Analyzing the Effects of a Performance Pay Plan on Manager Performance in an Accounting Firm

Analyzing the Effects of a Performance Pay Plan on Manager Performance in an Accounting Firm

Date: May 2007
Creator: McDaniel, Sarah Curran
Description: This study examined the effect of a score card¬-based performance pay plan in a professional services firm. The plan was implemented in response to a decreasing trend in productivity and a desire for a formal incentive compensation plan. Performance of manager and senior manager accountants were analyzed across two departments over a five year period. A definitive account of the effects of the intervention is limited by the case-¬study design, but the data does suggest that the performance pay plans used did not adversely affect performances. Design limitations of the plan and future research are also discussed.
Contributing Partner: UNT Libraries
Merit Pay for Teachers: A Review

Merit Pay for Teachers: A Review

Date: December 1983
Creator: Muro, James F.
Description: This pamphlet discusses merit pay for teachers. In most societies, the acquisition of money is a symbol of success. The present supply as well as the quality of public school teachers in the United States is directly related to the salaries that are paid to teachers as compensation for services rendered. How much to pay teachers for their services, who should be given merit pay, and how a pay plan should be administered are the focal points of an issue that promises to promote debate in the forthcoming presidential election.
Contributing Partner: UNT College of Education
Accounting Measurement Bias and Executive Compensation Systems

Accounting Measurement Bias and Executive Compensation Systems

Date: December 1994
Creator: Boone, Jeffery Paul
Description: This dissertation presents empirical evidence intended to help answer two research questions. The first question asks whether executive compensation systems appear to exploit the bias in accounting-based performance measures in order to reduce the volatility in executive compensation and to allocate incentives more effectively across the range of activities performed by the executive. The second question asks whether compensation systems systematically differ between firms that use alternative accounting methods and whether any such systematic difference helps explain accounting choice. Parameters estimated in fixed-effects endogenous switching regression models were used to test the risk-shielding and incentive-allocation hypotheses. The models were estimated across a dataset consisting of 1151 executive-year observations of annual compensation paid to 222 top-level executives in 40 oil and gas firms. The dataset was partitioned by accounting method and separate models estimated for the full cost and successful efforts partitions. The tests provided modest support for the risk-shielding and incentive-allocation hypotheses, revealing that accounting measurement bias is used to focus incentives for effort in the exploration activity and to reduce executives' exposure to production risk. The design also allowed an estimate of the proportional change in compensation that was realized from the accounting choice actually made.
Contributing Partner: UNT Libraries