Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations

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**Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations**

**SUMMARY**

With the failure of the Rambouillet peace talks and violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on March 24, 1999 NATO began *Operation Allied Force* air-strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. In all, NATO aircraft flew over 37,000 sorties in the 78-day air campaign. At the end of the campaign about 1,100 aircraft were participating, with the United States contributing about 725. Of the total aircraft, about 535 were strike aircraft, (U.S. 323/Allied 213). Thirteen of NATO’s 19 nations contributed aircraft to the operation, with 8 nations’ aircraft flying combat missions. The only NATO fatalities in *Operation Allied Force* were two U.S. Apache helicopter pilots killed in a training accident in Albania.

With the air campaign escalating, on June 4, 1999, Yugoslavia accepted a peace proposal devised at a G-8 summit, and on June 8, signed a military-technical agreement with NATO officials providing for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and turning military control of the province over to NATO’s peacekeeping forces (KFOR). On June 10, 1999, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 endorsed the peace settlement and “an international security presence with substantial NATO participation.”

Dubbed *Operation Joint Guardian*, KFOR totals about 39,000 in Kosovo, with about 5,000 support troops in neighboring countries. The United States has about 5,680 troops in Kosovo and 1,000 troops in near-by countries providing support to operations in both Kosovo and Bosnia. This represents about 15% of the total KFOR force. The U.S. has suffered no casualties from hostile action.

Albanian insurgencies in southern Serbia and Macedonia led NATO to permit the re-introduction of the Yugoslav army into the Ground Safety Zone around Kosovo, and increase efforts to seal the Kosovo border. Subsequently the Presavo Valley insurgents signed an amnesty agreement with the Serb government. In Macedonia, the Albanian nationalists and the government have reached an agreement that would grant many of the insurgents’ demands for equal political status, pending parliamentary approval. NATO troops have assisted in the voluntary collection the nationalists’ arms, and will continue to maintain a small operation (700) dubbed *Amber Fox* to monitor the peace agreement.

Congressional concerns have focused on the impact of Balkan operations on overall military readiness, and whether there has been an equitable distribution of responsibilities among the NATO allies or if the United States needs to participate in KFOR at all. Congress has appropriated approximately $7.7 billion for Kosovo operations through FY2002. In keeping with congressional direction, costs for Balkan peacekeeping operations after FY2002 are no longer separately budgeted, but rather are included in the individual armed services regular operating budgets.
**MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

NATO HQ has announced that the forces stationed in the Balkans will be reduced by approximately one-third by the end of 2002. The bulk of the reductions are expected in Bosnia, but NATO forces in Kosovo will also be reduced. NATO will also effect a consolidation of the Bosnia and Kosovo operations into one command structure, facilitating rapid reinforcement between the countries if needed.

NATO has extended the mandate of Task Force Amber Fox in Macedonia until December 15, 2002. The Netherlands has assumed command of the 700-strong contingent of peacekeepers in Macedonia. The European Union may assume responsibility for this operation in 2003. Though there are no U.S. units in Task Force Amber Fox, U.S. officials are pressing for an end to this NATO mission. Western diplomats view this as indicative of the Bush Administration’s desire to eliminate or at least significantly reduce U.S. military involvement in the Balkans. (Wall Street Journal, Sept 6, 2002)

U.S. troops in Kosovo total about 5,600, representing less than 15% of the 39,050 NATO and non-NATO troops deployed. Other large contingents include Italy – 6,200; France – 5,340; Germany – 4,900; and the United Kingdom – 2,970.

**BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS**

**Background**

Once an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has a 90% ethnic Albanian population. It nevertheless holds an emotional place in Serbian nationalist tradition. As part of his nationalist program, Yugoslav President Milosevic revoked Kosovo’s autonomous status, putting it under control of the Serbian-dominated Belgrade government. An armed ethnic Albanian resistance movement developed, led by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. The Belgrade government responded in early 1998 with counter-insurgency operations, with Yugoslav military ground units and aircraft destroying villages and executing civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents.

In 1998, NATO political leaders turned their attention to the Kosovo region because of the flow of refugees into Western Europe and Albania (itself destabilized by regional uprisings in 1997), and concerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). FYROM, an independent nation bordering Kosovo to the southeast, also has a large Albanian population alienated from its central government.

In May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, directed accelerated assessment of “a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression in Kosovo.” Options considered included: 1) preventative deployments in Albania and FYROM to stabilize the borders; 2) declaration of no-fly/no tank zones in Kosovo and enforcement of them with NATO air forces; 3) direct military intervention either through airstrikes or ground troops deployments; and 4) peacekeeping deployments in the event of a political resolution. On June 15, 1998, NATO launched a 6-
hour overflight of Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Code-named Determined Falcon, the exercise involved 80 aircraft from 13 NATO air forces (Canada, Luxembourg, and Iceland not participating), and was conducted from 15 airbases in 5 countries. Twenty-seven U.S. land and carrier-based aircraft took part.

On September 24, 1998, NATO defense ministers authorized an “activation warning” for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. On October 12, NATO defense ministers authorized an “activation order,” placing the necessary forces under the NATO command. The following day, it was announced that U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke had negotiated an agreement with Serbian leader Milosevic that postponed the threat of airstrikes if the Serbian government 1) would reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to “pre-crisis” levels; 2) permit unarmed NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to an international force of 2,000 unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4) begin meaningful negotiations towards Kosovar autonomy.

Meaningful negotiations never took place, owing to recalcitrance on both sides, and sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian civilians. Concerned over escalating violence, and its possible spread to other areas of the Balkans, on January 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized Secretary-General Solana to order airstrikes anywhere in Yugoslavia, if the warring Serb and Albanian factions had not reached a peace settlement by February 20.

The “Contact Group,” an informal forum of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia dealing with Balkan crises, devised a framework for a peace settlement. They did not wish to encourage continued fighting for Kosovar independence, but rather sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia. However, the Serb government did not agree to the framework, the so-called Rambouillet Agreement, and the talks adjourned.

During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional Serb troops massed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. These airstrikes were the first military offensive action undertaken by NATO without specific U.N. endorsement. U.N. Security Council approval was not sought because both Russia and China, each with veto power on the Council, continue to oppose the use of force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The September 23, 1998 U.N. Security Council resolution, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did, however, reference the U.N. Charter’s Article VII, which permits military force to maintain international security.

NATO defined five conditions for ending its air campaign:

1. Cessation of Serb operations against the Albanians in Kosovo;
2. Withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;
3. Acceptance of Kosovar democratic self-government;
4. Acceptance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force; and
5. Return of Kosovar refugees.
On May 6, 1999, at the G-8 economic summit, a another set of principles for a peace settlement were agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia. Russian acceptance was regarded as a major step forward in increasing the pressure on Milosevic to accede to NATO demands. These G-8 principles were:

- Immediate end to the violence.
- Withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other security forces.
- Deployment of UN-endorsed international civil and security presences.
- Interim international administration with U.N. Security Council approval.
- Return of all refugees, and access for aid organizations.
- Substantial self-government for Kosovo.
- Economic development of the region.

On June 4, 1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo by June 20, 1999, and details the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the peace agreement with all means necessary. On June 10, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (No. 2580), endorsing the peace-keeping mission under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes the use of force. Also on June 10, NATO suspended the air campaign upon evidence of Yugoslav forces beginning to withdraw from Kosovo.

### Military Operations

#### The Air Campaign

On March 24, 1999, NATO began air operations, code-named *Operation Allied Force*, against targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo. DOD defined the mission as attacking the Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations. Target selection focused on airfields, air defense and communication centers, military barracks, and some equipment production facilities. Attacks then extended to logistical support facilities and lines of resupply, Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo, and the national electrical and television systems. In total, NATO aircraft flew over 35,000 sorties (1 aircraft flight), about one-third of which were strike sorties, launching about 23,000 munitions. Initially, cloudy weather over Kosovo severely hampered attack aircraft equipped with laser-guided munitions, and also reduced the ability to locate and target Yugoslav ground units. In addition to the weather conditions, a strong concern over minimal risk to NATO pilots dictated that low-level flights to attack ground units not be undertaken until Serb air defenses had been sufficiently degraded. The desire to avoid any collateral civilian casualties (Serb or Albanian) also constrained targeting.

NATO HQ acknowledged that the air campaign did not impede the Serb operations to drive the Albanian population from Kosovo. The inability to stop Serb operations brought strong criticism of the decision to launch the air campaign while completely ruling out any use of ground forces. Aside from official NATO and Administration spokesmen, few, if any, observers believed that air power alone could achieve the desired objectives. Press reports
indicated that NATO political leaders were cautioned of an air campaign’s potential shortfalls, but believed that domestic public opinion would not support a ground invasion of Kosovo. It was then perceived as a choice between “do nothing” or proceed with air strikes. Some also suggested that in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, some advocates have overemphasized the capabilities of air power, encouraging the belief that ground forces are no longer as crucial to achieving military objectives.

There was also criticism that “command by committee” hampered NATO military leaders’ ability to wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign. Target lists, weapons used, and forces deployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments. This slowed decisionmaking, constrained operations, and sometimes emphasized political over military considerations. However, NATO officials maintain that SACEUR received all resources requested, and emphasized that this consensual process was critical to ensuring the cohesion of the alliance. A more fundamental criticism is that the air campaign’s actual objective from the start was political, not military — i.e., to bring President Milosevic back to the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributed to a constrained, incremental approach to targeting.

After the air operation, Secretary Cohen, SACEUR Gen. Clark, and the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee Gen. Klaus Naumann all recommended that NATO’s decision-making processes for conducting a military campaign be examined and, in some way, streamlined. None, however, offered specific suggestions, noting that any changes made would have to gain and sustain acceptance by all NATO members. NATO’s current structure and procedures were created to deal with homeland defense against invasion. Out-of-area operations like Allied Force present different political constraints and military requirements. Some have suggested greater delegation of authority to SACEUR, once the alliance has made the decision to carry out a military operation. However, within an alliance of democracies which maintains full consensus as a fundamental principle, this approach may not achieve acceptance. In addressing this issue, Gen. Clark emphasized that, structural reforms aside, “there has to be a strong political consensus founded on a common perception of military doctrine to overcome the obstacles we hit in the air campaign”. (Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, July 20, 1999)

In responding to the critics of the air campaign, Gen. Naumann has noted that NATO planned for a limited operation from the outset, and made this fact public, while President Milosevic “planned for a war”. Naumann also observed that NATO threatened military action, without having a consensus on how it would be carried out, thereby precluding its military commanders’ use of “overwhelming force from the beginning.” (Defense News, July 20, 1999)

In the wake of the Yugoslav acceptance of NATO peace conditions, supporters of reliance upon NATO airpower believe they have been vindicated in their approach. They emphasize that NATO sustained no combat fatalities in the course of the 78-day campaign, and that the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was achieved. The air campaign’ critics, however, point to the fact that it did not prevent the expulsion of almost the entire Albanian population of Kosovo.

The Department of Defense Joint Staff provided the following initial statistical summary of the 78-day air campaign:
Total sorties: 37,200
  ! U.S.: 23,208 (62%)
  ! Allies: 13,992 (38%)

Strike sorties: 9,500
  ! U.S.: 5,035 (53%)
  ! Allies: 4,465 (47%)

Intelligence/reconnaissance sorties: 1,200
  ! U.S.: 948 (79%)
  ! Allies: 252 (21%)

Support sorties: 26,500
  ! U.S.: 17,225 (65%)
  ! Allies: 9,275 (35%)

On October 14, 2000, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton provided the Senate Armed Services Committee with DOD’s preliminary “lessons learned” observations [http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/lessons/acw.html]. The final version Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report was issued January 31, 2000 shortly before the FY2001 budget submission. Among the issues addressed, were the following:

  ! Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated operational planning and maintenance of unity of command. Disparities between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities impeded U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.

  ! DoD needs to develop options for earlier and more efficient use of its reserve forces.

  ! DoD systems for planning and executing transportation of its forces were strained by the rapidly evolving requirements.

  ! The heavy commitment of NATO’s air defense suppression forces indicates the need to find innovative and affordable ways to exploit our technological skills in electronic combat.

  ! Success using the latest generation of air-delivered munitions systems in Kosovo validates plans to increase inventories.

  ! Task Force Hawk (U.S. ground troops in Albania) pointed out the need to regularly experiment with the independent use of key elements of all of our forces without their usual supporting elements.

  ! Improved unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission planning, improved processes for interaction between UAV operators and manned aircraft, frequent and realistic training opportunities, and equipment upgrades for individual UAVs all would benefit force effectiveness.

  ! Humanitarian operations highlighted the importance of such resources as linguists and civil affairs personnel, engineering assets capable of emergency repair of roads and bridges in very austere environments, detailed maps, and prepositioned stocks.
Ground Force Operations — KFOR (*Operation Joint Guardian*)

Because air operations did not stop Serb operations against Kosovar Albanians, public discussion of NATO ground force intervention was widespread. U.S. and NATO spokesmen continued to maintain there was no intention to introduce ground troops without “a permissive environment.” In the latter weeks of the air campaign, the British government began to push for ground intervention, but was unable to win the support of other alliance members. Though President Clinton and others publicly made the point that no option was permanently “off the table”, and NATO HQ re-examined the military requirements for an invasion of Kosovo and even Serbia, at no time did there appear alliance-wide support of offensive ground operations. Indeed, several member governments, particularly Greece, Italy, and Germany were publically adamant in their opposition.

With the Yugoslav acceptance of the peace plan devised by the G-8 and proposed to the Yugoslav government by Finnish President Ahtisaari, the focus turned to *Operation Joint Guardian*, the peace-keeping mission to be undertaken by KFOR. To facilitate this operation, NATO obtained the Yugoslav acceptance of a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) prepared by NATO on June 9, 1999. The following day, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an “international security presence” in Kosovo for its enforcement. On the same day, June 10, NATO Secretary-General Solana reported that Serb forces were beginning to withdraw from Kosovo and ordered suspension of the air campaign. On June 17, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops and police complete, NATO officially terminated the air campaign.

KFOR did not begin deploying into Kosovo until June 12, 1999, reportedly waiting to synchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid co-mingling forces. This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-strong contingent of Russian troops to leave their SFOR station in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital. Reportedly planned by the Russian General Staff, and endorsed by president Yeltsin, to ensure Russia a high-profile role in KFOR. This action occasioned high-level U.S.-Russian negotiations. An agreement reached on June 18, 1999 provides for shared control of Pristina airport operations, with Russian participation in airport ground operations and air operations under KFOR control. In addition, Russia deploys troops in the U.S., German, and French sectors. These troops are to be under a unified KFOR command, with a Russian general officer at KFOR HQ. Russia does not have an independent territorial sector as it initially demanded. NATO refused to grant Russia an independent territorial sector, believing that could be the first step toward a permanent partitioning of the province. To date, KFOR commanders have praised the Russian troops for their professionalism.

**Military-Technical Agreement (MTA).** After some initial recalcitrance, Yugoslav military officials signed the MTA on June 9, 1999. The MTA affirms the terms of the peace plan, and provides specific details of its implementation. Some of the main provisions are:

- KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance.
- KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment, and to carry out its mission, the KFOR commander has the right to compel the removal or relocation of forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities that pose a potential threat to
KFOR, its mission, or a third party. Failure to comply will result in military action, including the use of necessary force.

! KFOR has the right to monitor and inspect all facilities or activities that may have a police or military capability, or are deemed otherwise relevant to compliance. The KFOR commander is the “final authority” for the interpretation of the MTA.

! Air and Ground Safety Zones will extend 25 and 5 kilometers respectively beyond the borders of Kosovo, and no Yugoslav forces, aside from local police, may enter these zones without KFOR permission. All Yugoslav military, paramilitary, and police forces will conduct a phased withdrawal from Kosovo, to be completed by June 20, 1999.

! Yugoslav forces will mark and remove all mines, booby traps, and obstacles as they withdraw. A subsequent, separate agreement will address the return of “agreed Yugoslav and Serb personnel.”

**KFOR Operations.** KFOR command now rotates every six months, and is currently held by French General Marcel Valentin. KFOR divided the province into five territorial sectors under the command of British, German, French, Italian, and U.S. contingents. Other nations’ contingents are assigned to one of these sectors. (For current national contingents, see below)

In early 1999, KFOR nations quietly withdrew troops, reducing KFOR standing deployment from close to 50,000 to about 37,000 troops in Kosovo and 5,000 support forces in neighboring countries. Those nations with notable withdrawals were France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The other large contingents, Germany and the United States, remained relatively constant.

A repeated complaint from KFOR commanders has been the slowness of the United Nations efforts to deploy an international police force and establish a functioning judiciary. The U.N. has been hampered by lack of funds and bureaucratic inertia on the part of donor countries. However, a functioning police force and court system are critical elements for increasing stability in Kosovo. On June 20 1999, NATO announced an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army for its phased disbanding. The presence of armed KLA guerillas has given KFOR some concerns, and KFOR has disarmed KLA groups that could have presented a threat to security. In the demilitarization agreement, the KLA agreed to:

! Renounce the use of force and comply with KFOR and U.N. Interim Civil Administration directives. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts, including reprisals or detentions.

! Acknowledge KFOR’s use of necessary force to ensure compliance.

! Not carry weapons in specified areas.

In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and U.N. officials agreed to the creation of the Kosovo Corps. NATO and the U.N. intend the 3,000-strong organization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations such as forest fires, search and rescue, and reconstruction. Some KLA leaders see the Kosovo Corps as the nucleus of a future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and U.N. officials.
Albanian Insurgency – Presevo Valley and Macedonia

**Presevo Valley.** The Military Technical Agreement between Yugoslavia and NATO established a 3-mile Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) along the Kosovo-Serbia border within which no Yugoslav armed forces, and only lightly armed Yugoslav police, were allowed. The GSZ is outside of Kosovo, and the Military Technical Agreement has no provision for KFOR to conduct operations in it, though KFOR was to monitor it from the Kosovo border to ensure no re-entry of Yugoslav forces. In 2000, Albanian nationalists from Kosovo took advantage of the security vacuum in the GSZ’s Presevo Valley area to train and organize insurgents among the predominately Albanian population. In late 2000, the first indications of insurgency came with attacks by the self-proclaimed Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedya, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) against the Yugoslav police in the region. KFOR HQ and U.S. commanders particularly came under criticism for not interdicting the passage of men and arms across the Kosovo border in their sector. KFOR HQ emphasized that it had no mandate to conduct operations outside of Kosovo proper, and consequently could not intervene against the UCPMB in the Ground Safety Zone. British troops were transferred from their Central Sector to augment U.S. forces, and to conduct foot patrols in an attempt to strengthen border controls. In addition, NATO, citing the fall of Milosevic and the cooperative attitude of the new Kostunica government in Belgrade, negotiated an agreement for the “conditioned, phased” return of Yugoslav armed forces to the Ground Safety Zone to fill the security vacuum. Monitored by European Union representatives, limited numbers of Yugoslav Army personnel have re-entered the GSZ, though without tanks, armored cars, artillery, or helicopters, and the insurgents have signed a with the Belgrade government.

**Macedonia.** Negotiations between the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanian political representatives have overcome the stumbling blocks regarding the official status of the Albanian language and the structure of police forces, and a peace agreement has been reached that would address many of the insurgents concerns. In response, the insurgents have voluntarily turned over a substantial amount of their weaponry to NATO troops in Operation Task Force Harvest. In total, 3,875 weapons, including four tanks and armored personnel carriers were turned in. NATO has agreed to maintain a contingent in Macedonia to oversee implementation of the peace agreement. Dubbed Task Force Amber Fox, the 700-strong contingent is currently under German command.

**NATO Allies’ Military Participation in KFOR Operations**

Table 1 reflects data provided by DOD on the national contingents serving in KFOR. Non-NATO countries are marked with an asterisk. Of the 39,050 troops stationed with KFOR, the United States is providing about 5,680 or less than 15%. The remaining 85% comprise units from 37 other countries.

DOD has scheduled the major unit rotations for KFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last that long. The units involved are: 10th Mountain Division (11/01-05/02); V Corps, Germany (05/02-11/02 and 11/02-05/03); 4th Infantry Division (05/03-11/03); 1st Cavalry Division (11/03-05/04); 3rd Infantry Division (05/04-11/04), and 101st Airborne (11/04-05/05).
### Table 1. Allied Military Participation in KFOR Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Country</strong> (<em>indicates non-NATO</em>)</th>
<th><strong>KFOR Contingent</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>1 Field Hospital (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria*</td>
<td>1 support battalion (510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan*</td>
<td>1 support platoon (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 mechanized infantry battalion (1,060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria*</td>
<td>1 infantry company (40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Support personnel (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1 reconnaissance company (200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 armored company (280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia*</td>
<td>1 infantry platoon (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland*</td>
<td>1 motorized infantry battalion (850)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 reinforced infantry brigade (5,340)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia*</td>
<td>1 supply platoon (30)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1 armored division (4,900)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2 mechanized battalions (2,080)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1 support battalion (350)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>medical personnel (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland*</td>
<td>1 transport company (120)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 reinforced armored brigade (6,200)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia*</td>
<td>Support personnel (10)</td>
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<td>Lithuania*</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1 field hospital (510)</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>support personnel (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 motorized battalion (1,080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (*indicates non-NATO)</td>
<td>KFOR Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1 airborne battalion (570)</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Support personnel (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia*</td>
<td>1 airborne brigade (1,850)</td>
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<td>Slovakia*</td>
<td>1 engineer platoon (40)</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>1 mechanized battalion (1,350)</td>
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<td>Sweden*</td>
<td>1 mechanized battalion (810)</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1 logistics company (160)</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 mechanized brigade (1,160)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine*</td>
<td>1 helicopter detachment 1 supply company (320)</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates*</td>
<td>Support Personnel (50)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1 reinforced armored brigade (2,970)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1 reinforced mechanized infantry brigade (5,680)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian**

Within NATO, each nation participating in Operation Allied Force assumed the cost of its own operations. NATO does not provide estimates of the overall cost of the operation or of the cost of each member’s contributions. (For individual national cost estimates for Kosovo operations, see CRS Report RL30398, NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: a Preliminary Report.) Individual nations also assume the full cost of the deployments in support of on-going KFOR operations.

**Congressional Appropriations.** In April 1999, the Administration submitted a $6.05 billion emergency supplemental appropriation request to cover military operations in Kosovo and continuing air operations in Southwest Asia during FY1999. On May 18, 1999, the House approved a House-Senate conference agreement on H.R. 1141, providing $14.9 billion in FY1999 supplemental appropriations. On May 20, 1999, the Senate concurred. It was signed into law (P.L. 106-31) on May 21. Of this, only $10.8 billion was defense-related, and included funds for items other than Kosovo operations such as a military pay raise, military construction, training, and equipment/munitions procurement. The
Administration’s funding request assumed offensive military operations against Yugoslavia through September 1999. With the campaign ending in June, DOD calculated its actual FY1999 incremental costs to be $3.0 billion, and the remainder of the appropriated supplemental were re-programmed.

The Administration’s FY2000 budget request contained no funds for combat or peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The House Armed Services Committee expressed its concern that under or unbudgeted contingency operations have diverted funds from “quality of life, readiness, and modernization” programs. Seeing no funds budgeted for Kosovo operations in FY2000, and seeking to ensure that incremental Kosovo-related costs would be dealt with only through specific budgeted accounts or supplemental appropriations, the Committee inserted a provision in DOD’s authorizing legislation (H.R. 1401) prohibiting the use of any funds authorized by the legislation for military operations in Yugoslavia. On June 9, during consideration on the House floor, Representative Skelton introduced an amendment removing this provision. Upon receiving written notice from President Clinton stating that if military readiness were to be harmed by on-going operational requirements, he would submit a FY2000 budget amendment request, the House agreed (270-155) to remove the funding prohibition. A $2 billion supplemental appropriation for Kosovo was subsequently included in the FY2001 Military Construction Act (H.R. 4425; P.L. 106-246).

The FY2001 DOD appropriations legislation (H.R. 4576; P.L. 106-259) provided $1.7 billion for Kosovo, as requested.

Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual service budgets. Consequently, published DOD budget documents do not provide a separate accounting for these operations. In the FY2002 DOD appropriations conference report (H.Rept. 107-350), did note that $2.13 billion was appropriated for both Balkan operations, a reduction without comment of $600 million from the Administration’s request.

(For more information, see CRS Report RL30505: Appropriations for FY2001: Defense and CRS Report RL30457: Supplemental Appropriations for FY2000: Plan Colombia, Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance, and Other Initiatives.)

**Legislation**

**H.R. 4546 (Stump)**

To authorize appropriations for FY2003 for military activities of the Department of Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2003, and for other purposes. Introduced April 23, 2002; referred to Committee on Armed Services.

**S. 2225 (Levin)**

To authorize appropriations for FY2003 for military activities of the Department of Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2003, and for other purposes. Introduced April 23, 2002; referred to Committee on Armed Services.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

CRS Reports

CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and U.S. Policy, by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel.

World Wide Web Sites

The following WWW sites provide additional information:

- KFOR Headquarters — [http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html]
- NATO Headquarters — [http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press.htm]
- U.S. European Command — [http://www.eucom.mil]