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  Access Rights: Use restricted to UNT Community
 Decade: 2010-2019
 Degree Discipline: Management
 Collection: UNT Theses and Dissertations
Optimal design of Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels.

Optimal design of Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels.

Access: Use of this item is restricted to the UNT Community.
Date: May 2010
Creator: Li, Zhen
Description: The theory of auction has become an active research area spanning multiple disciplines such as economics, finance, marketing and management science. But a close examination of it reveals that most of the existing studies deal with ascending (i.e., English) auctions in which it is assumed that the bid increments are continuous. There is a clear lack of research on optimal descending (i.e., Dutch) auction design with discrete bid levels. This dissertation aims to fill this void by considering single-unit, open-bid, first price Dutch auctions in which the bid levels are restricted to a finite set of values, the number of bidders may be certain or uncertain, and a secret reserve price may be present or absent. These types of auctions are most attractive for selling products that are perishable (e.g., flowers) or whose value decreases with time (e.g., air flight seats and concert tickets) (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005). I began by conducting a comprehensive survey of the current literature to identify the key dimensions of an auction model. I then zeroed in on the particular combination of parameters that characterize the Dutch auctions of interest. As a significant departure from the traditional methods employed by applied economists and game theorists, ...
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