Tibet, China, and the 107th Congress: 
Issues for U.S. Policy

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Kerry Dumbaugh
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
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Summary

The political and cultural status of Tibet remains a difficult issue in U.S.-China relations and a matter of debate among U.S. policymakers. Controversy continues over Tibet’s current political status as part of China, the role of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the impact of Chinese control on Tibetan culture and religious traditions. These controversies have prompted recurring U.S. congressional action in support of Tibet’s status and traditions. This report briefly reviews Tibet’s historical status and discusses current issues. It will be updated regularly.
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Introduction

The political and cultural status of Tibet remains a difficult issue in U.S.-China relations, and appropriate U.S. actions remain matters of debate among U.S. policymakers. Controversy continues over Tibet’s current political status as part of China, the role of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the impact of Chinese control on Tibetan culture and religious traditions. These controversies have prompted recurring U.S. congressional actions in support of Tibet’s status and traditions – actions that are routinely denounced by the Chinese government in Beijing.

This report briefly reviews Tibet’s historical status, discusses current issues within Tibet and as components of U.S.-China relations, and discusses Bush Administration views and pending legislation in the 107th Congress.

Brief Historical Background of Tibet

Tibetan history is notable in two particular respects. One is the extraordinarily pervasive influence of Buddhism in all aspects of daily life. At one time, a sizeable number of Tibet’s male population were monks and lamas, and eventually this ecclesiastical group became Tibet’s temporal rulers as well as its spiritual leaders. The Dalai Lama, believed to be the reincarnation of Tibet’s patron deity, is the highest and most revered among this ruling monastic theocracy.

The second noteworthy aspect of Tibetan history is the ambiguity and disagreement surrounding Tibet’s long political relationship with China. Tibetans generally view Tibet as an historically independent nation that had a close relationship with a succession of Chinese empires. A succession of Chinese governments, on the other hand, have claimed Tibet as a political and geographical part of China. In 1949-1951, the newly established communist government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) backed up this claim by sending military troops to occupy Tibet. Since then, Tibet has been under active Chinese rule as its westernmost province, Xizang (the Tibet Autonomous Region). Much of the PRC’s tenure there has been troubled, particularly during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when most monasteries, palaces, and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism and culture were

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1 Such claims have been made by previous Chinese dynasties, the Republic of China government under Chiang Kai-shek (now the government on Taiwan), and the communist government of the People’s Republic of China.
either damaged or destroyed. The International Campaign for Tibet claims that over 1 million Tibetans died during the first 30 years of PRC rule.\(^2\)

In 1959, at the age of 24, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet and went into exile in India with a group of his followers. He remains there today, along with a Tibetan refugee community of tens of thousands, and he is still widely regarded as the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, their foremost advocate, and a figure of international stature. He has steadfastly maintained that Tibet is an independent country under illegal occupation by Chinese government forces. But he has also been willing to negotiate with Beijing, and has advanced a number of fairly moderate proposals regarding Tibet’s future status. The Chinese government condemns the Dalai Lama’s political activities and his leadership of a “government-in-exile,” although it recognizes him as a major religious figure.

**Tibet and U.S. Policy Since the 1980s**

In the late 1980's, Tibet became a recurring issue in congressional consideration of matters relating to China. A number of factors have contributed to Members’ greater interest. These include: the Dalai Lama’s and the Tibetan community’s ongoing political activities; reports of human rights abuses and China’s continuing repressive social and political controls in Tibet; and the lack of consensus among U.S. policymakers over what U.S. policy should be toward China. On matters involving Tibet — as on many matters involving China — congressional views have often been at odds with those of the White House. As a matter of official policy, the U.S. government recognizes Tibet as part of China and has always done so, although some dispute the historical consistency of this U.S. position.\(^3\) Since normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979, a succession of both Republican and Democratic U.S. Administrations have favored policies of engagement with China. In the process, they frequently have sought to minimize areas of potential tension with Beijing where Chinese leaders have taken strong positions, such as on the question of Tibet’s political status.

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\(^2\) There are varying estimates for how many Tibetans may have died as a direct consequence of Chinese rule. The figure of 1.2 million is the figure generally used by the Tibetan government-in-exile. Warren W. Smith, author of *The Tibetan Nation* (p. 607) calculates that the number of deaths is closer to 600,000.

\(^3\) Some assert that past U.S. actions which treated Tibet as if it were an independent state in effect signaled U.S. recognition. Michael C. van Walt van Praag, for instance, in *The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law*, (Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1987) states that “Washington supported Tibet and treated it as an independent State, even recognizing its *de facto* (italics included) independence...” p. 139. In the daily press briefing of October 8, 1987, responding to a question concerning what year the United States formally recognized Tibet as a part of China, the State Department’s Public Affairs office issued the following statement: “We have never recognized Tibet as a sovereign state independent of China. We first made the statement that we considered Tibet to be a part of China in 1978; however, our earlier formulations were not inconsistent with the statement, and we have never challenged China’s claim. No third country recognizes Tibet as a state independent of China.”
The Dalai Lama himself has been the most charismatic and renowned advocate for the Tibetan people over the past decade. He has a number of supporters in the U.S. Congress. The Dalai Lama’s and his exiled community’s efforts to gain international support for Tibet’s cause took a major step forward in 1986-1987, when a series of meetings between Tibetan and Western supporters in New York, Washington, and London launched what has become known as Tibet’s “international campaign.” The goal of this campaign was to garner Western and principally U.S. support for Tibet’s situation, and ultimately to bring this international pressure to bear on Beijing to make satisfactory political concessions. One result of this new strategy, the U.S. Congress in 1987 began to put pressure on the White House to protect Tibetan culture and accord Tibet greater status in U.S. law, despite Beijing’s strong objections.

Two events of particular importance occurred in 1987. First, on September 21, the Dalai Lama made his first political speech in the United States, at the invitation of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. In that speech, the Dalai Lama made a five-point proposal for resolving the Tibet question that was well-received in the United States and had significant consequences on congressional attitudes toward Tibet. Second, Congress put non-binding measures into place in 1987 declaring that the United States should make Tibet’s situation a higher policy priority and should urge China to establish a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama.

This language, not the first that Congress had passed regarding Tibet, nevertheless, marked the beginning of a significant increase in congressional activity on Tibet’s status. From this point on, congressional supporters sought to mention Tibet separately whenever possible in legislation relating to China. In 1990, in considering foreign relations authorization legislation that contained the so-called “Tiananmen sanctions,” Congress singled out Tibet for special mention in sense-of-Congress language that closely resembled the “five points” the Dalai Lama had proposed two years earlier and, in the same legislation, mandated the Voice of

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4 These have included Representatives Charlie Rose, Ben Gilman, and Tom Lantos, and the late Senator Claiborne Pell.

5 These three cities are all still centers for Tibet-related offices and information networks. According to Dr. Melvyn Goldstein, professor of anthropology at Case Western Reserve University, the details of how the “international campaign” strategy was formed have not yet been documented. Goldstein, Melvyn, *The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama*, University of California Press, 1997. pp. 76 and 138.

6 President Reagan signed into law H.R. 1777, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY88-89, on December 22, 1987 (P.L. 100-204); section 1243 contains language on Tibet. In 1985, 91 Members of Congress reportedly had also sent a letter to China’s President, Li Xiannian, expressing support for continued talks with the Dalai Lama.

7 Congress considered a number of non-binding measures in the 1980s concerning Tibet. In 1986, Congress listed “Tibet” as an independent country in H.R. 5548, legislation dealing the Export-Import Bank. This bill was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472.

8 According to a legislative database, in the four years prior to 1987, only 6 measures had been introduced in Congress concerning Tibet, whereas the 1987 legislation was one of 14 measures introduced in 1987-1988. [http://thomas.loc.gov]
This bill, H.R. 3792, was enacted as P.L. 101-246, and contains the “Tiananmen sanctions” on China that are still largely in effect. Its provisions on Tibet stated that U.S. policy toward China should be explicitly linked with the situation in Tibet, specifically to include lifting of martial law in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet; opening Tibet to foreigners, including the press and international human rights organizations; release of political prisoners; and conduct of negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in exile, and on conditions in Tibet.\textsuperscript{10}

Congressional efforts to raise the profile of Tibet over the last ten years or more have been resisted or mitigated by successive U.S. Administrations, but generally in a low profile, non-confrontational manner. As early as 1986, when Congress passed legislation authorizing Export-Import Bank funding which listed Tibet as a separate country, President Reagan signed the legislation into law.\textsuperscript{11} In his remarks, however, the President said:

\begin{quote}
I note that Tibet is listed as a country in section 8. The United States recognizes Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. I interpret Tibet’s inclusion as a separate country to be a technical oversight.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

In other respects, however, consistent congressional pressure has contributed to U.S. Administrations acknowledging, however subtly, the position of the Tibetan community-in-exile. Thus, President George Bush in 1991 became the first U.S. President to meet with the Dalai Lama, while President Bill Clinton met with the Dalai Lama several times in casual “drop-by” meetings. Although these meetings were deliberately low-key and informal, they nevertheless offended Chinese leaders, as did the Clinton Administration’s decision, after having opposed the Special Envoy position for four years, to compromise by establishing the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet.

\textsuperscript{9} This bill, H.R. 3792, was enacted as P.L. 101-246, and contains the “Tiananmen sanctions” on China that are still largely in effect. Its provisions on Tibet stated that U.S. policy toward China should be explicitly linked with the situation in Tibet, specifically to include lifting of martial law in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet; opening Tibet to foreigners, including the press and international human rights organizations; release of political prisoners; and conduct of negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.

\textsuperscript{10} Established pursuant to Section 536 of the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, H.R. 2333, enacted as P.L. 103-236.

\textsuperscript{11} H.R. 5548 was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472.

**Efforts to Create a Special Envoy for Tibet.** During the early years of the Clinton Administration, Congress began considering measures to establish the position of a U.S. Special Envoy for Tibet, with ambassadorial rank. In introducing such a measure in 1994, Senator Claiborne Pell stated he believed it was necessary to further focus White House attention on issues involving Tibet:

I recall how difficult it was to engage previous administrations in serious, knowledgeable discussions on Tibet...A Special Envoy for Tibet would ensure that this important element of United States-China relations was continually reflected in policy discussions on a senior level.\(^1\)

While legislation to create a Special Envoy for Tibet was never enacted, provisions similar to those in the 1994 legislation were also introduced as sections of authorization bills in the 104\(^{th}\) and the 105\(^{th}\) Congresses.\(^2\) In each case, the provision called for the Special Envoy to have ambassadorial rank and to actively promote negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. Clinton Administration officials opposed these provisions, primarily because of concerns about the creation of an ambassadorial rank position for an entity (Tibet) that the United States recognizes as part of China rather than as an independent country in its own right.

On October 31, 1997, in a move seen as a compromise to appeal to proponents of the “Special Envoy” position, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright designated a Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues within the State Department and named Gregory Craig to serve in the position concurrently with his job as Director of Policy Planning. Although the new Special Coordinator position did not come with ambassadorial rank, its creation nevertheless suggested there would be a higher level of official attention on issues involving Tibet. Consequently, the 105\(^{th}\) Congress dropped the Special Envoy provision from subsequent legislation.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Statement by Senator Pell, *Congressional Record*, October 7, 1994, p. S14878. Senator Pell’s bill, S. 2554, was not enacted; nor was H.R. 5254, a similar bill introduced in the House on October 7, 1994, by Representative Howard Berman.

\(^2\) In the 104\(^{th}\) Congress, that legislation was the American Overseas Interests Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561-Gilman, and S. 908-Helms). President Clinton vetoed this legislation on April 12, 1996; the House override vote on April 30,1996 failed to achieve the two-thirds necessary for passage (234-188). Similar legislation in the 105\(^{th}\) Congress, H.R. 1486, was replaced by three separate bills after consideration by the House Rules Committee on June 3, 1997: H.R. 1757, authorizing appropriations for the State Department for FY1998-1999 (and containing the Tibet Special Envoy provision); H.R. 1758, the European Security Act (NATO enlargement); and H.R. 1759, a foreign aid authorization and reform bill. The Special Envoy provision was dropped from this separate legislation before final passage.

\(^3\) On January 20, 1999, the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet was assumed by Julia Taft, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration. She stepped down on January 19, 2001. On May 17, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, would serve as the next Special Coordinator for Tibet.
Current Issues: Implications for the United States

In addition to issues involving Tibet’s political status and that of the Dalai Lama’s exiled community, many other aspects of Tibet-PRC relations have been sources of tension. There are long-standing disputes over basic statistics: the geographic area of Tibet, the number of Tibetans living there, and the number of ethnic Han Chinese residents. There are ethnic frictions between Tibetans and Chinese living in close proximity, with all the burdens of social discrimination and economic disparity that often accompany such frictions. And the still deep-rooted influence of religion in Tibet — as a way of life, a cultural identity, and an institutional force — clashes continually with the secular traditions and bureaucratic requirements of the Chinese communist government system. Among these entrenched tensions, a number of issues in particular have implications for Tibet’s future, as well as political implications for U.S.-China relations. These issues are described below.

Status of the Dalai Lama’s Negotiations with China. Despite the creation of the U.S. Special Coordinator on Tibet with the specific mission of helping to promote talks, relations between China and the Dalai Lama and his exiled followers have remained stalled for years, with no negotiations currently scheduled or even planned. In the past, both China and the Dalai Lama maintained that they were willing to hold discussions about Tibet’s future. The Dalai Lama himself — whose views on the subject are more cautious and diplomatic than those of many of his followers — generally speaks of Tibetan interests within the context of rule by China. He has spoken of a future Tibet that is part of China, but which also has “cultural autonomy” within the Chinese system. But the Dalai Lama also has insisted that there should be no preconditions for any discussions he has with Beijing; instead, the negotiators should be able to address every issue in contention.

In recent years, Chinese leaders have been highly critical of the Dalai Lama, going so far as to describe him as a “criminal” intent on splitting Tibet from China, and at times intimating that dialogue with him is impossible.16 In June 1998, during President Clinton’s summit trip to China, President Jiang Zemin appeared to take a more moderate position, indicating that the door to dialogue with the Dalai Lama was open. Since then, however, Beijing’s position has hardened, with some speculating that Jiang had little support for his more moderate stance among hardliners in Beijing. China continues to insist that discussions with the Dalai Lama should have several preconditions, including: an absolute ban on the subject of independence for Tibet; and the Dalai Lama’s public acknowledgment that Tibet and Taiwan are both part of China.

Some speculate that the Dalai Lama may have grown increasingly pessimistic about his ability to achieve a solution to Tibet’s situation. He has implied that the moderate approach he has been pursuing has failed because of China’s unwillingness to hold free-ranging talks, and has hinted that time may be running out for a negotiated settlement. Some are concerned that traditional Tibetan culture and values

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increasingly are being overwhelmed by the growing Chinese presence in Tibet. They worry about some of the educated and bilingual Tibetan elite, trained by the Chinese communists, who are now serving in government positions in Tibet and who therefore have more of a vested interest in the status quo. And, he has suggested that continued delay in achieving a negotiated settlement increases the possibility that frustrated Tibetans may resort to violence as an alternative to his own peaceful approach.

**Economic Development in Tibet.** Chinese government policies on economic development in Tibet appear to have helped raise the living standards of Tibet generally, but at a high cost to Tibet’s traditions and cultural identity. These policies reportedly have disrupted traditional living patterns and contributed to tensions between Tibetans and Chinese immigrants. In an evident effort to assuage Tibetan resentment, Beijing has spent substantial sums restoring Buddhist temples in Tibet. At a large conference conducted on Tibet in 1994, Chinese officials adopted plans to increase economic activity in Tibet by 10 percent per year and continue substantial economic subsidies to help Tibet’s backward economy. China since then has moved ahead with a number of major economic development and infrastructure projects.

The Dalai Lama and other Tibetans are concerned that Chinese economic activity in Tibet disrupts cultural identity, in part by encouraging huge migrations of non-Tibetans into the region — both technical personnel to work on the projects themselves, and entrepreneurs seeking new economic opportunities. Some have even suggested that Beijing has consciously pursued an economic development strategy in Tibet as a way to “solve” its Tibet problem, by ensuring that the Tibetan economy is tied more tightly into that of China’s eastern provinces. The tensions inherent in balancing economic development priorities and cultural preservation concerns will continue to influence how American policymakers view China’s Tibet policies.

**World Bank Project Loan.** Controversy arose in 1999 over a World Bank loan that was approved for China on June 24, 1999. One portion of the $160 million “Western Poverty Reduction” loan, totaling $40 million, would have financed construction of a dam, irrigation system, and poverty alleviation activities in an area of Qinghai Province which many Tibetans consider part of historical Tibet. According to the Bank’s estimates, this portion of the project also would involve resettlement of approximately 58,000 people, most of whom are non-Tibetan, into this area of Qinghai. Critics of the loan maintain that the resettlement plans will reduce the overall share of the population that ethnic Tibetans now have in this region. Faced with strong criticism, the Bank suspended its final commitment on the Qinghai portion of the loan pending completion of an investigation by an independent Inspection Panel. That panel found that although the Bank had violated some of its own rules in making the loan, China nevertheless should take remedial steps to address some valid criticisms, and that the Bank would have to vote a second time. On July 7, 2000, China withdrew its application for the loan, announcing it would use its own

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funds to carry out the project and thus avoid having to address any of the Bank’s concerns.

**China’s “Patriotic Education” and Other Campaigns.** In 1991, two years after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, China launched a “patriotic education” campaign in an effort to promote loyalty to the communist regime. In the mid-1990s, the campaign became a government tool in efforts to control monastic activity in Tibet and discredit the Dalai Lama among Tibetans. Under the guise of “patriotic education,” teams of Chinese officials visit Tibetan monasteries and subject Tibetan monks to “patriotic” education and training. The campaign requires monks to sign a declaration attesting to a number of patriotic statements, including rejection and denunciation of the Dalai Lama; acceptance of China’s choice for the Panchen Lama (see next section); recognition that Tibet is part of China; and a promise not to listen to Voice of America broadcasts. There reportedly has been widespread and intensive resistance to this campaign. According to some reports, monks refusing to accept “patriotic education” or sign the corresponding declaration have been expelled from their monasteries.

In addition to this campaign, in January 1999, Chinese officials began a three-year campaign to foster atheism in Tibet. According to a U.S. government report, a Chinese propaganda official in Tibet described the new campaign in a television interview, saying “intensifying propaganda on atheism plays an extremely significant role in promoting economic construction...and to help peasants and herdsmen free themselves from the negative influence of religion.”

Finally, there are reports that the Chinese government is poised to initiate a new campaign to target and undermine the Dalai Lama. According to a Hong Kong newspaper report, in late May 2001, at the Fourth Tibet Work Forum to be held in Tibet, Chinese authorities will discuss how to cope with what they refer to as the “convergence and collaboration of five evil forces” – defined as Tibetan independence, Xinjiang independence, Taiwan independence, the Falun Gong movement, and the pro-democracy movement. According to reports, the work forum will attempt to lessen the Dalai Lama’s influence in Tibet by defining him as a “loyal tool of the Western anti-Chinese forces.”

**The Panchen Lama Succession.** In 1995, controversy arose over the selection of the successor to the Panchen Lama, the second most important spiritual leader among Tibetans. When the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959, the 10th Panchen Lama remained behind, living in China until his death in 1989. Tibetans believe that

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20 Hong Kong Ming Bao, in Chinese, May 19, 2001, translated in FBIS online.

21 Ibid.
when a high-ranking spiritual leader dies, his soul is then reincarnated to await rediscovery by special “search committees.” In May 1995, the Dalai Lama announced that after years of searching — using search committees sanctioned by the Chinese government — Gedhun Choeki Nyima, a 6-year-old boy living in Tibet, had been found to be the legitimate reincarnation of the deceased Panchen Lama.

Chinese communist officials reportedly were furious that the Dalai Lama made his announcement unilaterally. They regarded it as a challenge to Beijing’s authority to have a final say in this important decision. Chinese officials responded by maintaining that only they had the authority to name this spiritual leader. Consequently, in November 1995, Chinese leaders rejected the Dalai Lama’s choice and announced they had discovered the “real” Panchen Lama – 5-year-old Gyaltsen Norbu, son of a communist yak herder. On November 29, 1995, he was officially enthroned as the 11th Panchen Lama in a ceremony attended by Tibetan monks and senior Chinese communist leaders. Immediately thereafter, both boys and their families were taken into custody by Chinese authorities and held in undisclosed locations in China. In June 1999, Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy recognized by Beijing, returned to Tibet for the first time, reportedly under heavy military protection. Gedhun Choeki Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama, apparently remains under house arrest and has not been seen since. The monk who headed the official search party, Chadrel Rinpoche, was arrested and is serving 6 years in jail, allegedly for collaborating with the Dalai Lama.

The decision of the Chinese government to become a direct player in the ancient spiritual rites of Tibetan Buddhism has several implications for Tibet’s political future and for U.S.-China relations. First, it has complicated the political and religious environment by presenting Tibetans with potential rival centers of spiritual authority in the two Panchen Lamas, thus burdening the private religious decisions of Tibetans with possibly serious political consequences and raising the prospects for future religious strife and divided loyalties. In addition, the Chinese government’s involvement in the Panchen Lama succession has led many observers to speculate that Beijing is positioning itself to choose the next Dalai Lama. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, such an option might improve Beijing’s prospects for co-opting Tibet’s religious leaders and marginalizing the Tibetan independence movement. But it also could create a long-term religious succession crisis in Tibet and cause serious rifts among Tibetans that could ultimately prove divisive and destabilizing for Chinese rule.

The Bush Administration and the 107th Congress

Consistent with its other early policy decisions regarding the People’s Republic of China, the Administration of George W. Bush appears to have taken a somewhat higher profile on Tibet, one less deferential to Beijing’s views. On May 17, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell appointed Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, as the next U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibet. As Undersecretary, Ms. Dobriansky is the highest-ranking of the three U.S. officials who have held this position. In a further higher profile move, Secretary of State Powell met personally with the Dalai Lama during the latter’s visit to Washington on May 22, 2001, reportedly to discuss “human nature, religious values, and the situation in Tibet.” This was followed by a personal meeting on May 23, 2001, between
President Bush and the Dalai Lama. This meeting (not held in the oval office) was characterized as a presidential meeting with a religious figure.

**Tibet Legislation in the 107th Congress.** There are indications that Members of the 107th Congress plan to continue and to expand upon their efforts to focus more U.S. attention on Tibet. Representative Steven Rothman reportedly has drafted legislation expressing the sense of the House that the President should consider recognizing the Tibetan government-in-exile as the legitimate government of Tibet if PRC authorities have not agreed to Tibetan political autonomy within three years or if they haven’t engaged in substantive talks with the Tibetan government-in-exile.

**H.R. 1779/S. 852: The Tibetan Policy Act of 2001.** In both the House and Senate, legislation was introduced on May 9, 2001 (H.R. 1779 by Representative Tom Lantos, and S. 852 by Senator Dianne Feinstein) entitled The Tibetan Policy Act of 2001. The bills introduce a number of sense-of-Congress proposals, including: that the United States should “initiate steps” to encourage a negotiated agreement between Beijing and the Dalai Lama; that the United States-European Parliamentary Group should encourage Sino-Tibetan dialogue; that the United States should seek unconditional release for political prisoners in Tibet; and that the United States should oppose any efforts in the United Nations either to prevent consideration of issues involving Tibet or to prevent the participation of the Dalai Lama or his representatives from participation in U.N. fora. Other major provisions of the legislation include:

- reaffirmation of the view that Tibet is an illegally occupied country;
- semi-annual reports to Congress on the status of Sino-Tibetan discussions;
- separate listing for Tibet in all mandated U.S. country-by-country reports;
- a statutory mandate for a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues in the State Department (as opposed to leaving such an appointment to presidential discretion);
- authorization of $2 million in U.S. funds for Tibetan migration and refugees assistance in each of the three fiscal years from FY2002-FY2004;
- policy declarations that the U.S. should encourage NGOs and international organizations to undertake projects designed to assist Tibetans to become self-sufficient and raise their standard of living;
- support for projects in Tibet by the U.S. EximBank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Trade Development Agency (TDA);
- the United States should seek to open in Lhasa, Tibet a branch office of the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu, to monitor developments in Tibet;
- Tibetan language training for U.S. foreign service officers; and
- the United States should seek a meeting with and the release of the boy the Dalai Lama announced as the 11th Panchen Lama.
Appendix A: Tibet-related Interest Groups

International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). Apart from the Dalai Lama, a number of interest groups established both in the United States and abroad since the mid-1980s have worked to bring the Tibetan cause to the attention of the Administration, the international community, and Members of Congress. These groups remain important forces of influence on the political scene in 2001. Among the most visible advocates for the Tibetan cause is the U.S.-based International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), formed in 1988. Although the ICT pursues broad human rights issues involving Tibet, its primary goals concern Tibet’s political and international status – specifically, to help Tibet regain independence from China, which the ITC regards as an illegal occupying power. Through its work, the ITC hopes to create sufficient international support for Tibet to force China to begin serious talks with the Dalai Lama about Tibet’s future status. The ITC has offices in Washington and Amsterdam. Although it occasionally receives small grants (for instance, from the National Endowment for Democracy), the ITC is largely dependent on donations from private individuals.

International Campaign for Tibet
1825 K St. N.W., Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006
Ph: (202) 785-1515
[http://www.savetibet.org/]

The Committee of 100 for Tibet. In a similar vein, the Committee of 100 for Tibet, formed in 1992, seeks to put Tibet on the international agenda, and to encourage international support for a free, independent Tibet. According to its self-description, the Committee maintains “uncompromising support of the Tibetan peaceful struggle for independence,” and it “cooperates with and complements the work of other organizations working for Tibet and the Tibetan people.” The Committee tries to disseminate news about Tibet through the World Tibet Network News (WTN) and the Tibet News Digest.

The Committee’s membership (of approximately 100) is an international one, and draws heavily from the actor/artist community (including Richard Gere, Joan Baez, John Cleese, Marvin Hamlisch, and Catherine Ingram); the Nobel Laureate community (13 Nobel prize winners, including Desmond Tutu and Elie Wiesel); and current and former U.S. officials (House International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman, Representative Charlie Rose, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jean Kirkpatrick). Membership also includes officials associated with other Tibetan activist organizations, including Lodi Gyari, president of the International Campaign for Tibet; Rinchen Dharlo, representative of the Dalai Lama to North America; and Tsewang Phuntso, president of the Tibetan Youth Congress.

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22 Taken from the group’s website, which also includes a complete list of the group’s membership. [http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/]
The Tibet Information Network (TIN). A third group, the Tibet Information Network (TIN – formed in October 1987) describes its goal as providing “accurate information free from political bias” (a claim supported by a spokesperson from the office of the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs). 23 Contrary to other advocacy/support groups on Tibet, TIN is an independent news organization. Based in London, with a U.S. office in Jackson, Wyoming, TIN maintains it is not associated with any government organizations or other Tibet-related organizations. Since its inception, TIN has been providing reports on social, economic, and political developments in Tibet, based on both official Chinese and Tibetan sources, and on independent observations from foreign visitors. In addition to its website, TIN offers its “News subscribers” about 35 faxed or e-mailed news reports annually, plus periodic book length studies, and moderate length briefing papers. Subscribers to its TIN Publications Service receive mailed copies of more in-depth reports a minimum of four times a year.

Tibet Information Network USA
P.O. Box 2270
Jackson, WY 83001
Ph: (307) 733-4670
[http://www.tibetinfo.net/]

23 Quote taken from the TIN website: [http://www.tibetinfo.net/admin/whattin.htm]