Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track): Labor Issues (Including H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019)

Updated December 7, 2001

Mary Jane Bolle
Specialist in International Trade
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary

Since trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly called “fast-track negotiating authority” expired in 1994, Congress has been unable to agree on language for its reauthorization. Under TPA, Congress agrees to consider trade agreements which the President has negotiated, on a fast-track basis – without amendment and with limited debate. TPA facilitates the adoption of trade agreements in that it arguably reassures negotiating partners that their carefully crafted concessions will not be changed when Congress votes on the implementing legislation for the agreement.

A key issue in current efforts to reauthorize TPA is the extent to which Congress will allow provisions relating to labor and the environment in new trade agreements considered under fast-track procedures. This report focuses on TPA labor issues. It traces the congressional debate since 1994 when the previous fast-track authority expired, and compares H.R. 3005 (Thomas), the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on October 16, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-249) and H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin), the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001. H.R. 3005 was passed by the House on December 6, along party lines, by a vote of 215-214. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 include as overall negotiating objectives of trade agreements, provisions to promote worker rights. However, H.R. 3005 aims to “promote respect for” worker rights “consistent with the International Labor Organization (ILO)”, and H.R. 3019 aims to promote “enforcement of” core labor standards “by U.S. trading partners.”

In terms of principal negotiating objectives, H.R. 3005 would aim to “strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards” through provisions similar to those in previous trade agreements and fast-track authority. H.R. 3019 would aim to “achieve a framework that leads to the adoption and enforcement of worker rights” in two different ways: For multilateral trade agreements, negotiated through the World Trade Organization (WTO), it would promote them through the WTO and the International Labor Organization (ILO). For a bilateral trade agreement, or a trade agreement covering a Free Trade Area of the Americas, H.R. 3019 would aim to promote worker rights enforcement in part by (1) including enforceable rules for the adoption and enforcement of core labor standards; (2) providing for phased-in compliance with labor market standards for least-developed countries; and (3) including dispute settlement provisions which would provide in "all contexts for the use of all remedies that are demonstrably effective to promote prompt and full compliance with" decisions by the dispute settlement panel.

Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 call for reviews of the potential impact of new trade agreements on U.S. workers. H.R. 3005 would also call for consultations and reports to Congress and its committees on various labor rights issues connected with trade agreements. A side-by-side comparison of labor provisions of the two bills is included.
Contents

Key Questions for Congress ............................................ 2
Reaction to How H.R. 3005 Addresses the Key Questions .......... 3

Background .............................................................. 4
North American Free Trade Agreement ............................... 5
Worker Rights and the WTO .......................................... 7
1997-1998 House and Senate-Reported Legislation to Renew Trade Promotion Authority .................................. 7
The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement ................................ 8

Key TPA Legislation in 2001 ............................................ 8
Economic Arguments Concerning New TPA .......................... 9
The Lead-Up to TPA Compromise Bills ............................. 10

H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 Compared .................................. 11
Overall Negotiating Objectives ....................................... 11
Definitions of Worker Rights in H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 .... 11
Principal Negotiating Objectives ..................................... 13
Congressional and Administrative Oversight ..................... 20

List of Tables

Table 1. Worker Rights Defined ...................................... 2
Table 2. H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019: Overall Negotiating Objectives..... 11
Table 3. Worker Rights Defined In Terms of H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 ... 13
Table 4. H.R. 3005: Principal Negotiating Objectives for All Trade Agreements (WTO, Bilateral and FTAA) ........ 15
Table 5. H.R. 3019: Principal Negotiating Objectives for Trade Agreements Negotiated in the WTO .............. 16
Table 6. H.R. 3019: Principal Negotiating Objectives for FTAA and Bilateral Agreements ......................... 19
Table 7. H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019: Congressional and Administrative Oversight .............................................. 21
Table 8. Comparison of H.R. 3005 (Thomas) and H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) . 22
Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track) Labor Issues: (Including H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019)

Since trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly called “fast-track negotiating authority” expired in 1994, Congress has been unable to agree on language for its reauthorization. Under TPA, Congress agrees to consider trade agreements which the President has negotiated, on a fast-track basis – voting them up or down without amendment and with limited debate. TPA or fast-track authority facilitates the adoption of trade agreements in that it arguably reassures negotiating partners that their carefully crafted concessions will not be changed when Congress votes the implementing legislation for the agreement up or down.

A key issue in TPA reauthorization has been whether or not, and more recently the extent to which Congress will allow provisions relating to labor and the environment in trade agreements destined for fast-track consideration.

This report focuses on TPA labor issues. After summarizing some key questions for Congress, it traces the congressional debate on the worker rights issue since 1994 when the previous fast-track authority expired. Then it compares provisions in two current bills to extend that authority, in terms of how the worker rights issue would be treated by each. These bills are: H.R. 3005 (Thomas), the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on October 16, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-249) and H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin), the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001. H.R. 3005 was approved as amended under Rules Committee Resolution H.R. 306 (H. Rept. 107-323) and passed by the House on December 6, 2001 along party lines, by a vote of 215-214. This report will be updated as events warrant.

---

1 This authority was included in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418).

Key Questions for Congress

Within the labor-TPA issue in fast-track reauthorization, two key questions seem to be getting the most attention as Congress focuses in on the reported H.R. 3005 and compares its provisions with those of the expired TPA:

1. What should be the goal of trade agreements in promoting labor provisions (worker rights provisions, defined in table 1)?
   a. Should they be subject to the same enforcement procedures as other provisions? (If the answer is “yes,” they would typically be included in the body of the agreement rather than in a side agreement);
   b. How (with what provisions) should labor/worker rights be promoted?

2. Should the TPA authority promote a working party in the WTO to discuss the link between worker rights and trade?

A comparison of how the expired TPA authority and H.R. 3005 address these questions follows, together with some responses to these differences. A lengthy discussion of provisions in H.R. 3005, and a table comparing the provisions of H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 are included toward the back of this report.

Table 1. Worker Rights Defined

While there is no single official list of worker rights agreed upon by interested parties all over the world, there are two similar lists that are most commonly used. One is “internationally recognized worker rights” which is defined in U.S. trade law. The other is “core labor standards,” which is a slightly different list identified by the International Labor Organization (ILO), a United Nations organization founded more than 80 years ago to promote and protect the rights of workers around the world.

Key elements of both worker rights lists are: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to organize (into unions) and bargain collectively; (c) prohibition of forced labor; and (d) minimum age for the employment of children (i.e., prohibition of child labor). The two lists differ in their 5th item. The U.S. list includes as (e) acceptable working conditions regarding minimum wages, maximum hours, and occupational safety and health protection. The ILO list includes as (e) freedom from all types of employment discrimination (i.e., on the basis of sex, race, age, religious preference, etc.)

The worker rights goal of trade agreements under the old TPA was to promote respect for worker rights without specifying details about how (through what provisions) worker rights should be promoted, or whether worker rights provisions should be subject to the same enforcement (dispute resolution procedures) as other provisions.
H.R. 3005 includes specifics in each of these areas. Under H.R. 3005, one principal negotiating objective is promotion of worker rights through self-enforcement: “to ensure that parties do not fail to enforce their own labor laws.” However H.R. 3005 also includes caveats to this requirement which would also be objectives for inclusion in a trade agreement. The caveats would be for parties to retain discretion in the reallocation of resources in enforcement, and for protection of U.S. exports from labor policies that discriminate against them.

Under H.R. 3005, one principal negotiating objective for enforcement is to seek provisions that treat U.S. primary negotiating objectives “equally” with other negotiating objectives.

The seeking of a working party on the relationship between worker rights and trade within the World Trade Organization (WTO) was listed as a principal negotiating objective of the expired fast-track authority. H.R. 3005 does not include this provision.

Reaction to How H.R. 3005 Addresses the Key Questions

Between the time that the old fast-track authority expired in 1994 and the time H.R. 3005 was reported, Congress voted to implement three trade agreements: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), (implemented in 1994 by P.L. 103-82), the Uruguay Round of Agreements, and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (P.L. 107-43 on September 28, 2001). Relating to the key congressional questions identified above, the provisions included in these agreements are viewed as precedents by some in Congress and as unique occurrences by others.

NAFTA promotes worker rights by providing that each country abide by its own labor laws, and that each country strive toward 12 labor standards. The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement provides that each country enforce its own laws and strive to ensure that ILO labor principles and internationally recognized worker rights (see table 1 above for definition) are “recognized and protected by domestic law.”

Some Democrats in Congress, particularly Representatives Charles B. Rangel, Ranking Democrat on the House Ways and Means committee, Representative Sander M. Levin, and Representative Robert T. Matsui, members of the committee and all co-sponsors of H.R. 3019, have argued that the provisions in the U.S.-Jordan FTA should be a “floor,” or lower limit for the kind of labor provisions that should be included in new trade agreements. They also argue that this floor is not being honored by H.R. 3005, which specifies as a goal, that parties to a trade agreement

---

3 Technically, the principal negotiating objective in P.L. 100-418, Sec. 1101, was “to secure a review of the relationship of worker rights to GATT articles, objectives, and related instruments with a view to ensuring that the benefits of the trading system are available to all workers.” The GATT was superseded by the World Trade Organization (WTO), through the Uruguay Round of Agreements in 1994. The Act that implemented the Uruguay Round of Agreements (P.L. 103-465, Sec. 131) requires the President to seek a working party in the “new WTO” to examine the relationship between internationally recognized worker rights and trade.
should “not fail to enforce” their own labor laws. Rather than requiring parties to a trade agreement slated for fast-track consideration by Congress to strive toward adopting either ILO “core labor” standards or “internationally recognized worker rights,” these Democrats argue, H.R. 3005 merely includes the more vague goal “to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards.”

The Democrats have also expressed concern that H.R. 3005, unlike the expired TPA, does not include the goal of establishing a working party for worker rights and trade in the WTO. This is a goal that has so far been difficult to achieve, because developing countries are typically strongly opposed to the idea, lest a discussion of the relationship between worker rights and trade ultimately lead to the imposition of labor requirements on these countries.

Some Republicans, on the other hand, (Senators Phil Gramm, Jon Kyl, and Mitch McConnell) have expressed concern with H.R. 3005 for not including protections on the sovereignty of U.S. laws. They argue that if worker rights provisions in a trade agreement are subject to the same dispute resolution procedures as other provisions in the agreement, the United States could be in a position to be judged on whether it does or does not fail to enforce its own labor standards. If the U.S. is found to “fail to enforce” its own labor standards, U.S. goods and services could be subject to sanctions. They recommend two amendments to remedy the potential situation.

Organizations that have come out against TPA legislation (especially H.R. 3005) include the AFL-CIO, Public Citizen, the United Steelworkers of America, the Teamsters, and the Communications Workers of America. Groups in favor of the bill include the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers.

Background

Over the past several decades, Congress has passed various pieces of trade legislation that have included provisions for promoting worker rights. Between 1969 and 2001, at least six U.S. trade laws (establishing U.S. conditions for preferential trade treatment, providing negotiating authority, and providing for trade remedies)

---


7 “House Negotiations on TPA Compromise To Resume Among Members Next Month”. Inside U.S. Trade, August 23, 2001.
and four international trade agreements to which the United States was a mutual party
promoted the rights of workers in countries with which the United States trades.\(^8\)

One of those trade acts was the *Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988* (OTCA, P.L. 100-418) – the previous fast-track authority which expired in 1994. This law gave the president broad authority to include worker rights protections in trade agreements by identifying as a principal negotiating objective of trade agreements “to promote respect for worker rights.”\(^9\)

Before it expired in 1994, OTCA authority was used to negotiate two key multilateral trade agreements: the *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA, implemented by P.L. 103-182), which for the first time, included a labor side agreement; and the *Uruguay Round of Multilateral Agreements* (implemented by P.L. 103-465), which required the President to seek a working party in the new WTO, to examine the relationship between “internationally recognized worker rights” and trade.

The debate over the inclusion of worker rights provisions in new fast-track authority reflects some shifts in congressional attitude toward including worker rights provisions in trade agreements – shifts affected in part by experience under NAFTA and the WTO.

**North American Free Trade Agreement**

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect January 1, 1994, ushered in a new level of controversy over presidential authority to include worker rights provisions in trade agreements.

The NAFTA was accompanied by a labor side agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). NAALC was negotiated by the incoming Clinton Administration, after the NAFTA agreement itself had been

---


\(^9\) The OTCA also included two additional worker rights mandates for the President. He was, to: (a) secure a review of the relationship between worker rights and GATT articles; and (b) promote as a GATT principle that the denial of worker rights should not be a means for a country or its industries to gain a competitive advantage in international trade. (The GATT was the predecessor body to the WTO.)
completed, and had several key provisions. First, under it, Mexico, Canada, and the United States all agreed to enforce their own labor standards and to move toward strengthening those standards relating to 12 agreed-upon labor principles.\footnote{These labor principles included the first four of the five “internationally recognized worker rights” as (see page 9 for definition), plus (1) the right to strike; (2) minimum employment standards relating to overtime pay; (3) elimination of employment discrimination; (4) equal pay for men and women; (5) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses; (6) protection of migrant workers; (7) minimum employment standards pertaining to minimum wages; and (8) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses.}

Second, fines were authorized if a country was taken to dispute settlement and found to have failed to enforce one of three of its 12 labor principles – those relating to (a) prohibition of child labor; (b) payment of minimum wages; or (c) protections against occupational injuries and illnesses – in a trade-related context.

Third, sanctions were authorized if a country failed to pay its fines. Sanctions are suspension of NAFTA benefits to the amount of the monetary penalty (which may be no greater than benefits from tariff reductions) for one year.

In reacting to NAFTA, many U.S. multinational corporations were concerned that NAFTA’s labor side agreement could usher in a new era of attaching more stringent worker rights provisions to trade agreements. Their concern was that this could lead to increased labor costs, particularly in developing countries, where multinational corporations had begun to greatly expand production operations, and possibly to restrictions on trade if the provisions were not enforced.

Organized workers, on the other hand – especially in labor-intensive industries, feared that NAFTA, with its strong investment provisions, could lead to major increases in U.S. foreign direct investment to Mexico, with potentially adverse effects on U.S. jobs and wages.\footnote{By 2001, seven years after NAFTA went into effect, total job “gains” and job “losses” from NAFTA were still relatively small. Between January 1, 1994 and 2001, jobs created by increased exports to Mexico and Canada are estimated using the U.S. Trade Representative’s methodology for the number of jobs supported by each billion dollars worth of exports, at roughly 1.3 million, while total direct job “losses” from increased imports from or plant relocations to Mexico or Canada are estimated by the Department of Labor at roughly 361,000.}

Organized workers were also disappointed in NAFTA’s labor side agreement because it did not authorize fines and sanctions for failure to enforce several other major protections, including: (d) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (e) the right to strike; and (f) prohibition of forced labor. Over time, most of the cases arising under NAALC have been about Mexico’s failure to enforce its laws permitting workers to organize and bargain collectively – violations not enforceable by fines or sanctions under NAFTA’s labor side agreement. As a result of its concerns and disappointments since NAFTA went into effect, the AFL-CIO has taken the position that new trade promotion authority must require enforceable worker rights in the core of all new trade agreements, and that monetary fines based on the
NAFTA labor side agreement model are inadequate, and have proven an ineffective means of enforcement.\(^\text{12}\)

**Worker Rights and the WTO**

U.S. efforts to promote worker rights in the WTO has added to the controversy over including worker rights provisions in new trade agreements. The efforts of the Clinton Administration to fulfill the OTC\(\text{A}\) language encouraging the President to seek in the WTO a working group to examine the relationship between “internationally recognized worker rights” and trade did not meet with success. In fact, his efforts and those of other developed countries met with great resistance by developing countries.

Developing countries, which make up a majority in the WTO, have expressed a fear that even a WTO study group on the relationship between worker rights and trade can lead to the imposition on developing countries of labor standards. These are standards which could raise wage costs and thereby threaten the economic growth of developing countries, which depend heavily on their abundance of low-cost labor. As a result of this concern, the 1996 WTO Conference of trade ministers in Singapore voted to shift the focus of worker rights promotion from the WTO to the International Labor Organization (ILO). It did this by designating the ILO as the “competent body to set and deal with” international labor standards.\(^\text{13}\) The issue of worker rights has not been addressed in a WTO ministerial conference since 1996.

**1997-1998 House and Senate-Reported Legislation to Renew Trade Promotion Authority**

The WTO experience may not have directly affected an attitude in Congress toward renewal of trade promotion authority. However, the fact that U.S. businesses have increasingly established business operations in developing countries, especially during the 1990s, may have had an impact, as has experience under NAFTA.

Nevertheless, so great was the controversy over the linkage of worker rights provisions (as well as environmental provisions) to trade agreements in the aftermath of NAFTA, that by 1997, no legislation to reauthorize TPA had been reported out of committee in either house of Congress.

In 1997, a seeming consensus was reached, when the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees reported out bills to reauthorize trade promotion authority, in S. 1269 (S.Rept. 105-102), and H.R. 2621 (H.Rept. 105-341).

---


\(^\text{13}\) From the Singapore Declaration, signed by representatives of WTO countries present at the first meeting of Ministers of WTO countries in Singapore, December, 1996, contained in the *WTO Annual Report*, 1997.
Both House and Senate bills aimed to limit presidential fast-track authority to include worker rights provisions in trade agreements slated for fast-track consideration.

- Specifically, both House and Senate TPA bills would have allowed the inclusion of labor provisions in trade agreements negotiated under new “fast-track” procedures only to prevent foreign governments from “derogating from” (lowering) existing labor standards in order to attract investment or gain a competitive trade advantage.

- The House bill would also have: (1) permitted labor provisions to ensure that foreign labor practices do not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably serve as disguised barriers to trade;” and (2) permitted changes to a country’s labor laws (i.e., changes to weaken those laws) if the changes were “consistent with sound macroeconomic development.”

There was great political concern, not only over what provisions should be in the bills, but also over whether a vote should be taken. The Republican leadership scheduled a vote on H.R. 2621 for the fall of 1998. Many Democrats were concerned about voting so close to the elections. In the end, H.R. 2621 was defeated by a vote of 180 to 243. S. 1269 was not brought to the Senate floor for a vote.

The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement

Without “fast-track” authority, the Clinton Administration, in an effort to strengthen economic ties with Jordan, negotiated the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The FTA was adopted into law on September 28, 2001 (P.L. 107-43). This was the first U.S. trade agreement ever to include a set of labor provisions directly in the body of the agreement, where all provisions would be subject to dispute resolution procedures. Like the NAFTA labor side agreement, the U.S.-Jordan FTA required each country to enforce its own labor standards, and authorized sanctions for patterns of non-enforcement. However, unlike the NAFTA side agreement, the U.S.-Jordan FTA did not identify any standards as unenforceable by sanctions.

In Congress, the U.S.-Jordan agreement was controversial because of its labor provisions. The possibility of using sanctions to require a country to enforce its own labor standards was a major issue. Possible action by Congress to reject the agreement or change the language in the implementing legislation was diverted at the last minute by an exchange of letters between the United States and Jordan agreeing to “make every effort to resolve [the disputes] without recourse to the formal dispute resolution procedures.”

14 *Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress*, by Lenore Sek. CRS Issue Brief IB10084.

Key TPA Legislation in 2001

Consideration of the U.S.-Jordan FTA occurred on a track parallel to the continuing debate over presidential trade promotion authority. The push to resolve the TPA stalemate was given an extra boost early in 2001, when the Business Roundtable (BRT) made up of chief executive officers from roughly 200 major companies, released a report calling anew for fast-track reauthorization, and suggesting a compromise solution. The BRT argued that the United States was falling behind other countries in trade leadership because the United States did not have fast-track authority.16

Specifically, in contrast to the traditional attitude of the business community against the inclusion of worker rights provisions in trade agreements, the BRT, in its report, took a stand that: in pursuing labor (and environmental) objectives in trade and investment negotiations, the United States should adopt a “one size does not fit all” approach. Rather, “we must grant our trade negotiators the flexibility to negotiate” instead of placing limitations on the President to include worker rights provisions in trade agreements.

Economic Arguments Concerning New TPA

The BRT argued that new trade promotion authority, resulting new trade agreements, and the trade expansion that could ensue would be good for the United States. Traditional economic arguments primarily support the BRT position, and point out how further reduction in international trade barriers could benefit businesses, workers, consumers, and investors alike.

For some businesses, an increase in trade from new agreements could help: (1) expand U.S. exports to new foreign markets; and (2) expand investment abroad. Other businesses that compete domestically with imports could suffer difficult adjustments or go out of business.

For workers, new trade authority could lead to long-term gains if they can shift to higher paying, higher productivity industries from those being phased out by increased imports and/or U.S. plant relocations abroad, particularly to developing countries. However, what is unclear is the long-term wage impact of increased international trade, particularly on lower-skilled U.S. workers who, with the exodus of much low and mid-level manufacturing from the United States, and increased automation of many remaining jobs, must essentially move up to higher skill level jobs or down to lower-skill service jobs.

For consumers, new trade agreements could: further lower prices on imported goods, and help raise overall U.S. productivity levels, which can lead to increases in the standard of living.

For investors, new trade agreements could give a boost to stocks benefitting from greater profitability of U.S. businesses.

Other arguments in favor of including worker rights provisions in trade agreements are that: (1) worker rights provisions can discourage multinational corporations from engaging in exploitative labor practices in developing countries; (2) worker rights protections can lessen labor cost differences between countries and thereby make plant relocation (“runaway plants”) to developing countries less attractive; and (3) worker rights protections can help discourage downward pressure on U.S. wages from cheaper imports.

Other arguments against including worker rights provisions in trade agreements are that: (1) labor provisions (addressing “social” issues) do not belong in an economic vehicle designed to promote trade; (2) labor provisions are protectionist (in that, to the extent that they impose labor requirements, they may raise the production costs of the trading partners) and thereby amount to substituting non-tariff barriers for the tariffs they are designed to reduce or eliminate; and (3) all countries will eventually adopt worker protections as they develop economically.

The Lead-Up to TPA Compromise Bills

After the BRT issued its position paper, other groups and individuals followed with their lists of acceptable concepts and provisions for new fast-track authority. The list of those offering ideas included President Bush, some pro-free-trade Democrats who called themselves the New Democrats, Chairman Phil Crane of the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee (with H.R. 2149, the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001), Senator Max Baucus of the Senate Finance Committee, and the AFL-CIO.17

Two key bills to reauthorize presidential fast-track authority were introduced in October, 2001. Representative Bill Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Representative Charles Rangel, ranking minority member of the same committee, authored bills that, between them, included provisions from virtually all of the various position papers offered to promote a compromise. H.R. 3005 (Thomas), the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 (BTPAA) was reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on October 16, 2001. H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin), the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001, the Democratic alternative, was voted down as a substitute for the committee bill.

---

H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 Compared

H.R. 3005 was introduced by its author as a bipartisan compromise. It includes language and ideas from the reported House bill from 1997 (H.R. 2621), NAFTA, the U.S.-Jordan FTA, and the OTCA 1988 fast-track authority. It also includes a number of “new” provisions relating to congressional and administrative consultation and oversight.

H.R. 3019 was offered as a Democratic-sponsored bill and includes two different approaches, contained in two different sets of principal negotiating objectives, for the promotion and enforcement of worker rights.

The sections below compare and contrast key provisions in H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019, and address some policy implications of these provisions. Table 8 at the back of this report includes a detailed comparison of the labor provisions of H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019.

Overall Negotiating Objectives

Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 include as overall negotiating objectives (summarizing the conceptual approach of the bills): to promote worker rights. However, H.R. 3005 aims to promote respect for worker rights, and H.R. 3019 aims to promote enforcement of worker rights. (See discussion on the definition of worker rights, below.) The overall negotiating objectives of both bills are detailed, below.

Table 2. H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019: Overall Negotiating Objectives

- H.R. 3005, Sec. 2(a)(6): “To promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with core labor standards of the ILO . . . and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights;”

- H.R. 3019, Sec. 2(a)(11): “To promote enforcement of internationally recognized core labor standards by trading partners of the United States.”

Definitions of Worker Rights in H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019

The definitions of worker rights used by each bill cannot be determined by comparing the terms used in the overall negotiating objectives (in italics) with the terms and definitions mentioned earlier in this report and repeated below as items listed under “internationally recognized worker rights” and “core labor standards.”
Thus, one must look elsewhere in each bill to determine which definition of worker rights each bill uses. It should be re-emphasized, that there is no official definition of “worker rights” in international parlance.

H.R. 3005, in principal negotiating objectives, uses the term “core labor standards” in Sec. 2(b)(11)(c), and in Sec.11(2) defines it by listing the items which are identified below as “internationally recognized worker rights.”

H.R. 3019 includes two sets of principal negotiating objectives, each of which contains a different definition of worker rights.

For principal negotiating objectives for trade agreements in the WTO, H.R. 3019 uses several terms: “core internationally recognized labor standards,” “core labor standards,” and “internationally recognized worker rights” which it defines as indicated below.

For principal negotiating objectives for bilateral trade agreements and trade agreements in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), H.R. 3019 refers to “core labor standards” and defines them as indicated below.
Worker rights are typically defined in one of two ways: “internationally recognized worker rights” or “core labor standards.”

“Internationally recognized worker rights,” typically referenced in U.S. trade laws and trade agreements, are defined in the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618 as amended by Sec. 503 of P.L. 98-573) as:

- 1. the right of association;
- 2. the right to organize and bargain collectively;
- 3. prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
- 4. minimum age for the employment of children; and
- 5. acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.

“Core labor standards” are defined slightly differently by the International Labor Organization (ILO). They substitute for “5” above,

- freedom from employment discrimination.

Confusing Terms for Worker Rights in H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019:
H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 do not adhere strictly to the above definitions of “worker rights,” which leads to some confusion.

- H.R. 3005 refers to its standards as “core labor standards” but defines them with the list of “internationally recognized worker rights,” above;
- H.R. 3019, on the other hand, calls worker rights by four different names:
  - For multilateral trade agreements negotiated within the World Trade Organization (WTO), uses three terms to describe worker rights – “core internationally recognized labor standards,” “internationally recognized worker rights,” and “internationally recognized core labor standards,” and defines only “internationally recognized worker rights” with a correct reference to the Trade Act of 1974.
  - For bilateral agreements and a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, it uses the term “core labor standards” and the definition listed above.

Principal Negotiating Objectives

As mentioned, H.R. 3005 includes one set of principal negotiating objectives (items targeted for inclusion in trade agreements) applicable to all trade agreements, and H.R. 3019 includes two distinct sets of principal negotiating objectives: one set for multilateral trade agreements under the WTO, and the other set for bilateral agreements and an agreement establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

H.R. 3005: For ALL Trade Agreements (WTO, Bilateral, and FTAA).
H.R. 3005 has 12 principal negotiating objectives, of which one relates to labor and the environment. It has a number of parts (Sec. 2 (b) (11)), and aims to promote respect for worker rights by focusing on such things as self-enforcement, sovereignty,
and dispute resolution procedures which treat labor issues equally with other issues. These principal negotiating objectives relating to labor are listed in table 4.

The key principal negotiating objectives in H.R. 3005 relating to labor (see below) are similar to provisions that have already appeared in the NAFTA labor side agreement (which includes the self-enforcement provision), the U.S.-Jordan FTA (which includes the self-enforcement and sovereignty provisions, and a commitment to core labor standards), and H.R. 2621 (Crane, defeated by the House in the 105th Congress, which includes protections for businesses).

The principal negotiating objectives relating to dispute settlement procedures in H. R. 3005 reflect the "flexibility" advocated by the BRT (See “A” under the dispute settlement procedure description above which calls for penalties appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter and scope of the violation.) The principal negotiating objectives also reflect calls by organized labor to have labor provisions in trade agreements treated as equal in importance to “traditional” subjects covered in trade agreements, e.g., foreign investment, intellectual property, etc. (See “B” under the dispute settlement procedure description above.)
Table 4. H.R. 3005: Principal Negotiating Objectives for All Trade Agreements (WTO, Bilateral and FTAA)

- Self-enforcement, Sec.2(b)(11)(A): “To ensure that a party... does not fail to effectively enforce its... labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade...” (similar to the NAFTA labor side agreement and the U.S.-Jordan FTA);

- Sovereignty, Sec b(11)(B): “To recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement... and to recognize that a country is effective in enforcing its laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources” (similar to the NAFTA labor side agreement and the U.S.-Jordan FTA);

- Core Labor Standards, Sec.2(b)(11)(C): “To strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards;”

- Protections for businesses, Sec.2(b)(11)(G): “To ensure that labor... policies and practices of the parties to the trade agreement with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against U.S. exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade” (similar to H.R. 2621 in the 105th Congress);

- Dispute Settlement, Sec. 2(b)(12): By way of enforcement, H.R. 3005 would:
  A. Sec.2 (b)(12)(E): “Seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a party to a dispute under that agreement that encourages compliance with the obligations of the agreement, is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter and scope of the violation, and has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or interests not party to the dispute while maintaining the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism;” and
  B. Sec. 2(b)(12)(F): “Seek provisions that treat U.S. principal negotiating objectives equally” with other negotiating objectives [i.e., treat labor issues equally with foreign investment, intellectual property, etc.] “with respect to the ability to resort to dispute settlement under the applicable agreement, the availability of equivalent dispute settlement procedures, and the availability of equivalent remedies.”

H.R. 3019: For Trade Agreements Negotiated in the WTO. H.R. 3019 has 23 principal negotiating objectives, of which one relates to labor and the environment. It has several parts {Sec.2(b)(13)}, and aims to promote and enforce “core internationally recognized labor standards,” primarily through WTO and ILO promotion and enforcement. Its principal negotiating objectives for trade agreements in the WTO are detailed in table 5 below.
Table 5. H.R. 3019: Principal Negotiating Objectives for Trade Agreements Negotiated in the WTO

- Achieve a framework, Sec. 2(b)(13)(A): “To achieve a framework of enforceable multilateral rules as soon as practicable that leads to the adoption and enforcement of core labor standards, including in the WTO, and as appropriate other international organizations including the ILO;”

- Update WTO Agreements, Sec. 2(b)(13)(B): “To update article XX of the GATT, 1994, and Article XIV of the GATS in relation to core internationally recognized worker rights, including in regard to actions of WTO members, taken consistent with and in furtherance of recommendations made by the ILO under Article 33 of the Constitution of the ILO;”

- Establish a working group, Sec. 2(b)(13)(C): “To establish promptly a working group on trade and labor issues” (without specifying the forum) –“to explore the linkage between international trade and investment and internationally recognized worker rights (as defined in section 502(a)(4) of the Trade Act of 1974) taking into account differences in the level of development among countries;”

- Provide for regular review, Sec. 2(b)(13)(D): “To provide for regular review of adherence to core labor standards in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism established in Annex 3 to the WTO agreement;”

- Establish a regular working relationship, Sec. 2(b)(13)(E): “To establish a working relationship between the WTO and the ILO. . . to provide WTO members with technical and legal assistance in developing and enforcing internationally recognized core labor standards;”

- Improve WTO-ILO coordination, Sec. 2(b)(15)(C): “To improve coordination between the WTO and other international organizations such as ... the ILO;”

- Achieve Dispute Settlement, Sec. (2)(b)(6): “To improve enforcement of decisions of dispute settlement panels to ensure prompt compliance by foreign governments with their obligations under the WTO.”

Provisions in H.R. 3019 call for the establishment of a framework that leads to the adoption and enforcement of core labor standards in the WTO and in the ILO, and specify some of the elements in that framework. These provisions are subject to two different interpretations. One interpretation is that they have the potential to be very strong – even stronger than the provisions in H.R. 3005 which are open-ended and permit great negotiating flexibility. The reason for the strength of H.R. 3019 provisions, proponents of this position argue, is that the WTO has in place specific dispute settlement procedures. Proponents of this idea also argue that the ILO is
already set to be a partner with the WTO in promoting and enforcing worker rights because the ILO is the international organization with the major responsibility for promoting and enforcing worker rights around the world.

The other interpretation suggests that the framework described on page 13 for the adoption and enforcement of core labor standards in the WTO and the ILO could represent a long-term approach. Proponents argue this position based on efforts stemming from the Uruguay Round Agreements implementing Act (Sec. 131 of P.L. 103-465), which required that the President seek a working party in the WTO to examine the relationship between internationally recognized worker rights and trade. As mentioned earlier in this report, President Clinton did seek such a working party in the WTO; but he was unsuccessful because his efforts met with great resistance by developing countries, which make up a majority in the WTO.

Proponents of the idea that promotion and enforcement of worker rights through the WTO and the ILO could be a long-term approach also argue that the ILO, an organization with roughly 175 members, has a limited range of enforcement tools.\textsuperscript{18} The ILO’s primary tools for promoting and enforcing worker rights throughout the world are technical assistance, consultation, recordkeeping (i.e., maintaining lists showing which countries have formally adopted which labor standards), and persuasion. The ILO is dependent on self-enforcement by member countries, with little chance of penalty for non-compliance. The ILO’s strongest enforcement tool, Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, relies on voluntary trade discrimination against countries that do not meet ILO guidelines. Article 33 has been used only once—on Myanmar, in 2000, in an effort to try to put group pressure on that country to end its widespread use of forced labor.\textsuperscript{19}

H.R. 3019: For a FreeTrade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Bilateral Agreements. H.R. 3019's principal negotiating objectives for an FTAA agreement differ considerably from its objectives for WTO trade agreements. Instead of delegating promotion and enforcement of worker rights to the WTO and the ILO, H.R. 3019 seeks to incorporate strict enforcement guidelines into the FTAA itself. Principal negotiating objectives for an FTAA and bilateral agreements are identified below.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item The ILO adopted a declaration in June of 1998 which said, in part, that all member countries, even if they have not ratified ILO conventions (e.g., core labor standards) have an obligation arising from the fact of their membership in the ILO, to respect, and promote core labor standards. International Labour Conference 96\textsuperscript{th} Session, Geneva, June 1998. Obtained from the ILO website: [http://www.ilo.org].
  \item Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, states that “in the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the recommendations if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry... the Governing Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance herewith.” The resolution approved by the delegates recommended that ILO members review their relations with Myanmar to ensure that they do not abet the system of forced or compulsory labor. Source: In Historic Vote, ILO Assembly Tightens Pressure on Myanmar. \textit{ILO News}, August 8, 2000: [http://us.ilo.org/news/focus/0008/FOCUS-1.html].
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The H.R. 3019 provisions, if adopted in an FTAA, could take worker rights promotion and enforcement to a new level of worker rights promotion beyond the NAFTA labor side agreement and beyond the U.S.-Jordan FTA by: (1) including in an FTAA enforceable rules for the adoption and enforcement of core labor standards (although each country would have the right to establish its own domestic labor standards consistent with core labor standards); (2) providing for phased-in compliance with labor market standards for least-developed countries; and (3) including dispute settlement provisions which would provide in all contexts for the use of all remedies that are demonstrably effective to promote prompt and full compliance with decisions by the dispute settlement panel. (By comparison, NAFTA limits remedies to fines and, for non-payment of fines, removal of NAFTA benefits to the amount of the penalty for one year.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. H.R. 3019: Principal Negotiating Objectives for FTAA and Bilateral Agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Retain the right to allocate resources on the basis of priorities, Sec. 2(c)(9)(B)(ii)(I): For FTAA members “to retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters determined to have higher priorities;”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Retain the right to establish own domestic labor standards, Sec. 2(c)(9)(B)(ii)(I): For FTAA members to “retain the right to establish their own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly labor policies, laws, and regulations, in a manner consistent with” core labor standards.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Provide for phased-in compliance, Sec. 2(c)(9)(C): “To provide for phased-in compliance for least-developed countries comparable to mechanisms utilized in other FTAA agreements;”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Regularly review countries’ adherence, Sec. 2(c)(9)(E): To “provide regular review of adherence to core labor standards;”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Exceptions from FTAA obligations, Sec. 2(c)(9)(F): “To create exceptions from the obligations under the FTAA agreements for products produced by prison labor or slave labor, products produced by child labor, and actions taken consistent with and in furtherance of recommendations made by the ILO;“</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Improve FTAA-ILO coordination, Sec. 2(c)(11)(A): “To improve coordination between the FTAA and other international organizations such as . . . the ILO . . . to increase the effectiveness of technical assistance programs;” and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Achieve dispute settlement procedures, Sec. 2(c)(4)(B): “To provide in all contexts for the use of all remedies that are demonstrably effective to promote prompt and full compliance with decisions by the dispute settlement panel.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Congressional and Administrative Oversight

Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 include provisions for congressional and administrative oversight of trade agreements. Both bills would include reviews of the potential impact of new trade agreements on U.S. workers. The two bills differ in who would produce as well as receive the reports.

Under H.R. 3005, reports would be transmitted from the President to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees. Under H.R. 3019, (see table 7 below), they would be transmitted from the U.S. Trade Representative in conjunction with the International Trade Commission and the Department of Labor to Congress.

The bills also differ in their timing requirements.

H.R. 3005 has no specific timing requirements. H.R. 3019 has very specific requirements which include different schedules for different potential trade agreements. For agreements negotiated under the WTO, an initial review is due to Congress within six months after the onset of the negotiations, and a final version is due not later than 90 calendar days before the agreement is signed by the President. See page 21 for congressional and administrative oversight provisions.

The extensive use of consultations and reports to Congress and committees on various labor rights issues connected with trade, would cover new ground. Some observers argue that, of the two bills, H.R. 3005's provisions are stronger because they require more reports. Others contend that H.R. 3019's provisions are stronger because they are much more detailed and include strict time requirements for preliminary and final versions of the report.

The table that follows lays out a more detailed comparison between the various approaches to trade promotion authority discussed in this report.
Table 7. H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019: Congressional and Administrative Oversight

Both H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019 provide for reviews on the employment effects of trade agreements:

- **H.R. 3005, Review on employment, Sec. 2(c)(5):** directs the President to “review the impact of future trade agreements on U.S. employment, modeled after Executive Order 13141, and report to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committee on such review.”

- **H.R. 3019, Review on employment, Sec.6(e):** “Upon the commencement of negotiations for a trade agreement, the Trade Representative, jointly with the Secretary of Labor and the Commissioners of the International Trade Commission, and in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies, shall commence a review of the effects on workers in the United States of a proposed trade agreement.” The Trade Representative shall submit to Congress within 6 months after the onset of negotiations, a preliminary draft of the labor review. . . and not later than 90 calendar days before the agreement is signed by the President, the final version of the labor review.”

H.R. 3005 also includes additional provisions for reports and administrative oversight. It provides that the President shall:

- **Consultative mechanisms:** Sec. 2(c)(2): “seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards [defined as internationally recognized worker rights] and to report to” the house Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee on the context and operation of such mechanisms.”

- **Consultations by the Secretary of Labor, Sec. 2(c)(7):** “have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning that country’s labor laws and provide technical assistance to that country if needed;”

- **Survey on prohibitions against exploitative child labor, Sec. 2(c)(8):** “submit to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the country or countries that are parties to the agreement have in effect laws governing exploitative child labor;” and

- **Report on effectiveness of penalties in promoting worker rights, Sec. 2(c)(11):** report to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees “not later than 12 months after the imposition of a penalty or remedy by the United States permitted by a trade agreement. . . on the effectiveness of the penalty or remedy . . . The report shall address whether the penalty or remedy was effective in changing the behavior of the targeted party and whether the penalty or remedy had any adverse impact on parties or interest not party to the dispute.”
Table 8. Comparison of H.R. 3005 (Thomas) and H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>H.R. 3005 (Thomas) For all agreements</th>
<th>H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) (WTO vs. FTAA/bilateral agreements )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. 2(a)(6): To promote respect for worker rights consistent with the ILO, and an understanding of the relationship between trade and worker rights.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(a)(11): To promote enforcement of internationally recognized core labor standards by U.S. trading partners.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principal Negotiating Objectives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To promote worker rights</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(11)(C): To strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(13)(A): To achieve a framework that leads to adoption and enforcement of “core internationally recognized labor standards” through such organizations as the WTO and the ILO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create WTO review of standards</td>
<td>No provision.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(13)(D): To Regularly review adherence to core labor standards in the WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish/improve WTO-ILO Cooperation</td>
<td>No similar provision as a principal negotiating objective. However, as a directive:</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(13)(E): To establish a WTO-ILO working relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(1): For the President to seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(15)(C): To improve WTO-ILO coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To ensure self-enforcement</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(11)(A): To ensure that a party does not fail to enforce its own labor laws through a sustained course of action or inaction in a manner affecting trade</td>
<td>No similar provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To maintain sovereignty</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(11)(B): To recognize the right of parties to exercise discretion regarding allocation of resources on enforcement.</td>
<td>No similar provision in the WTO provisions, but a similar provision is included under the FTAA provisions, below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To protect U.S. interests</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(11)(G): To ensure that labor policies and practices do not unjustifiably discriminate against U.S. exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade.</td>
<td>No similar provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>H.R. 3005 (Thomas) For all agreements</td>
<td>H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) (WTO vs. FTAA/bilateral agreements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update worker rights for the GATT and GATS</td>
<td>No provision.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(13)(B): To update Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to reflect ILO core internationally recognized worker rights and recommendations under article 33. In this way, a country could legally deviate from its obligations under the WTO and discriminate against imports produced under conditions not protected by core labor standards or not meeting ILO recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish a working group on trade and labor</td>
<td>No provision.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(13)(C): To establish working group on trade and labor issues (without specifying the forum.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Dispute Settlement                           | Sec. 2(b)(12)(E): To seek penalties appropriate to the parties, subject matter and scope of the violation that will be effective, but not adversely affect parties not involved in the dispute.  
Sec. 2(b)(12)(F): To seek provisions that treat U.S. principal negotiating objectives equally with other negotiating objectives (i.e. treat labor issues equally with foreign investment, intellectual property, etc.) | Sec. 2(b)(6)(A): To ensure prompt compliance by foreign governments with their obligations under the WTO.  
No similar provision. |
| FTAA/Bilateral Agreements ONLY               |                                        | Sec. 2(c)(9)(A): To include enforceable rules providing for the adoption and enforcement of ILO core labor standards.  
Sec. 2(c)(9)(B)(ii)(II): For FTAA members to retain the right to establish their own domestic labor standards consistent with core labor standards. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Negotiating Objectives (Cont.)</th>
<th>H.R. 3005 (Thomas) For all agreements</th>
<th>H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) (WTO vs. FTAA/bilateral agreements)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To establish dispute settlement trigger</td>
<td>No provision.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(9)(B): To establish a trigger for invoking the dispute settlement process. The trigger shall be: (a) an FTAA member's sustained failure to enforce; or (b) waiver or derogation from domestic labor standards to attract investment or gain a competitive advantage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To maintain sovereignty</td>
<td>Sec. 2(b)(11)(B) – (mentioned under H.R. 3005 general provisions, earlier): To recognize the right of parties to exercise discretion regarding the allocation of resources on enforcement.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(9)(B)(ii)(I): Similar provision to that in H.R. 3005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide phased-in compliance</td>
<td>No provision.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(9)(C): To provide phased-in compliance with labor market standards for least-developed countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create an FTAA work program</td>
<td>No provision.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(9)(D): To create FTAA work program providing guidance, technical assistance, and market access incentives for FTAA members to adhere to and enforce core labor standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To review countries’ adherence to standards</td>
<td>No provision.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(9)(E): To regularly review countries’ adherence to core labor standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To create exceptions from FTAA obligations</td>
<td>No provision.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(9)(F): To create exceptions from FTAA trade obligations for products produced by prison, slave, or child labor and for ILO recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve FTAA-ILO coordination</td>
<td>No provision, but as mentioned previously: Sec. 2(c)(1): For the President to seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(11)(A): To improve FTAA-ILO coordination to increase effectiveness of technical assistance programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Settlement</td>
<td>See dispute settlement provision under WTO Agreement.</td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(4)(B): To provide in all contexts for the use of all remedies that are demonstrably effective to promote prompt and full compliance with decisions by the dispute settlement panel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>H.R. 3005 (Thomas) For all agreements</td>
<td>H.R. 3019 (Rangel/Levin) (WTO vs. FTAA/bilateral agreements )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Congressional and Administrative (Labor) Oversight</strong></td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(5): The President shall review the impact of future trade agreements on U.S. employment and report to House Ways and Means (HW&amp;M) and Senate Finance (SF) Committees.</td>
<td>Sec. 6(e): The USTR, Secretary of Labor, and International Trade Commission shall begin review of the effects on U.S. workers of the proposed trade agreement, and the USTR shall submit a draft report to Congress 6 months after onset of negotiations, and a final version at least 90 calendar days before the agreement is signed by the President. (Several exceptions on timing include one for FTAA: preliminary draft due 18 months after enactment.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review Effects on Workers</strong></td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(2): The President shall seek consultative mechanisms among Parties to promote respect for core labor standards and report to HW&amp;M and SF Committees.</td>
<td>No similar provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Report to Congressional Committees</strong></td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(7): The President shall have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country seeking a U.S. trade agreement about its labor laws and provide technical assistance if needed.</td>
<td>No similar provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical Assistance by Secretary of Labor</strong></td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(8): The President shall submit to Congress a report describing the extent to which parties to a trade agreement have laws governing exploitative child labor.</td>
<td>No similar provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Report to Congress</strong></td>
<td>Sec. 2(c)(11): The President shall report to HW&amp;M and SF Committees within 12 months after a penalty is imposed, on its effectiveness in enforcing U.S. rights under the trade agreement, whether the penalty was effective in changing the behavior of the targeted party, and whether it had adverse impacts on parties not involved in the dispute.</td>
<td>No similar provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Report to Congressional Committees</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>No similar provision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>