Kosovo: U.S. and Allied Military Operations

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Steve Bowman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
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Kosovo: U.S. and Allied Military Operations

SUMMARY

With the failure of the Rambouillet peace talks and violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on March 24 NATO began Operation Allied Force airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. DOD defined the mission as attacking the Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objectives of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations. Initial target selection focused on airfields, air defense and communication centers, military barracks, and some equipment production facilities. Attacks extended to logistical support facilities and lines of resupply, and to an increasing extent Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo. Late in the campaign, targets also included Yugoslavia’s national electrical grid and radio/television stations. In all, NATO aircraft flew over 37,000 sorties in the 78-day air campaign. At the end of the campaign about 1,100 aircraft were participating, with the United States contributing about 725. Of the total aircraft, about 535 were strike aircraft, (U.S. 323/Allied 213). Thirteen of NATO’s 19 nations contributed aircraft to the operation, with 8 nations’ aircraft flying combat missions. The only NATO fatalities in Operation Allied Force were two U.S. Apache helicopter pilots killed in a training accident in Albania.

With the air campaign escalating, on June 4, Yugoslavia accepted a peace proposal devised at a G-8 summit, and on June 8, signed a military-technical agreement with NATO officials providing for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and turning military control of the province over to NATO’s peacekeeping forces (KFOR). On June 10, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2580 endorsed the peace settlement and “an international security presence with substantial NATO participation.”

Dubbed Operation Joint Guardian, KFOR totals about 38,000, down from over 50,000 in 1999. The United States has about 5,600 troops in Kosovo and neighboring countries. The U.S. has suffered no casualties from hostile action. Ethnic persecution and violence against Serbs and Gypsies remaining in Kosovo continue, while criticism of the United Nations slowness in establishing a functioning civil government grows. A recent increase in violent resistance to KFOR troops, and potential instability on the Kosovo-Serbia border has raised the issue of reinforcement, but only Italy, France, and Britain have assigned additional troops.

Congressional concerns have focused on the impact of Balkan operations on overall military readiness, and whether there has been an equitable distribution of costs among the NATO allies. On January 31, DOD issued a Kosovo/Operation Allied Force after-action report to Congress addressing a wide range of issues. Congress provided supplemental appropriations of $3 billion for FY1999 and $2 billion for FY2000 to cover DOD incremental costs in Kosovo operations. Together with the $1.7 billion appropriated for FY2001, this totals $6.7 billion.
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On July 13, the President signed into law (P.L. 106-246) the FY2001 Military Construction Act, which contained $2 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental appropriations for Kosovo operations. The House-Senate Conference report on H.R. 4276, FY2001 DOD appropriations, was filed on July 17 (H.Rept. 106-754), providing $1.7 billion for Kosovo. The report was agreed to by the House on July 19, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 413), and awaits consideration by the Senate.

On May 18, the House passed the DOD Authorization bill (H.R. 4205) approving Kosovo funding as requested, but including a provision that conditions continued U.S. participation in KFOR upon 1) presidential certification by April 1, 2000 that the NATO allies have provided specific percentages of the aid contributions they have pledged for Kosovo humanitarian, reconstruction, civil administration, and police needs; and 2) a report providing specific detailed information on these pledges and actual contributions. The Senate version (S. 2549), contains a reporting requirement regarding European contributions, but no certification requirement and no mandatory withdrawal provisions. It is expected these issues will be addressed in the upcoming House-Senate conference.

Spanish General Juan Ortuno has assumed KFOR command, as the 5-nation Eurocorps assumes its first operational command responsibilities. Comprising military personnel from Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the Eurocorps represents one of the first steps towards a more self-reliant unified European military capability.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Background

Once an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has a 90% ethnic Albanian population. It nevertheless holds an emotional place in Serbian nationalist tradition. As part of his nationalist program, Yugoslav President Milosevic revoked Kosovo’s autonomous status, putting it under control of the Serbian-dominated Belgrade government. An armed ethnic Albanian resistance movement developed, led by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. The Belgrade government responded in early 1998 with counter-insurgency operations, with Yugoslav military ground units and aircraft destroying villages and executing civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents.

In 1998, NATO political leaders turned their attention to the Kosovo region because of the flow of refugees to the southwest into Western Europe and Albania (itself destabilized by regional uprisings in 1997), and concerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). FYROM, an independent nation bordering Kosovo to the southeast, also has a large Albanian population alienated from its central government.

In May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, directed accelerated assessment of “a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic
campaign of violent repression in Kosovo.” Options considered included; 1) preventative deployments in Albania and FYROM to stabilize the borders; 2) declaration of no-fly/no tank zones in Kosovo and enforcement of them with NATO air forces; 3) direct military intervention either through airstrikes or ground troops deployments; and 4) peacekeeping deployments in the event of a political resolution. On June 15, 1998, NATO launched a 6-hour air exercise over Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Code-named Determined Falcon, the exercise involved 80 aircraft from 13 NATO air forces (Canada, Luxembourg, and Iceland not participating), and was conducted from 15 airbases in 5 countries. Twenty-seven U.S. land and carrier-based aircraft took part.

On September 24, 1998, NATO defense ministers authorized an “activation warning” for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. On October 12, NATO defense ministers authorized an “activation order,” placing the necessary forces under the NATO command. The following day, it was announced that U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke had negotiated an agreement with Serbian leader Milosevic that postponed the threat of airstrikes if the Serbian government 1) would reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to “pre-crisis” levels; 2) permit unarmed NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to an international force of 2,000 unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4) begin meaningful negotiations towards Kosovar autonomy.

Meaningful negotiations never took place, owing to recalcitrance on both sides, and sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian civilians. Concerned over escalating violence, and its possible spread to other areas of the Balkans, on January 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized Secretary-General Solana to order airstrikes anywhere in Yugoslavia, if the warring Serb and Albanian factions had not reached a peace settlement by February 20.

The “Contact Group,” an informal forum of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia dealing with Balkan crises, devised a framework for a peace settlement. They did not wish to encourage continued fighting for Kosovar independence, but rather sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo’s autonomy within Yugoslavia. However, the Serb government did not agree to the framework, the so-called Rambouillet Agreement, and the talks adjourned.

During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional Serb troops massed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. These airstrikes are the first military offensive action undertaken by NATO without specific U.N. endorsement. U.N. Security Council approval has not been sought because both Russia and China, each with veto power on the Council, continue to oppose the use of force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The September 23, 1998 U.N. Security Council resolution, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did, however, reference the U.N. Charter’s Article VII, which permits military force to maintain international security.

NATO defined five conditions for ending it air campaign:

- Cessation of Serb operations against the Albanians in Kosovo;
• Withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;
• Acceptance of Kosovar democratic self-government;
• Acceptance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force; and
• Return of Kosovar refugees.

On May 6 1999, at the G-8 economic summit, a another set of principles for a peace settlement were agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia. Russian acceptance was regarded as a major step forward in increasing the pressure on Milosevic to accede to NATO demands. These G-8 principles are:

• Immediate end to the violence.
• Withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other security forces.
• Deployment of UN-endorsed international civil and security presences.
• Interim international administration with U.N. Security Council approval.
• Return of all refugees, and access for aid organizations.
• Substantial self-government for Kosovo.
• Economic development of the region.

On June 4, 1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces form Kosovo by June 20, 1999, and details the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the peace agreement with all means necessary. On June 10, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (No. 2580), endorsing the peace-keeping mission under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes the use of force. Also on June 10, NATO suspended the air campaign upon evidence of Yugoslav forces beginning to withdraw from Kosovo.

Military Operations

The Air Campaign

On March 24, NATO began air operations, code-named Operation Allied Force, against targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo. DOD defined the mission as attacking the Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations. Target selection focused on airfields, air defense and communication centers, military barracks, and some equipment production facilities. Attacks then extended to logistical support facilities and lines of resupply, Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo, and the national electrical and television systems. In total, NATO aircraft flew over 35,000 sorties (1 aircraft flight), about one-third of which were strike sorties, launching about 23,000 munitions. Initially, cloudy weather over Kosovo severely hampered attack aircraft equipped with laser-guided munitions, and also reduced the ability to locate and target Yugoslav ground units. In addition to the weather conditions, a strong concern over minimal risk to NATO pilots dictated that low-level flights to attack ground units not be undertaken until Serb air defenses had been sufficiently degraded. The desire to avoid any collateral civilian casualties (Serb or Albanian) also constrained targeting.
NATO HQ acknowledged that the air campaign did not impede the Serb operations to drive the Albanian population from Kosovo. The inability to stop Serb operations brought strong criticism of the decision to launch the air campaign while completely ruling out any use of ground forces. Aside from official NATO and Administration spokesmen, few, if any, observers believed that air power alone could achieve the desired objectives. Press reports indicated that NATO political leaders were cautioned of an air campaign’s potential shortfalls, but believed that domestic public opinion would not support a ground invasion of Kosovo. It was then perceived as a choice between “do nothing” or proceed with air strikes. Some also suggested that in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, some advocates have overemphasized the capabilities of air power, encouraging the belief that ground forces are no longer as crucial to achieving military objectives.

There was also criticism that “command by committee” hampered NATO military leaders’ ability to wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign. Target lists, weapons used, and forces deployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments. This slowed decisionmaking, constrained operations, and sometimes emphasized political over military considerations. However, NATO officials maintain that SACEUR received all resources requested, and emphasized that this consensual process was critical to ensuring the cohesion of the alliance. A more fundamental criticism is that the air campaign’s actual objective from the start was political, not military — i.e., to bring President Milosevic back to the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributed to a constrained, incremental approach to targeting.

Secretary Cohen, SACEUR Gen. Clark, and the recently retired Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee Gen. Klaus Naumann all recommended that NATO’s decision-making processes for conducting a military campaign be examined and, in some way, streamlined. None, however, offered specific suggestions, noting that any changes made would have to gain and sustain acceptance by all NATO members. NATO’s current structure and procedures were created to deal with homeland defense against invasion. Out-of-area operations like Allied Force present different political constraints and military requirements. Some have suggested greater delegation of authority to SACEUR, once the alliance has made the decision to carry out a military operation. However, within an alliance of democracies which maintains full consensus as a fundamental principle, this approach may not achieve acceptance. In addressing this issue, Gen. Clark emphasized that, structural reforms aside, “there has to be a strong political consensus founded on a common perception of military doctrine to overcome the obstacles we hit in the air campaign”. (Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, July 20, 1999)

In responding to the critics of the air campaign, Gen. Naumann has noted that NATO planned for a limited operation from the outset, and made this fact public, while President Milosevic “planned for a war”. Naumann also observed that NATO threatened military action, without having a consensus on how it would be carried out, thereby precluding its military commanders’ use of “overwhelming force from the beginning.” (Defense News, July 20, 1999)

In the wake of the Yugoslav acceptance of NATO peace conditions, supporters of reliance upon NATO airpower believe they have been vindicated in their approach. They emphasize that NATO sustained no combat fatalities in the course of the 78-day campaign, and that the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was achieved. The air
campaign’ critics, however, point to the fact that it did not prevent the expulsion of almost the entire Albanian population of Kosovo, which will now require a very lengthy period of resettlement and reconstruction.

The Department of Defense Joint Staff provided the following initial statistical summary of the 78-day air campaign:

Total sorties: 37,200
- U.S.: 23,208 (62%)
- Allies: 13,992 (38%)

Strike sorties: 9,500
- U.S.: 5,035 (53%)
- Allies: 4,465 (47%)

Intelligence/reconnaissance sorties: 1,200
- U.S.: 948 (79%)
- Allies: 252 (21%)

Support sorties: 26,500
- U.S.: 17,225 (65%)
- Allies: 9,275 (35%)

On October 14, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton provided the Senate Armed Services Committee with DOD’s preliminary “lessons learned” observations [http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/lessons/acw.html]. The final version Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report was issued January 31, 2000 shortly before the FY2001 budget submission. Among the, were the following:

- Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated operational planning and maintenance of unity of command. Disparities between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities impeded U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.
- DoD needs to develop options for earlier and more efficient use of its reserve forces. DoD systems for planning and executing transportation of its forces were strained by the rapidly evolving requirements.
- The heavy commitment of NATO’s air defense suppression forces indicates the need to find innovative and affordable ways to exploit our technological skills in electronic combat. Success using the latest generation of air-delivered munitions systems in Kosovo validates plans to increase inventories.
- Task Force Hawk pointed out the need to regularly experiment with the independent use of key elements of all of our forces without their usual supporting elements. Improved unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission planning, improved processes for interaction between UAV operators and manned aircraft, frequent and realistic training opportunities, and equipment upgrades for individual UAVs all would benefit force effectiveness.
- Humanitarian operations highlighted the importance of such resources as linguists and civil affairs personnel, engineering assets capable of emergency repair of roads and bridges in very austere environments, detailed maps, and prepositioned stocks
On May 8, 2000, *Newsweek* reported obtaining a copy of an unreleased Kosovo bomb damage assessment whose existence had been rumored for some time. The report is the result of an effort ordered by SACEUR Gen. Wes Clark to obtain an accurate account of the damage inflicted on the Serb military in Kosovo. Conducted by the Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team (MEAT), which was composed primarily of U.S. Air Force personnel, the damage survey was conducted by helicopter and “walking the terrain.” While previously released statistics claimed 120 tanks, 220 armored personnel carriers, and up to 450 artillery pieces destroyed, the MEAT team could confirm only 14 tanks, 12 armored personnel carriers, and 20 artillery pieces killed. Of over 700 successful airstrikes publically claimed, the Air Force inspectors on the ground found evidence to support only 58. No evidence of the surreptitious removal of damaged or destroyed equipment was found. The team did find evidence of very successful Serb use of decoys, including repeatedly re-fabricating an entire bridge to induce repeated NATO strikes. [“The Kosovo Cover-Up”, *Newsweek*, May 15, 2000, p. 23]

*Newsweek* sources indicated that pressure to define a successful air campaign in terms of numbers led NATO and DOD leaders to order a “re-analysis” using looser evidence criteria, hereby allowing a more positive report for public release. The MEAT report supports the view of Lt. Gen. Michael Short, *Operation Allied Force* Air Commander, that the most effective use of air power against the Milosevic regime was targeting the political and utility infrastructure in Serbia itself. It also appears to confirm that high altitude bombing remains ineffective against mobile ground forces, unless they are massed in the open, and that decoys and “spoofing” remain very effective countermeasures.

The MEAT report notwithstanding, it can be argued that the controversy over “bean-counting” distracts from the fact that the NATO air campaign did force a Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, for whatever reason. With that being the over-arching objective of *Operation Allied Force*, the effort remains a success regardless of the number of “tank kills”.

The Department of Defense responded to the *Newsweek* article in a May 9th press conference with Air Force Brig. Gen. John Corley who headed the NATO assessment efforts. He defended the accuracy of NATO and DOD’s previously released statistics, and suggested that the report *Newsweek* obtained may have been an “interim” report based solely on ground observation of wreckage. DOD acknowledged in a post-news conference release that only 14 destroyed tanks were found, along with 12 self-propelled artillery pieces. However, Brig. Gen. Corley said that other information sources (e.g. cockpit video, reconnaissance film) provided adequate evidence of additional destroyed vehicles removed by the Serbs. Brig. Gen. Corley and DOD spokesman Ken Bacon both emphasized that no report was ever suppressed.

The MEAT report deserves closer scrutiny for an accurate assessment of current Air Force capabilities and shortfalls in weaponry and tactics. The suspicion that the report was suppressed, or that extraordinary efforts were made to provide more favorable conclusions in the final version, could serve to undermine the credibility of NATO and DOD public reports in the future. Congressional re-consideration of the report and the manner in which it’s conclusions were handled may be expected.
Ground Force Operations — KFOR (Operation Joint Guardian)

Because air operations did not stop Serb operations against Kosovar Albanians, public discussion of NATO ground force intervention was widespread. U.S. and NATO spokesmen continued to maintain there was no intention to introduce ground troops without “a permissive environment.” In the latter weeks of the air campaign, the British government began to push for ground intervention, but was unable to win the support of other alliance members. Though President Clinton and others publicly made the point that no option was permanently “off the table”, and NATO HQ re-examined the military requirements for an invasion of Kosovo and even Serbia, at no time did there appear alliance-wide support of offensive ground operations. Indeed, several member governments, particularly Greece, Italy, and Germany were publically adamant in their opposition.

With the Yugoslav acceptance of the peace plan devised by the G-8 and proposed to the Yugoslav government by Finnish President Ahtisaari, the focus turned to Operation Joint Guardian, the peace-keeping mission to be undertaken by KFOR. To facilitate this operation, NATO obtained the Yugoslav acceptance of a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) prepared by NATO on June 9. The following day, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an “international security presence” in Kosovo for its enforcement. On the same day, June 10, NATO Secretary-General Solana reported that Serb forces were beginning to withdraw from Kosovo and ordered suspension of the air campaign. On June 17, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops and police complete, NATO officially terminated the air campaign.

KFOR did not begin deploying into Kosovo until June 12, reportedly waiting to synchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid co-mingling forces. This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-strong contingent of Russian troops to leave their SFOR station in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital. Reportedly planned by the Russian General Staff, and endorsed by president Yeltsin, to ensure Russia a high-profile role in KFOR. This action occasioned high-level U.S.-Russian negotiations. An agreement reached on June 18, provides for shared control of Pristina airport operations, with Russian oversight of ground operations and air operations under KFOR control. In addition, Russia will deploy troops in the U.S., German, and French sectors. Russian troops will be under a unified KFOR command, with a Russian general officer at KFOR HQ. Russia will not have an independent territorial sector as it initially demanded. NATO refused to grant Russia an independent territorial sector, believing that could be the first step toward a permanent partitioning of the province. To date, KFOR commanders have praised the Russian troops for their professionalism.

Military-Technical Agreement (MTA). After some initial recalcitrance, Yugoslav military officials signed the MTA on June 9, 1999. The MTA affirms the terms of the peace plan, and provides specific details of its implementation. Some of the main provisions are:

- KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance.
- KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment, and to carry out its mission. The KFOR commander has the right to compel the removal or relocation of forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities that pose a potential threat to
KFOR, its mission, or a third party. Failure to comply will result in military action, including the use of necessary force.

- KFOR has the right to monitor and inspect all facilities or activities that may have a police or military capability, or are deemed otherwise relevant to compliance. The KFOR commander is the “final authority” for the interpretation of the MTA.

- Air and Ground Safety Zones will extend 25 and 5 kilometers respectively beyond the borders of Kosovo, and no Yugoslav forces, aside from local police, may enter these zones without KFOR permission. All Yugoslav military, paramilitary, and police forces will conduct a phased withdrawal from Kosovo, to be completed by June 20, 1999.

- Yugoslav forces will mark and remove all mines, booby traps, and obstacles as they withdraw. A subsequent, separate agreement will address the return of “agreed Yugoslav and Serb personnel.”

**KFOR Operations.** KFOR command now rotates every six months, and is currently held by Spanish General Juan Ortuno. KFOR divided the province into five territorial sectors under the command of British, German, French, Italian, and U.S. contingents. Other nations’ contingents are assigned to one of these sectors. (For current national contingents, see below)

Over the last several months, KFOR nations have quietly withdrawn troops, reducing KFOR from close to 50,000 to about 38,000 troops. Those nations with notable withdrawals were France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The other large contingents, Germany and the United States, have remained relatively constant. With an upsurge in violence and resistance to KFOR troops, and concerns over Kosovar Albanians fostering unrest among Albanians living across the border in Serbia, the issue of the need for reinforcements has arisen. France and Italy have re-deployed about 1,200 troops, but other nations have not. SACEUR Gen. Clark maintains that additional reinforcements are not needed. However, NATO has undertaken *Dynamic Response 2000*, a training exercise in Kosovo intended to demonstrate reinforcement capability. The exercise has involved 1,500 troops from the United States, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Argentina. The Department of Defense, in response to an incident when U.S. troops were stoned by demonstrators while assisting weapons searches in the French sector, has instructed that U.S. troops not be deployed out of the U.S. except in emergency situations. The U.S. troops also have heightened responsibilities along the Kosovo-Serbia border, where former KLA members are suspected of encouraging and arming Albanian dissidents in Serbia’s Presavo valley.

A repeated complaint from KFOR commanders has been the slowness of the United Nations efforts to deploy an international police force and establish a functioning judiciary. The U.N. has been hampered by lack of funds and bureaucratic inertia on the part of donor countries. However, a functioning police force and court system are critical elements for increasing stability in Kosovo. On June 20 1999, NATO announced an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army for its phased disbanding. The presence of armed KLA guerillas has given KFOR some concerns, and KFOR has disarmed KLA groups that could have presented a threat to security. In the demilitarization agreement, the KLA agreed to:

- Renounce the use of force and comply with KFOR and U.N. Interim Civil Administration directives. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts, including reprisals or detentions.
• Acknowledge KFOR’s use of necessary force to ensure compliance.
• Not carry weapons in specified areas.

The accord also provided a 90-day timetable for the KLA’s demilitarization, including the cantonment of weapons (except authorized rifles and handguns), the prohibition of uniforms, and prohibitions on training and “parades”. The accord makes reference to giving KLA members “special consideration” for positions in the future Kosovo police and civil administration, and establishing a Kosovo army “on the lines of the U.S. National Guard” at an unspecified time in the future.

On August 20, 1999, the KFOR HQ announced that the KLA had complied with the 60-day deadline to canton all heavy weapons and 60% of all small arms. The deadline for full demilitarization has been extended for 10 days until September 29. Official compliance aside, as sporadic violence against Kosovar Serbs continued, KFOR’s Gen. Jackson has questioned whether the KLA leadership had full control of its personnel. A further complicating factor is the existence of a significant organized crime element in the province, which may also include KLA personnel.

In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and U.N. officials have agreed to the creation of the Kosovo Corps. NATO and the U.N. intend the 3,000-strong organization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations such as forest fires, search and rescue, and reconstruction. Some KLA leaders see the Kosovo Corps as the nucleus of a future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and U.N. officials. Of recent concern is evidence that former KLA members are encouraging Albanian rebels who live right across the border in Serbia’s Presavo valley. KFOR is attempting to interdict these efforts, because they could provoke Yugoslav government action could further destabilize the region.

**NATO Allies’ Military Participation in Balkan Operations**

Table 1 reflects data provided by KFOR HQ as of March 23 on the national contingents serving in KFOR. Non-NATO countries are marked with an asterisk.
Table 1. Allied Military Participation in Balkan Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>KFOR Contingent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>1 Field Hospital (113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria*</td>
<td>1 support battalion (480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbajian*</td>
<td>1 support platoon (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1 mechanized infantry battalion (700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1 reconnaissance company (122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 armored battalion (800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland*</td>
<td>1 motorized infantry battalion (795)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1 reinforced mechanized infantry brigade (4,550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia*</td>
<td>1 supply platoon (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1 armored division (4,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2 mechanized infantry battalions (1,150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1 support battalion (322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>medical personnel (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland*</td>
<td>1 transport company (104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1 infantry company (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 reinforced armored brigade (4,750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1 support platoon (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania*</td>
<td>1 support platoon (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1 support platoon (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1 field hospital (350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1 reinforced artillery battalion (600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1 motorized infantry battalion (900)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>KFOR Contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1 airborne battalion (1,250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1 infantry battalion (329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia*</td>
<td>1 airborne brigade (3,300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia*</td>
<td>1 engineer platoon (40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1 mechanized infantry battalion (1,100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 mechanized battalion (750)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1 logistics company (134)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 mechanized infantry brigade (948)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 helicopter detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 supply company (200)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1 reinforced armored brigade (3,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1 reinforced mechanized infantry brigade (5,600)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian**

Within NATO, each nation participating in *Operation Allied Force* assumes the cost of its own operations. NATO does not provide estimates of the overall cost of the operation or of the cost of each member’s contributions. Most NATO governments are in still in the process of determining the incremental costs of the operation, and reliable information is not yet available.

On April 19, the Administration submitted a $6.05 billion emergency supplemental appropriation request to cover military operations in Kosovo and continuing air operations in Southwest Asia during FY1999. On May 18, the House approved a House-Senate conference agreement on H.R. 1141, providing $14.9 billion in FY1999 supplemental appropriations. Of this, only $10.8 billion is defense-related, and includes funds for items other than Kosovo operations such as a military pay raise, military construction, training, and equipment/munitions procurement. On May 20, the Senate concurred in approving H.R. 1141. It was signed into law (P.L. 106-31) on May 21. The Administration’s funding request assumed offensive military operations against Yugoslavia through September 1999.
With the campaign ending in June, DOD calculated its actual FY99 incremental costs to be $3.0 billion, and the remainder of the appropriated supplemental being re-programmed.

The Administration’s FY2000 budget request contained no funds for combat or peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The House Armed Services Committee expressed its concern that under or unbudgeted contingency operations have diverted funds from “quality of life, readiness, and modernization” programs. Seeing no funds budgeted for Kosovo operations in FY2000, and seeking to ensure that incremental Kosovo-related costs would be dealt with only through specific budgeted accounts or supplemental appropriations, the Committee inserted a provision in DOD’s authorizing legislation (H.R. 1401) prohibiting the use of any funds authorized by the legislation for military operations in Yugoslavia. On June 9, during consideration on the House floor, Representative Skelton introduced an amendment removing this provision. Upon receiving written notice from President Clinton stating that if military readiness were to be harmed by on-going operational requirements, he would submit a further FY2000 budget request, the House agreed (270-155) to remove the funding prohibition. The Administration has submitted an FY2000 supplemental appropriation request for $2.02 billion, and a $1.7 billion request for FY2001. Together with the $3 billion appropriated for FY1999, this totals $6.9 billion for Kosovo operations.

The House version of the supplemental appropriation legislation (H.R. 3908) contains $7.7 billion in add-ons to the Administration’s request. The Senate leadership expressed reservations about the additional funds, and now the Senate Appropriations Committee plans to divide H.R. 3908 into three major components and consider them as part of the regular FY2001 appropriation measures for Military Construction (DOD peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and other DOD items), Foreign Operations (Plan Colombia, Kosovo aid, debt relief, and Mozambique relief), and Agriculture (domestic natural disaster assistance). Markups are scheduled for the week of May 8.

On May 9, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved an amendment offered by Sen. Byrd to the FY2001 DOD Military Construction bill which will cut all funds for Kosovo operations on July 1, 2001 unless the President requests and receives congressional permission for their continued deployment.

(For more information, see CRS Report RL30505: Appropriations for FY2001: Defense and CRS Report RL30457: Supplemental Appropriations for FY2000: Plan Colombia, Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance, and Other Initiatives)

**Congressional Action**

On March 11, 1999, the House approved H.Con.Res. 42 (219-191), which authorizes the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping operation, subject to extensive reporting requirements, including reports to Congress in both classified and unclassified forms regarding the following subjects:

- Certification that U.S. forces will be under the operational control of U.S. officers;
- Military resources committed;
- Percentage of U.S. troops participating compared to allied contributions;
• Impact of deployment on U.S. military readiness;
• Intelligence-sharing arrangements;
• Rules of engagement;
• Russian participation;
• Roles and mission of U.S. forces in peace enforcement;
• Cost; and
• Exit strategy.

H.Con.Res. 42 has not been acted upon by the Senate. However, on March 23, 1999 the Senate did pass S.Con.Res. 21 (58-41), authorizing the President to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This measure failed of passage in House (213-213) on April 28.

Also on April 28, 1999, the House defeated two measures sponsored by Representative Campbell, H.Con.Res. 82 (139-290) and H.J.Res. 44 (2-427). The former would have required the withdrawal of U.S. forces from participation in offensive operations against the Republic of Yugoslavia, and the latter would have declared a state of war between the United States and the Republic of Yugoslavia.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 106-31, H.R. 1141

P.L. 106-65, S. 1059
An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Committee on Armed Services ordered to be reported an original measure in lieu of S. 974 (S.Rept. 106-50) May 13. Passed Senate (92-3) May 27. Message on Senate actions received in House June 7. House struck all after enacting clause and inserted in lieu thereof the provisions of a similar measure, H.R. 1401, which passed without objection. Conference (H.Rept. 106-301) filed August 6, and agreed to by House September 15, and by Senate September 22. Signed into law (P.L. 106-65) October 5, 1999.

P.L. 106-79, H.R. 2651/S. 1122
P.L. 106-65, H.R. 1401 (Spence)
A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 2000 to 2001, and for other purposes. Introduced April 14, 1999; referred to Committee on Armed Services. Reported House by committee May 24, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-162). Passed House (365-58), June 10, 1999. On June 14, the House struck all after the enacting clause of S. 1059, and inserted the provision of H.R. 1401. A conference agreement was reported on S. 1059 on August 5. The House approved the report by a vote of 375-45 on September 15, and the Senate concurred by a vote of 93-5 on September 22. The President signed the bill into law (P.L. 106-65) on October 5, 1999.

P.L. 106-246, H.R. 4425

H.R. 647 (Paul)
A bill to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Kosovo unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law. Introduced February 9, 1999; referred to Committee on Armed Services.

H.R. 1569 (Fowler)
A bill to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment of ground elements of the United States Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law. Introduced April 27, 1999; reported to House by Committee on Rules, and passed House (249-180) April 28, 1999. Received in Senate April 29, 1999.

H.R. 1664 (Young)
A bill making emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations, refugee relief, and humanitarian assistance relating to the conflict in Kosovo, and for military operations in Southwest Asia for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes. Reported to House by Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 106-125) May 4; passed House May 6 (311-105). In Senate unanimous consent agreement was reached to vote on final passage June 18.[Kosovo-related supplemental funding was removed from this legislation and included in H.R. 1141]

H.R. 3908 (Young)
A bill making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes. On March 14, the House Committee on Appropriations reported an original measure, H.Rept. 106-521, by Mr. Young (FL). On
March 30, the bill passed the 263 - 146 (Roll no. 95), and was received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

**H.R. 4205 (Spence)**

An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Introduced April 4, 2000; referred to Committee on Armed Services. Reported from Committee on May 12 (H.Rept. 106-616). Passed the House, as amended, May 18 (353-63; Roll No. 208). Received in the Senate May 22, 2000. On July 13, the Senate struck all after the enacting clause and substituted the language of S. 2549 as amended, and passed H.R. 4205 as amended, 97-3 (Roll Call vote 179). Conference requested on July 17, 2000.

**H.R. 4576 (Lewis)**

An original bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes. Reported to House on June 6, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-644). Passed the House on June 7, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 241). Passed the Senate on June 13, as amended, 95-3 (Record Vote No. 127). House-Senate Conference report was filed on July 17 (H.Rept. 106-754), and was agreed to by the House on July 19, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 413).

**H.Res. 268 (Bereuter)**

A bill calling for equitable sharing of the costs associated with the reconstruction, peacekeeping, and United Nations programs in Kosovo. Introduced July 30, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations.

**H.Con.Res. 29 (Fowler)**

A concurrent resolution expressing the opposition of Congress to any deployment of U.S. ground forces in Kosovo, a province in the Republic of Serbia, for peacemaking or peacekeeping purposes. Introduced February 10, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations.

**H.Con.Res. 42 (Gilman)**

A concurrent resolution regarding the use of U.S. Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement. Introduced March 8, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. Rules Committee resolution, H.Res. 103, reported to House March 10. Passed House March 11, 1999 (219-191). Received in Senate March 16, 1999.

**H.Con.Res. 82 (Campbell)**

A concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Introduced April 12, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. Reported April 27 (H.Rept. 106-116). Failed of passage in House April 28 (139-290).
H.J.Res. 44 (Campbell)

S. 2549 (Warner)
An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Committee on Armed Services reported an original measure (S.Rept. 106-292) May 22, 2000. Considered by the Senate June 7-July 13; incorporated as amended, into H.R. 4205 on July 13.

S. 2593 (Stevens)
An original bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes. The Committee on Appropriations reported an original measure May 18, 2000 (S.Rept. 106-298). On June 8, the Senate incorporated this measure in H.R. 4576 as an amendment.

S.Con.Res. 21 (Biden)

FOR ADDITIONAL READING

CRS Issue Briefs

CRS Issue Brief IB98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy, by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel (updated regularly).

World Wide Web Sites

The following WWW sites provide additional information:

KFOR Headquarters — [http://kforonline.com]

NATO Headquarters — [http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press.htm]


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