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Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process
This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the re-transfer to third party states of such military items.
Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process
This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the re-transfer to third party nations of such military items.
Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process
This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the re-transfer to third party nations of such military items.
Army Future Combat System (FCS) "Spin- Outs" and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and Issues for Congress
This report discusses the Future Combat System (FCS), which was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts.
The Army's Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress
This report describes the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems linked by an extensive communications and information network. This report describes the proposed restructuring of the FCS program, announced by Secretary of Defense Gates in April 2009, which includes modernizing outdated equipment and re-evaluating vehicle design strategy. This report will be superseded by a report on the Army's BCT (Brigade Combat Team) Modernization Strategy when sufficient details are available.
The Army's Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress
This report describes the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems linked by an extensive communications and information network.
The Army's Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress
This report describes the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems linked by an extensive communications and information network. This report describes the proposed restructuring of the FCS program, announced by Secretary of Defense Gates in April 2009, which includes modernizing outdated equipment and re-evaluating vehicle design strategy.
The Army's Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress
This report describes the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems linked by an extensive communications and information network.
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Report that looks at budget requests for the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program, Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, and brigade combat teams (BCTs). It ends with a discussion of potential issues for Congress.
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
This report looks at budget requests for the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program, Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, and brigade combat teams (BCTs). It ends with a discussion of potential issues for Congress.
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
This report looks at budget requests for the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program, Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, and brigade combat teams (BCTs). It ends with a discussion of potential issues for Congress.
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
This report looks at the history and current need for a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. Potential issues for Congress include the role of the GCV and the need for the program in a downsized Army that will likely have fewer heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs).
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Report that looks at the history and current need for a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. Potential issues for Congress include the role and need for the GCV in a downsized Army that will likely have fewer heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs).
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
This report looks at the history and current need for a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. Potential issues for Congress include the role and need for the GCV in a downsized Army that will likely have fewer heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs).
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
This report examines the history and current need for a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. Potential issues for Congress include the role and need for the GCV in a downsized Army that will likely have fewer heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs).
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
This report looks at the history and current need for a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. Potential issues for Congress include the role and need for the GCV in a downsized Army that will likely have fewer heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs).
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
This report looks at the history and current need for a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. Potential issues for Congress include the role and need for the GCV in a downsized Army that will likely have fewer heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs).
The Army's M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress
This report discusses various issues surrounding the M-1 Abrams Tank, the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), and the M-1126 Stryker Combat Vehicle, centerpieces of the Army's Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs).
The Army's M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress
This report discusses various issues surrounding the M-1 Abrams Tank, the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), and the M-1126 Stryker Combat Vehicle, centerpieces of the Army's Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). Congress is concerned with the long-term military effectiveness of these vehicles.
The Army's M-4 Carbine: Background and Issues for Congress
This report discusses possible replacements for the M-4 carbine, most notably the Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR). This report also details results of studies and tests of the M-4 and feedback response from potential competitors.
The Army's M-4 Carbine: Background and Issues for Congress
The M-4 carbine is the Army's primary individual combat weapon for infantry units. Due to the nature of the M-4's design, firing it can lead to weapons malfunctions. This report discusses possible replacements for the M-4, most notably the Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle (SCAR). This report also details results of studies and tests of the M-4 and feedback response from potential competitors.
The Assault Weapons Ban: Review of Federal Laws Controlling Possessions of Certain Firearms
This report reviews the 1994 assault weapons ban, which is effective for ten years on 19 types of semiautomatic assault weapons. The Act builds upon a 60-year history of federal regulation of firearms. The report also summarizes the pre-1994 federal gun control laws, analyzes the major cases relating to constitutional and statutory challenges to these laws, and reviews judicial and legislative developments since enactment of the ban.
Assessing the Options for Preserving ICBM Survivability
The decision on how to redress the perceived vulnerability of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) is the most controversial strategic nuclear weapon decision now facing the 97th Congress. A full-scale debate on this issue, especially as regards MX missile basing, seems certain. To assist Members of Congress in the debate, this paper discusses nine proposals for treating ICBM survivability: Recognize that ICBMs are invulnerable, rely only on bombers and submarines for deterrence, deploy a large or scaled-down shell-game multiple shelter system, defend MX with anti ballistic missiles, launch ICBMs on warning of attack, deploy MX on aircraft or small submarines, and diversify strategic forces, perhaps using small ICBMs.
Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition
This report presents background information and discusses potential issues for Congress relating to U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. These efforts pose several potential policy, funding, and oversight issues for Congress. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could affect U.S. defense funding requirements and military capabilities, and U.S. relations with countries in the Asia Pacific region, including China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Australia.
Biological and Chemical Weapons: Criminal Sanctions and Federal Regulations
Various federal regulations and criminal sanctions apply to biological and chemical weapons. Some of the provisions are broadly drafted, covering biological and chemical weapons as well as other controlled material and technology. Some focus on biological and chemical weapons as such. Recent anti-terrorism legislation, Public Law 107-56, amended many of these provisions, broadening the scope criminal sanctions relating to the use of biological and chemical weapons and materials. This report outlines provisions criminalizing certain uses of biological and chemical weapons, and references other relevant domestic and international material.
Bioterrorism Countermeasure Development: Issues in Patents and Homeland Security
In the 109th Congress, several bills have been introduced, including S. 3, the Protecting America in the War on Terror Act, and S. 975, the Project Bioshield II Act, that would generate additional incentives for the creation of new technologies to counteract potential biological threats. These bills propose reforms to current policies and practices associated with intellectual property, particularly patents, and the marketing of pharmaceuticals and related products. This report includes patents and innovation, the role of patents in pharmaceutical/biomedical R&D, legislative developments and proposals for change.
Bioterrorism Countermeasure Development: Issues in Patents and Homeland Security
Congressional interest in the development of bioterrorism countermeasures remains strong, even after passage of legislation establishing Project BioShield. In the 109th Congress, several bills have been introduced, including S. 3, the Protecting America in the War on Terror Act, S. 975, the Project Bioshield II Act, and S. 1873, the Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act, that would generate additional incentives for the creation of new technologies to counteract potential biological threats. These bills propose reforms to current policies and practices associated with intellectual property, particularly patents, and the marketing of pharmaceuticals and related products.
Bomber Options for Replacing B52s
One of the main issues discussed in this report is the replacement of the B-52 bombers, due to the fact that many believe that by 1990, the B-52's vulnerability to improving Soviet air defenses will imperil its effectiveness as a penetrating bomber.
Border Security and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to improve border security is a technique that has garnered congressional attention. This report examines the strengths and limitations of deploying UAVs along the borders and related issues for Congress. This report is not intended to provide in-depth information regarding technical or military capabilities of UAVs, but to discuss their application at the border.
Brazilian Trade Policy and the United States
As the largest and one of the most influential countries in Latin America, Brazil has emerged as a leading voice for developing countries in setting regional and multilateral trade agendas. Brazil is critical of U.S. trade policies such as the Byrd Amendment (repealed, but program in effect until October 1, 2007), which directs duties from trade remedy cases to affected industries, the administration of trade remedy rules, and what it considers to be discriminatory treatment in the U.S. expansion of free trade agreements in Latin America. Despite the differences, both countries recognize the potential for important gains to be had from mutually acceptable trade liberalization at all levels.
"Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005 and FY2006
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program has been the most controversial nuclear weapon program in Congress for the last several years. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply buried targets (such as leadership bunkers) in countries of concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations; critics assert that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. This report presents a brief technical background on RNEP, then discusses the history of RNEP in Congress and the Administration for the FY2005 and FY2006 budget cycles.
"Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005 and FY2006
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program has been the most controversial nuclear weapon program in Congress for the last several years. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply buried targets (such as leadership bunkers) in countries of concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations; critics assert that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. This report presents a brief technical background on RNEP, then discusses the history of RNEP in Congress and the Administration for the FY2005 and FY2006 budget cycles.
"Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005 and FY2006
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program has been the most controversial nuclear weapon program in Congress for the last several years. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply buried targets (such as leadership bunkers) in countries of concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations; critics assert that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. This report presents a brief technical background on RNEP, then discusses the history of RNEP in Congress and the Administration for the FY2005 and FY2006 budget cycles.
"Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, FY2005-FY2007
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program has been the most controversial nuclear weapon program in Congress for the last several years. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and deeply buried targets (such as leadership bunkers) in countries of concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations; critics assert that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and prompt other nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. This report presents a brief technical background on RNEP, then discusses the history of RNEP in Congress and the Administration for the FY2005 and FY2006 budget cycles.
"Bunker Busters": Sources of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Debate
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), often called a “bunker buster,” is at present the subject of a cost and feasibility study to determine if either of two nuclear bombs, the B61 and the B83, could be modified, mainly by adding a heavy, pointed case, so as to be able to penetrate perhaps 10 meters into earth or rock. This penetration would increase the weapon’s ability, by a factor of 20 to 50, to destroy hardened and deeply buried facilities. The RNEP debate has received much attention and spawned much confusion. This report examines sources of confusion in this debate.
"Bunker Busters": Sources of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Debate
Earth penetrator weapons, often called “bunker busters,” burrow into the ground some tens of feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried targets. The United States has several types of conventional earth penetrators. The Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). The FY2005 defense authorization act contained the full RNEP request, $27.6 million. This report explains the budget request and provides details on the RNEP plan.
C-17 Cargo Aircraft Program
The C-17 Globemaster III is a long-range cargo/transport aircraft operated by the U.S. Air Force since 1993. Congress approved development of the aircraft in the late 1970s, when it was recognized that the Air Force did not have enough airlift capability. In 1981, the McDonnell Douglas C-17 emerged as winner of a competition with Boeing and Lockheed to develop a next-generation aircraft to replace C-130s and C-141s.
Chemical Warfare: A Primer on Agents, Munitions, and Defensive Measures
The recent Department of Defense proposal to develop a capability to modernize and expand the current U.S. chemical warfare munition stocks with binary nerve agent munitions has focused attention on the subject of chemical warfare. This paper provides a brief introductory discussion of modern chemical warfare, describing the types of agents, delivery methods, and defense against chemical agents. It does not discuss policy, strategy, tactics, or disarmament aspects of chemical warfare. These issues w i l l be covered i n CRS Issue Brief IB 8l08l .
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention's implementation. Chemical Weapons Convention implementing legislation, as S. 610, passed the Senate unanimously on May 23, 1997. This legislation, which was an amendment in the nature of a substitute reported from the Judiciary Committee, provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the Convention's provisions. It sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention's implementation. Chemical Weapons Convention implementing legislation, as S. 610, passed the Senate unanimously on May 23, 1997. This legislation, which was an amendment in the nature of a substitute reported from the Judiciary Committee, provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the Convention's provisions. It sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC’s deadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC’s deadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC’s deadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC’s deadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC’s deadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC’s deadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention's implementation. Chemical Weapons Convention implementing legislation, as S. 610, passed the Senate unanimously on May 23, 1997. This legislation, which was an amendment in the nature of a substitute reported from the Judiciary Committee, provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the Convention's provisions. It sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention's implementation. Chemical Weapons Convention implementing legislation, as S. 610, passed the Senate unanimously on May 23, 1997. This legislation, which was an amendment in the nature of a substitute reported from the Judiciary Committee, provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the Convention's provisions. It sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC’s deadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress
The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention's implementation. Chemical Weapons Convention implementing legislation, as S. 610, passed the Senate unanimously on May 23, 1997. This legislation, which was an amendment in the nature of a substitute reported from the Judiciary Committee, provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the Convention's provisions. It sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons.
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