This report discusses the U.S. Air Force's intention to acquire a new type of aircraft. The OA-X light attack aircraft is a small, two-seat turboprop airplane designed for operation in relatively permissive environments.
This report discusses the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as the Obama Administration's stated goal of pursuing U.S. ratification of the CTBT, although the Administration has mainly focused on securing Senate consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
This report discusses U.S. military research and development programs related to directed energy (DE) weapons which utilize electromagnetic energy rather than kinetic energy. This report examines the two most prevalent types of DE weapons: High Energy Lasers (HELs) and High Powered Microwaves (HPMs).
This report briefly covers the formal declaration and subsequent destruction of Syria's chemical weapons program. The report also mentions newer allegations of further use of chemical weapons that did not fall under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) ban.
This report discusses the use of chemical weapons (CW). Despite being banned under the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has become a growing international concern in the past several years.
This report provides a brief background about North Korea's announcement that it successfully tested a "hydrogen bomb" (its fourth nuclear test) on January 6, 2016. The official statement also called the device an experimental or "pilot H-bomb."
This report discusses the missile defense program and whether current policy or program direction might change. The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 114-328) made several notable changes that could have significant effects on the direction of U.S. BMD policy and programs.
This report describes the Life Extension Program (LEP), which is meant to replace and maintain aging nuclear warheads. It includes extensive background information, program developments, fiscal year actions from 2006-2009, various policy options and issues, and supplemental information about the topic.
Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fleeting targets” at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. Some concerns that Congress has shown are the Department of Defenses' rationale for the mission, the Air Force's ability to set up the system in a timely manner, and how the new START Treaty between the US and Russia will affect the system.
This report looks at why prompt global strike (PGS) missiles are beneficial to the U.S. and how they can help contribute to a conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) mission.
This report discusses the Future Combat System (FCS), which was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts.
Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This report provides an overview of the rationale for the PGS mission and the possible deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles in support of this mission. It then reviews the Air Force and Navy efforts to develop these systems. It summarizes congressional reaction to these proposals, then provides a more detailed account of the issues raised by these concepts and programs.
This report describes the Life Extension Program (LEP), difficulties ascribed to it by its critics, and their responses; shows how changed post-Cold War constraints might open opportunities to improve long-term warhead maintenance and reach other goals; describes the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and its pros and cons; tracks RRW program developments and congressional action on budget requests; and presents options and issues for Congress.
Some observers have proposed procuring Navy ships using incremental funding or advance appropriations rather than the traditional full funding approach that has been used to procure most Navy ships. Supporters believe these alternative funding approaches could increase stability in Navy shipbuilding plans and perhaps increase the number of Navy ships that could be built for a given total amount of ship-procurement funding. The issue for the 109th Congress is whether to maintain or change current practices for funding Navy ship procurement. Congress's decision could be significant because the full funding policy relates to Congress's power of the purse and its responsibility for conducting oversight of defense programs.
Some observers have proposed procuring Navy ships using incremental funding or advance appropriations rather than the traditional full funding approach that has been used to procure most Navy ships. Supporters believe these alternative funding approaches could increase stability in Navy shipbuilding plans and perhaps increase the number of Navy ships that could be built for a given total amount of ship-procurement funding. The issue for the 109th Congress is whether to maintain or change current practices for funding Navy ship procurement. Congress's decision could be significant because the full funding policy relates to Congress's power of the purse and its responsibility for conducting oversight of defense programs.
This report provides background information and discusses issues for Congress regarding the use of electric-drive propulsion technology (as opposed to traditional mechanical-drive technology) on U.S. Navy ships. As a result of technological developments over the last few years, electric-drive technology has matured to the point where the Navy has selected it for use on its planned next-generation DD-21 land-attack destroyer and is considering it for use on other kinds of Navy ships as well.
Among airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconaissance (ISR) platforms, the U-2 Dragon Lady and the RQ-4A Global Hawk are especially valuable. This report discusses how best to use existing and planned manned and unmanned ISR aircraft to most effectively satisfy the Department of Defense's (Dod) requirements for timely and accurate information on enemy forces.
This report examines the major, foreign conventional weapon systems that China has acquired or has committed to acquire since 1990, with particular attention to implications for U.S. security concerns. It is not the assumption of this report that China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), will engage in conflict with other forces in Asia. Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing concern about China’s assertiveness in Asia and greater threats against Taiwan.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of Iran’s nuclear program since 2003 have revealed significant undeclared activities with potential applications for nuclear weapons, including uranium enrichment facilities and plutonium separation efforts. Ever on the brink of being declared in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has allowed IAEA inspectors access only when pressed. Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities in exchange for promises of assistance from Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3). Negotiations with the EU-3 are ongoing, although, on August 1, 2005, Iran told the IAEA of its plans to resume uranium conversion, regardless of what the EU-3 offer. This report will be updated as needed.
This report examines the major, foreign conventional weapon systems that China has acquired or has committed to acquire since 1990, with particular attention to implications for U.S. security concerns. It is not the assumption of this report that China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), will engage in conflict with other forces in Asia. Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing concern about China’s assertiveness in Asia and greater threats against Taiwan.
Inspections in 2003 and 2004 of Iran’s nuclear program revealed significant undeclared activities with potential applications for nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uncovered two uranium enrichment programs (centrifuges and lasers) and plutonium separation efforts. Iran has been pressured to give up its enrichment and reprocessing activities and has declared twice (November 2003 and November 2004) that it would halt all such activities in exchange for technical cooperation with Germany, France, and the UK. It is not clear whether Iran is buying time for a clandestine program or effectively using its program as a bargaining chip for wider economic gain. Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement in December 2003 but has not yet ratified it. Ever on the brink of being declared in violation of the NPT, Iran has allowed IAEA inspectors access only when pressed. After several months, Iran recently agreed to let inspectors visit a military site: Parchin. This report, which is updated as needed, analyzes the significance of the IAEA’s findings for a possible Iranian nuclear weapons program.
This report examines various issues regard Iran and its nuclear program.International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed two decades’ worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in negotiations with Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3), which broke down in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement and reported Iran’s case to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. The Security Council called upon Iran to resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued its enrichment activities, failing to meet deadline after deadline. The Security Council passed UNSCR 1696 on July 31, 2006, and on December 23, 2006, the Security Council adopted limited sanctions under UNSCR 1737. The next deadline is February 23, 2007.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. The Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in February -- reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and failed to meet the Security Council's request.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. The Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in February -- reinstate its suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and failed to meet the Security Council's request.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed almost two decades' worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. The Security Council called upon Iran to take steps requested of it by the IAEA Board in February -- resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran has continued enrichment activities and failed to meet the Security Council's request.
Many potential biological terrorism agents lack available countermeasures. President Bush proposed Project BioShield to address this need and signed into law on July 21, 2004 S. 15 (The Project BioShield Act of 2004). The main provisions of this law include (1) relaxing procedures for bioterrorism-related procurement, hiring, and awarding of research grants; (2) guaranteeing a federal government market for new biomedical countermeasures; and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved countermeasures.
This report provides an overview of the Administration’s rationale for the possible deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles. It then reviews the Air Force and Navy efforts to develop these systems. It summarizes congressional reaction to these proposals, then provides a more detailed account of the issues raised by these concepts and programs.
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