Iraq: Weapons Programs, Compliance, and U.S. Policy

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Iraq: Weapons Programs, Compliance, and U.S. Policy

SUMMARY

After accusing Iraq of failing to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions that require Iraq to rid itself of WMD, the Bush Administration began military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, there was heightened U.S. concern about the potential threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and alleged ties to terrorist groups, to which Iraq might transfer WMD. However, many governments did not support U.S. military action to disarm Iraq because it failed to receive U.N. authorization.

Part of the debate over U.S. policy centered on whether Iraq’s WMD programs could be ended through U.N. weapons inspections. During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) made considerable progress in dismantling and monitoring Iraq’s but was unable to finish verifying Iraq’s claim that it has destroyed all its WMD or related equipment. Iraq’s refusal of full cooperation with UNSCOM eventually prompted U.S.-British military action in December 1998. All inspectors withdrew and Iraq was uninspected during 1998-2002, leaving uncertainty as to the status of Iraq’s WMD programs. At the start of military action, many of the questions about those programs remained unresolved.

On November 10, 1994, as required, Iraq accepted the U.N.-designated land border with Kuwait (confirmed by Resolution 833) as well as Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq has not detailed the fate of about 600 Kuwaitis still missing from the war and has not returned all Kuwaiti property taken. Iraq initially rejected a 1991 U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program to address humanitarian needs, but it later accepted a revised version of that plan, operational since December 1996 but suspended due to the war.

Iraq was widely deemed non-compliant in other areas, especially human rights issues. A U.S.-led no-fly zone has provided some protection to Kurdish northern Iraq since April 1991. Since August 1992, a no-fly zone has been enforced over southern Iraq, where historically repressed Iraqi Shiites are concentrated. The zone was expanded in August 1996, but Iraq nonetheless maintained a substantial ground presence in the south. Iraq has openly challenged both no-fly zones since December 1998.
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On November 8, 2002, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, giving U.N. weapons inspectors new authorities; inspections began November 27. After several reports by the U.N. weapons inspectors on their work, the U.N. Security Council did not agree to authorize use of force against Iraq. All inspectors were withdrawn, and the United States, Britain, and a few other allies began a military offensive against Iraq on March 19, 2003. (See CRS Report RL31715, Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview.)

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

In response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait. After the Persian Gulf war (January 16 - February 28, 1991), a ceasefire was declared in Security Council Resolution 686 (March 2, 1991). The primary ceasefire resolution is Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), which required Iraq – in return for a graduated easing of sanctions – to end its weapons of mass destruction programs, recognize Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property, and end support for terrorism. Iraq accepted the resolution. Iraq was required by Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991) to end repression of its people. In forty reviews (at 60-day intervals) of Iraqi compliance from the end of the Gulf war in 1991 until August 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council maintained the comprehensive international sanctions on Iraq’s imports and exports imposed by Security Council Resolution 661 (August 6, 1990). After the breakdown of the original weapons inspections regime in December 1998, two additional major resolutions (1284 of December 17, 1999 and 1441 of November 8, 2002) were adopted in an effort to resume U.N. disarmament efforts. Including Resolution 1441, a total of 17 U.N. resolutions required Iraq’s complete dismantlement of its WMD programs. (See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade; and CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, the Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq.)

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its prohibited WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program of WMD facilities (Resolution 715, October 11, 1991). The monitoring program, accepted by Iraq in November 1993, consisted of visitations and technical surveillance of about 300 sites. Under Resolution 1051 (March 27, 1996), U.N. weapons inspectors monitored, at point of entry and at end-use destination, Iraq’s imports of any dual use items.

Confrontations over access to suspected WMD sites began almost as soon as UNSCOM began operations in April 1991, prompting adoption of Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991) requiring unfettered access to all sites and disclosure by Iraq of all its WMD suppliers. During March 1996 - October 1997, Iraq impeded inspectors from entering Iraqi security
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service and military facilities, and it interfered with some UNSCOM flights. These actions, which were not resolved by a March 1996 side agreement between UNSCOM and Iraq governing pre-notification of inspections of defense and security sites, prompted Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) and other Council statements (such as on June 13, 1997) demanding Iraqi cooperation. Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) threatened travel restrictions against Iraqi officials committing the infractions, and Resolution 1134 (October 23, 1997) again threatened a travel ban and suspended sanctions reviews until April 1998.

1997-1998 Crises. Six days after that vote, Iraq barred American UNSCOM personnel from conducting inspections, and on November 13, 1997, it expelled the Americans. Resolution 1137 (November 12, 1997), imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi officials. (On November 13, 1997, the House adopted H.Res. 322, backing unilateral U.S. military action as a last resort. The Senate did not act on a similar resolution, S.Con.Res. 71, because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein.) In November 1997 and February 1998, Russia and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM to resume inspections. The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for access to eight “presidential sites” by weapons inspectors and diplomatic observers. Resolution 1154 (March 2, 1998) accepted that agreement, threatening “the severest consequences” if Iraq reneged. Iraq allowed presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings) during March 26-April 3, 1998, the travel ban on Iraqi officials was lifted, and sanctions reviews resumed.


Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath. After a month of testing Iraq’s cooperation, UNSCOM said on December 15, 1998 that Iraq refused to yield known WMD-related documents and that it was obstructing inspections. All inspectors withdrew and a 70-hour U.S. and British bombing campaign followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998), directed against Iraqi WMD-capable facilities and military and security targets. After almost one year of negotiations, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 (December 17, 1999) by a vote of 11-0 (Russia, France, China, and Malaysia abstained), providing, subject to a vote of the Security Council, for the suspension of most sanctions if Iraq “fully cooperates” with a new WMD inspection body (UNMOVIC, U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission). The resolution called for inspectors to determine within 60 days of reentering Iraq what WMD elimination tasks remain and to report to the Council every three months. In January 2000, former IAEA director Hans Blix was named head of UNMOVIC. In the absence of Iraq’s agreement to allow in-country inspections during 1999-2002, UNMOVIC’s staff of 63 – all employees of the United Nations and not their individual
governments – reviewed documents and imagery, interviewed informants, and reviewed civilian contracts for goods purchased by Iraq to determine whether certain items subject to review (“Goods Review List” items) were included.

“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy. Amid a growing debate over whether to expand the post-September 11 “war on terrorism” to Iraq, based partly on fears that Iraq would not hesitate to use WMD or provide WMD to terrorist groups, in early 2002 President Bush began to build a case that the United States must act preemptively to change Iraq’s regime and prevent its re-emergence as a threat. In his January 2002 State of the Union speech he described Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea. One month prior to that speech, the House passed H.J.Res. 75 on December 20, 2001, by a vote of 392-12. The resolution called Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. inspectors a “material breach” of its international obligations and a mounting threat to peace and security. The resolution, not taken up in the Senate, did not explicitly authorize U.S. military action.

Resolution 1441. After an internal debate, the Administration decided to work through the U.N. Security Council to force Iraq to eliminate its suspected WMD. In a September 12, 2002 speech before the United Nations, President Bush implicitly threatened U.S. military action, unilateral if necessary, if the United Nations did not enforce existing resolutions on Iraq. Four days later, Iraq pledged to admit UNMOVIC inspectors without conditions, reversing a position taken during several meetings with the United Nations in 2002. On October 11, Congress completed work on a resolution (H.J.Res. 114, P.L. 107-243) authorizing the use of U.S. armed forces against Iraq.

After several weeks of negotiations, on November 8, 2002 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, with the following key provisions:

(1) declaring Iraq in material breach of pre-existing resolutions;
(2) giving Iraq 7 days to accept the resolution and 30 days (until December 8) to provide a full declaration of all WMD programs;
(3) requiring new inspections to begin within 45 days (December 23) and an interim progress report within 60 days thereafter (no later than February 21, 2003);
(4) declaring all sites, including presidential sites, subject to unfettered inspections;
(5) giving UNMOVIC the right to interview Iraqis in private, including taking them outside Iraq, and to freeze activity at a suspect site;
(6) forbidding Iraq from taking hostile acts against any country upholding U.N. resolutions, a provision that appeared to cover Iraq’s defiance of the “no fly zones;” and
(7) giving UNMOVIC the authority to report Iraqi non-compliance and the Security Council as a whole the opportunity to meet to consider how to respond to Iraqi non-compliance. This was interpreted by France and some other countries as requiring a second resolution to authorize force, although the United States disputed that interpretation.

Iraq accepted the resolution on November 13 in a defiant letter, and inspections began on November 27. Blix said the inspectors received full access in their inspections of about 450 sites (over 300 by UNMOVIC and 140 by the IAEA). On December 7, Iraq submitted its required declaration, but after comparing the Iraqi declaration to U.S. intelligence assessments, the Bush Administration said on December 19, 2002 that there were material omissions that constituted a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations. Blix criticized the
declaration as failing to clear up outstanding questions, although he did not call the declaration a material breach of Resolution 1441.

President Bush and other senior U.S. officials maintained that Iraq did not actively cooperate with the new disarmament effort. In briefings to the Security Council on January 27, February 14, and March 7, Blix and IAEA head Mohammad Baradei said that Iraq had failed to fully comply with Resolution 1441 but that Iraq had been providing more active cooperation in February - March and that inspections were making progress, including some substantive disarmament (destruction of the Al Samoud II missile).

Maintaining that the inspections process would not lead to Iraq’s disarmament, the United States, Britain, and Spain called for a Security Council vote on a resolution to set a short deadline for Iraq to clearly demonstrate full cooperation and voluntary disarmament or face use of force. After a few weeks of diplomacy, on March 17, 2003, the three countries determined that the Security Council would not vote in favor of the resolution, and they withdrew it. That night, President Bush issued an ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay to leave Iraq or face military action. At the same time, Secretary General Annan ordered the U.N. inspectors out of Iraq. Saddam rebuffed the ultimatum, and on March 19, U.S. military action (Operation Iraqi Freedom) began with air strikes on a facility where Saddam Hussein and other leaders were believed to be gathering.

**Post-War Inspections?** Press reports say that U.S. teams are following coalition forces fighting in Iraq to detect and catalogue any WMD uncovered in the course of the war. U.S.-led forces have captured some suspect sites, but no finds of WMD stockpiles have yet been announced. No WMD has been used against allied forces in the current war, but U.S. forces have uncovered Iraqi chemical protection suits and chemical weapons antidotes.

Some believe that UNMOVIC and IAEA might be asked to return to Iraq after the war to conduct additional inspections and investigative work on Iraq’s WMD programs. Just after the war started, IAEA Director Baradei said the IAEA should have a role to play in post-war Iraq.

The following summarizes outstanding issues on Iraq’s WMD.

**Nuclear Program**

**Current Status.** The United States believes that Iraq retained the expertise (about 7,000 scientists and engineers) and intention to rebuild its nuclear program. Administration officials pointed particularly to reputed attempts to purchase materials abroad, including uranium from Niger and aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear weapons program. IAEA chief Mohammad Baradei said March 7 that the IAEA believes the tubes were for use in conventional rocket programs, although their importation was not legal under the international sanctions regime. He also said documents alleging attempted procurement of uranium from Niger were “not authentic.” The IAEA said on January 27, 2003 that it had found no evidence Iraq had restarted a nuclear program, and it repeated that assessment March 7.

**Older Unresolved Questions.** During 1991-1994, despite Iraq’s initial declaration that it had no nuclear weapons facilities or unsafeguarded material, UNSCOM/IAEA
uncovered and dismantled a previously-undeclared network of about 40 nuclear research facilities, including three clandestine uranium enrichment programs (electromagnetic, centrifuge, and chemical isotope separation) as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation program. Inspectors found and dismantled (in 1992) Iraq’s nuclear weapons development program, and they found evidence of development of a radiological weapon ("dirty bomb"), which scatters nuclear material without an explosion. UNSCOM removed from Iraq all discovered nuclear reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated. Following the defection of Hussein Kamil (Saddam’s son-in-law and former WMD production czar) in August 1995, Iraq revealed it had launched a crash program in August 1990 to produce a nuclear weapon as quickly as possible by diverting fuel from its reactors for a nuclear weapon. The IAEA report of December 1, 1995 said that, if Iraq had proceeded with its crash program, Iraq might have produced a nuclear weapon by December 1992.

In 1997, the IAEA said that Iraq’s nuclear program had been ended and that it had a relatively complete picture of Iraq’s nuclear suppliers. A May 15, 1998 Security Council statement reflected a U.S.-Russian agreement to close the nuclear file if Iraq cleared up outstanding issues (nuclear design drawings, documents, and the fate of some nuclear equipment). An IAEA report of July 1998 indicated that some questions still remained, and the United States did not agree to close the file. In May 2000, the IAEA destroyed a nuclear centrifuge that Iraq had stored in Jordan in 1991. In January 2002, as it has in each of the past 3 years, IAEA inspectors verified that several tons of uranium remained sealed, acting under Iraq’s commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

**Chemical Weapons**

**Current Status.** In January 2003, UNMOVIC and Iraq found 16 chemical artillery munitions, believed empty. Iraq included an Iraqi Air Force document in its December 7 declaration that indicated that 6,500 chemical bombs were unaccounted for (13,000 bombs the document says were used versus 19,500 bombs Iraq previously said were used). An October 2002 CIA assessment, released by the Administration, said Iraq had renewed chemical weapons production and probably stocked a few hundred tons of agent. An UNMOVIC workplan on unresolved issues, submitted March 7, 2003, said UNMOVIC had found in Iraq a previously undeclared type of cluster munition that could deliver chemical or biological agents.

**Older Unresolved Questions.** UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel uncovered — 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces of production equipment items — and the destruction operation formally ended on June 14, 1994. In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that shells taken from Iraq in 1996 contained 97% pure mustard gas, indicating it was freshly produced. However, the fate of about 31,600 chemical shells, 550 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors remains unknown. The primary remaining chemical weapons questions center on VX nerve agent, which Iraq did not include in its initial 1991 declarations and of which no stockpile was ever located. Iraq did not prove it destroyed the chemical precursors. By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to force Iraq to admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had imported enough precursor — about 600 tons — to produce 200 tons of the agent. In late June 1998, UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army lab, contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in
stabilizing the agent. Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of VX. In March 2003, Iraq proposed a technical method to prove its assertions that it destroyed its VX in 1991. About 170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring. Iraq has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997.

**Biological Weapons**

**Current Status.** There are more unresolved questions about Iraq’s biological weapons than about any other WMD category; Iraq’s biological declarations during 1991-1998 were considered neither credible nor verifiable, and very little new was apparently included in Iraq’s December 7, 2002 declaration. The October 2002 CIA assessment said that Iraq had reactivated its biological program and that most elements of the program are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war. U.S. officials say Iraq has developed unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to deliver biological or chemical weapons, and Secretary of State Powell showed an artist’s sketch, based on intelligence information, of a mobile biological weapons production facility in his February 5, 2003 briefing to the Security Council. Blix said on March 7, 2003 that UNMOVIC had found mobile labs used for food testing, but no biological weapons labs. In February 2003, Iraq dug up, under UNMOVIC’s supervision, fragments of over 100 R-400 biological bombs (anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin) destroyed in 1991 and declared in August 1995.

**Older Unresolved Questions.** Iraq did not initially (1991) declare any biological materials, weapons, research, or facilities, and no biological weapons stockpile was ever uncovered. UNSCOM focused its investigation initially on the major biological research and development site at Salman Pak, but Iraq partially buried that facility shortly before the first inspections began. In August 1991, Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research program. In July 1995, Iraq modified its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive biological weapons program and that it had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin, clostridium, and ricin. According to UNSCOM, Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for producing biological agents during the 1980s, of which 4 tons remained unaccounted for. Iraq did not give UNSCOM information on its development of drop tanks and aerosol generators for biological weapons. UNSCOM had 86 biological sites under long-term monitoring. UNSCOM discovered and dismantled the Al Hakam facility on June 20, 1996. The White House said in late December 2001 that the anthrax used in the October 2001 mailings appeared to be from a domestic source, such as a U.S. military laboratory.

**Ballistic Missiles**

**Current Status.** Iraq made progress in developing permitted-range missiles – the Ababil and Samoud programs – according to the January 2002 CIA report to Congress and, prior to Desert Fox, UNSCOM had been monitoring about 63 missile sites and 159 items of equipment, as well as 2,000 permitted missiles. Iraq’s December 7 declaration said some flight tests of these missiles did exceed the allowed range by about 50 km, and Blix ordered the destruction of the Al Samoud (about 120 missiles) and related production equipment. Iraq began the destruction by the deadline of March 1, and about half of the missile force was destroyed by the time the war started. Iraq’s “Fatah” program was being studied to see if its range exceeds allowed limits. Some of these missiles have been fired by Iraq into Kuwait.
during the war thus far, but almost all have been intercepted by U.S. Patriot interceptor systems.

**Unresolved Questions.** U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 required the destruction of all Iraqi ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. UNCOM accounted for 817 of 819 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, 130 of which survived the Gulf war, as well as all 14 declared mobile launchers and 60 fixed launch pads. U.S. analysts believe Iraq might have concealed as many as 12 Scud-like missiles and that it was manufacturing propellants for missiles of ranges longer than those allowed. Thus far in the current war against Iraq, no firing of any Scud or Scud-range missiles by Iraq have been announced, and Iraq has not fired any missiles at Israel thus far.

UNCOM’s October 1998 report said it had been able to account for at least 43 of the 45 chemical and biological (CBW) warheads Iraq said it unilaterally destroyed in 1991. (The warheads were unearthed in mid-1998.) An additional 30 chemical warheads were destroyed under UNCOM supervision. UNCOM also accounted for all but 50 conventional Scud warheads and said it made progress establishing a material balance for Scud engine components. Unresolved issues include missile program documentation, 300 tons of special missile propellant, and indigenous missile production (30 indigenously-made warheads and 7 missiles).

There is evidence of past Iraqi cheating on missile issues. In December 1995, after Jordan reported seizing 115 Russian-made missile guidance components allegedly bound for Iraq, UNCOM said Iraq had procured some missile components since 1991, a violation of sanctions. (That month, UNCOM retrieved prohibited missile guidance gyroscopes, suitable for a 2,000 mile range missile, from Iraq’s Tigris River, apparently procured from Russia’s defense-industrial establishment.)

**Human Rights/War Crimes Issues**

U.S. and U.N. human rights reports since the Gulf war have repeatedly described Iraq as a gross violator of human rights. In 1994, the Clinton Administration said it was considering presenting a case against Iraq to the International Court of Justice under the 1948 Genocide Convention. U.N. Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der Stoel’s February 1994 report said that Convention might be violated by Iraq’s abuses against the Shiite “Marsh Arabs” in southern Iraq, including drainage of the marshes where they live. In February 2002, Iraq allowed the U.N. human rights rapporteur for Iraq, Andreas Mavromatis of Cyprus, to visit Iraq, the first such visit since 1992. On October 20, 2002, Saddam Hussein granted an amnesty and released virtually all prisoners in Iraq, calling the move gratitude for his purported “100%” victory in a referendum (no opponent) on his leadership on October 15, 2002.

**War Crimes Trial.** U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29, 1990) calls on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related atrocities to the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1992, (P.L. 102-138, October 28, 1991, section 301) stated the sense of Congress that the President should propose to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137, (passed the House November 13, 1997);
International Terrorism/September 11

U.N. Resolution 687 required Iraq to end support for international terrorism, and Iraq made a declaration that it would do so in 1991. FBI Director Robert Mueller said in early May 2002 that, after an exhaustive FBI and CIA investigation, no direct link has been found between Iraq and any of the September 11 hijackers, although some still assert that hijacker Mohammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in April 2001. Senior U.S. officials said in September 2002, and again in January 2003, that there are contacts between Al Qaeda members and Iraq, that Iraq had helped Al Qaeda train with chemical weapons in the past, and that the Ansar Islam faction in northern Iraq has contacts with Baghdad. In a February 5, 2003 briefing to the Security Council, Secretary Powell offered additional U.S. intelligence of these linkages. U.S. forces bombed the Ansar enclave in northern Iraq in the opening days of the current war.

Others maintain that Baghdad has had little contact with Al Qaeda because it differs with Al Qaeda’s Islamist ideology and because doing so would hurt Iraq’s efforts to improve relations with moderate Arab states that are threatened by Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, in a February 12, 2003 audiotape, exhorted the Iraqi people to resist a U.S. invasion but also criticized Saddam and his ruling Ba’th Party as socialist “infidels.” The CIA told Congress on October 7, 2002 that Iraq would likely not conduct a terrorist attack using WMD against the United States unless there were a U.S.-Iraq war.

Iraq remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and, according to the State Department’s reports on international terrorism (most recently the report for 2001, issued May 21, 2002), continues to harbor the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine Liberation Front of Abu Abbas. In August 2002, Abu Nidal died (committed suicide or was killed) as Iraqi police went to arrest him for alleged contacts with foreign governments opposed to Baghdad. Iraq says it is paying the families of Palestinian suicide bombers $25,000, and some press reports say Iraq is cultivating Palestinians that might unleash anti-U.S. or anti-Israel terrorism in the event of a U.S.-led war against Iraq. (See CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002.)

Iraq-Kuwait Issues

Resolution 1284 requires reports on the issues discussed below but, unlike Resolution 687, does not link the easing of any sanctions to Iraqi compliance on Kuwait-related issues. Resolution 1441 does not impose any new Kuwait-related requirements on Iraq.

Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty. Resolution 687 required Iraq to annul its annexation of Kuwait, directed the U.N. Secretary-General to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait border, and established a demilitarized zone 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into
Kuwait. Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992) endorsed border decisions taken by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (established May 2, 1991) that, in November 1992, finished demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border as described in an October 1963 agreement between Iraq and Kuwait. The border took effect January 15, 1993. The new line deprived Iraq of part of Umm Qasr port and a strip of the Rumaylah oil field, which straddles the border. On March 18, 1993, the Commission determined the sea border, allowing both countries access to the Gulf. Resolution 833 (May 27, 1993) demanded that Iraq and Kuwait accept the final border demarcation. On November 10, 1994, Iraq formally recognized Kuwait in a motion signed by Saddam Hussein. At the Arab summit in Beirut (March 27-29, 2002), Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to Kuwait’s territorial integrity and pledged to cooperate to determine the fate of missing Kuwaitis (see below). On December 7, 2002, Saddam Hussein issued an “apology” to Kuwait for the invasion, but Kuwait rejected it as insincere.

Until it ended operations on the eve of the current war, the 32-nation U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established by Resolutions 687 and 689 April 9, 1991), monitored border violations. The United States contributed 11 personnel to the 197 observers in UNIKOM, which was considered a U.N. peacekeeping operation. Under Resolution 806 (February 5, 1993), passed after Iraqi incursions into the demilitarized zone in January 1993 (and other incidents), a 908-member Bengali troop contingent supplements the observer group. Kuwait furnished two-thirds of UNIKOM’s $51 million annual budget. The United States contributes about $4.5 million per year to UNIKOM.

Kuwaiti Detainees and Property. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to account for Kuwaiti and other nationals detained in Iraq during the Persian Gulf crisis. Of an initial 628 Kuwaiti cases, 608 are unresolved (ICRC figure as of May 2000), as are the cases of an additional 17 Saudi nationals. Iraq admitted to having arrested and detained 126 Kuwaitis, but did not provide enough information to resolve their fate. Only three cases were resolved since 1995. Since January 1995, Iraq and Kuwait were meeting every month on the Iraq-Kuwait border, along with U.S., British, French, and Saudi representatives, but Iraq has boycotted the meetings since Operation Desert Fox. In February 2000, retired Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontsov was appointed to a new post (created by Resolution 1284) of U.N. coordinator on the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons and unreturned property. Iraq has not allowed him to visit Iraq, and in April, June, and August 2000, as well as in March, April, and June 2001, the Security Council has issued statements of concern about the lack of progress. On December 12, 2002, Iraq publicly invited Vorontsov to visit, but no visit occurred. In January 2003, Iraq held a few meetings with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the issue, pledging to bring forward new information on the fate of the missing, but no outstanding cases were resolved. In April 2002, Iraq offered to receive a U.S. team to discuss the case of missing Gulf war Navy pilot Michael Speicher, but Defense Department officials declined on doubts of the benefits of a visit.

U.N. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to return all property seized from Kuwait. In the first few years after the cease-fire, Iraq returned some Kuwaiti civilian and military equipment, including U.S.-made Improved Hawk air defense missiles, and a June 2000 Secretary General report and a June 19, 2000 Security Council statement did note that Iraq had returned “a substantial amount of property.” However, since 1994, U.S. officials have accused Iraq of returning to Kuwait some captured Iranian equipment that was never part of Kuwait’s arsenal and of using Kuwaiti missiles and armored personnel carriers...
during Iraq’s October 1994 troop move toward the Kuwait border. The United Nations and Kuwait say Iraq has not returned extensive Kuwaiti state archives and museum pieces, as well as military equipment including eight Mirage F-1 aircraft, 245 Russian-made fighting vehicles, 90 M113 armored personnel carriers, one Hawk battery, 3,750 Tow anti-tank missiles, and 675 Russian-made surface-to-air missile batteries. Iraq claimed the materiel was left behind or destroyed when Iraq evacuated Kuwait. In July 2002, an agreement was reached on a “mechanism” for Iraq to return Kuwait’s state archives (six truckloads of documents) to Kuwait. Iraq began the return of tons of documents on October 20, 2002, although Kuwait says preliminary assessments suggest key archives were not returned. Iraq returned some additional property in early February 2003.

**Reparations Payments**

The U.N. Security Council has set up a mechanism for compensating the victims of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (individuals, governments, and corporations), using 25% (reduced from 30% in December 2000) of the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales. As of June 21, 2002 – following an award of $4.5 billion to Kuwait’s government and state-owned oil industry – the Compensation Commission (UNCC) has approved claims worth about $43.6 billion, of a total asserted value of $320 billion claims submitted. Following an April 2002 payout of about $1 billion, which included $800 million in payments to Kuwait, the UNCC has paid out about $14.8 billion. Awards to U.S. claimants thus far total over $666 million. In September 2000, the UNCC governing council approved an award to Kuwait of $15.9 billion for oil revenues lost because of the Iraqi occupation and the aftermath of the war (burning oil wells), although current payment schedules will provide only a small fraction of that award (about $50 million) until 2003. In June 2001, the UNCC approved $243 million in payments to all of Iraq’s immediate neighbors (except Turkey) for studies of Gulf war environmental damage. Of this amount, $5 million was approved for Iraq’s legal expenses to counter the expected environmental reparations claims. Kuwait was awarded $700 million in October 2002 to cover the cost of removing Iraqi mines laid in the Gulf war.

Several legislative proposals (“Iraq Claims Act”) to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets (about $2.4 billion) in the United States (separate from the U.N. compensation process) were not enacted, because of differences over categories of claimants that should receive priority. In the 107th Congress, H.R. 1632 proposes to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets primarily to U.S. victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Some might argue that this group of claimants is covered under the U.N. process discussed above and that the frozen assets in the United States should be used for those with claims resulting from events prior to the Iraqi invasion. On March 20, 2003, President Bush issued an executive order for the U.S. government to confiscate the frozen Iraqi assets and to hold them for reconstruction of Iraq following the current war. (See CRS Report 98-240, *Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues.*)

**U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program**

As international concerns for the plight of the Iraqi people grew, the United States had increasing difficulty maintaining support for international sanctions. The oil-for-food program (OFF), established by Resolution 986 (April 15, 1995) and in operation since
December 1996, has been progressively modified to improve Iraq’s living standards, and the United States has eased its own sanctions to align them with the program. Of the Security Council permanent members, the United States set the highest standards for full Iraqi compliance that would trigger a lifting of sanctions. The United States ruled out direct dialogue with Iraq on the grounds that Iraq’s level of compliance did not justify talks. (See CRS Report RL30472, *Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade*, which also covers U.S. trade regulations for Iraq and Iraq’s illicit trade with its neighbors.)

“Smart Sanctions” Initiative. During a February 2001 trip to the Middle East, Secretary of State Powell presented a U.S. plan to facilitate exports of civilian equipment to Iraq in exchange for measures to ensure that no militarily useful goods reach Iraq. The Bush Administration portrayed its initiative as an effort to rebuild containment by narrowing differences within the Security Council and limiting sanctions erosion. After a year of debate within the Council on the U.S. plan, on May 14, 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1409, providing for goods to be exported to Iraq without Sanctions Committee scrutiny, largely removing the opportunity for Sanctions Committee members to place contracts for Iraq on “hold.” Military items remained banned outright and a defined list of items (Goods Review List, GRL) remained subject to export after review by UNMOVIC. The new export procedures were placed into effect in late July 2002. Resolution 1447 (December 4) rolled the program over for another six months and contained a pledge to add, within 30 days, certain items to the GRL, items that the United States said could be used by Iraq to counter a U.S. military offensive. The Security Council added 36 U.S.-suggested items to the GRL on December 30, 2002 (Resolution 1454).

Comprehensive U.S. trade sanctions against Iraq have been in place since Iraq’s 1990 invasion (Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, Executive Order 12724 of August 6, 1990, and the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, Section 586 of P.L. 101-513). Since then, U.S. trade regulations have been amended to align them with the OFF program. U.S. imports of Iraqi oil have increased since 1999 and now account for almost half of Iraq’s oil exports, amounting to about 1.1 million barrels per day as of January 2003. The imports are purchased by U.S. refiners through other companies and are not bought directly from Iraq.

Prior to the OFF program, funds for civilian goods and the implementation of U.N. resolutions on Iraq were drawn from frozen Iraqi assets transferred — or direct contributions — to a U.N. escrow account pursuant to Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992). Total U.S. transfers to the escrow account, which matched contributions from other countries, reached $200 million, the maximum required under Resolution 778. These transfers were being repaid to the United States from proceeds of the OFF program. Resolutions 1284 and 1302 (June 8, 2000) suspended reimbursements until the end of 2000; about $173 million was due back to the United States. Repayments resumed in 2001.

The oil-for-food program was suspended on the eve of the current war, although Iraq continues to export some oil through Turkey. The U.N. Security Council is debating mechanisms to resume the program during and after the current war, although differences within the Council have held up agreement and the program remains suspended. The Administration, in its request for supplemental funding to pay for the current war, has also requested that Congress approve legislation repealing or enabling the waiving of U.S. sanctions on Iraq in the post-war period.
Iraq's Illicit Trade with Its Neighbors

As regional fears of Iraq have eased and sympathy for the Iraqi people has grown, the United States has had difficulty persuading regional governments to enforce the sanctions regime. Improving sanctions enforcement by Iraq's neighbors was dropped from the U.S. targeted-sanctions proposals adopted in Resolution 1409 because of regional resistance. With the exception of Kuwait, virtually all the neighboring governments wanted to avoid a U.S.-led war against Iraq, fearing chaos inside Iraq and unintended political fallout. However, in deference to their strategic ties to the United States, most of the Gulf states (with the apparent exception of Saudi Arabia and the UAE), Turkey, and Jordan are hosting varying numbers of U.S. forces that are participating in an offensive against Iraq.

**Jordan.** Since 1992, despite Jordan’s economic linkages with Iraq, the United States has determined that Jordan's compliance with the U.N. sanctions regime on Iraq is satisfactory. Every year since FY1994, foreign aid appropriations laws (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, P.L. 104-107, P.L. 104-208, P.L. 105-118, P.L. 105-277, P.L. 106-113, P.L. 106-429, and P.L. 107-115), have denied U.S. aid to any country that does not comply with the sanctions against Iraq, though these laws do not mention Jordan specifically. The Administration has routinely waived sanctions in order to provide aid to Jordan, which is a key U.S. ally in the Middle East peace process. Recognizing Jordan’s economic need, the Sanctions Committee “takes note of” Jordan’s purchases of discounted Iraqi oil which is exchanged for Jordanian goods and write-downs in Iraqi debt to Jordan. (See CRS Issue Brief IB93085, *Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues.*)

**Turkey.** Turkey estimates that it has lost $35 billion as a result of the sanctions, and, in addition to fearing further economic fallout from a new war, is concerned that a war against Iraq will embolden Iraq’s Kurds to become independent or attempt to control additional territory in northern Iraq. This might explain why Turkey demanded substantial U.S. foreign assistance, as well as a clear operational role in northern Iraq, as a condition for allowing U.S. forces to deploy to Turkey in preparation for possible war. Turkey did not grant that permission, allowing only U.S. overflights. The Turkish government regulates and taxes the illicit importation of about $400 million per year in Iraqi energy products by Turkish truck drivers. U.S. sanctions against Turkey for this trade have been waived each year. Turkey returned its Ambassador to Iraq in January 2001.

**Iran.** In enforcing the embargo, two U.S. ships lead a Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that conducts maritime searches in the Persian Gulf to prevent the smuggling of oil and other high-value exports. From its high of about $600 million in 2000, smuggling through this route has fallen substantially since early 2001, indicating that Iraq may be increasingly using the pipeline to Syria (see below). In June 2002, U.S. military officials attributed the drop-off in part to more robust enforcement techniques by the MIF, but which might also reflect Iran’s cooperation with sanctions enforcement. Iran’s cooperation with the sanctions comes despite the substantial improvement in Iranian-Iraqi relations since 1995, and Iran’s public opposition to a U.S. offensive against Iraq. The two exchanged 6,000 prisoners from the Iran-Iraq war in April 1998 and smaller batches of prisoners and remains since, even as recently as the day before the current war began. In early October 2000, the two agreed to abide by the 1975 Algiers Accords that delineated their border, and Iran’s Foreign Minister visited later in the month, a sign of accelerating rapprochement. Iran is believed to be tacitly cooperating with the U.S. war against Iraq, in part to gain greater
participation in a post-Saddam regime for Iranian-backed Shiite Islamist groups. Iran allowed Iraqi dissidents to cross from Iran into northern Iraq for a meeting in February 2003.

**Syria.** Syria and Iraq began a warming trend in relations by reopening their border in 1997; this trend has accelerated since the July 2000 accession of Bashar Assad to the presidency of Syria. Since late 1998, the two countries have benefitted from the reopening of the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, closed since 1982, and Iraq has been sending about 180,000-250,000 barrels per day of oil through the line, under a “swap” arrangement in which Syria uses the oil domestically and exports an equivalent extra amount of its own oil. In May 2001, Iraq and Syria reopened diplomatic missions in each others’ capitals, and there have been unconfirmed reports that Iraq might have moved some WMD equipment into Syria to avoid detection by UNMOVIC. Syria voted in favor of Resolution 1441, but Syria, a member of the U.N. Security Council, opposed a resolution authorizing the current war.

**Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition**

The debate on Iraq policy included the question of the role, if any, for the Iraqi opposition in U.S. military action against Iraq and in a post-Saddam Iraq. A Washington Post report of June 16, 2002 said that in early 2002, President Bush, either as a prelude to or alternative to a ground offensive, authorized stepped up covert action by the CIA and U.S. special forces to destabilize Saddam. During August 9 and 10, 2002, senior members of six major Iraqi opposition groups visited Washington for meetings with senior U.S. officials. These groups sponsored a major meeting in London (December 13 - 17, 2002) that established a 65-member “follow-up committee,” in which Iranian-backed Shiite Islamists are heavily represented. The Bush Administration opposed the formation of a provisional government in advance of Saddam’s overthrow. The “follow-up committee” met in northern Iraq in late February 2003 and named a smaller six person “leadership” committee, although it stopped short of declaring itself a provisional government. The six are Iraqi National Congress director Ahmad Chalabi; PUK leader Talabani (see below); KDP leader Masud Barzani (see below); Shiite leader Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, who heads the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI; Iraq National Accord leader Iyad Alawi; and former Iraqi foreign minister Adnan Pachachi.

Despite strains within the opposition, on December 9, 2002, President Bush announced he had authorized the draw down of $92 million (the remainder of the $97 million total authorized) of defense articles and services authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA, P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998) for the opposition. He also named six new groups as eligible to receive such aid. Some Iraqis have received combat training. More extensive coverage is included in CRS Report RL31339, *Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, the Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq.*

**Military Action and Long-Term Containment**

Prior to the current war, U.S. deployments had focused on containing Iraq. The United States and Britain enforced two “no fly zones” to provide a measure of protection for Iraq’s Kurdish minority and other objects of regime repression and to contain Iraq militarily. To enforce the no-fly zones, the two allies invoked U.N. Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990, authorizing use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait), 687 (the main ceasefire resolution), 688 (human rights), and the Safwan Accords (the March 3, 1991 cease-fire agreements between
Iraq and the coalition forces that banned Iraqi interference with allied air operations. Resolutions 678 and 687 were written under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, dealing with peace and security, and were interpreted as allowing military action to enforce these resolutions. Resolution 688 was not written under Chapter VII, nor did that or any other resolution specifically establish no fly zones.

To justify Operation Desert Fox, the Administration cited additional justification from Resolution 1154 (see above), which warned of “the severest consequences” for non-compliance. Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1992, signed December 5, 1991, expressed Congress’ support for “all necessary means” to achieve the goals of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. In instances of strikes on Iraq for no fly zone or other infractions, the Administration also cited congressional action (primarily P.L. 102-1 of January 12, 1991), authorizing military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait. (For information on the U.S. military posture in the Gulf, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.)

Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW). The northern no fly zone was set up in April 1991 to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. The zone extends north of the 36th parallel. After the September 1996 Iraqi incursion into northern Iraq, humanitarian aspects of ONW were ended and France ended its ONW participation. In December 2002, Turkey renewed for six months basing rights at Incirlik Air Base for the 24 American aircraft and about 1,300 U.S. forces (plus Allied forces). However, Turkey feared that ONW protected the anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which takes refuge in parts of northern Iraq, and Turkey has made repeated attacks against the PKK there since May 1997.

The two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP led by Masud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, agreed in May 1992 to share power after parliamentary and executive elections. In May 1994, tensions between them flared into clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for backing. In August 1996, Iraqi forces helped the KDP capture Irbil, seat of the Kurdish regional government. With U.S. mediation, the Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the establishment of a 400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens (75% of the force). The United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3 million for peacekeeping (Section 451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about $4 million in DOD drawdowns for vehicles and communications gear (Section 552 of the FAA).

Also set up was a peace supervisory group consisting of the United States, Britain, Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens. A tenuous cease-fire has held since November 1997 and the KDP and PUK leaders signed an agreement in Washington in September 1998 to work toward resolving the main outstanding issues (sharing of revenues and control over the Kurdish regional government). Reconciliation efforts showed substantial progress in 2002; on October 4, 2002, the two Kurdish factions jointly reconvened the Kurdish regional parliament for the first time since their 1994 clashes. In June 2002, the United States gave the Kurds $3.1 million in new assistance to help continue the reconciliation process. Both parties are represented in the opposition umbrella Iraqi National Congress, and both also maintain a dialogue with Baghdad. The Kurds have threatened to fight against any Turkish forces that might deploy inside northern Iraq as part of a U.S.-led war.
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch. Shiites constitute a majority in Iraq but historically have been repressed. The U.S.-led coalition declared a no-fly zone over southern Iraq (south of the 32nd parallel) to protect the Shiites on August 26, 1992 (Operation Southern Watch), although the overflights are primarily part of the U.S. containment strategy. The United States and the United Kingdom (but not France) expanded the zone up to the 33rd parallel on September 4, 1996; France ended its participation entirely after Desert Fox. In response to Iraq’s movement of troops toward Kuwait in October 1994, Security Council Resolution 949 (October 15, 1994) demanded Iraq not deploy forces to threaten its neighbors. The United States and Britain interpret this as authorizing military action if Iraq enhances (numbers or quality of armament) its forces below the 32nd parallel. Such enhancements include Iraq’s movement of air defense equipment into the zones.

During March 2000-March 2001, Iraqi air defenses fired at or near fixed radar or allied aircraft enforcing both zones on 500 occasions, in many cases provoking U.S. strikes on the activated missile batteries. On February 16, 2001, the United States and Britain struck elements of that network north of the southern no-fly zone, in response to Iraq’s increasing ability to target U.S. aircraft. U.S. aircraft did not go beyond the zone. During 2002, Iraqi air defenses and related infrastructure were bombed about 60 times in response to about 200 provocations, and U.S. strikes on Iraqi facilities have become more frequent since late 2002 in conjunction with U.S. preparations for possible military action against Iraq. During the U.S. buildup to the current war, the target list was expanded to include those systems, such as surface-to-surface missiles, that could be used against U.S. ground forces.

Costs of Containment. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates contributed a total of $37 billion to the $61.1 billion in incremental costs of Desert Storm, all of which has been paid. From the end of the Gulf war until the end of FY2002, the Defense Department has incurred about $10.5 billion in costs to contain Iraq and provide humanitarian aid to the Kurds. About $1.2 billion was spent in FY2002, and an additional $2 billion was spent to deploy U.S. forces to the Gulf for the current war. The Department of Defense, under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a), assisted UNSCOM by providing U-2 surveillance flights (suspended since the December 15, 1998 UNSCOM pullout), intelligence, personnel, equipment, and logistical support, at a cost of about $15 million per year. (See CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement.)