Congressional Research Service Reports - 28 Matching Results
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- Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Russia: Statutory Procedures for Congressional Consideration and Their Implementation
- This report sketches the procedures prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) for congressional action in relation to nuclear cooperation agreements, then summarizes legislative proceedings occurring in relation to the proposed agreement with Russia, beginning with its recent submission. It also addresses several questions regarding the implementation and intent of these statutory requirements related to the proposed agreement with the Russian Federation. Special attention is given to the definition of "days of continuous session" and possible implications of this definition depending on whether or not the requisite period ends before the end of the 110th Congress.
- Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Russia: Statutory Procedures for Congressional Consideration and Their Implementation
- This report sketches the procedures prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) for congressional action in relation to agreements of this kind.
- Yellow Rain and Related Issues: Implications for the United States
- The United States has charged that the Soviet Union is implicated in the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and of chemical and toxin weapons, including the toxin known as "Yellow Rain," in Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia). These charges raise two significant sets of issues: First, issues surrounding the evidence that has been presented to show: (a) that such weapons have been used and (b) that the Soviet Union is implicated in this use. Second, issues connected with the implications of Soviet involvement, if proven, in chemical and toxin warfare.
- Enlargement in Central Europe
- In December 1994, NATO members will begin the process of debating possible criteria for new members from Central Europe. Alliance relations with Russia will be a central factor determining the outcome of the debate.
- Partnership for Peace
- NATO's Partnership for Peace program seeks to encourage eligible states, above all the states of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union, to build democracy and undertake greater responsibilities in international security. The program could open the door to, but does not promise, NATO membership. U.S. and NATO relations with Russia are likely to be the determining factor in deciding whether states move from Partnership to NATO membership.
- The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)
- This report discusses the increasing international pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear program and how that pressure discourages foreign firms from investing in Iran's energy sector, hindering Iran's efforts to expand oil production. This report discusses the history and progress of the formal U.S. effort to curb energy investment in Iran, which began with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in 1996. This report also discusses U.S. concerns that other nations, e.g., U.S. allies, Russia, and China, are not as strict with their economic sanctions against Iran, and how U.S. policymakers are combating this reticence with various pieces of legislation.
- Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response
- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has raised a number of serious issues and choices for the United States. The train of events seem likely to have an important influence on overall American foreign policy in the 1980s. Reassessment of Soviet motives and of U.S. roles in the world are already in progress. Emerging American attitudes, in turn, will shape more specific policy decisions on several issues, which this issue brief discusses.
- Democracy in Russia: Trends and Implications for U.S. Interests
- U.S. attention has focused on Russia's fitful democratization since Russia emerged in 1991 from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many observers have argued that a democratic Russia with free markets would be a cooperative bilateral and multilateral partner rather than an insular and hostile national security threat. President Putin's 2004 proposal to restructure the government has been supported by international observers. The U.S. Administration and Congress have welcomed some cooperation with Russia on vital U.S. national security concerns, including the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among other issues.
- Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy
- This report looks at the Russia's revamping of the armed forces that it inherited from the Soviet Union. It discusses the revamping process as well as the new armed forces' relationship with the U.S.
- U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
- The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. This report discusses key policy issues related to that agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation and Russia's policies toward Iran.
- U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
- This report discusses key policy issues related to the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement signed by the United States and Russia on May 6, 2008, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russia's policies toward Iran. These issues were relevant to the debate when the agreement was being considered in the 110th Congress.
- U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
- This report discusses key policy issues related to a nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Russia signed on May 6, 2008, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russia's policies toward Iran.
- U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
- The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. This report discusses key policy issues related to that agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation and Russia's policies toward Iran.
- U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
- The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. The agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration by President George W. Bush on September 8, 2008, in response to Russia's military actions in Georgia. President Obama transmitted the proposed text of the agreement to Congress on May 10, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. This report discusses key policy issues related to the agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russian policies toward Iran.
- U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
- The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. This report discusses key policy issues related to that agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation and Russia's policies toward Iran.
- U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress
- The United States and Russia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on May 6, 2008. President Bush submitted the agreement to Congress on May 13. This report discusses key policy issues related to that agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russia's policies toward Iran.
- NATO Enlargement and Russia
- No Description Available.
- Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Unilateral vs. Bilateral Reductions
- This report discusses changing U.S. policy and priorities in regards to arms control. The report compares the various strengths and weaknesses of unilateral and bilateral approaches to arms reduction.
- Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control
- This report reviews some of the monitoring and verification provisions in the new START Treaty between the U.S. and Russia and compares these with some of the provisions in the original START Treaty. It focuses, specifically, on differences between the treaties in the provisions governing the exchange of data, known as telemetry, generated during missile flight tests; provisions governing the monitoring of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); and differences in the numbers and types of on-site inspections.
- The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
- The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty - known as New START - on April 8, 2010. This treaty is designed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009. This report provides an overview of New START, including a comparison to the original START Treaty, the belief of the Obama Administration and outside analysts that New START will enhance U.S. national security, and the criticisms of those who say that New START (and, indeed, the entire issue of U.S.-Russian arms control) is a distraction from more important items on the nonproliferation agenda.
- The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
- This report discusses the new START treaty between the U.S. and Russia that limits each countries number of ballistic missiles and nuclear capable bombers. This treaty came into effect on February 5, 2011 and is a replacement for the original START treaty implemented in 1991. This report covers the treaties main rules and regulations, the ratification process, compliance assessment, and issues for Congress.
- The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
- The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty - known as New START - on April 8, 2010. This treaty is designed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009. This report provides an overview of New START, including a comparison to the original START Treaty, the belief of the Obama Administration and outside analysts that New START will enhance U.S. national security, and the criticisms of those who say that New START (and, indeed, the entire issue of U.S.-Russian arms control) is a distraction from more important items on the nonproliferation agenda.
- The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
- The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty - known as New START - on April 8, 2010. This treaty is designed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009. This report provides an overview of New START, including a comparison to the original START Treaty, the belief of the Obama Administration and outside analysts that New START will enhance U.S. national security, and the criticisms of those who say that New START (and, indeed, the entire issue of U.S.-Russian arms control) is a distraction from more important items on the nonproliferation agenda.
- The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions
- The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty - known as New START - on April 8, 2010. This treaty is designed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009. This report provides an overview of New START, including a comparison to the original START Treaty, the belief of the Obama Administration and outside analysts that New START will enhance U.S. national security, and the criticisms of those who say that New START (and, indeed, the entire issue of U.S.-Russian arms control) is a distraction from more important items on the nonproliferation agenda.
- Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union
- Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. It has evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups, to a global program to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.
- Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
- On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Treaty of Moscow) that will reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. Russia convinced the United States to sign a legally binding treaty, but the United States rejected any limits and counting rules that would require the elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads removed from service. It wanted the flexibility to reduce its forces at its own pace, and to restore warheads to deployed forces if conditions warranted. Russian officials have hailed the success of Russia's diplomacy in convincing the United States to sign a legally binding Treaty that casts Russia as an equal partner in the arms control process.
- Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
- This report is on Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.
- The Interim Agreement Between the United States pf America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: A Brief Pro-Con Discussion
- This report discusses the pros and cons of the 1972 interim agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to limit strategic offensive arms in their respective countries.