially of draftees at current, AVF-generated pay rates.

Proponents of the AVF assert that it is inaccurate to include most of the costs resulting from the major military pay increases of November 1971 in an accounting of AVF costs. In support of their assertion, they argue that (1) "pay comparability" was a DOD objective long before the draft was eliminated and (2) the Government is "morally obliged" to pay military personnel wages comparable with those in the civilian sector regardless of whether the Armed Forces are manned by draftees or volunteers.

Some observers believe that the costs resulting from increased enlisted turnover and personnel turbulence and the larger training establishment that would result from a return to the draft would actually increase manpower costs, unless first-term enlisted pay were reduced substantially. See Issue Brief 79078, Defense Manpower Costs.

PROJECTED ACTIVE FORCE RECRUITING SITUATION IN THE 1980s

As the effects of declining birth rates that began in the 1960s are felt, the number of men reaching prime military age (18) each year will decline

from approximately 2.1 million in 1979 to 1.7 million in 1987 -- a 20% drop. The Armed Forces will then have to recruit a larger proportion of the available manpower than at present. There is a general consensus that given present military manpower procurement and utilization policies, the services will not be able to maintain current military manpower strengths in the 1980s. Available manpower will have to be used more efficiently; more personnel will have to be retained in service after being enlisted; manpower requirements will have to be decreased; or the proportion of the manpower pool actually recruited will have to be raised. The problem will be greatly exacerbated by plans to expand the size of the active Armed Forces from 2.1 million to the approximately 2.3 million necessary to man the increased force structure proposed by the Reagan Administration. There is a growing body of opinion which holds that increased quantitative requirements, rather than problems of manpower quality and career retention, will pose the greatest threat to the continued viability of the All-Volunteer Force in the 1980s.

SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH AND RECRUITING

The Selected Reserve Components of the Armed Forces provide the sole available source of trained units for immediate augmentation of the active Armed Forces upon mobilization. The Selected Reserve consists of Reservists in paid status who are required to perform approximately two weeks of active duty for training annually and usually one weekend of inactive duty training ("drill") per month. All members and units of the Selected Reserve are also members of a larger category of Reserves known as the Ready Reserve. Members of the Ready Reserve -- including, therefore, members of the Selected Reserve -- may be called to active duty without their consent in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress or the President (i.e., congressional approval is not required); a maximum of 1,000,000 Ready Reserve personnel may be on active duty on this basis at any one time. In addition, Selected Reserve personnel may be called to active duty for up to 90 days without a declaration of war or Congressional or Presidential declaration of national emergency; up to 100,000 Selected Reservists may be on active duty on this basis at any one time.

Selected Reserve strength dropped drastically after the inception of the AVF, reaching a low of 788,000 at the end of FY78. Since then, however, major increases in recruiting and retention incentives and efforts have assisted in rebuilding Selected Reserve strength to a level of 877,000 as of Apr. 30, 1981. This compares with 919,000 at the end of FY73, and an FY81 authorized minimum average strength of 850,000, an FY73 authorized average minimum strength of 977,000, and an FY82 wartime requirement of 1,055,000.

The real problem in maintaining Selected Reserve strength seems to lie as much in the retention of those enlisted as in recruiting. Since the inception of the AVF, the number of nonprior service Reserve enlistees who joined the Reserves for 6 years (often to avoid being drafted into the active Armed Forces) has declined, while large numbers of persons with prior active military service have joined the Reserves, usually for much shorter terms (often as little as one year). The turnover rate among prior service enlistees is thus very high. Accordingly, Reserve authorities feel that improvements in retention could do much more to boost Selected Reserve strength than corresponding increases in recruiting.

The intelligence and educational levels of Selected Reserve male nonprior service enlistees (the only group for which data are available prior to FY75)

has declined considerably from pre-AVF levels; in most cases, the nonprior service recruit with above-average or superior intelligence and a college education of the draft era has been replaced by a non-high-school graduate of average or below average intelligence. To a certain extent, however, more mature and better educated prior-service enlistees compensate for this decline in nonprior service recruit quality.

These recruiting and strength trends are statistically documented in Tables "B" showing Selected Reserve quantitative, qualitative, and race/sex recruiting or strength trends since FY70.

RECENTLY IMPLEMENTED AND PROPOSED ACTIVE FORCE AND RESERVE RECRUITING AND RETENTION INCENTIVES

A variety of compensation and benefit initiatives were recently enacted as part of the Military Personnel and Compensation Amendments of 1980 (P.L. 96-343), the FY81 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act (P.L. 96-342), and the Military Pay and Allowances Benefits Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-579). These included:

- An across-the-board 11.7% military pay raise as of Oct. 1, 1980 (this contrasts with the 9.1% pay raise received by General Schedule Federal civil servants, which would otherwise have been received by military personnel as well).
- Increased levels of enlistment and reenlistment bonus money and expanded eligibility (in terms of years of service) for the latter; enlistment bonuses for Selected Reserve personnel with prior active military service; bonuses for prior-service personnel who voluntarily affiliate or extend their service with the Individual Ready Reserve; and bonuses for career aviation officers extending their active duty.
- Raising per diem allowances for military personnel traveling on official business; providing moving expenses for military personnel who own house trailers or mobile homes; authorizing family separation allowances for junior enlisted personnel, and allowing personnel on long field or sea duty to accumulate leave beyond current limits.
- Increasing benefits available under CHAMPUS -- the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services.
- Establishing (on a test basis) an educational assistance program for active duty and Selected Reserve personnel, using both cash grants and loan repayments, in addition to existing educational programs, and allowing career personnel to transfer entitlement to such benefits to their dependents.
- Increasing flight pay, hazardous duty pay, Navy nuclear-power officer bonuses, and special pays; increasing and restructuring submarine duty and sea pay levels, especially for career personnel, and authorizing sea pay for officers as well as enlisted personnel.

- Authorizing a Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) to be paid to personnel living in high-housing cost areas within the United States (such allowances are already payable for personnel stationed outside the United States); removing limits on mileage allowances payable to persons making a permanent change of station move.
- Increasing Basic Allowance for Subsistence by 10% effective Sept. 1, 1980 (i.e., =before- the 11.7% general pay raise mentioned above took place, providing a total BAS increase of almost 23%).

Most of these initiatives were directed at retention rather than first-term recruiting, and most did not directly address the major overall gap between military and civilian compensation which developed after the mid-1970s. These incentives, anticipation of their enactment, and the indication that they provided tangible public and congressional support for career personnel have all had positive effects on career retention. Overall DoD career enlisted retention was up in FY80 compared to FY79, and even higher in the first quarter of FY81 than in FY80. Navy career enlisted retention has recovered from a low of 62% in FY79 to 73% during the first half of FY81; Marine Corps career enlisted retention rebounded from 52% in FY79 and 50% in FY80 to 74% in the first half of FY81. Army and Air Force career enlisted retention rates have also increased from FY79 lows. (See Table "D" appended to this issue brief.)

Further major increases in recruiting and retention incentives were proposed by the Reagan Administration in March 1981 as part of its major increases in the FY82 defense budget originally proposed by the Carter Administration. These are targeted on first-term recruiting as much, if not more so, than career retention, and apparently are designed to directly improve the quantity and quality of recruits through restoring almost full comparability of military and civilian compensation across-the-board. These incentives and measures (some of which have only an indirect, but highly important, impact on recruiting and retention) include:

- A 5.3% across-the-board military pay raise effective July 1, 1981, plus a 9.1% across-the-board raise effective Oct. 1, 1981. Together with the 11.7% general pay raise of Oct. 1, 1980, these three increases would represent a jump of over 28% in Regular Military Compensation in 12 months. (It appears unlikely that Congress will approve the July increase, but the July and October pay raises may be combined into one 14.4% raise as of Oct. 1, 1981.)
- Increased funding for recruiting and advertising programs and personnel. When inflation is taken into account, there has been a substantial decline in real purchasing power devoted to recruiting since the mid-1970s.
- Improved training, living, and work environments to raise morale and motivation. This involves funding more activities in the field and at sea; building and renovating bachelor and married living quarters; and replenishing spare parts stocks and upgarding facilities.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger has recommended that the first \$20,000 of a military member's pay be exempt from Federal income taxes as a recruiting

and retention incentive. The advantages of this proposal are held to include: (1) the lack of expense to the defense budget per se; and (2) the increased effect it would have on persons in higher tax brackets, improving the attractiveness of a military career and the rewards for lengthy military service. Some of the disadvantages are described as: (1) possible adverse public reaction against the military receiving special tax consideration; (2) alleged unfairness to junior enlisted personnel (who now pay little or no Federal income tax due to the extent to which the tax is aimed toward persons with higher incomes); and (3) the consequent lack of impact on junior enlisted recruiting and retention.

Some military manpower analysts believe that some options still remain with which to improve active force and/or Selected Reserve recruiting within the context of an All-Volunteer Force. These observers feel that while the DOD has worked hard to make the AVF successful, the potential for improvements in military manpower utilization and recruiting is still substantial. They also assert that given the major social and political controversies that would accompany serious proposals for a return to the draft, all possible efforts should be made to keep military service voluntary. Finally, both supporters and opponents of an AVF believe that conscription would provide only indirect, but still important, assistance at best in improving the retention of career personnel.

It has been suggested that the resumption of standby draft registration will act as a spur to enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force by making the public more aware of the Armed Forces and of their potential military obligations as citizens, and creating the desire to avoid eventual conscription -- if the draft is actually reimposed -- by volunteering for a branch of service of one's own choosing. It is not clear to what extent this has in fact taken place. Approximately 15% of young men registering have checked a box on their registration forms indicating a desire to receive military recruiting information and/or be contacted by military recruiters. How many of these individuals would otherwise have been interested in military service is not known. Some officials, however, have stated that they believe that registration has acted as an intangible, and often subconscious, impetus toward voluntary enlistment, as much by making persons aware of the possibility of military service as actually pressuring an individual to enlist to avoid potential conscription sometime in the future.

The following suggestions are among those that have been made to improve active force and Selected Reserve recruiting and retention, or to reduce military manpower requirements. (It is essential to note that almost all of them have, in fact, already been acted upon, in varying degrees and with varying resource commitments.) The recommended improvements include:

- Modifying enlistment terms, including, but not limited to, (a) shorter enlistment terms or (b) a combination of active force enlistment with an obligatory period of service in the Selected Reserve. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all began similar 2-year enlistment test programs in 1979. Indications are, however, that so far these programs have failed to significantly increase the total number of enlistments, although they may have had some impact on raising the quality of enlistees.
- Modifying minimum physical, mental, or educational standards for enlistment. (This has already been done to a considerable degree.)

- Recruiting more women. The Carter Administration had planned to increase the total number of women in the Armed Forces to approximately 254,300 by FY85, or 12.5% of total strength. However, the military services, particularly the Army, have recently requested that these goals be reexamined with a view toward actual and anticipated negative effects on combat readiness and performance of the increased proportion of women in the Armed Forces. It appears now that the goals set by the Carter Administration will be cut back at least somewhat. See Issue Brief 79045, Women in the Armed Forces.
- Decreasing the emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior-service personnel in the 18-19 year old bracket and attempting to either recruit more older personnel or raise the proportion of older career personnel.
- Converting more military to civilian positions. This has already been done, during both the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, civilian personnel strength has declined substantially, affecting the important depot and maintenance services that DoD civilians provide to the military services.
- Increasing the length of enlistments. This has also been done; however, it conflicts with the desire to shorten enlistments as a recruiting incentive.
- Decreasing the use of early discharges to separate marginally undesirable personnel from the Armed Forces and placing heavier reliance on counseling and military discipline to ensure effective performance from such individuals while remaining in service. There has been some progress made in reducing first-term enlisted attrition, as these early discharges are called. It is important however, that too many marginal performers not be retained in service if they will not or cannot be forced to do their jobs. (See Table E appended to this issue brief.)
- Substituting capital (equipment) for labor (military manpower) wherever possible. This is a largely unexplored area. It could show great promise for the technically oriented services, less so for the ground combat forces. However, complex equipment demands skilled operators, which are hard to recruit and retain in the AVF.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

In addition to the active Armed Forces and units of the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Armed Forces is designed to fill large requirements for previously-trained individual Reservists to be promptly available in the event of mobilization. These individual Reservists are needed to (1) bring undermanned units of the active force and Selected Reserve to full war strength and (2) provide trained replacements for casualties until such time as draftees can be provided by a reactivated Selective Service System.

The IRR consists mostly of personnel who have served on active duty, are not members of the Selected Reserve, and who have not completed their total

six-year military obligation. IRR personnel are not currently required by DOD to train periodically, although they are legally obligated to do so if ordered. Members of the IRR are also members of the Ready Reserve (along with Selected Reserve personnel). As such, they also may be called to active duty without their consent in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress or the President, subject to the maximum of 1,000,000 Ready Reservists that may be on active duty on such a basis at any one time.

Table "C", appended to this issue brief, indicates in detail the major decline in IRR strength that has taken place since FY73; from 1,229,000 to 410,000 as of Apr. 30, 1981. IRR strength has increased from 356,000 at the end of FY78 to current levels, and is expected to continue increasing slowly over the next few years as some suggested policies are implemented.

The projected IRR strengths contrast with estimated IRR mobilization requirements. An intensive interagency debate on IRR requirements appears to have been "resolved" in favor of an accepted IRR shortfall of approximately 300,000 (of which the Army's share is 270,000); however, some analysts continue to believe that a more accurate estimate of the shortfall is in the 400,000-600,000 range. In either case, actual IRR strength will remain well below requirements at least into the late 1980s, under the most optimistic estimates.

IRR strength has declined for several reasons. First, large numbers of Vietnam-era draftees who spent only two years of their total six-year military obligation on active duty, and the remaining four in the IRR, completed their six years of service between 1973 and 1976 and left the IRR pool. Second, the advent of the AVF resulted in longer active duty terms, shortening the time remaining out of the total six-year obligation to serve in the IRR. Third, a greater proportion of active force separatees than previously is entering the Selected Reserve. Fourth, longer active duty enlistment terms and lower active duty military strengths have reduced recruiting requirements, and hence the number of persons leaving active duty and entering the IRR.

Without a peacetime draft or a quickly responsive standby Selective Service System, shortages of IRR personnel would severely affect the ability of the Armed Forces to fight a major war with the Soviet Union in the interval between the outbreak of hostilities and the availability of trained draftees--now programmed for no earlier than seven months after mobilization. Even with a standby draft system capable of the most rapid reactivation considered feasible, four months would elapse between mobilization and the delivery of trained draftees to the Armed Forces, during which requirements for trained personnel could only be met by the IRR.

RECENT AND PROPOSED INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO INCREASE IRR STRENGTH

Among actually implemented remedies for increasing IRR strength and improving IRR mobilization capabilities within an All-Volunteer Force context are the following:

- Eliminating automatic transfer from the IRR to the Standby Reserve after 5 years of obligated military service. While this does not increase the total IRR/Standby Reserve manpower pool, it does increase the size of the more easily mobilizable IRR.
- Requiring a fixed IRR obligation of all active duty separatees,

regardless of the length of their active duty service. Certain active and Reserve enlistees who do not complete their full enlistments are now assigned to the IRR, if they are judged suitable; formerly, no such personnel were retained in the IRR.)

- Requiring female military personnel to fulfill an IRR obligation in the same manner as male personnel.
- Identifying and designating selected retired military personnel for recall to active duty upon mobilization.
- Improving personnel management of pretrained individual reservists and standby Reservists, with better tracking and location procedures, more frequent contact, faster mobilization

notification

notification procedures, and peacetime refresher training for IRR personnel.

- Reducing the length of active duty enlistments, thus increasing the proportion of the total six-year obligation spent in the IRR unless the individual enlisted in the Selected Reserve.
- Authorizing direct enlistment and reenlistment into the IRR, and providing bonuses for persons without an IRR obligation to voluntarily affiliate with the IRR, if they have prior military service.

A legislative proposal to extend the total military service obligation beyond the current 6 years has been considered in DOD and the Congress, but not acted on.

STANDBY DRAFT CAPABILITIES

According to DOD, a major war with the Soviet Union in Europe or any other military contingency other than minor, short-term operations would require the reactivation of the draft to furnish manpower above and beyond that provided by the active forces, Selected Reserve, and IRR. Draftees would be required to provide replacements for wartime casualties and activate new military units needed in an expanded wartime force structure.

The Military Selective Service Act Amendments of 1971 (P.L. 92-129, approved Sept. 28, 1971) required that after induction authority ceased on June 30, 1973, the Selective Service System be maintained as "an active standby organization, with (1) a complete registration and classification structure capable of immediate operations in the event of a national emergency, and (2) personnel adequate to reinstitute immediately the full operation of the system...." Progressive reductions in funding and manpower for the standby Selective Service System have substantially reduced its capabilities and responsiveness since FY73. Standby registration and classification of potential inductees was suspended by executive order in April 1975 until resumed in July 1980. DOD estimates it would require the System to deliver at least 650,000 personnel to the Armed Forces within 180 days after general mobilization (M+180). A variety of studies by several Government agencies all agree that before the resumption of standby registration in mid-1980, the Selective Service System fell grossly short of having the capability to meet these requirements.

After taking office in January 1977, President Carter on several occasions reiterated the opposition of the Ford Administration to standby registration, as did Carter Administration officials. In his State of the Union message of Jan. 23, 1980, however, President Carter changed his policy. He announced that he would send legislation to the Congress which would (a) provide supplemental appropriations for standby draft registration to take place before mobilization and (b) require women as well as men to register. The registration legislation approved by the Congress on June 25, 1980, and signed by the President on June 27 (P.L. 96-282) differed substantially from the President's proposal. Rather than appropriating new funds, it authorized the transfer of approximately \$13.3 million from the FY80 DOD budget to that of the Selective Service System for the purpose of registering males only. All men born in 1960 were required to register at their local post offices during the week beginning July 21, 1980, and all men born in 1961 were required to register during the week beginning July 28. Selective Service has stated that by July 1981 92% of all men born in 1960, 1961, and 1962 had registered -- over 5 million out of 5.5 million eligibles. Registration is required of all men born in 1963 or later upon reaching age 18. Percentage figures on compliance with this ongoing registration program are not yet available. A report and audit of the registration process by the General Accounting Office, performed in December 1980, stated that the Selective System's claims as to the success of registration and the level of compliance were accurate, and praised the System's management of registration.

RETURN TO A PEACETIME DRAFT

The quantitative and qualitative recruiting problems of the active and Reserve forces have resulted in considerable discussion about returning to actual peacetime conscription.

A return to the peacetime draft would insure that the Armed Forces could procure the quantity and quality of personnel they needed without regard to the vagaries of the civilian economy or transient national moods. Conscription would also serve the political/social/philosophical ends of (1) levying a requirement on all citizens, if called, to participate in the common defense and (2) insuring popular involvement in and concern over national military policies.

It is by no means clear that the reinstatement of the draft would decrease defense manpower costs. While recruiting costs could be decreased, utilization and training costs resulting from increased personnel turnover and turbulence would probably rise. Military compensation costs would drop only if pay and allowance levels for first-term enlisted personnel were frozen or reduced.

A return to the draft could conceivably be unpopular. Some say that the Vietnam experience and subsequent clemencies and pardons of draft evaders and some military deserters have raised doubts about whether young people would respond to draft calls. In addition, there are political/philosophical issues of (1) conscription as a form of involuntary servitude or economic tax-in-kind and (2) the inequity of selective as opposed to universal or general conscription.

SELECTION ISSUES

Several alternative methods of selecting draftees have been proposed, including (1) universal national service with a military option (including compulsory registration, classification, and evaluation for national service, without a compulsory service requirement itself), (2) universal military service, and (3) selective service. The proposals for universal service all have the advantage of being more equitable, and providing both tangible and intangible benefits to the civilian economy as a whole, as well as sufficient trained military manpower to meet any imaginable military contingency. Universal service would also be more coercive than selective service, would establish a principle of conscription for non-military purposes, and could produce more trained military manpower than the Armed Forces required or low-cost civilian labor than the civilian economy needed or could absorb. Selective service, on the other hand, while it would provide no more military manpower than that needed, and would rest less lightly on the shoulders of American youth, could also be more inequitable in that only a few persons would actually be drafted.

Other issues regarding the selection of draftees include:

- Possible conscription of women, involving the current debate over the legal status and sociological implications of equality of opportunity for women and the roles of men and women in society and culture.
- Deferments and exemptions involving various educational, occupational, marital, physical, and moral categories.
- Selection mechanisms to be used, involving a choice between a local and community-based selection apparatus, as in the old Selective Service System, or one nationally administered and centralized.

UTILIZATION ISSUES

Two broad alternatives have been mentioned for the use of draftees, if peacetime conscription were revived: (1) conscription for the active forces, with a Reserve obligation capable of fulfillment according to an individual's option, or (2) conscription for the Selected Reserve and/or Individual Ready Reserve. A third alternative would involve conscription for the active forces with a Reserve option to be fulfilled along mandatory lines, without an individual option.

The first alternative would essentially involve a return to the active-Reserve relationship that existed before the termination of the draft in 1973. Active force draftees (and voluntary enlistees) would have a Reserve obligation after release from active duty which they would fulfill in the Individual Ready Reserve; the Selected Reserve would consist largely of nonprior service personnel who enlisted to avoid conscription into the active forces. Such a system would preserve maximum freedom of choice for the individual and continue the voluntary and local character of our Reserve Components. It would also prevent an orderly flow of fully trained personnel into the Reserves (by leaving Reserve enlistment as an individual option), continue the Reserves as a draft-avoidance route, and prevent the full integration of the active and Reserve components for purposes of preparation

for war.

A draft for the Selected Reserve and/or Individual Ready Reserve, while maintaining all-volunteer active forces, would address current major Reserve shortfalls without -- according to some -- overreacting to possibly temporary and/or minor active force shortfalls. Such a Reserve draft would minimize the impact on the persons drafted, since only a relatively short tour of active duty (several months) would have to be served before the individual returned to civilian life, with only a training obligation remaining. In addition, the wider exposure to military life gained by Reserve draftees could stimulate enlistments in the active force among persons who otherwise would not have considered active military service. A Reserve draft would not deal directly with active force recruiting problems. It would affect the traditionally voluntary character of the Reserves. It could also result in major problems of skill-matching for the Selected Reserve, given the mobility of individual Reservists and the need -- in the case of the Selected Reserve -- to fit a Reserve recruit not just into a particular military unit, but into a particular unit in a particular locality.

Finally, the United States could adopt the traditional Continental European type of integrated active-Reserve military manpower procurement. Individuals would be drafted into the active force and would be involuntarily assigned to a specific Reserve unit upon release from active duty; their Reserve training obligations would vary according to the needs of the Armed Forces. The Reserve Components would be filled exclusively by persons with prior military service. Such a system would provide an orderly, manageable flow of trained personnel into the Reserves; generate large numbers of individual Reservists available for use upon mobilization; fully integrate the active force with the Reserve Components; and remove draft evasion as an incentive for Reserve service. On the other hand, the American tradition of Reserve service as voluntary would be abolished and individual options for performing military service would be substantially diminished.

SUMMARY

The active Armed Forces are experiencing quantitative and qualitative recruiting problems; the difficulties of the Selected Reserve have been much greater. The strength of the Individual Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve is only a fraction of known and estimated wartime requirements. Retention of active duty career military personnel is still a problem, especially in the Navy and Marine Corps. Demographic constraints will ensure progressively increasing recruiting difficulties during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The standby Selective Service System was incapable of being activated in time to meet DOD requirements for draftees after general mobilization until standby draft registration was resumed in July 1980. Proposed measures to deal with these problems while continuing to maintain an All-Volunteer Force involve increasing the number of enlistments and reenlistments in the Armed Forces, increasing the size of the available manpower pool, and reducing military manpower requirements. Some persons have suggested that a return to peacetime conscription for the active forces or Reserve Components will be necessary to solve quantitative and qualitative manpower problems.

LEGISLATION

H.R. 2614 (Price et al.)

Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization Act, 1981. Authorizes the appropriation of additional funds for FY81 for the use of the armed forces for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles and for research, development, test, and evaluation. Increases the active duty personnel and strengths of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Increases the number of reserve component members authorized to serve on fulltime duty with the Marine Corps Reserve. Increases the number of civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense. Introduced Mar. 18, 1981; referred to Committee on Armed Services. Reported to House with amendment (H.Rept. 97-20) Apr. 9, 1981. Passed House, amended, June 23, in lieu of S. 694.

S. 694 (Tower, by request, et al.)

Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization Act, 1981. Authorizes the appropriation of additional funds for FY81 for the use of the armed forces for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles and for research, development, test, and evaluation. Increases the active duty personnel and strengths of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Increases the number of reserve component members authorized to serve on full time duty with the Marine Corps Reserve. Introduced Mar. 12, 1981; referred to Committee on Armed Services. Reported to Senate with amendment (S.Rept. 97-35) Apr. 1. Passed Senate, amended, Apr. 7, 1981. Passed House, amended, June 23; laid on table, with H.R. 2614 passed in lieu.

H.R. 2970, H.R. 3519 (Price, by request, et al.)

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. Authorizes appropriations for FY82 for the Armed Forces for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, for research, development, test, and evaluation, and for operation and maintenance. Prescribes the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense. Introduced Apr. 1, 1981; referred to Committee on Armed Services. Referred Apr. 8 to Subcommittees on NATO Standardization, Interoperability, and Readiness and on Research and Development. Clean bill H.R. 3519 reported to the House, with amendment, from the Committee on Armed Services (H.Rept. 97-71, Part I) May 19; referred to the Committees on the Judiciary and on Government Operations. Reported to the House, with amendment, from the Committee on the Judiciary (H.Rept. 97-71, Part II) and from the Committee on Government Operations (H.Rept. 97-71, Part III) June 12. Considered in House.

H.R. 3380 (Nichols et al.)

Armed Forces Pay Act of 1981. Authorizes a 14.3% increase in basic pay and in quarters and subsistence allowances for all personnel in the uniformed services; restores, in current dollars, the relative relationship of military compensation to pay in the private sector that existed in 1972; provides certain increases in special pays and bonuses that are designed to assist in attracting and retaining individuals in critical skills in the uniformed

services; provides certain travel and transportation allowances that are designed to assist in alleviating hardships and financial irritants occasioned by military service personnel. Introduced May 1, 1981; referred to the Committee on Armed Services. Reported to the House (H.Rept. 97-109) May 19; referred to the Committee on Appropriations. Reported to the House (H.Rept. 97-109, Part II) June 11.

S. 815 (Tower, by request, et al.)

Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. Authorizes appropriations for FY82 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, for research, development, test, and evaluation, and for operation and maintenance for the Armed Forces, to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component of the Armed Forces and for civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, to authorize the military training student loads, and for other purposes. Introduced Mar. 26, 1981; referred to Committee on Armed Services; referred to Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel. Reported to the Senate (S.Rept. 97-58), with amendment, May 6. Called up by unanimous consent in Senate; passed the Senate, amended, May 14.

HEARINGS

- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense appropriations for 1978. Part 5: Recruiting activities, advanced logistics systems, testimony of Members of Congress and other individuals and organizations. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. p. 1-197.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Military posture... Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1981... and... Armed Forces Education Assistance Act of 1980. Part 5 of 6 parts, Military personnel. Hearings, 96th Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 849 p.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Military Personnel. Continuing review of the All-Volunteer Force. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session. July 11, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 24 p. (H.A.S.C. 95-98)
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Investigations. Improprieties of U.S. Army Recruiting Practices. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. July 30, Sept. 26, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 152 p. (H.A.S.C. 95-46)
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense appropriations, fiscal year 1981. Part 2-Manpower. Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 296 p.
- Military draft registration, fiscal years 1980-1981. Hearings, 96th Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,

1980. 212 p.

- Department of Defense appropriations for 1981. Part 10, General provisions and language, Guard and Reserve, testimony of Members of Congress and other interested individuals and organizations, reprogrammings, FY80. Hearings, 96th Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 1,497 p.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1981. Hearings, 96th Congress, 2nd session. Part 3, Manpower and personnel. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 725 p.
- Reinstitution of procedures for registration under the Military Selective Service Act. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Mar. 13, May 21, July 10, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 239 p.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel. Military recruiting practices. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d session. Oct. 10, 12, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 317 p.
- Status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session. June 20, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 286 p.
- Recruiting in the United States Army. Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st session. Nov. 19, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 103 p.
- Costs of the All-Volunteer Force. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session. Feb. 6, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978.

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Making additional funds available by transfer for the Selective Service System for 1980; report to accompany H.J.Res. 521. Apr. 18, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. (96th Congress, 2nd session. House. Report no. 96-885)
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982; report to accompany H.R. 3519. May 19, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. (97th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 97-71, Part I)
- U.S. Congress. House. Selective Service Reform. Message from the President of the United States, transmitting his proposal for Selective Service reform, together with a draft of proposed legislation to amend the military Selective Service Act to allow the registration of both men and women, pursuant to Section 811 of Public Law 96-107. Feb. 12, 1980.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 62 p. (96th Congress, 2nd session. House. Document no. 96-265)

- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Making additional funds available by transfer for the Selective Service System for 1980; report to accompany H.J.Res. 521. May 21, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. (96th Congress, 2nd session. Senate. Report no. 96-789)
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Achieving America's goals: National Service or the All-Volunteer Armed Force. February 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977: 121 p. At head of title: 95th Congress, 1st session. Committee print. LRS77-2100

- Authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1982 for military procurement, research and development, active duty, selected reserve, and civilian personnel strengths, civil defense, and for other purposes; report to accompany S. 815. May 6, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. (97th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 97-58)
- Requiring reinstatement of registration for certain persons under the Military Selective Service Act, and for other purposes; report to accompany S. 109. June 19, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 46 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-226)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 06/25/81 -- The Supreme Court ruled that requiring only men and not women to register for the draft was constitutional.
- 01/28/81 -- Secretary of Defense Weinberger, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that he felt registration might create "social strains" in American society due to its being equated with actual conscription. Secretary Weinberger reiterated the opposition of the Reagan Administration to draft registration, but stated that neither he nor the President planned to end it at present. General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated his support for registration and strongly criticized the All-Volunteer Force, stating that while it still might be made to work with increased compensation its overall effect had been pernicious for the military as a fighting force.
- 01/13/81 -- In confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate Frank C. Carlucci III stated that he felt that the All-Volunteer Force should be given "a little more time to either prove itself, or demonstrate that it cannot work." If it did not work, then he would be prepared to state so after such a test period. Mr. Carlucci also supported continuation of standby draft registration.

- 01/05/81 -- Registration of all men born in 1962 began. Hereafter, all men born in 1963 or later will be required to register upon reaching age 18.
- 12/16/80 -- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that a declining number of young men of military age in the mid-1980s may force the United States to return to the draft at that time.
- 07/28/80 -- Registration of men born in 1961 began.
- 07/21/80 -- Registration of men born in 1960 began.
- 07/02/80 -- President Carter issued Presidential Proclamation 4771, ordering the registration of men under the Military Selective Service Act to begin on July 21, 1980.
- 06/27/80 -- President Carter signed H.J.Res. 521, authorizing the transfer of funds from the DOD to the Selective Service System budget to begin registration, into law (P.L. 96-282).
- 06/25/80 -- The House approved the Senate version of H.J.Res. 521, authorizing the transfer of \$13.3 million from the Department of Defense to the Selective Service System to begin registration of young men.
- 06/19/80 -- Admiral Thomas Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the All-Volunteer Force was failing and publicly advocated a return to the draft.
- 06/12/80 -- The Senate approved (58-34) H.J.Res. 521, transferring \$13.3 million from DoD to the Selective Service System for purposes of beginning standby draft registration. An amendment added in the Senate Appropriations Committee by Senator Hatfield requiring that registration forms provide a space for a registrant to indicate whether or not he was a conscientious objector was deleted on the floor of the Senate.
- 05/13/80 -- The Senate Appropriations Committee reported H.J.Res. 521, transferring \$13.3 million from DOD to Selective Service, with an amendment by Senator Hatfield requiring that registration forms include space for a registrant to indicate if he is a conscientious objector.
- 04/29/80 -- By an 8-4 vote, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies approved H.Con.Res. 521 as passed by the House.
- 04/22/80 -- The House approved 218-188 a House Appropriations Committee recommendation to transfer \$13.3 million to the Selective Service System in order to begin standby draft registration of 19- and 20-year-old males this summer. The vote came on an amendment to H.J.Res. 521, which originally provided \$4.7 million to upgrade the standby status of

Selective Service short of requiring registration.

- 04/17/80 -- The House Appropriations Committee voted 26-23 to transfer \$13.3 million from the DOD to the Selective Service System in order to begin the registration of males ages 19 and 20.
- 03/07/80 -- The House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee voted 8 to 1 to exclude women from President Carter's draft registration plan.
- 03/05/80 -- The Administration's request for FY80 supplemental funds for Selective Service ran into a snag as Congress learned it had exceeded its spending limit for FY80. The Administration's money proposal for registration was frozen until either Congress approved a third concurrent resolution or other funds were found in the FY80 budget for transfer to Selective Service.
- 02/27/80 -- The House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD and Independent Agencies, on a tie 6-6 vote, defeated the Administration's request for funds to begin draft registration. The subcommittee recommended an appropriation of \$4.3 million to enable Selective Service to prepare to register, but not to begin it.
- 02/08/80 -- President Carter requested that the Congress approve mandatory registration of both men and women for the draft. Persons turning age 19 and 20 in 1980 would begin registering in the summer of 1980. Those turning 18 in 1980 would have to register later in 1980, and in 1981 and thereafter each person would be required to register upon reaching their 18th birthday. The President stated that he had no intention of modifying current policies or statutes which bar women from various combat assignments. The President reiterated his position that he saw no need at the time for a reinstitution of actual conscription.
- 01/23/80 -- In his State of the Union message, President Carter announced that he had "determined that the Selective Service System must now be revitalized." He stated that in February 1980 he would send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress to begin standby draft registration to "meet future mobilization needs rapidly as they arise."
- 09/12/79 -- By a recorded vote of 252-163, the full House defeated a measure proposed by the House Armed Services Committee in the FY80 Defense appropriation authorization bill (H.R. 4040) to begin standby draft registration of 18-year-old males in 1981.
- 06/11/79 -- The Senate Armed Services Committee voted 12-5 in favor of S. 109, as amended, which requires the President to commence registering 18- to 26-year-old

males effective Jan. 2, 1980.

- 05/15/79 -- The House Armed Services Committee approved its version of the FY80 DOD Appropriation Authorization bill, requiring the President to commence standby draft registration on Jan. 1, 1981, of males who become 18 after Dec. 31, 1980.
- 03/13/79 -- In testimony before the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Bernard W. Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, proposed resumption of the draft in order to bring the Army Individual Ready Reserve to war requirements strength. Later in the same day, Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., issued a statement directly disagreeing with that of General Rogers. Secretary Alexander stated that there was no need for a return to the draft at the present time, and that such a return would be "unnecessary, unfair, and counterproductive" to the Army's interests.
- 01/29/79 -- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in congressional testimony supporting an upgrading of the standby Selective Service System, stated that any new legislation requiring standby draft registration should apply to young women as well as young men. He did not, however, endorse the resumption of standby registration. General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in similar congressional testimony, did endorse the resumption of standby registration, but stated that the inclusion of women in such registration (and possible actual conscription) would not fill actual manpower needs for large numbers of ground combat replacements for anticipated casualties and force expansion.
- 03/18/77 -- Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers stated that if it becomes necessary to resume a peacetime draft, "very serious consideration must be given" to making women subject to it.
- 03/01/77 -- President Carter stated that he had no intention at the present time of asking the Congress to reinstitute the draft, but that he would not hesitate to do so if needed. The President further stated that if a return to the draft were required, he would be inclined to make it "more comprehensive" than the pre-1973 system. He specifically mentioned not allowing draft deferments for college students.
- 10/01/76 -- The Selective Service System completed strength reductions necessary to place it in "deep standby" status, and thus incapable of meeting DOD mobilization requirements for draftees.
- 01/23/76 -- The annual registration of potential Selective Service System draftees scheduled for spring 1976 was cancelled.

- 04/30/75 -- All Selective Service System registration and classification procedures were totally suspended.
- 11/28/74 -- Under a special early release program, the last draftees remaining in the Army on other than a voluntary basis were allowed to separate from the Army up to a month early. These men had been drafted during September-December 1972.
- 06/30/73 -- The legal authority of the President to induct men into the Armed Forces expired, with certain minor exceptions.
- 01/27/73 -- Upon the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement, the Department of Defense announced that all involuntary inductions would cease immediately.
- 12/31/72 -- What eventually became the last draftees to enter the Armed Forces were inducted.
- 09/28/71 -- With the signing of P.L. 92-129 (the 1971 amendments to the Military Selective Service Act) into law, the three-month gap in the authority of the President to induct individuals into the Armed Forces ended and drafting individuals was legally authorized until June 30, 1973.
- 06/30/71 -- The authority of the President to induct individuals into the Armed Forces expired in the middle of debate on the proposed Military Selective Service Act amendments of 1971.
- 04/23/70 -- President Nixon proposed in a message to Congress that induction authority be extended until June 30, 1973, and that thereafter the Armed Forces be manned solely by volunteers.
- 02/20/70 -- The Gates Commission submitted its report with favorable recommendations toward creating an All-Volunteer Force.
- 03/27/69 -- The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (the Gates Commission) was created.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES

- Coffey, Kenneth J. Strategic implications of the All-Volunteer Force: the conventional defense of Central Europe. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina press, 1979.
- Cooper, Richard V. L. Military manpower and the all-volunteer force. Report R-1450-ARPA. Santa Monica, Calif., the Rand Corporation, Sept. 1977. 407 p.
- Keeley, John B., ed. All-Volunteer Force and American society. Charlottesville, Virginia: University press of Virginia, 1978.
- Laird, Melvin R. People, not hardware: the highest defense priority. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980. 24 p.

- Moskos, Charles C. Saving the All-Volunteer Force. The Public interest, fall 1980: 74-89.
- Moskos, Charles C. and Morris Janowitz. Five years of the All-Volunteer Force; 1973-1978. Armed Forces and society, Feb. 1979: 171-218.
- The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force The Gates Commission. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Feb. 1970. 211 p.
- Selective Service System. Semiannual reports of the director of selective service, Jan. 1, 1973-Present. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973-.
- U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Improving the readiness of the Army Reserve and National Guard: a framework for debate. Budget issues paper for fiscal year 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 1978. 58 p.
- Costs of manning the active-duty military; staff working paper. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., May 1980. 47 p.
- Costs of the National Service Act (H.R. 2206): A Technical Analysis. Staff Working Paper. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Dec. 1980. 42 p.
- National service programs and their effects on military manpower and civilian youth problems. Budget issue paper for fiscal year 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1978. 93 p.
- The Selective Service System: mobilization capabilities and options for improvement. Budget issues paper for fiscal year 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., November 1978. 53 p.
- U.S. Defense Manpower Commission. Defense manpower: the keystone of national security. Report to the President and the Congress. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Apr. 1976. 518 p.
- U.S. Dept. of Defense. Annual Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, FY82. Jan. 19, 1981. Washington, 1981 317 p. + appendixes.
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics). America's volunteers: a report on the all-volunteer armed forces, Dec. 31, 1978. Washington, 1978. 390 p.
- Office of the Deputy Assistant of Defense (Reserve Affairs). Reserve compensation system study final report and supporting papers. Washington, Department of Defense, processed, June 30, 1978: 4 vols.
- Manpower Requirements Report for FY82. Washington, February 1981. 231 p.

Manpower requirements report for FY82. Pension Washington, April 1981 . 40 p.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Additional cost of the all-volunteer force. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO report nos. FPCD-78-11, B-157371. Feb. 6, 1978. 103 p.

----- Actions to improve parts of the military manpower mobilization systems are underway. Report to the Honorable Bennet M. Stewart by the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO Report nos. FPCD-80-58 and B-199333. July 22, 1980. 14 p.

----- Can the Army and Air Force Reserves support the Active Force effectively? Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO report nos. LCD-79-404 and B-146964. Apr. 25, 1979. Washington 1979. 173 p.

----- Can the individual Reserves fill mobilization needs? Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO report nos. FPCD-79-3, B-148167. June 28, 1979. 34 p.

----- Critical manpower problems restrict the use of National Guard and Reserve forces. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO report nos. FPCD-79-58, B-157371. July 11, 1979. 111 p.

----- Difficulties in selected Army Reserves recruiting under the All-Volunteer Force. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO report nos. FPCD-79-71 and B-157371. Aug. 20, 1979. Washington 1979. 26 p.

----- Efficiency of Reserve and Guard training has improved since 1974, but more can be done. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO report nos. FPCD-79-59, B-179230. July 30, 1979. 71 p.

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "A"

PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTED RECRUITING OBJECTIVE MET, FY 73-PRESENT

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD Total
FY 73	98	92	100	100	97
FY 74	94	99	85	100	97
FY 75	102	101	101	102	102
FY 76	100	100	100	101	100
FY TQ (Jul-Sep 1976)	96	95	96	101	96
FY 77	99	96	95	100	98
FY 78	98	94	100	100	98
FY 79	90	94	98	98	93
FY 80	100	100	100	100	100
FY 81 (1st Half)	99	103	103	100	101

ACTUAL AND AUTHORIZED ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTHS, IN THOUSANDS FY 64-PRESENT
(AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS IN PARENTHESES)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD Total
FY 64	973 (NA)	668 (NA)	190 (NA)	857 (NA)	2,687 (NA)
FY 73	810 (829)	565 (602)	196 (198)	691 (701)	2,253 (2,330)
FY 77	782 (789)	530 (541)	192 (192)	571 (571)	2,075 (2,093)
FY 78	772 (787)	530 (536)	191 (192)	570 (571)	2,062 (2,085)
FY 79	759 (776)	524 (524)	185 (190)	559 (566)	2,027 (2,056)
FY 80	777 (777)	527 (528)	188 (189)	558 (558)	2,050 (2,052)
FY 81 (31 May 81)	774 (775)	540 (537)	186 (188)	564 (565)	2,065 (2,065)

NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN,
PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD Total
FY 64	67	58	61	84	68
FY 73	58	70	50	84	66
FY 77	59	73	70	88	69
FY 78	74	77	75	85	77
FY 79	64	77	75	82	73
FY 80	54	75	78	83	61
FY 81 (1st Half)	72	73	71	84	75

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "A" (CONTINUED)

BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS,
MEN AND WOMEN, FY 73-PRESENT

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD
FY 64*	14	5	9	10	11
FY 73	19	11	19	14	16
FY 77	29	11	21	11	20
FY 78	34	13	24	14	23
FY 79	37	16	28	16	26
FY 80	30	13	23	15	21
FY 81 (1st Half)	25	12	18	14	18

*Includes males only, other minorities: Asian American and Indians
(Navy includes blacks only).

BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTED STRENGTH,
MEN AND WOMEN, END FY 73-PRESENT

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD
FY 64	12	6	9	10	10
FY 73	18	8	17	14	14
FY 77	26	9	18	15	18
FY 78	29	9	15	15	19
FY 79	32	11	22	16	21
FY 80	33	11	23	16	22

WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTH, END FY 73-PRESENT

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD
FY 64	1.2	1.2	0.8	1.0	1.1
FY 73	2.5	2.2	1.2	2.9	2.5
FY 77	6.6	4.4	2.0	7.0	5.7
FY 78	7.5	4.7	2.6	8.7	6.6
FY 79	7.8	5.4	3.0	9.4	7.2
FY 80	8.9	6.6	3.6	10.8	8.4
FY 81 (28 Feb 81)	9.2	6.9	3.7	11.1	8.6

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "A" (CONTINUED)

NONPRIOR SERVICE ACTIVE FORCE ENLISTMENTS, MEN AND WOMEN, PERCENT IN MENTAL CATEGORIES I, II, AND III (SUPERIOR, ABOVE AVERAGE, AND AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE)**

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD Total
FY 64	80	89	91	96	85
FY 73	84	84	84	96	87
FY 77**	56	79	73	94	70
FY 78**	61	84	73	94	75
FY 79**	54	82	74	91	70
FY 80**	48	83	73	90	67
FY 81 (1st Half)	70	87	85	92	82

**All DoD mental test scores for FY 1976-1980 were discovered to be invalid. Recent analysis has revealed that these scores substantially understated the proportion of recruits in Mental Category IV (below average) and overstated the proportion in Mental Category III (average). The proportions of recruits in Mental Category I and II (superior and above average) were apparently recorded somewhat more accurately by the original tests; DoD found less error in their case. These scores for FY 1976-1980 represent recomputations of the original raw data to correct for the errors discovered. A new test, designed to avoid the errors of the old, was introduced at the beginning of FY 1981.

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "B"

SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY STRENGTHS, END FY 73-PRESENT (IN THOUSANDS)

	Army Natl Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Natl Guard	Air Force Reserve	DoD Total
FY 64	382	269	123	46	73	61	953
FY 70	409	261	128	49	90	50	987
FY 73	386	235	126	38	90	44	919
FY 77	355	189	90	31	92	50	808
FY 78	341	186	83	33	92	54	788
FY 79	346	190	88	33	93	57	807
FY 80	367	207	87	35	96	59	851
FY 81	380	217	88	35	98	59	877

(30 Apr 81)

SELECTED RESERVE NONPRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENTS, PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES*

	Army Natl Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Natl Guard	Air Force Reserve	DoD Total
FY 70	93	97	94	93	96	98	95
FY 73	66	84	88	39	91	92	68
FY 77	38	52	83	52	85	83	45
FY 78	35	31	66	44	85	83	39
FY 79	38	26	60	38	86	83	38
FY 80	40	32	57	36	83	83	43
FY 81 (1st Half)	38	24	61	70	78	84	41

SELECTED RESERVE NONPRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENTS, PERCENT IN MENTAL CATEGORIES I-III (SUPERIOR, ABOVE AVERAGE, AND AVERAGE)

	Army Natl Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Natl Guard	Air Force Reserve	DoD Total
FY 70	95	95	100	98	99	98	95
FY 73	69	88	99	78	97	89	85
FY 77**	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
FY 78**	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
FY 79**	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	72
FY 80**	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	73
FY 81 (1st Half)	88	77	89	91	100	98	86

*A significant minority of non-high school graduate recruits are in their senior year of high school rather than dropouts.

**All DoD mental test scores for FY 1976-1980 were discovered to be invalid. Recent analysis has revealed that these scores substantially understated the proportion of recruits in Mental Category IV (below average) and overstated the proportion in Mental Category III (average). The proportions of recruits in Mental Category I and II (superior and above average) were apparently recorded somewhat more accurately by the original tests; DoD found less error in their case. A new test, designed to avoid errors of the old, was introduced at the beginning of FY 1981. Recomputations of the original raw data for Selected Reserve recruits in FY 1977-1978 have not yet been completed; only partial recomputations of the test scores of Selected Reserve recruits in FY 1979-1980 are available.

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLES "B" (CONTINUED)

WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH, END FY 71-PRESENT

	Army Natl Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Natl Guard	Air Force Reserve	DoD Total
FY 71	0	0.4	0.9	0.2	0.6	1.9	0.4
FY 73	0.1	1.1	1.3	0.3	1.1	3.0	0.8
FY 77	3.5	11.4	4.3	2.3	6.1	10.2	6.1
FY 78	4.0	12.0	4.5	2.8	7.0	11.6	6.8
FY 79	4.2	12.4	6.2	3.0	7.7	12.4	7.3
FY 80	4.6	14.1	6.2	2.8	8.5	13.1	8.0
FY 81	4.7	14.4	6.2	2.7	8.8	13.6	8.3

(30 Apr 81)

BLACKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH, END FY 71-PRESENT

	Army Natl Guard	Army Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Natl Guard	Air Force Reserve	DoD Total
FY 71	1.2	2.2	2.0	3.2	1.0	2.8	1.7
FY 73	3.2	5.6	3.5	12.6	2.0	4.2	4.2
FY 77	14.5	19.6	5.9	18.0	5.7	11.8	13.8
FY 78	16.5	21.6	5.9	19.3	6.4	13.2	15.4
FY 79	16.9	23.3	6.7	20.1	6.8	14.0	16.0
FY 80	16.7	23.6	7.1	19.9	7.1	14.3	16.3
FY 81	16.4	23.6	7.5	19.7	7.2	14.3	16.3

(30 Apr 81)

CRS ISSUE BRIEF 77032--MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

TABLE "C"

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE STRENGTHS, END FY 73-PRESENT (IN THOUSANDS)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD
FY 73	759	217	116	137	1,229
FY 77	160	106	45	64	375
FY 78	177	93	40	46	356
FY 79	206	86	59	44	396
FY 80	212	97	57	47	413
FY 81	211	104	51	44	410

(30 Apr 81)

TABLES "D"

UNADJUSTED FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT RATES FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL*
(percentage of those eligible)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD Total</u>
FY 64	28	23	14	30	25
FY 73	38	23	13	20	24
FY 74	33	33	17	31	30
FY 75	39	40	20	40	37
FY 76	21	35	26	37	30
FY 77	33	37	29	39	35
FY 78	36	40	29	41	37
FY 79	43	38	20	38	37
FY 80	51	37	23	36	39
FY 81 (1st Half)	59	44	28	44	45

UNADJUSTED CAREER SECOND-TERM AND LATER REELISTMENT RATES FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL*
(percentage of those eligible)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD Total</u>
FY 64	84	90	86	90	88
FY 73	63	92	82	93	83
FY 74	75	80	80	90	81
FY 75	75	81	73	90	82
FY 76	71	75	78	82	76
FY 77	70	68	72	86	75
FY 78	69	64	69	82	72
FY 79	66	62	52	82	68
FY 80	69	67	50	82	71
FY 81 (1st Half)	74	73	74	86	77

*Statistics here do not include draftees, but pre-FY 1976 figures include a substantial proportion of voluntary enlistees whose original enlistment was undoubtedly draft-induced. The "unadjusted" reenlistment rate is defined as "the ratio of total reenlistments occurring in a given period to total separations of personnel eligible to reenlist in the same period, expressed as a percentage."

77032

TABLE "E"

PERCENTAGE OF ACTIVE DUTY MALE FIRST-TERM ENLISTEES WHO FAIL TO
COMPLETE THREE YEARS OF INITIAL SERVICE*
(Based on Year of Entry into Service)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD Total</u>
FY 71	26	28	31	21	26
FY 72	28	32	24	26	28
FY 73	31	34	32	30	32
FY 74	39	38	37	31	37
FY 75	37	35	38	29	35
FY 76	37	31	35	26	34
FY 77	34	29	29	26	31
FY 78*	31	26	30	27	29
FY 79*	31	27	29	27	29

*Estimated. These groups have not had time to complete their full three years of service.