-ti- Japan's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations May 23, 1991 Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress by Larry A. Niksch & Robert G. Sutter [Larry A. Niksch Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Robert G. Sutter Senior Specialist in International Politics Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division] TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION............................................1 THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS, AUGUST 1990 - FEBRUARY 1991 ............................4 Phase One, August - September 1990 .....................4 Phase Two, September - November 1990 ...................7 Phase Three, November 1990 - February 1991 .............8 FACTORS INFLUENCING JAPANESE POLICY ....................9 Japan's Reticent View of Adopting International Responsibilities .......................................8 The No War Constitution and Japanese Pacifism .........11 Role of the Political Opposition ......................13 Prime Minister Kaifu's Leadership and LDP Divisions ...15 Views of Dependence on Middle East Oil ................18 Japanese Attitudes Towards U.S. Pressures and Policies 18 Counterpressures From Other East Asian Governments.....20 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS .............................................22 ____________________________________________________ (Page 1) JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS INTRODUCTION The international crisis brought about by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the U.S.-led international efforts to force Iraq to withdraw represented a major test for the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. Both sides were disappointed with the results. In the view of many U.S. officials, the Japanese government largely failed the test by responding to the crisis in ways that gave priority to Japanese political, legal and fiscal restraints at the expense of broader international responsibilities. Some U.S. officials, who have been supportive of a U.S.-Japan "global partnership" in the post Cold War world order, saw Japanese behavior during the crisis as a disappointment which raised fundamental doubts about the United States trying to work closely with Japan over sensitive international issues in the future. The Japanese response reinforced the view of other U.S. officials, who have long been skeptical of the ability of the United States to cooperate closely with Japan because of what they view as fundamentally divergent and competing economic and other interests of the two countries. The American public also registered a marked decline in the respect it gave to Japan as a result of Japan's actions in the Gulf crisis. (.\1) In Japan, government leaders at the highest levels were frustrated that Japan's major financial contribution, consistent political support in the U.N. and other supportive actions seemed to count for so little in the minds of many American leaders and in the general public. Some opinion polls and research studies pointed to growing anti-Americanism among the Japanese public as a result of the Gulf crisis. (.\2) ____________________________________________________ 1 On reported U.S. public opinion polls, see Business Week, April 1, 1991, p. 28, and National Journal, February 23, 1991, p. 476. On divisions of U.S. officials views of Japan-U.S. relations, see Japanese Government Cooperation with the United States -- U.S. Officials Perspectives. CRS Report 90-436 F, August 24, 1990 by Robert Sutter. 24 p. 2 On Japanese views, see among others New York Times, March 17, 1991, Section 4, p. 2; Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1991, p. A22; Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1991, p. 4; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 18,1991, p. 2; Washington Post, March 19, 1991, p. 21. As seen below, some Japanese commentators argued that it was unrealistic of American leaders to expect "instant" compliance with U.S. demands, especially given longstanding political and other restraints on Japanese actions in these areas. ____________________________________________________ (Page 2) The U.S.-Japanese friction over the Persian Gulf crisis added to recent uncertainty on both sides of the Pacific stemming from major changes affecting the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. (.\3) On the one hand, U.S.-Japanese relations have deepened enormously, especially over the past two decades, as the two societies and economies have become increasingly intertwined and interdependent. Japan receives more U.S. exports than any other country except Canada, while the United States buys roughly one-third of Japan's exports. As of 1990, Japan had $65 billion in direct investment in the United States, while the United States had more than $17 billion invested in Japan. Some $100 billion in U.S. Government securities held by people in Japan helped to finance a substantial portion of the U.S. budget deficit. Trade and other economic exchanges reinforce a wide variety of scientific, technical, tourist and other exchanges. Both countries continue to see each other as their main security ally in Asia and the Pacific, and substantial majorities of Americans and Japanese agree that the bilateral relationship is vital to both countries. On the other hand, growing interdependence has been accompanied by sometimes acrimonious disputes, especially over economic matters. These reflect markedly changing circumstances at home and abroad that raise basic questions about future U.S.-Japan relations. Economically, there has been sweeping change in the relative power of the United States and Japan, especially in the last decade. This change goes well beyond the implications of the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with Japan -- which remained at about $50 billion annually for the last several years and dropped to about $41 billion in 1990. The persisting U.S. trade and budget deficits of the early 1980s led to a series of decisions in the middle of the decade that saw a major realignment of the value of U.S. and Japanese currencies. This strengthened Japan's ability to purchase U.S. goods and to invest in the United States. By the end of the decade, the United States had reversed its previous position as the world's largest creditor and had become the world's largest debtor. With its stronger currency, Japan was the main international creditor. Moreover, Japan's creditor status helped Japanese industry use its economic power to invest in the range of high technology products where U.S. manufacturers still had a lead. U.S. ability to compete under these circumstances was seen as hampered by such factors as heavy personal, government, and business debt, and a low savings rate. In foreign policy, the collapse of the Soviet empire and growing preoccupation of Soviet leaders with massive internal political and economic difficulties meant that the U.S. and Japanese governments have had to reassess their longstanding alliance relationship focused against the now increasingly weakened Soviet threat. Officials on both sides of the alliance had tended to ____________________________________________________ 3 For background on the changing relationship see CRS Report 90-435 cited in note 1. See also Japan-U.S. Relations: A Briefing Book, CRS Report 91-401F, April 1991. 139 p. ____________________________________________________ (Page 3) characterize the security alliance as the linchpin and the foundation of the relationship that should take precedence over disputes concerning economic issues. The alliance is still viewed as a bulwark of stability in Asia and the basis of proposed U.S.-Japanese "global partnership" in world affairs, but skeptics in both countries doubt that common security goals will be able any longer to offset competing economic interests. Public attitudes in Japan and the United States also have registered a degree of change. Although majorities of Americans and Japanese continue to be positive toward the others' country, Americans show growing concern about the Japanese economic "challenge" or "threat" to American power and influence. Japanese polls indicate impatience with American complaints against Japan, seeing them as unjustified and a reflection of U.S. anxiety over "America's slipping economic position." (.\4) Expert opinion in the United States and Japan has warned that U.S.- Japanese frictions seen during the Gulf crisis would reinforce the centrifugal forces affecting the alliance relationship. (.\5) Possible implications range from less restrained U.S.-Japanese disputes over trade issues such as implementation of the U.S.-Japanese agreement in 1990 on the Structural Impediments Initiative and negotiations over the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade accords; to longer term issues involving weakened support for a large U.S. military presence in Japan and U.S.-Japanese cooperation in international bodies concerned with maintaining foreign stability and promoting economic development. In Congress, many Members strongly criticized Japan's behavior during the Gulf crisis and warned of possible U.S. countermeasures if Japan does not bear a greater share of responsibility for maintaining international stability. Others have been less prone to threaten harsh U.S. countermeasures, but they warn that U.S. frustration with Japan could seriously complicate U.S. efforts to forge a closer alliance relationship as a bulwark to world order and development in the 1990s. This report provides information and analysis for use by Members of Congress as they deliberate on the Japanese response to the Gulf crisis and, perhaps more important, what it may mean for future U.S.-Japanese relations. The first chapter briefly reviews Japanese government actions in response to the crisis, from August 1990 to February 1991. A second section examines in detail the various factors and constraints that affected Japanese policy. The final section offers conclusions and examines implications of the episode for future U.S.-Japanese relations. Published sources for the report are cited in footnotes. The report also benefited greatly from interviews and discussions conducted from late 1990 and through March 1991 in Tokyo and Washington with over 20 U.S. and Japanese government officials. Discussions were also held with ____________________________________________________ 4 These trends are reviewed in CRS Report 90-435 F, op. cit. 5 See, among others, National Journal, February 23, 1991, pp. 448-449 and 479; Newsweek, January 21, 1991, p. 25; New York Times, December 11, 1990, p. 17. ____________________________________________________ (Page 4) Japanese and U.S. journalists, scholars, and other nongovernment experts on Japan-U.S. relations. In order to elicit frank assessments, it was agreed that the information provided in the interviews would be on a nonattribution basis. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS, AUGUST 1990 - FEBRUARY 1991 Japanese government actions during the Persian Gulf crisis can be divided into three phases. The first phase, through mid-September 1990, saw the Japanese government struggle to understand and deal effectively with the broad implications of the crisis for Japan's international position, especially its relations with the United States. It culminated in a Japanese commitment of a total of $4 billion in support for the allied forces and assistance to front line states and refugees. Japanese government efforts to meet U.S. calls for Japan to have a "physical presence" in the crisis led to a highly contentious debate in the Japanese Diet in October 1990 over a "peace cooperation" law that would have allowed the Japanese government to send Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the Gulf to serve in a support role. The inability of the Japanese government to push its bill through the Diet was the highlight of the second phase of Japan's response to the crisis. In the third phase, the Japanese government focused on meeting U.S. requests for large-scale financial support for the war effort. Its commitment of an additional $9 billion to the allied effort was the highlight of this phase. (.\6) Japanese government behavior throughout the crisis was determined by a complex mix of factors -- some of which have long influenced the government's ability to deal with sensitive international security issues. Those factors are explained in detail in the next section. To place that discussion in an appropriate context, and to provide background information for readers unfamiliar with Japanese government actions during the crisis, we have listed below major developments and salient features of Japan's response. Phase One, August - September 1990 The Japanese government was quick to condemn the Iraqi invasion of August 2 and froze Kuwaiti assets in response to a Kuwaiti request on August 3. The government hesitated in taking action on economic sanctions against Iraq until President Bush telephoned Prime Minister Kaifu on August 4. The government reportedly had been awaiting formal U.N. action on the sanctions before it would join them. Prime Minister Kaifu telephoned President Bush on ____________________________________________________ 6 Coverage of the Japanese media in this period is provided by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report, Asia-Pacific. See also coverage in such weekly publications as the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly. ____________________________________________________ (Page 5) August 5 to tell him that Japan would join the economic sanctions against Iraq. The United Nations passed sanctions against Iraq on August 6. (.\7) As the United States and other allies sent forces to the Gulf to protect Saudi Arabia and other neighbors of Iraq and to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq, President Bush and other U.S. leaders made clear in discussions with Japanese leaders that the United States expected Japan to do more than offer political support. U.S. officials said that in addition to a strong Japanese financial commitment, the United States expected Japan to have a "physical presence" in the Gulf. (.\8) There are conflicting accounts among U.S. officials as to whether the U.S. specifically asked for a Japanese military presence -- a very sensitive issue for the Japanese government. Several U.S. officials, who claim to have been ambivalent or opposed to a Japanese military presence, said that officials at the White House, U.S. Ambassador Michael Armacost and others were in favor of such a presence and suggested it to Japanese leaders. By mid-August prominent Japanese leaders were proposing that Japan send minesweepers to the Gulf. (.\9) During the 1987-1988 U.S. effort to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from attack related to the Iran-Iraq War in the Persian Gulf, Japanese leaders had suggested sending minesweepers as a sign of support for the United States, but political opposition in Japan blocked the move. (.\10) By late August, the Kaifu Administration announced a package of support measures amounting in value to about $1 billion. President Bush reportedly reacted coolly when Kaifu telephoned him with the news and urged Japan to do more. In early September, Treasury Secretary Brady also formally asked the Kaifu Administration for more financial support. On September 13, the Japanese government announced a package of support measures for allied forces, front line states and refugees, amounting to $4 billion. This came two days after the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1991 (H.R. 4739) requiring that Japan pay all deployment costs for U.S. forces in Japan or face a withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. forces from Japan each year. Although the amendment clearly registered congressional sentiment on Japan, both Japanese and U.S. administration officials asserted that the amendment had no direct bearing on Japan's announced $4 billion pledge, which they claimed was ready to be announced when the amendment was passed. ____________________________________________________ 7 For useful background on a chronology of events during the crisis see Iraq- Kuwait Crisis: A Chronology of Events, July 17, 1990-February 7, 1991. By Clyde Mark and Renee Stasio. CRS Report 91-14 F. February 8, 1991. 52 p. 8 See among others Vice President Quayle's remarks in this regard reported by Kyodo on November 14, 1990 and replayed in FBIS Daily Report, Asia- Pacific, November 14, 1990. p. 1. 9 LDP faction leader, Michio Watanabe was associated with this view. 10 Reviewed in Japan-U.S. Relations. CRS Issue Brief 89133, p. 6. ____________________________________________________ (Page 6) Salient features of Japanese government behavior during this phase of the crisis include the following: Japanese preoccupied elsewhere: Japanese government policy makers were preoccupied with a series of foreign policy issues and initiatives elsewhere, especially regarding China, North Korea, Indochina and the Soviet Union. They did not expect a crisis in the Middle East and were slow in reacting to it. Prime Minister Kaifu had been expected to travel to the region on an official goodwill visit in August -- a trip that was canceled because of Iraq's unexpected invasion of Kuwait. Slowness to understand implications of crisis: Japanese leaders were slow to grasp the importance of the crisis for the United States and the Western alliance, and for Japan's relations with the U.S. and those allies. Initial reaction from senior Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Kaifu, in the days after the crisis was to focus on their claim that the crisis "would not have much effect" on Japan. (.\11) Indeed, the crisis pointed up a major misperception between the United States and Japan. U.S. officials, especially in Congress, commonly judged that since Japan was heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East, it should respond in ways similar to the West in dealing with the Iraqi threat to that "oil life line." In contrast, Japanese officials were careful to point out that Japan was much less dependent on Middle East oil for its energy needs than in the past. As one foreign ministry official said: Since the second oil shock of 1979, Japan vigorously pursued energy saving. Since 1985, the appreciation of the yen against the dollar pushed the oil import bill of Japan down almost by half. And over this ten-year period, the size of Japan's economy nearly doubled in terms of GNP, which means that the impact of the oil factor on the economy of Japan today is less than a quarter of what it used to be ten years ago. (.\12) In addition, Japan had a petroleum reserve for 142 days and assumed that whatever political regime controlled Middle East oil would want to sell the oil and that Japan could afford the higher price. Japan's Reactive Posture: The Kaifu Administration placed itself in a reactive position, waiting for external pressure, mainly from the United States, ____________________________________________________ 11 Prime Minister Kaifu's remarks, as reported by Japanese media, are replayed in FBIS Daily Report, Asia-Pacific. August 3, 1990. 12 Speech by Japanese political counselor, Kenzo Oshima at the Arab- American Council meeting, Atlanta, March 1,1991. ____________________________________________________ (Page 7) to provide it with strong political arguments to force contending bureaucratic, political and other domestic interests in Japan to come to agreement on greater Japanese government contributions to the allied efforts. Not surprisingly, U.S. officials saw the Japanese government as weak, passive and incapable of decisive action without strong U.S. guidance or pressure. Reflecting the reasons for the weakness and testifying to the weakness, factional rivals of Prime Minister Kaifu within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party were among the most prominent critics of his performance in this first phase of the crisis. (.\13) Phase Two, September-November 1990 During this period, the Kaifu Administration sought to reach a political consensus on the passage of a peace cooperation law that would have allowed the government to send a small group -- about 1,000 Self Defense Forces -- to the Persian Gulf in a support role. (In September, a 17 person Japanese medical team had traveled to the region, but left after a brief tour; the Japanese also sent a few planes to pick up refugees.) (.\14) Increasingly aware of the negative feelings arising in the West over Japan's unwillingness to share the risk with other allies in the Gulf, and facing continued U.S. requests that Japan show a "physical presence" in the Gulf, the Kaifu Administration tried to move the legislation through the Diet. Strategically, the Japanese administration was up against the formidable political, legal and other restraints that have long impeded Japan's ability to send forces beyond its borders (see discussion, next session). Tactically, according to interviews with several U.S. officials and Japanese officials in Tokyo, the effort was compromised by Kaifu's weak leadership and by tacit opposition from some politicians who seemed most likely to support the deployment of SDF abroad -- the conservative members of the LDP. According to those interviewed, Kaifu so compromised the original intent of the bill in his efforts to achieve opposition support in the Diet that the bill was seen by conservative LDP lawmakers as a step backward in their efforts to have Japan play a greater role in world politics. As a result, when the bill faced predictable challenges from left-wing oppositionists in the Diet, media and among public opinion, these conservative LDP legislators were unenthusiastic about defending the bill. They left Kaifu to take responsibility for a significant legislative defeat when the bill was withdrawn from consideration in early November 1990. ____________________________________________________ 13 As is discussed below, it is overly simple to blame Kaifu alone for the "weak" Japanese response. A variety of other factors were involved. And from at least one perspective the "weak" Japanese government response was the response that enjoyed the broadest political appeal in Japan. 14 Japan also endeavored to send 4-wheel drive vehicles to the Gulf. The shipment was blocked by various obstacles leading to repeated television coverage in the U.S. depicting the vehicles at dockside awaiting shipment -- coverage that doubtless had a negative effect on U.S. perceptions of Japan's responsiveness. ____________________________________________________ (Page 8) Phase Three, November 1990-February 1991 The failure of the peace cooperation law in early November 1990 coincided with President Bush's announcement of a virtual doubling of the size of U.S. forces in the Gulf As the allies moved step-by-step toward a showdown with Saddam in January, the Kaifu Administration was more prompt and effective than in earlier phases in showing political support for the allies and in coming up with pledges of $9 billion in additional aid. The $9 billion pledge came on top of the earlier $4 billion commitment, making Japan's stake the largest financial contribution of any country except Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The $9 billion pledge required the passage of a supplementary spending bill by the Japanese Diet. On March 6, 1991, the Diet passed the bill without the acrimonious debate that had blocked the peace cooperation bill of the previous fall. Of course the passage came after the shooting had stopped and all other coalition partners had finished making their commitments, leaving Japan the last one to do so. Press reporting and interviews showed that there was a broader awareness among Japanese officials as to what was expected of Japan by the United States and Western allies. Japanese officials deemed that Japan should work hard to fulfill these expensive financial obligations, especially in light of its inability to muster even a token official presence in the Gulf. The alternative was seen as isolation of Japan that could be politically damaging in Japan, to ruling and opposition politicians alike. The Japanese government moved quickly after the Diet action to disperse the funds, but controversy over significant details of the appropriation and disbursement process remained. In particular, due to exchange rate fluctuations, the yen denominated contribution that equated to $9 billion when submitted to the Diet fell to the equivalent of $8.6 billion by the time of its passage. Moreover, Japan intended to give a small part of the money to other coalition allies, as it did with its earlier contribution in September 1990, whereas the Bush administration officials maintained that Japan's commitment was to pay $9 billion to the U.S. alone. (.\16) FACTORS INFLUENCING JAPANESE POLICY Japanese policy in the Persian Gulf crisis showed a number of factors which coalesced in the initial reticence in Japan's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent response that was limited largely to financial support. Some are common to a number of the democracies, such as political divisions and ineffective political leadership. However, other factors were more uniquely Japanese, including Japanese attitudes toward Japan's international obligations, and the Japanese view of Japan's dependence on Middle East oil. ____________________________________________________ 16 See, among others, Japan's contributions in the war against Iraq. CRS Report 91-293 F by Richard Cronin. March 29, 1991. 6 p. ____________________________________________________ (Page 9) Japan's Reticent View of Adopting International Responsibilities One factor within the government is a reluctance to formulate a more assertive role for Japan in world affairs and take strong, immediate actions in response to international crises. Vice Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama spoke of "a passive foreign policy" in a 1990 essay, in which policy makers still view Japan as "a minor power." (.\16) Japan in the last few years has begun to assert itself more in international economic affairs, and it has undertaken political initiatives in East Asia on issues like Korea, China, and Cambodia. There is opinion within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Foreign Ministry that Japan needs to accept broader international obligations. However, views within the government as a whole, the political parties, a major segment of the media, and parts of the general public do not appear to accept the proposition that Japan's global economic power gives it new responsibilities in key global political and/or military issues. Yomiuri Shimbun, one of Japan's three largest newspapers, summed it up this way: Until now, Japan has been immersed in a state of peaceful stupor, just chasing after economic prosperity, shielded under the umbrella of nuclear protection that the U.S.-Japan Security Pact provided. Politics as well has been thoroughly guided by 'domestic considerations'. Regarding Japanese responsibility toward the establishment of a framework for peace, and awareness of how Japan should contribute to such a framework, discussion has been meager. This atmosphere has contributed to the suppression of a recognition of the need to foster a sharp sense of internationalism, (Seiki Nishihiro, former permanent vice minister of defense). (.\17) Kuriyama asserted that "Japan must outgrow the patterns of thought and behavior it gradually acquired unknowingly as a country that was defeated in war and that was a latecomer striving to catch up with the industrial West." (.\18) This attitude was shown most graphically during the Gulf crisis by statements of Japanese businessmen that Japan did not have to get involved in the Gulf because, in the longer term, Iraq would have to sell oil to Japan and that the Japanese economy was strong enough to withstand higher oil prices that would result from Iraq's conquest of Kuwait. (See Section below on "Views of Dependence on Middle East Oil and Middle East Issues.) This Japan-centered ____________________________________________________ 16 Kuriyama, Takakazu. Assuming Global Responsibilities in a Transition Period. Economic Eye. Autumn 1990. pp. 4-8. 17 A Sense of Peace: Becoming Conscious of a Role in Creating Peace; Casting Off the Parochial Way of Thinking. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 20, 1990. 18 Kuriyama, Assuming Global Responsibilities in a Transition Period, p. 6. ____________________________________________________ (Page 10) perception of how Japan should react to international crises undoubtedly was shared by non-business segments of the society. The apparent weak Japanese sense of international obligations probably explains Japan's reluctance to get physically involved in the non-military aspects of such crises. The example in the Gulf crisis was the chaotic refugee situation of August and September 1991 when several hundred thousand refugees poured into Jordan. The Japanese Government traditionally had given little emphasis to international refugee work. Foreign Ministry diplomats reportedly believed that assignment to the United Nations is career retarding, and few serve on the U.N. refugee agency's staff. (Perhaps signaling a change in this pattern, during the crisis, a Japanese was appointed head of the U.N. refugee agency.) (.\19) Japan responded generously with money but did not get involved in the badly needed evacuation of the refugees from Jordan, even though a sizable proportion were East Asian workers in the Gulf region. The Government made no effort to charter civilian aircraft for evacuations, and it appeared to give no serious consideration to the September 21 proposal of LDP faction leader, Michio Watanabe, that the Prime Minister order C-130 military transport aircraft to Jordan. Only in January 1991 did the Government charter civilian aircraft and propose sending military planes to Cairo for refugee evacuation. By then, the opportunity for an initial decisive, Japanese action had been lost. A second important limiting influence seems to be Japan's relations with the United States. Japanese officials acknowledge that because Japan's security policy is heavily based on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japanese officials are prone to wait until they receive clear signals from the U.S. Government before they formulate responses to international crises. (.\20) Some Japanese officials seem to judge that crises like the Persian Gulf War are important only in the context of Japan's relations with the United States. This was clearly the case in the first few weeks after the Iraqi invasion. Japan took no action on either financial support of multinational troop deployments or even refugee aid until the Bush Administration requested this assistance and the U.S. Congress began to complain of inaction. In defending Japanese government proposals on the Gulf before the Diet and in public fora, government officials and political leaders constantly justified the proposals as necessary to reinforce cooperation with the United States and prevent damage to relations with Washington. The Bush Administration reinforced this Japanese perception with its initial pressure for Japan to send minesweepers to the Gulf and its warnings that a failure by Japan to act would give credibility to U.S. opponents of a strong security relationship. This posture and the Japanese reaction helped to create a view of Japanese inaction as an unwillingness to get involved and ____________________________________________________ 19 Weisman, Stephen. U. N. Choice: A Signal for a Bigger Role for Japan. New York Times, December 27, 1990. 20 Chira, Susan. Japan and the World: Applying Assertiveness Training to a Foreign Policy. New York Times. September 6, 1988. p. A8. ____________________________________________________ (Page 11) commit resources. Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Thomas Foley, described this predicament during his visit to Japan late in 1990: Many of us desperately desire a change in the relationship that permits some response other than the American complaint or challenge and the Japanese reactions . . . The Gulf crisis, for example, has been widely interpreted in Japan as a bilateral problem. What would the Japanese government think about the Gulf if it were divorced from its relationship with the United States? Nothing? (.\21) The cautious fiscal views of the powerful Finance Ministry also slowed and limited Japan's initial financial contribution. The first Japanese offer, $1 billion to support the allied forces, reportedly came as a result of Finance Ministry pressure to keep costs down. (.\22) It wasn't until the September 7 meeting between Finance Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady that Finance Ministry bureaucratic resistance began to break down. The reaction of the ideological left in Japan to Japanese cooperation with the United States in such crises is another limiting factor. This is true in the Diet, mainly because of the anti-U.S. position of the Japan Socialist Party, the largest opposition party. (See section, below, on "The Role of the Political Opposition.") Anti-U.S. sentiment also reaches significant parts of the public through two of the three newspapers with national circulations, Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun (circulations about 18.5 and 10.0 million respectively). Both have a history of criticism of Japan's close ties with the United States. (.\23) They continued this stance during the Gulf crisis, editorializing constantly against proposals for Japanese involvement. The No War Constitution and Japanese Pacifism The debates over Gulf policy within the Kaifu cabinet, the Diet, the press and the public all dwelled on the constitutionality of policy proposals in relation to Article 9 of Japan's 1947 constitution. This "no war" clause bars Japan from maintaining armed forces, denies Japan the right of belligerency, and prohibits the threat or use of force to settle disputes. It reads: ____________________________________________________ 21 Thorton Emily. Foreign Policy Still Lacking Courage. Japan Times, December 25, 1990. p. 3. 22 Lehner, Urban C. Japan Unveils Package to Aid Mideast Efforts. Asian Wall Street Times, August 30, 1990. 23 For a background on the political-ideological views of Japanese newspapers, see Kim, Yong C. Japanese Journalists and Their World. Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1981. ____________________________________________________ (Page 12) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. Article 9 has embodied the deep strain of pacifism in Japanese attitudes since the disastrous defeat in World War II. Public opinion polls consistently have shown overwhelming majority support for Article 9. Very few politicians have advocated amending or deleting it; all political leaders have expressed support. The controversy over Article 9 during the Persian Gulf crisis stemmed from two factors in Japan's history. First, Article 9 has been reinterpreted several times since the early 1950s to permit the establishment of a military arm, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954 and the buildup of its military capabilities. Moreover, successive Japanese governments have stretched the meaning of Article 9 further to sanction defense cooperation with the United States under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Reinterpretations since 1954 also have set down limits on the functions of the SDF. The most important of these in relation to Japanese involvement in the Gulf crisis were: (1) The SDF can only be used for the defense of Japan against an armed attack against Japanese territory. (2) The Government cannot send SDF personnel to other countries: this is stated in the 1954 Self-Defense Forces law. (3) Defense cooperation with other countries is limited to the United States; Japan does not have the right to participate in military collective security. These reinterpretations have been controversial and not always popular with the public. The main opposition Japan Socialist Party has opposed nearly all of them, citing constitutional grounds; and the public is not in favor of a major buildup of the SDF, according to the polls. Opponents cited constitutionally-based restrictions and popular opinion repeatedly in arguing against the Kaifu cabinet's proposals to send SDF personnel to the Gulf and provide $9 billion to the U.S. and other multinational forces after the Gulf war had begun. A poll conducted by Nikon Keizai Shimbun, Japan's leading business newspaper, found only 23 percent of the public in favor of the Peace Cooperation bill. Divisions quickly appeared in the LDP on the proposal. Senior faction leaders, Shin Kanemaru and Kiichi Miyazawa, urged caution in proposing to send the SDF overseas. LDP Secretary (Page 13) General Ichiro Ozawa, one of the younger generation of party leaders, spearheaded the push to include the SDF in the bill. (.\24) Ozawa and other proponents tried to articulate new constitutional formulations to support their position. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau, composed of legal experts, played an important role in offering opinions as to the constitutionality of the proposal. It expressed doubt in October 1990 whether the inclusion of SDF personnel in the Peace Cooperation bill was constitutional. (.\26) This apparently was influential in the disintegration of LDP support for the bill. The debate over constitutionality also figured into Kaifu's subsequent decision to drop a proposal of sending SDF planes to evacuate refugees. Polls showed public majorities or pluralities against the proposal. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis, it is clear that the proponents of dispatching the SDF overseas failed to measure the depth of sentiment within the political parties (including within the LDP) against altering the Article 9-based prohibition of sending military personnel outside Japan. The Government did prevail, however, in its contention that financial support of a multinational collective security force does not violate Article 9 -- despite a strong dissent from the JSP and an ambivalent public view. Moreover, the Government and the LDP appear able at this juncture to get support from the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito for the position that a contribution of civilian personnel to a multinational force does not violate Article 9. Following the demise of the Peace Cooperation bill, LDP, Komeito, and Democratic Socialist Party leaders agreed to cooperate in shaping a future proposal for Japanese participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the April 1991 decision to dispatch minesweepers to the Gulf opens the possibility for SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping. Role of the Political Opposition The Gulf crisis pointed up the continuing role of the political opposition in dealing with proposals for a broader Japanese participation in international crises -- so far, mainly a factor opposing major policy changes. The importance of the opposition parties, in fact, is greater than ever, given their present majority in the upper house of the Japanese Diet, the House of Councilors. The Government and the LDP must have legislative support from some of the opposition parties in order to pass legislation that would expand Japanese involvement in crises like the one in the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf crisis showed several facets about the opposition's role that the Japanese and U.S. governments will have to deal with in the future. First, three of the four main opposition parties, the Socialist Party (JSP), the ____________________________________________________ 24 Neilan Edward. Japan Ponders More Aid in Gulf Crisis. Washington Times, September 12, 1990. 25 Ekonomisuto (Tokyo), December 25, 1990. pp. 67-71. Article by Tokyo University Professor Takashi Inoguchi; Shukan Tokyo Keizai, November 17, 1990. pp. 52-53. Article by political commentator Minoru Morita. ____________________________________________________ (Page 14) Komeito, and the Communist Party portrayed themselves as embodiments of Japanese pacifism. They opposed any kind of military involvement in the Gulf, from the Peace Cooperation bill to the proposed dispatch of SDF aircraft to airlift refugees. They constantly cited the constitutional arguments related to Article 9 in the Diet deliberations and in pronouncements aimed at the Japanese public. Second, the political parties have large public constituencies, which express similar views. The parties' pronouncements also seem to reflect and/or influence attitudes within the broader public, although the extent of their influence is difficult to measure. This seems to reinforce the apparent public sentiment, which favors the process of consensus-seeking between the LDP and the opposition parties on these kinds of issues and would oppose attempts by the LDP to push measures through the Diet unilaterally. Third, the Gulf crisis pointed up the Japan Socialist Party's (JSP) intractable opposition to Japan-U.S. security cooperation. The JSP opposed every proposal for Japanese support of the multilateral coalition against Iraq, including Japanese financial contributions. JSP leaders not only cited constitutional arguments, but they also accused the United States of trying to precipitate a war in the Middle East. (.\26) This line follows on closely to the Socialists' attacks on the U.S. troop presence in Japan and criticism of increased Japanese financial support of the American forces in Japan, and the JSP pledge to enforce anti-nuclear principles against U.S. military ships and aircraft in Japanese territory. The JSP position during the Gulf crisis was noteworthy in contrast to the party's very recent attempt to moderate its image through changing its English language name to the Social Democratic Party (while retaining the Japanese term for Socialist Party) and the earlier promises in 1989 not to immediately terminate the SDF and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty if it came to power. Although the JSP did not gain power in the last parliamentary election, it did win a substantial number of seats in both houses of the Diet. If the Socialists make additional progress in the next round of elections, the Japanese and U.S. governments undoubtedly would face even greater problems in finding ways to cooperate on future international security issues. Fourth, the balance of parties in the Diet and the intractability of the JSP put the Komeito Party in the center of the Japanese political process related to the Gulf. Komeito was the balancer in the House of Councilors; its support or opposition was the key determinant of whether government legislative proposals passed or failed. The Government and the LDP could count on the backing of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which has supported more assertive foreign and defense policies; but DSP strength alone was not enough to secure ____________________________________________________ 26 For overviews of the JSP position on the Gulf crisis, see: Fransworth, David. Winds of Fortune. The Daily Yomiuri, March 16, 1991; and Ishii, Fujio. SDP Shows 'Outdated' Attitudes. Mainichi Daily News, March 16,1991. The initials SDP stands for Social Democratic Party, the JSP's new name. ____________________________________________________ (Page 15) a majority in the upper house. Support from Komeito, with its 20 seats, would provide a majority. Komeito thus has held the balance of power in the Diet on a number of issues. Komeito was pulled in two directions in responding to government-LDP proposals on the Gulf crisis. On the one hand, a new Komeito leadership had indicated a general willingness to cooperate more closely with the LDP in order to enhance Komeito's influence and public profile. Komeito previously had rejected the JSP's position on the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. On the other hand, Komeito's core constituency is the Soka Gakkai Buddhist sect, which originally founded the party. Soka Gakkai contains large female and youth contingents, which are predominantly pacifist. Komeito tried to meld these competing interests in dealing with the LDP on the Gulf. It supported the Government's financial contributions, and it indicated that it would back other forms of a Japanese non-military role. It rejected any Japanese military role in the Gulf but agreed to cooperate with the LDP in shaping legislation that would allow civilian participation in future U.N. peacekeeping operations. It conditioned its support of the financial contribution by insisting (and receiving) a government pledge that the money would be used only for non-lethal purposes. It also demanded and received a government commitment that 40 percent of the $9 billion would come out of the defense budget rather than deriving totally from new taxes. Komeito staked out a position on defense issues in the Gulf crisis, which it likely will continue for some time to come. (.\27) It also gained a strong bargaining position, which it could hold until at least the next election of the House of Councilors (scheduled for no later than July 1992). Prime Minister Kaifu's Leadership and LDP Divisions Detailed Japanese and American press accounts of the Government's decision-making suggest that Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's leadership within the Liberal Democratic Party contributed to the Government's hesitancy in acting after the Iraqi invasion, the ill-fated decision to incorporate the SDF into the Peace Cooperation bill, and to the widespread perception of governmental ineffectiveness. Kaifu's political status within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is one of the lowest among Japan's postwar Prime Ministers. He is not a leader of any of the LDP factions in the Diet and is a member of only one of the smallest factions. Party leaders put Kaifu into the office in 1989 mainly because he was not tainted by the Recruit scandal (most LDP faction leaders and other top party officials were implicated). (.\28) The party powerbrokers apparently believed that Kaifu would appeal to the Japanese electorate as a ____________________________________________________ 27 For background on Komeito's stance, see: Komeito Puzzles Over Ikeda's Dismissal. Seikai Orai, March 1991. pp. 74-79. 28 The scandal involved monetary payments of the Recruit Corporation to Japanese political leaders apparently in return for government favors. ____________________________________________________ (Page 16) "clean fresh face" in crucial elections to the lower house of the Diet in February 1990. They assumed that he would be a caretaker Prime Minister until the public image of the main faction leaders had improved. The faction leaders appear to give little emphasis to supporting Kaifu on policy issues or promoting him as a leader in such cases. In fact, on other foreign policy issues in 1990 -- relations with the Soviet Union and North Korea -- faction leaders negotiated with Soviet and North Korean leaders independently of Kaifu and took positions different from official Japanese policy. Kaifu stresses the limited nature of Japan's involvement in world affairs. He appears reluctant to take initiatives or to adopt a personal activist profile. This is in contrast to Yasuhiro Nakasone, Japan's Prime Minister for most of the 1980s. Nakasone often projected himself forcefully during international crises, usually in support of the United States, even when the substantive Japanese role was limited. He probably conditioned U.S. leaders to expect forthright Japanese support in international crises. During the Gulf crisis, Kaifu appeared to succumb to pressures from stronger LDP leaders and the opposition parties. He took few personal initiatives, which contributed to the failure of Japan to get directly involved in the airlift of refugees in August and September. In line with a Foreign Ministry recommendation, he reportedly opposed including personnel of the SDF in the Peace Cooperation bill but was pressured by LDP Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa into incorporating SDF participation into the bill. (.\29) Kaifu failed to forge a consensus among LDP leaders regarding the contents of the bill. Subsequently, he could not prevent senior LDP leaders like Shin Kanemaru and Kiichi Miyazawa from withholding their support of the bill. When the Cabinet Legislation Bureau issued an opinion questioning whether the bill was constitutional, Kaifu began to hedge on his backing of it and suggested consideration of changes in the bill or alternative proposals. Kaifu may have miscalculated when he did not invoke the National Security Council as the key decision making body regarding the Persian Gulf, or alternatively, create another cabinet-level body in the Prime Minister's office as the key policymaking organization. Prime Minister Nakasone had established the NSC in 1986 to set Japanese policy in international crises that affected Japan's security. (.\30) The NSC is composed of designated cabinet and agency heads. It had met frequently during the Persian Gulf reflagging crisis of 1988-1989. In the new Gulf crisis, however, Kaifu reportedly agreed with the opinion of the Foreign Ministry and others that an invocation of the NSC was inappropriate because the Director General of the Defense Agency is a permanent member of the Council. Kaifu reportedly told the Director General ____________________________________________________ 29 Sanger, David E. Japan's Gulf Commitment Seems Endangered. New York Times, November 6, 1990; The Brake: Degree of Civilian Control; Hard Evidence from Deep-Rooted Uneasiness. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 19, 1990. 30 Japan's Defense Agency. Defense of Japan 1989. pp 78-79. ____________________________________________________ (Page 17) of the Defense Agency in late August that he did not want any contact with the Defense Agency during the process of decision-making regarding the Gulf. (.\31) This again points up the legal questions over Article 9 and the role of the military that often dominate and can frustrate Japanese decision making. As a result of this decision, Kaifu did not have a cabinet organization to help him set policy and deal with pressures from politicians and bureaucrats, and adjust policy in an institutional framework. Kaifu consequently found himself isolated and easily susceptible to the views of Ozawa and other LDP leaders. Kaifu displayed initiative in proposing the $9 billion contribution after the fighting began in January 1991. He argued for public support more forcefully than previously. He and the cabinet seemed to be more effective in securing Diet approval of the money on March 6, especially in concluding difficult negotiations with Komeito. This met the Government's original timetable for securing Diet approval. The Government also moved in January to charter private airplanes for the evacuation of over 1,000 Vietnamese and Thai refugees from the Persian Gulf region. Nevertheless, Kaifu vacillated again when criticism arose over his announcement that he would order SDF personnel to fly military aircraft to Jordan to evacuate refugees. According to Japanese press reports, Kaifu was reluctant to propose new measures for the deployment of SDF personnel in the Gulf but accepted the proposal of Ozawa and other LDP leaders for the dispatch of aircraft. Then, after the adverse public and political reaction, he decided not to issue the order. (.\32) In short, Kaifu's inability to bring about a united LDP stance produced confusion within the Government, a misreading by the Government of what was politically possible, and limited the Government's ability to influence public opinion. A stronger display of leadership in the initial three months of the crisis might have resulted in more practical actions and legislative proposals, whose adoption might have changed perceptions of Japan's inability and unwillingness to play a role in the Gulf more commensurate with its strength and resources. (.\33) ____________________________________________________ 31 The Brake: Degree of Civilian Control; Hard Evidence Sought from Deep Rooted Consciousness. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 19, 1990. 32 The Politics of Mistrust. Asahi Shimbun, January 26, 1991; Japan's Gulf War Aid. Yomiuri Shimbun, January 24, 1991. 33 For a critique of Kaifu's leadership in the first 2 1/2 months of the crisis, see: Qualifications for the Prime Ministership: Leadership Qualities Become More Important; Limitations of a Popularity That Depends on Level of Support in Public Opinion Polls. Yomiuri Shimbun, October 23, 1990. ____________________________________________________ (Page 18) Views of Dependence on Middle East Oil Certain segments of Japanese opinion, especially businessmen, either opposed or took a neutral position toward proposals for an assertive Japanese policy in the Gulf crisis because they viewed the Iraqi invasion as posing little threat to Japan's energy security and the economy generally. Press reports quoted businessmen that the Gulf crisis posed little threat to the Japanese economy because Japan relied on oil for only slightly over 60 percent of its energy needs. Some businessmen also asserted that Saddam Hussein would have to sell oil to Japan no matter what and that Japan's strong economy gave it the ability to pay a higher price per barrel that Saddam and other suppliers might charge. (.\34) This view contrasts with American arguments that Japan had a vital interest in the Gulf crisis since about 70 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East. These Japanese businessmen cited the sharp decline in Japan's reliance on oil for overall energy requirements, and they apparently believe that oil will be an increasingly minor factor in Japan's energy policy because of growing efficiencies in the use of energy and alternative sources like nuclear power. Their view that Japan's economic strength insulates the country from the effects of such crises is a newly emergent sentiment, in contrast to past Japanese feelings of vulnerability because of reliance on foreign sources of energy and natural resources. This view seemed devoid of any strong sense of international obligations or the need to confront aggressor nations like Iraq. As such, it stood in sharp contrast to American public opinion. Japanese Attitudes Towards U.S. Pressures and Policies The Gulf crisis revealed what appears to be more pronounced, varied, and sometimes contradictory reactions to U.S. policy and especially to Washington's pressures on the Japanese government. This trend already had been apparent in recent economic disputes between Japan and the United States. The Gulf crisis showed the potential for these reactions to become more negative. Japanese reactions followed three broad themes. The first was to seek a strong, positive contribution in support of the United States. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty framework provided the context for the view within the Government (especially the Foreign Ministry) and the LDP that Japan should try to cooperate with the United States in dealing with the Iraqi invasion. Among the opposition parties, the DSP also held this view. One of the three major newspapers, Yomiuri Shimbun, sounded a similar theme in editorials. Within the LDP, Secretary General Ozawa pushed for military cooperation, including the dispatch of SDF personnel to the Gulf. One opinion expressed was that Ozawa used U.S. proposals as a vehicle to promote his own views on Kaifu. The Foreign Ministry and other segments of the Government and ruling parties, ____________________________________________________ 34 Chipello, Christopher J. and Brauchli, Marcus W. Japan Seen Coping Easily with Oil Crisis. Asian Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1990; Fire on the Other Side. Newsweek, January 21, 1991. p. 25. ____________________________________________________ (Page 19) however, favored limiting cooperation to non-military measures, principally financial contributions. This split caused considerable problems for the Government. Nevertheless, the Government did assist the United States in several ways besides money, such as providing refuge to 16 U.S. diplomats and their families in the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait and insuring that Japanese companies supplied key components and equipment used by the U.S. military during the war. A second theme was resentment directed at the U.S. pressures and a rejection of the specific U.S. proposals. The opposition parties, several major newspapers, and the public reacted to these pressures with criticism of the Bush Administration for being heavy-handed. (.\35) Observers also noted substantial public opposition to the Bush Administration's diplomatic and military preparations for war with Iraq, reflecting pacifist sentiment. Japanese public opinion, by most accounts, favored more diplomatic efforts to settle the issue, and much of it rejected military force as a legitimate measure. A Kyodo News Service poll taken in late January found 48 percent in favor of the war and 45 percent against -- essentially an even division; 53 percent opposed the Government's pledge of $9 billion and 45 percent were in favor of it. (.\36) The Japanese government also received criticism from the press and public for merely following the U.S. lead in the Gulf crisis. Prime Minister Kaifu was labeled a "Bush button" in newspapers that attacked his alleged servility in dealing with Bush. Part of this criticism obviously stemmed from opposition to U.S. proposals for a Japanese military role. Another facet of it, however, seemed to express a third theme that the Government should adopt initiatives independent of the United States. A Mainichi Shimbun poll published in March 1991 found that public disapproval of the Kaifu cabinet had risen from 24 percent in December 1990 to 32 percent in March 1991, almost equaling the 34 percent approval rating. The rise in disapproval was due to the Government's handling of the Gulf crisis, and dissatisfaction came most strongly from younger Japanese in their 20s and 30s. The main reasons for disapproval were: * The Government does nothing more than follow the lead of the United States (40 percent). * The Government makes no effort to stop the war (28 percent). ____________________________________________________ 35 Weisman, Steven R. Japanese in Disarray Over Sending Troop to Gulf. New York Times, October 26, 1990. 36 Reid, T. R. Kaifu Proposes Payment of $9 Billion for War. Washington Post, January 24, 1991; Poll: Citizens Divided on Gulf War, Against Aid. Kyodo News Service, January 30, 1991. ____________________________________________________ (Page 20) * The Government does not try to determine the opinion of citizens (16 percent). (.\37) The JSP and the left expressed this sentiment the strongest, advocating policy initiatives at variance with those of the United States. Prime Minister Kaifu's perceived weaknesses appeared to reinforce this sentiment. As the crisis unfolded over time, and as the U.S.-Japanese dialogue became common knowledge, this view seemed to grow in intensity in relation to the reluctance to become involved at all. As allied victory in the war became apparent, observers noted Japanese expressions of concern and even shame that Japan had been "left out." Government officials, press editorials, and private sector experts reportedly expressed dismay when the Kuwaiti government omitted Japan in expressing thanks publicly to those countries that had contributed to Kuwait's liberation. As allied forces launched the ground offensive against Iraq in late February, a Kyodo News Service poll indicated that Japanese opinion had turned more supportive of Japanese involvement; 70 percent backed the $9 billion contribution and 56 percent supported the Government's proposal to send SDF aircraft to the Middle East to evacuate refugees. In short, Japanese public opinion at the end of the Gulf war had moved away from the strong reluctance to be involved and opposition to the use of force against Iraq. The Government took advantage of this altered mood in sending the minesweepers to the Gulf in April. The longer term implications of this are harder to judge. The change could be a short-lived Japanese-style postwar euphoria, or it could be long lasting. The first test likely will be the public's reaction to any new government proposal for SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Counterpressures From Other East Asian Governments The Persian Gulf crisis brought into focus a clear difference between the United States (at least the Bush Administration) and a number of governments in East Asia over the deployment of Japanese military forces outside of Japanese territory. While President Bush and other U.S. officials urged the Japanese government to send SDF personnel and naval vessels to the Persian Gulf, the governments of China, South Korea and several Southeast Asian countries warned the Japanese government not to take such action. Indicators of public sentiment in these countries also showed opposition. A South Korean official interviewed described a groundswell of negative media and public sentiment that arose in South Korea when Prime Minister Kaifu submitted the Peace Cooperation bill to the Diet. The Chinese government made its opposition known in a number of public statements and reportedly private pronouncements. There is no single motive behind these warnings. China, for example, seems to view Japan as a long term rival for influence in East Asia. Other ____________________________________________________ 37 Poll shows drop in support for Kaifu Cabinet. Mainichi Daily News, March 15, 1991. ____________________________________________________ (Page 21) governments probably use the defense issue as a lever to influence Japan on other subjects such as Japanese economic assistance. However, the experience of Japanese colonial and military occupation before and during World War II unquestionably is a common motivation. Officials and citizens seem to believe that a Japanese decision to abandon the prohibition against sending troops abroad could open the way to an assertive Japanese military policy in East Asia that could pose problems for or even threaten the security of their countries. This view also grows out of concerns that U.S. pressure will push Japan toward being a military power or that Japan would seek to fill a military vacuum left by a U.S. military withdrawal from the Western Pacific. In contrast to Germany, Japan never has had a long-term NATO-type alliance relationship with its non-communist neighbors, which would have built regional confidence in Japanese defense policies. According to officials of several of these governments, neither the Reagan Administration nor the Bush Administration initiated serious discussions of the Japanese military role with their governments since 1981, when U.S. proposals influenced a decade-long Japanese defense buildup. This also was true during the Gulf crisis. These warnings do influence Japanese decision makers. In the initial stage of drafting the Peace Cooperation bill, Japanese officials voiced concern that any move to send SDF personnel to the Gulf would produce a negative reaction from East Asian governments. (.\38) After introducing the bill into the Diet, Kaifu lamented that "we did not have time to explain this plan fully to the Asian nations." (.\39) Foreign Minister Nakayama said that if the bill passed, the Government would send a special diplomatic mission to East Asian countries to explain the policy. Opponents of SDF deployments including LDP faction leader Shin Kanemaru and more moderate observers cited East Asian opinion in speeches and in newspaper editorials and columns. (.\40) In a trip to Southeast Asian countries and China soon after the war had ended, LDP faction leader, Michio Watanabe made the issue the number one subject he raised with these leaders of these states. At the end of the Gulf War, there were indications that some East Asian governments might be rethinking their positions. Indonesia's President Suharto reportedly told Michio Watanabe that the contribution of Japanese personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations would not conflict with Indonesian policy; Suharto, however, did not specifically refer to SDF personnel. As Japan considered the dispatch of SDF aircraft to the Middle East in February 1991, the ____________________________________________________ 38 Blustein, Paul. Japan Offers New Gulf Aid. Washington Post, September 14, 1990. 39 Reid, T. R. Kaifu Makes Troop Proposal. Washington Post, October 17, 1990. 40 Kanemaru: Nation 'Must Avoid' Worrying Asia. Kyodo News Service, October 30, 1990. ____________________________________________________ (Page 258) Philippine Government approved a request to allow the aircraft to fly through Philippine air space. South Korean Information Minister Choe Chang-yun stated in March that "it would be natural for Japan to take part" in U.N. peacekeeping. Choe quickly retracted the statement in the face of public criticism, but it suggests that diverse opinions exist within the South Korean government. There could be ground for accommodation among these countries, Japan and the United States over Japan's future role in international peacekeeping and collective security. A view is emerging that the question should be negotiated in a broader framework than U.S.-Japan bilateral relations. Singapore's Foreign Minister Wong Kan-seng has proposed that Japan and the East Asian countries have a meeting over the issue. However, if these governments do not reach a consensus, East Asian opposition to proposals for a Japanese military role likely will carry greater weight with Japan as Japan continues to integrate its economy with those of the region. In the absence of a regional consensus, China may prove to be intractable in opposing any expanded military role for Japan, even under U.N. auspices. U.S. and Chinese differences could clash more directly in any future situation like the Persian Gulf. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS Press reports, leadership comment and interviewed Japanese and U.S. officials view Japan's response to the crisis and the U.S.-Japanese interaction over the issue as a failure. There is a widespread feeling that the Japanese administration of Prime Minister Kaifu was ill prepared to deal with the crisis in the Gulf, slow to recognize the implications of the crisis for Japan's relations with the United States and other Western allies, and politically maladroit in dealing with initial U.S. requests for assistance and for a physical presence in the Gulf. The Japanese administration did a better job in delivering political and financial support in the last phase of the crisis. U.S. Expectations/Japan's Response: Bush administration officials tended to expect too much of Japan. U.S. officials later admitted that they were surprised and disappointed at how weak and indecisive the Japanese government appeared to be, especially in the early stages of the crisis. Some in the Bush Administration had seen the crisis as a "heaven sent opportunity" to get Japan to play a stronger international role, alongside the U.S., commensurate with Japan's economic power. In pushing Japan to do more, they found that many Japanese leaders did not share U.S. judgments as to what was at stake in the conflict and what was an appropriate response. The Japanese government seemed well prepared to handle any oil shock from the crisis and held ambivalent or undeveloped views as to the broader consequences of Saddam's aggression for the world peace and development, on which U.S. and Japanese well-being depend. In the event, some U.S. officials, perhaps including President Bush, suggested that Japan go further than its reaction to the Persian (Page 23) Gulf crisis of 1987-1988 and agree to send a small contingent of Japanese defense forces to play a support role in the Gulf. This suggestion was echoed with various degrees of enthusiasm by the like-minded officials in the Japanese government and some senior leaders in the LDP. But it was strongly opposed by others in the LDP, public opinion and opposition politicians, setting the stage for Kaifu's vain efforts to seek a consensus leading to passage of the peace cooperation law in November 1990. Regarding the less politically sensitive area of financial contributions, Japanese officials complained that the U.S. side was imprecise at first, in specifying what they wanted Japan to do. Once it was clearer what the United States wanted, as during negotiations with Treasury Secretary Brady in September 1990 leading to Japan's overall pledge of $4 billion, and in discussions in early 1991 leading to Japan's pledge of an added $9 billion, the Japanese side was able to respond more effectively. Despite the widespread perceptions of failure, however, Japanese officials are quick to emphasize, and U.S. officials also acknowledge, that Japan's financial contribution was very important to the allied effort. The size of Japan's contribution was surpassed only by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (other Japanese actions -- e.g. flights for refugees, medical team visit -- were of only minor significance.) Short Term implications: Among the immediate implications of the Gulf crisis for U.S.-Japan relations is Japan's seeming inability to gain approval from U.S. leaders and public opinion for its large financial contribution. This is a source of great frustration on the Japanese side and a source of puzzlement to some American officials. In particular, the latter assert that the poor view of Japan in Washington after the Gulf crisis seems to contradict those who charge that a Japan "Lobby" has been able to take hold of levers of power in the U.S. Government and influence opinion in ways favorable to Japan. Indeed, the disparaging remarks used by some U.S. officials, who had a strong record of support for close U.S.-Japan relations, to characterize Japanese government behavior during the crisis would appear to underline a decline of Japanese influence. Thus, for example, one source characterized a prevailing view of Japan in one executive branch department heretofore known to be supportive of Japan as that of "a day late and a dollar short"; senior officials in another executive branch department also known to be supportive of good relations with Japan characterized the Japanese response as that of "political pygmies"; and a senior official in a third executive group also known to be supportive of Japan characterized Prime Minister Kaifu's urgently scheduling a visit to the United States in April 1991 as "puerile." Broader Consequences: The broader implications of the Gulf crisis for U.S.-Japan relations are subject to mixed reviews. It has clearly hindered understanding and cooperation between the United States and Japan at a time when the relationship is under pressure from changes caused by trade and other economic friction, a collapse of the Soviet threat and shifts in U.S. and Japanese public opinion. In particular, it has embarrassed those officials in both the (Page 24) United States and Japan who had widely touted the benefits to be derived from an ever closer U.S.-Japan "global partnership." And it has strengthened the hands of advocates in the United States and Japan who argue that U.S.-Japanese foreign policy goals and values are not fundamentally compatible and provide insufficient reason to offset growing strains caused by intense U.S.-Japanese economic competition. Many Americans supportive of closer cooperation with Japan were particularly disappointed that Japan was unable to articulate and act upon a set of values and national interests that were in line with those of the United States. The Japanese government's constant refrain about needing specific guidance from the United States was among the evidence showing that Japan's response was motivated by what Tokyo judged the United States wanted, not out of a sense of sharing international responsibility. American skeptics of closer U.S. cooperation with Japan view Japan's lack of vision or responsibility sharing as another sign of what they see as narrowly self-serving Japanese policies designed to support the ever increasing economic power and competitiveness of Japan. On the Japanese side, the U.S. has appeared to be bullying, insensitive to Japan's contribution; and inarticulate and contradictory as to what it wants Japan to do. For example, Japanese observers are quick to point out that while some in the Bush Administration supported a SDF presence in the Gulf, other U.S. officials were ambivalent about sending Japanese forces beyond the boundaries of Japan. There was also a belief noted by some that U.S. decision making in the post Cold War environment is excessively "Washington-centered" and did not realistically reflect the interests of the other major international actors, including Japan. Whether U.S.-Japan relations deteriorate further will depend heavily on how the United States and Japan manage sensitive issues over the next year. Optimists tend to focus on the fact that the war ended favorably for the allies, with few allied casualties and with relatively low cost to the United States. The bulk of Japan's large-scale financial contribution was enacted in March 1991 and might have an overall positive impact on U.S. opinion. Moreover, American and Japanese leaders still face a "reality" of close interdependence in economic, security and other areas. Each side needs the other to protect and nurture important interests in world stability and development. Some U.S. officials aver that the lessons of the crisis are likely to redound to the benefit of closer U.S.-Japanese relations. Thus, they were encouraged by Japan's dispatch of mine-sweepers to clear mines in the Gulf in April 1991; they claimed to see better prospects for passage of a peace cooperation law that would allow Japan to respond more actively to international security crises; and they highlighted the view that the Japanese government now has greater experience in managing Japan's response to such crises and would be more sensitive in responding to U.S. and other foreign expectations in similar crises in the future. These officials urge the United States to work closely within the U.S.-Japanese alliance relationship to encourage Japan to take incremental steps toward a more articulate and prominent role in world affairs. (Page 25) A more common U.S. view is that the United States should not overemphasize Japan's ability to change. The political leadership in Japan is likely to be weak, at least until the leadership succession struggle is resolved at the end of Kaifu's term this fall. Institutional, political, legal and traditional constraints on Japan's freedom of action in international security matters remain strong and are unlikely to be modified by the current Japanese leadership. (.\41) Under these circumstances, the United States should avoid stressing the global partnership with Japan. It should follow the example of President Bush, who did not go out of his way to follow through on a planned visit to Japan in early 1991. The President did not reschedule a visit with Kaifu, despite his effort earlier in the administration to establish a close personal relationship with the Japanese Prime Minister at the Palm Springs summit in 1990. Responding to strong urgings of the Kaifu Administration, President Bush did agree to meet in Washington with Foreign Minister Nakayama in March, and with Kaifu in April, but he also agreed to meet with prominent political rivals of Kaifu in the LDP. Even if the political dynamics in Japan allows a strong leader to emerge in the LDP later this year, a number of U.S. experts aver that the best the United States can expect is slow progress in Japanese efforts to articulate and carry through a greater world role. Although they acknowledge that the long-standing U.S.-Japan "patron-client" relationship gives U.S. officials considerable leverage on Japanese decision making, the Gulf crisis shows the limits of that influence and the danger of the U.S. overplaying its hand. Under circumstances of limited U.S.-Japanese cooperation on foreign and security policy, greater attention may be devoted to economic or other disputes. Many critics of Japan, especially in the U.S. Congress, were outspoken in their commentary on Japan's behavior in the Gulf crisis, urging a harder U.S. line on economic disputes with Japan, with some calling for the U.S. to penalize Japan in trade or other areas for its apparent unwillingness to bear greater responsibility in international crises such as the Persian Gulf war. Heretofore, the Bush Administration and supporters in Congress had emphasized common U.S.-Japanese world interests under the rubric of "global partnership" in order to encourage Americans to reduce emphasis on economic or other disputes. If U.S. and Japanese leaders prove unable to come up with tangible evidence of international partnership following the Gulf crisis, officials on both sides will doubtless have to work harder to check economic and other tensions if centrifugal forces affecting U.S.-Japanese relations are to be kept within bounds. ____________________________________________________ 41 In particular, as was noted on pp. 13-14 the opposition parties led by the Socialist party reacted to the Gulf crisis in ways that appeared to reinforce pacifist and isolationist tendencies in Japan. ____________________________________________________ [end of text]