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Air Force Aerial Refueling
This report considers the future of the U.S. tanker fleet for aerial refueling.
Air Force Aerial Refueling
Aerial refueling aircraft are key to air operations. The U.S. tanker fleet is large and effective, but old. Modernizing or replacing the current fleet of tankers presents the Department of Defense (DOD) with difficult choices in terms of desired capabilities, force structure, and budget. How this fleet will be maintained or replaced, and on what schedule, has proven controversial.
Air Force Aerial Refueling Methods: Flying Boom versus Hose-and-Drogue
Decisions on the composition of the Air Force aerial refueling fleet were made decades ago, when the primary mission was to refuel long-range strategic bombers. Modifications have been made to many of these tanker aircraft (KC-135s and KC-10s) to make them more effective in refueling fighter aircraft. This report, which will be updated, examines the balance between two different refueling methods in today’s refueling fleet — “flying boom” and “hose-and-drogue.”
Air Force FB-22 Bomber Concept
The Air Force has expressed interest in developing a bomber variant of the F-22A Raptor to "bridge the gap" between today's bombers and a follow-on bomber in 2037. Questions exist regarding the FB-22's feasibility, cost, and combat potential.
Air Force Transformation
This report considers how the Air Force is changing itself to meet new defensive needs. The issues for Congress on this are mostly budgetary and how effective it will be.
Airborne Laser (ABL): Issues for Congress
This report examines the airborne laser (ABL) program and budget status. It also examines a variety of related issues, including the questionable maturity of ABL technologies, the number of ABL platforms the United States should acquire, and to what degree the United STates should invest in alternative technologies in the event that the ABL may not prove successful. This report does not provide a detailed technical assessment of the ABL program (see CRS Report RL30185, The Airborne Laser Anti-Missile Program).
Bioterrorism Countermeasure Development: Issues in Patents and Homeland Security
In the 109th Congress, several bills have been introduced, including S. 3, the Protecting America in the War on Terror Act, and S. 975, the Project Bioshield II Act, that would generate additional incentives for the creation of new technologies to counteract potential biological threats. These bills propose reforms to current policies and practices associated with intellectual property, particularly patents, and the marketing of pharmaceuticals and related products. This report includes patents and innovation, the role of patents in pharmaceutical/biomedical R&D, legislative developments and proposals for change.
"Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005 and FY2006
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program has been the most controversial nuclear weapon program in Congress for the last several years. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply buried targets (such as leadership bunkers) in countries of concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations; critics assert that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. This report presents a brief technical background on RNEP, then discusses the history of RNEP in Congress and the Administration for the FY2005 and FY2006 budget cycles.
"Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005 and FY2006
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program has been the most controversial nuclear weapon program in Congress for the last several years. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply buried targets (such as leadership bunkers) in countries of concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations; critics assert that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. This report presents a brief technical background on RNEP, then discusses the history of RNEP in Congress and the Administration for the FY2005 and FY2006 budget cycles.
"Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005 and FY2006
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program has been the most controversial nuclear weapon program in Congress for the last several years. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply buried targets (such as leadership bunkers) in countries of concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations; critics assert that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. This report presents a brief technical background on RNEP, then discusses the history of RNEP in Congress and the Administration for the FY2005 and FY2006 budget cycles.
"Bunker Busters": Sources of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Debate
Earth penetrator weapons, often called “bunker busters,” burrow into the ground some tens of feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried targets. The United States has several types of conventional earth penetrators. The Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). The FY2005 defense authorization act contained the full RNEP request, $27.6 million. This report explains the budget request and provides details on the RNEP plan.
China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues
Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Skeptics question whether China's cooperation in weapons nonproliferation has warranted President Bush's pursuit of stronger bilateral ties. This report discusses the national security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s.
China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues
Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Skeptics question whether China's cooperation in weapons nonproliferation has warranted President Bush's pursuit of stronger bilateral ties. This report discusses the national security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s.
Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and Issues for Congress
This report discusses the Deepwater program, which is a 20- to 25-year acquisition effort to replace or modernize 93 aging Coast Guard ships and 207 aging Coast Guard aircraft. The program’s estimated total acquisition cost is $19 billion to $24 billion. On March 25, 2005 the Coast Guard submitted to Congress a revised implementation plan for the program that alters the planned capabilities and numbers of Deepwater assets and the schedule for acquiring or modernizing them. Some Members of Congress have criticized the revised implementation plan. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2006 budget requests $966 million for the program.
Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Deepwater program is a $24-billion, 25-year acquisition program to replace or modernize 93 Coast Guard ships and 207 Coast Guard aircraft. The Coast Guard’s FY2006 budget requests $966 million for the program. Some Members of Congress have strongly criticized the Deepwater program on several grounds. The House version of H.R. 2360, the FY2006 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations bill, reduces the FY2006 Deepwater funding request to $500 million; the Senate version reduces it to $905.6 million.
Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Deepwater program is a $24 billion, 25-year acquisition program to replace or modernize 93 Coast Guard ships and 207 Coast Guard aircraft. The Coast Guard's FY2007 budget requests $934.431 million for the program. Some Members of Congress have criticized and expressed strong concerns over the Deepwater program on several grounds. The House-reported version of H.R. 5441, the FY2007 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations bill, recommends $892.64 million for the Deepwater program.
Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Deepwater program is a $24-billion, 25-year acquisition program to replace or modernize 93 Coast Guard ships and 207 Coast Guard aircraft. The Coast Guard’s FY2006 budget requests $966 million for the program. Some Members of Congress have strongly criticized the Deepwater program on several grounds. The House version of H.R. 2360, the FY2006 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations bill, reduces the FY2006 Deepwater funding request to $500 million; the Senate version reduces it to $905.6 million.
Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The Deepwater program is a $24-billion, 25-year acquisition program to replace or modernize 93 Coast Guard ships and 207 Coast Guard aircraft. The Coast Guard’s FY2006 budget requests $966 million for the program. Some Members of Congress have strongly criticized the Deepwater program on several grounds. The House version of H.R. 2360, the FY2006 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations bill, reduces the FY2006 Deepwater funding request to $500 million; the Senate version reduces it to $905.6 million.
Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications
In March 2005, the Bush Administration announced a willingness to resume sales of F-16 combat aircraft to Pakistan. Potential sales to India are also being considered. These potential sales have political, military, and defense industrial base implications for the United States and the South Asia region. H.R. 1553 and S. 12 would impose nonproliferation conditions on these sales.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pros and Cons
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban all nuclear explosions. President Clinton signed it in 1996 and transmitted it to the Senate in 1997. The Senate rejected it in 1999. To enter into force, 44 named nations, including the United States, must ratify the treaty. The Bush Administration opposes ratification but has maintained a moratorium on nuclear testing begun in 1992. This report presents pros and cons of key arguments: the treaty’s implications for nuclear nonproliferation, for maintaining and developing nuclear weapons, for the value of nuclear weapons, and for maintaining U.S. nuclear advantage; monitoring issues; and potential consequences of resuming testing.
Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997-2004
This report is prepared annually to provide unclassified quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. The data in the report illustrate how global patterns of conventional arms transfers have changed in the post-Cold War and post-Persian Gulf War years.
Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress
This report provides an overview of the Administration’s rationale for the possible deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles. It then reviews the Air Force and Navy efforts to develop these systems. It summarizes congressional reaction to these proposals, then provides a more detailed account of the issues raised by these concepts and programs.
Cruise Missile Defense
Congress has expressed interest in cruise missile defense for years. Cruise missiles (CMs) are essentially unmanned attack aircraft — vehicles composed of an airframe, propulsion system, guidance system, and weapons payload. The Department of Defense is pursuing several initiatives that seek to improve capabilities against an unpredictable cruise missile threat. These initiatives compete for funding and congressional attention.
Cruise Missile Proliferation
Upon the submission of this report, about 75 countries possessed cruise missiles. Many experts predict that anti — ship and land attack cruise missile proliferation will increase in terms of both scope and technological sophistication.
European Union's Arms Control Regime and Arms Exports to China: Background and Legal Analysis
This report provides detailed background and legal analysis of the nature of the current European Union embargo on arms exports to China. It also provides detailed background on the European Union’s current Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. A strengthened version of the Code would be one of the control mechanisms that would remain should the EU lift the embargo on arms exports to China. This report also gives information on recent EU arms exports authorized for China. It further summarizes U.S. concerns regarding the lifting of the arms embargo, and notes the prospective timing of EU action on the embargo issue.
European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy
Overall, there are two sets of questions for Congress in examining U.S. policy toward the fate of the EU’s arms embargo on China. What are the implications for U.S. interests in trans-Atlantic relations and China? If U.S. interests are adversely affected, what are some options for Congress to discourage the EU from lifting its arms embargo on China and, if it is lifted, to protect U.S. national security interests in both Asia and Europe? Issues raised by these questions are the subject of this CRS Report.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues
This report discusses the background, status, and current issues of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The F-35 JSF, also called the Lighting II, is a new strike fighter being procured in different versions by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The F-35 program is the Department of Defense's (DOD's) largest weapon procurement program in terms of total estimated acquisition cost. This report details the Obama Administration's proposed FY2010 defense budget requests for F-35 program funding and outlines the issues that Congress must consider when deciding whether to approve, reject, or modify the administration's funding requests.
F/A-22 Raptor
The F-22A Raptor is a next-generation fighter/attack aircraft that features the latest stealth technology to reduce detection by radar. Using more advanced engines and avionics than the current F-15 Eagle, the F-22A is intended to maintain U.S. Air Force capabilities against more sophisticated enemy aircraft and air defenses in the 21st century. This report examines the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor program, including costs and schedule; considers several key issues, and concludes with a synopsis of recent legislative activity on the program.
F/A-22 Raptor
The F-22A Raptor is a next-generation fighter/attack aircraft that features the latest stealth technology to reduce detection by radar. Using more advanced engines and avionics than the current F-15 Eagle, the F-22A is intended to maintain U.S. Air Force capabilities against more sophisticated enemy aircraft and air defenses in the 21st century. This report examines the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor program, including costs and schedule; considers several key issues, and concludes with a synopsis of recent legislative activity on the program.
Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border Surveillance
This report examines the strengths and limitations of deploying UAVs along the borders and related issues for Congress
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Status
Until 2005, India and Pakistan were the only states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to declare, openly, their nuclear weapons capability. In 1998, they tested nuclear weapons and since then, deployed ballistic missiles, enunciated nuclear doctrine, and made organizational changes to their nuclear establishments. In 2002, they teetered on the brink of war in Kashmir. This report summarizes Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon capabilities and thinking, and discusses some confidence-building measures in place intended to help avert nuclear war.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs: Issues for Congress
This report discusses congressional concerns regarding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) programs' costs, management, and efficacy and how to best resolve the issues within ISR programs. Updated February 22, 2005.
Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iran’s nuclear program since 2003 have revealed significant undeclared activities with potential applications for nuclear weapons, including uranium enrichment facilities and plutonium separation efforts. Ever on the brink of being declared in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has allowed IAEA inspectors access only when pressed. Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities in exchange for promises of assistance from Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3). Negotiations with the EU-3 are ongoing, although, on August 1, 2005, Iran told the IAEA of its plans to resume uranium conversion, regardless of what the EU-3 offer. This report will be updated as needed.
Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments
Inspections in 2003 and 2004 of Iran’s nuclear program revealed significant undeclared activities with potential applications for nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uncovered two uranium enrichment programs (centrifuges and lasers) and plutonium separation efforts. Iran has been pressured to give up its enrichment and reprocessing activities and has declared twice (November 2003 and November 2004) that it would halt all such activities in exchange for technical cooperation with Germany, France, and the UK. It is not clear whether Iran is buying time for a clandestine program or effectively using its program as a bargaining chip for wider economic gain. Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement in December 2003 but has not yet ratified it. Ever on the brink of being declared in violation of the NPT, Iran has allowed IAEA inspectors access only when pressed. After several months, Iran recently agreed to let inspectors visit a military site: Parchin. This report, which is updated as needed, analyzes the significance of the IAEA’s findings for a possible Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments
Since 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iran’s nuclear program have revealed significant undeclared activities with potential applications for nuclear weapons, including uranium enrichment facilities and plutonium separation efforts. Also since 2003, Iran has been negotiating with Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3) for a wide range of assistance in exchange for a halt to such activities. Yet, most evidence indicates that Iran has never completely suspended its enrichment activities, raising the question of whether Iran is buying time to build nuclear weapons.
Military Aircraft, the F/A-18EF Super Hornet Program: Background and Issues for Congress
The decision to undertake the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program was made during a period of great turbulence in Navy aviation modernization. During this time frame, the Navy struggled to identify and implement the best way to modernize its aging fleet of F-14 fighters and A-6E attack aircraft. The A-12 program (a stealthy replacement to the A-6E) was terminated in January 1991. The AFX program, another proposed replacement for the A-6E, began in 1991 but was also terminated.
The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress
The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction cost of $128 million, will be the The first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization are unclear, as conflicting the information has been provided during each of the past three budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include funding for the construction of the NBACC facility, transparency of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
Navy Aircraft Carriers: Proposed Retirement of USS John F. Kennedy - Issues and Options for Congress
The Navy’s FY2006 budget proposes retiring the conventionally powered aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in FY2006 and reducing the size of the carrier force from 12 ships to 11. The Kennedy is homeported in Mayport, FL. The proposal would not retire any other ships or any carrier air wings. Prior to this proposal, the Navy’s plan was to maintain a 12-carrier force and keep the Kennedy in operation until 2018. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the proposal to retire the Kennedy and reduce the carrier force to 11 ships.
Navy Aircraft Carriers: Proposed Retirement of USS John F. Kennedy - Issues and Options for Congress
The Navy’s FY2006 budget proposes retiring the conventionally powered aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in FY2006 and reducing the size of the carrier force from 12 ships to 11. The Kennedy is homeported in Mayport, FL. The proposal would not retire any other ships or any carrier air wings. Prior to this proposal, the Navy’s plan was to maintain a 12-carrier force and keep the Kennedy in operation until 2018. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the proposal to retire the Kennedy and reduce the carrier force to 11 ships.
Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy Force Architecture and Ship Acquisition: Selected FY2006 Issues for Congress
This report is based on CRS testimony at a March 10, 2005, hearing on Navy force structure and ship acquisition before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Since February 2003, if not earlier, there has been no current, officially approved, unambiguous plan for the future size and structure of the Navy.
Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy Ship Acquisition: Options for Lower-Cost Ship Designs - Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy Ship Acquisition: Options for Lower-Cost Ship Designs - Issues for Congress
No Description Available.
Navy Ship Acquisition: Options for Lower-Cost Ship Designs - Issues for Congress
Rising procurement costs for Navy ships have recently emerged as a matter of concern for both Navy officials and some Members of Congress who track Navyrelated issues. Combined with constraints on ship-procurement funding, these rising costs have caused the Navy to reduce planned ship procurement rates.
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