NEGOTIATION, COMMUNICATION, AND DECISION STRATEGIES

USED BY HOSTAGE/CRISIS NEGOTIATORS

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While dealing with hostage takers, hostage/crisis negotiators use either a negotiation process or police rescue team intervention. Negotiators use negotiation as a primary technique or as a part of the overall strategy depending on the factors affecting and constructing hostage negotiation resolutions. Negotiators usually look at the behavioral, criminal, and psychological distinctiveness of the hostage takers involved in the situations to decide whether they should be handled as instrumental or expressive. Looking at the negotiation process from the interactive and communicative perspective also helps the negotiators determine what kind of dynamic activities, communication skills and negotiation tools should be used while responding to hostage situations. By doing this, the negotiators build trust and rapport with the hostage takers, enabling the negotiators to gather greater quantities of useful information about the hostage takers and thereby are able to determine the appropriate negotiation, communication, and decision strategies.

By conducting this theory-based empirical study, gathering data from working negotiators in the US and Canada, I have determined what primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools are used by hostage/crisis negotiators. I have determined that negotiators implement their negotiation and decision strategies differently depending on whether the situations they deal with are instrumental or expressive. I have determined which elements of negotiations and factors affecting negotiations differ while handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations. I found that the collected data did not reveal any significant relationship between handling instrumental/expressive hostage situations

differently and belief in the elements of Brenda Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories. I have also determined that the belief in the elements of the Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories is workable and practical for negotiators to use.

Based on the above findings, the model suggested by this research adds the elements and directives of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's models to the common approach used by the negotiators. This revised model suggests that the negotiators pay attention to the dynamics of the interactions presented between the two parties: the negotiators themselves and hostage takers. The revised model also recommends that the negotiators focus on not only the hostage takers behavioral characteristics, psychological conditions, and criminal history but also on the meaning of the sent message and the interaction itself as performed between the two parties. This perspective enables the negotiators to look at the negotiation process as information and communication process. We are not ignoring the fact that hostage negotiation is a format of extreme information management. By looking at such an extreme case, we can add to our understanding of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's perspectives in order to see the hostage negotiation process from a wider perspective.

The revised model is not an alternative approach to the common approach most negotiators use. Instead, the revised model uses the perspective and directives of the common approach and extends its meaning and content by also focusing on Dervin's sense making theory and Shannon-Weaver's communication model perspectives. The use of the perspective of this revised model is one more tool for the negotiators to use in order to promote new ways of looking at hostage negotiation resolutions.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the problem statement, research objectives, research questions, scale creation, and hypotheses as well as give an overview of the following chapters in the study. Since each police department might use different terminology in order to describe their activities in dealing with hostage situations, the most commonly used terms and concepts throughout this study are defined. The purpose of defining the most used terms and concepts is to make clearer the key concepts of the argument in the study.

Problem Statement

Police agencies worldwide confront a number of hostage situations every year. They deal with hostage takers through either negotiation practice of hostage/crisis negotiators or tactical team intervention of police tactical units. The aim of both applications is the same; to save the lives of hostages. The police initially use all available communication tools and a full range of negotiation strategies and practices to attempt to resolve hostage situations. If verbal negotiation does not work to resolve hostage situations, the police use tactical team interventions. Today the police understand how valuable the negotiation strategy and practice is in saving the lives of hostages. Most reliable and effective negotiation strategies and techniques are determined through the research studies based on cooperation and collaboration between the police and scholars. However, I observed through the literature review during this study that there are very few research studies within the field of hostage negotiations.

Wilson revealed that there are very few research studies on hostage situations for two primary reasons. First, there are so many activities going on in hostage situations that it's

difficult for scholars to track all of them; the scholars must interact with numerous parties involved in hostage situations after these situations have ended if they want to get information. Second, there are countless research questions and interests/issues that should be answered by the scholars through empirical research studies in the field (Wilson, 2000). The scholars face a variety of difficulties and challenges while implementing empirical research studies within the field of hostage negotiations. Research studies within this field might be limited because of certain environmental dangers and difficulties.

As a point of self-disclosure and as a matter relevant to the construction and analysis of the research, it should be noted that I am an officer in the Turkish National Police with 13 years of training and experience. Although some reliable books, articles, and course manuals written by retired negotiators exist, there are few scholarly sources in the field of hostage negotiation resolutions. There are very few research studies concerning the primary factors and activities affecting the negotiation strategies and decision making of hostage/crisis negotiators in both instrumental (terrorist, criminal, and/or inmate) and expressive (emotionally disturbed and/or mentally ill hostage takers) hostage situations. If the negotiators are taught about the factors and activities that affect their negotiation strategies and decision making during hostage situations, they are more likely to be affective in determining the best negotiation strategy and practice in response to hostage situations.

In order to make valuable contributions to the negotiation strategies and decision making of the negotiators, I aimed to address several research interests and issues mentioned above. The utilization of communication skills, negotiation tools, and dynamic activities used by the negotiators while implementing negotiation strategy in hostage situations are discussed. This section specifically addresses the first research question.

I also explored what elements of negotiation strategy differ in instrumental and expressive hostage situations as well as the factors affecting the negotiation and decision strategies of the negotiators in both instrumental and expressive hostage situations. This section specifically addresses the second research question.

Lastly, the directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories are analyzed to discern whether they are workable as a framework for negotiation strategy of the negotiators in the field of hostage negotiations. I am not testing and/or measuring those two theories, but instead trying to explore if the general concepts and elements of the two theories fit with the current use of negotiation strategy of the negotiators in saving lives of hostages. I also measured if the negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories has an impact on handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. This addresses the negotiators' belief in the two theories affects on negotiation strategy. This section specifically addresses the third research question.

Research Objectives

The goals of this research study are to make valuable contributions to the negotiators' negotiation strategies and to make practical recommendations to the police agencies as well as to scholars and researchers for their future research studies. It can be revealed that there are primary and secondary research objectives in this study.

Primary Objectives

With the inquiry into the research questions in this study, the nature of negotiation resolutions and the factors affecting negotiation strategies and decision making of the negotiators are examined more effectively to create a model of communication theory-based negotiation in

order to end hostage situations peacefully. There are three primary objectives, and each objective is addressed by one of the research questions in this study:

- To identify how negotiation strategy and practice is implemented by the negotiators in hostage situations

- To examine the elements and factors affecting and constructing hostage negotiations in instrumental and expressive hostage situations

- To examine if the negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories has an impact on handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently and to gauge the level of effectiveness of the two theories in the field of hostage negotiation resolutions.

The three objectives are addressed by each research question. The goals are to establish a model of communication theory-based negotiation for the negotiators, and to determine if the negotiators would validate this model to use it in all types of hostage situations.

Secondary Objectives

Every hostage situation is unique because every hostage situation has different demands, deadlines, motivations, and of course police applications and resolutions. Every hostage situation also has its own difficulties and dangers. Therefore, each hostage situation is evaluated by its own unique characteristics. Each situation requires a different strategy and practice based on its own unique conditions and characteristics. Formulating negotiation strategies, however, might help the negotiators make decisions about what to do and how to do it while dealing with hostage takers. The unified and consolidated negotiation resolutions increase the credibility of the police and can only be earned through well programmed training schedules and manuals. These

manuals should be prepared as a result of the research studies, and be based on cooperation and

collaboration between the police and scholars.

The negotiators study different aspects of hostage negotiation resolutions and perform

their abilities in training courses. They are also able to improve their communication skills

through training. Consequently, I recommend a rigorously prepared two-week negotiator course

schedule. The manual of this course schedule is the dissertation itself for the negotiators

attending this recommended two-week negotiator training. The goals of this are to make valuable

contributions to the negotiation and decision strategies of the negotiators and to make them

understand the need for negotiator training because, as stated in the second chapter, using

negotiation is a special task that should be performed only by well-trained negotiators.

Significance of the Study

I am a member of the hostage/crisis negotiator community; therefore, I am aware that the

police lack empirical research studies to enhance their negotiation techniques and strategies,

despite the fact that they deal with a number of hostage situations every year. As stated several

times throughout this study, there are not many academic studies within the field of hostage

negotiation resolutions because many researchers are not interested in researching this field. The

reason is that if they are interested in researching the field, they would have to be involved in a

number of interactions and activities with the parties involved in hostage situations in order to

conduct their studies. Often their involvement would be limited because of the dangers,

difficulties, and challenges in hostage situation environments.

In addition, there are not many databases that compile information in the field of

negotiation resolutions for the researchers to study. There have been some individual enterprises

that have collected data, but they are very limited in making significant contributions to the

police studies. Lipetsker points out that the HOBAS is a database formulated by the FBI of nationwide hostage and barricade situations. Some scholars have also created their own databases by collecting data about hostage situations (Lipetsker, 2004), such as *(1) the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events Database, ITERATE, (2) the database of Friedland and Merari, (3) the Hostage Event Analytic Database, HEAD, and (4) the database of Feldman.* The negotiators can learn from these databases by evaluating the situations which occurred in the past (Call, 2003). As mentioned before, the databases are either very few or too limited for scholars to utilize them to study the field of hostage negotiations. Lastly, although the police have records on past hostage situations, they may not be willing to share them with other parties, including researchers and scholars.

If reliable database studies were made by scholars and researchers, it would help them create new rules, guidelines, and policies in dealing with hostage takers. To promote new standards for the police, researchers are expected to conduct more empirical research studies to achieve the aims stated above. Strong cooperation and collaboration between the police and researchers is required to improve negotiation resolutions.

I aim to fill this gap in the field by implementing this study which encourages the police and researchers to cooperate and collaborate on studying the field of hostage negotiation resolution. With this study, the nature of negotiation resolutions and the primary factors affecting negotiation strategies and decision making of the negotiators are examined in order to recommend better negotiation strategies. The Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories are measured to see if they are workable as a framework for hostage negotiations. In sum, this study aims to make valuable contributions to the field of hostage negotiations by establishing a model

of negotiation and also to recommend a practical method that will be strengthened with the theoretical aspects of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories.

Research Issues

Although the primary terms and concepts most used throughout this study are defined at the very end of the first chapter, the meanings of the four terms: *(1) hostage/crisis negotiator, (2) hostage situation, (3) instrumental hostage situation, and (4) expressive hostage situation* are discussed once again before giving the research questions in this chapter. The purposes of giving the brief conceptual definitions of these terms are to make clearer the general concept of the research questions, to give a general idea about these primary terms, and to help the reader understand the meaning of these terms precisely while reading the research questions.

Definition of Hostage Situation

In every hostage situation, hostages are held by hostage takers in a place surrounded by command post professionals (Jenkins, Johnson, and Ronfeldt, 1977). Hostages are taken and intimidated by their captors to compel third parties to give into demands (Fuselier, Van Zandt, and Lanceley, 1991). The police use either negotiation or force to save the lives of hostages (Poland and McCrystle, 1999).

A hostage situation includes hostage(s), hostage taker(s), and the police surrendering them. The definition of 'hostage situation' in this study includes hostage situations only. Siege, barricade, suicidal, kidnap, and extortion situations are not included in this definition. The reason is that hostage situations always include the holding of hostages, whereas barricade, siege, suicidal, and extortion situations might not necessarily include the holding of hostages. In some cases, these situations might turn into hostage situations for some reason. As long as they include hostage(s), they are included in the definition of hostage situation in this study.

In some cases, a kidnapping might turn into a hostage situation as well. For instance, if the location of kidnappers is found by the police, then this kidnapping is converted into a hostage situation. Or, if kidnappers are not successful in their abduction, the kidnapping might be unintentionally converted into a hostage situation (Jenkins, Johnson, and Ronfeldt, 1977). The negotiation strategies used in kidnappings are not the same as the ones used in hostage situations. The police are aware of the locations where hostage takers are holding their hostages in hostage situations, so the negotiators initiate and control the negotiation. The police, however, are not aware of the locations where kidnappers are hiding, so the police cannot initiate negotiation in kidnappings. If a kidnap situation turns into a hostage situation, then it is included in the definition of hostage situation in this research study.

Definition of Hostage/Crisis Negotiator

Hostage/crisis negotiators initiate and control negotiation with hostage takers through communication skills and the use of negotiation tools. Negotiation is not a work handled through only one officer's skills and efforts; it is professional negotiation teamwork. There are at least three hostage/crisis negotiators in the chain of command post. There might be the need for more than three negotiators in order to end situations successfully (Noesner, 1999). While the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker, the secondary negotiator is there to assist and support the primary negotiator. The last negotiator serves as the negotiation team leader, who provides coordination between the command post and the negotiation team (Hancerli, 2005).

This team has a second tactical role. In this role, when negotiation does not work to resolve the situations peacefully and use of force is seen as a necessary and acceptable resolution response, the negotiation team attempts to distract the hostage takers by talking to them on the phone. Their objectives are to prevent the hostage takers from hurting the hostages and to put the

hostage takers in a situation in which they are less wary while the tactical team unpredictably implements the use of force (Noesner, 1999). In sum, the negotiation team has two tasks: *(1) initiating and maintaining negotiation practice with hostage takers in order to rescue hostages and/or (2) keeping hostage takers busy and less prepared over the phone while a tactical unit uses force against them.* The second task is only used if the mission requires it.

The definition of hostage/crisis negotiator in this study includes several types, including international, federal, state, local, and county negotiators. This definition also includes not only police negotiators but also correction and sworn negotiators working with the police in response to hostage situations. This study is not interested in involving military hostage/crisis negotiators. Therefore, negotiators, who are police, correction and/or sworn officers, in the US and Canada were selected to be the respondents to the survey questions in this study.

Definition of Instrumental and Expressive Hostage Situations

Hostage takers show instrumental and/or expressive behaviors. Instrumental behaviors are based on clear intention, while expressive behaviors are scattered behaviors of hostage takers (Noesner and Webster, 1997). Criminal, prisoner, and terrorist hostage takers are likely to show instrumental behaviors, whereas mentally ill and emotionally disturbed hostage takers are likely to show expressive behaviors (Gilliland and James, 1997). Well-organized hostage situations are more commonly committed by terrorist and/or criminal hostage takers because they perform their actions based on rational choices (Wilson, 2000). Negotiators use much more rational and concrete communication-based applications while dealing with instrumental hostage takers (Gilliland and James, 1997).

Many hostage situations are committed by expressive hostage takers who might have some difficulties in conveying their messages and thoughts to the negotiators during the

negotiation process. An ex-husband, a fired employee, a jealous boy friend might be good examples for this type of profiling (Noesner and Webster, 1997). Interdependence based communication is likely to be used by the negotiators while dealing with expressive hostage takers (Gilliland and James, 1997).

Research Questions

In this study, there are three primary research questions. The first one is a descriptive question, while the other two are deductive research questions.

1. What are the primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by hostage/crisis negotiators in implementing negotiation strategies in hostage situations?

2. What elements of negotiation strategies differ in instrumental and expressive hostage situations?

   a. What factors influencing negotiation and decision strategies of hostage/crisis negotiators are different in instrumental and expressive hostage situations?

   b. Are negotiation strategies implemented by hostage/crisis negotiators different in instrumental and expressive hostage situations?

3. Does hostage/crisis negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories impact their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently?

   a. Are the directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories useful as a framework for negotiation and decision strategies of hostage/crisis negotiators?

Regarding the third research question, I added two more critical questions into the survey questionnaire: "do you handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently?" and

"do you believe that negotiators should handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently?"

<p style="text-align:center">Scale Creation</p>

For the purpose of the first research question, there is a 19 item scale (Table 1) that might influence the negotiation strategy. The 19 scale items have been used to formulate the first 17 questions in the survey instrument addressing the first and third research questions. For the purpose of the third research question, the relationship between the independent variable (negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories) and dependent variable (implementing negotiation strategy and practice of the negotiators differently in instrumental and expressive hostage situations) was measured in this study.

Table 1

19-item Scale with Possible Influence on Negotiation in Hostage Situations

1	Miscommunication between key players
2	Building rapport in negotiation
3	Establishing trust in negotiation
4	Presence of media on-scene
5	Using active listening skills
6	Asking open-ended questions
7	Language difference between negotiator and hostage taker
8	Using right tone of voice
9	Paraphrasing in negotiation
10	Misinterpretation of the message of hostage taker
11	Number of hostage takers
12	Number of hostages
13	Negotiation experience of negotiator
14	Joint training course with incident commander
15	Joint training course with tactical team
16	Presence of Stockholm syndrome
17	Presence of by-standers on-scene
18	Motivation of hostage taker
19	Paraphrasing in negotiation

For the purpose of the second research question, there is a 10 item scale (Table 2) of influences on negotiation strategy and practice in instrumental and/or expressive hostage

situations. The 10 scale items have been used to formulate both types of scenario questions in the survey instrument. The 10 scale items have been used in creating survey questions 19-27, which is related to Scenario Number 1, and have been used in creating survey questions 28-36, which is related to Scenario Number 2, in the survey instrument.

Table 2

10-item Scale with Possible Influence on Negotiation in Hostage Situations

1	Hostage's prior relationship with hostage taker
2	Using face-to-face negotiation
3	Prior criminal history of hostage taker
4	Presence of demand
5	Threat level of hostage taker
6	Presence of mental health professional's assistance
7	Presence of tactical team on-scene
8	Duration of hostage situation
9	Psychological condition of hostage taker
10	Presence of deadline

Hypotheses

The definition of hypothesis, as quoted from Dantzker and Hunter, (2006 p. 26): "The hypothesis is a specific statement describing the expected relationship between the independent and dependent variables."

There is no hypothesis associated with the first research question because it is explained by the primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by the negotiators in hostage situations as a descriptive response using frequencies and exploratory factor analysis. There are three hypotheses addressing the research questions 2, 2a, and 3.

H1: Some elements of negotiation strategy and practice differ depending on whether a hostage situation is instrumental or expressive. (This hypothesis addresses the RQ-2).

H2: Some factors that influence negotiation strategies and decision making of hostage/crisis negotiators are different depending on whether a hostage situation is instrumental or expressive. (This hypothesis addresses the RQ-2a).

H3: Hostage/crisis negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories predicts more sophisticated understanding of the difference in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. The negotiators' belief in the elements of both theories has an impact on their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. (This hypothesis addresses the RQ-3).

Definitions of the Primary Terms

Each police department employs different terminologies and nomenclatures to describe their police activities in dealing with hostage takers. The most commonly used terms and concepts throughout this study are defined to make clear the key concepts of the argument.

Command Post

A command post structure in a hostage situation is composed of some primary key players, such as an incident commander, the negotiation team, tactical team, and mental health professional. It is a management unit used by the police to save hostages' lives (Hancerli, 2005).

Incident Commander

The incident commander is the one who is in charge of the command post. Negotiation and tactical teams work together through the coordination and control of the incident commander. Both team leaders inform the incident commander about all information and movements during hostage situations (Hancerli, 2005).

Negotiation Team

Negotiation with hostage takers is initiated and maintained by a negotiation team. Negotiation is a task implemented through a trained police team. The team is usually composed of three negotiators depending on the conditions of the hostage situations. There might be more than three negotiators if the situation so requires it. The team tries to induce hostage takers to surrender to the police by using specific skills and tools (Hancerli, 2005).

Tactical Team

Any required tactical intervention against hostage takers is implemented by a tactical team. If negotiation does not work to resolve a hostage situation, this team implements tactical intervention against hostage takers by using special tactical skills and tools (Hancerli, 2005).

Mental Health Professional

Mental health professionals help the negotiators by giving them information about the hostage takers' psychological conditions, or they provide the negotiators assistance and assessment of hostage takers' personalities (Hancerli, 2005).

Hostage Taker

Hostage takers take and hold hostages in a place against their will to achieve some advantages either from the third parties or from the hostages. There are five types of hostage takers: *(1) terrorist, (2) inmate, (3) criminal, (4) emotionally disturbed, and (5) mentally ill hostage takers* (Hancerli, 2005).

Hostage

Individuals taken and held by hostage takers against their free will in a place that is surrounded by police professionals until sent messages and demands are met are defined as hostages (Hancerli, 2005).

Suicide-By-Cop

Some individuals who might want to commit suicide are unable to kill themselves due to fear of self inflicted violence (Miller, 1980). They become dangerous to the officers and to themselves by aiming their guns at the police, or directly stating to the officers that they want to be killed (Lord, 2000).

Overview of the Following Chapters

There are five chapters in this study: *(1) introduction; (2) literature review; (3) research design and methodology; (4) findings and analysis; and (5) discussion and conclusion.*

The first chapter is the introduction and road map of the entire study. This chapter includes the introduction, the problem statement, the research objectives, the significance of the study, the research questions, the scale creation, the hypotheses, and the definitions of the most used terms throughout the study.

The second chapter covers the key aspects and players of negotiation resolutions in hostage situations. I review crisis situations, hostage/crisis situations and history of the negotiation resolutions, primary key players and their roles in hostage situations, and communication skills, which are negotiation tools and strategies used by the negotiators. This analysis throughout this chapter helps the readers understand the concept of police interventions in hostage situations addressed by the research questions. Later, I analyze the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's communication theories to construct a communication theory-based negotiation model that might be a new way of listening to the other parties in responding to hostage situations.

The third chapter is about the research design and methodology of the study. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research design and methodology of the research objectives as

well as the limitations in the study. I discuss the target population, sampling frame, survey design, survey instrument, data collection and data analysis methods. Lastly, reliability and validity issues are discussed.

The fourth chapter analyses of the findings with the collected data. I collected the data addressing the research questions and analyzed this data using statistical methods. The data was collected by the survey study based on the perceptions of the negotiators implementing negotiation in the US and Canada. I analyzed the collected data to discern:

- What the primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools of implementing negotiation are

- What elements of negotiation differ in instrumental and expressive hostage situations

- What factors influencing negotiation are different in instrumental and expressive hostage situations

- How the negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories impact implementation of negotiation differently in instrumental and expressive hostage situations

- How the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories are useful to the hostage negotiation process.

The fifth chapter is about the discussion and conclusion of the entire study, analyses of the findings of the survey study, and the literature review. There are also policy implications and future recommendations for the police agencies as well as the scholars and researchers for their future studies. Lastly, I recommend a two-week training course schedule for the negotiators. The course manual of this recommended course schedule is the dissertation itself.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the methods used by the negotiators in hostage/crisis situations, effective communication systems, and hostage negotiations. In addition, I discuss the key players and their primary roles, hostage negotiations, and primary activities affecting and constructing the negotiations and decision making of the negotiators. I also analyze the two well known communication theories, *(1) Brenda Dervin's sense making theory and (2) Shannon-Weaver's mathematical theory of communication,* in order to better describe the communications addressed by the relevant research questions. The goal of this chapter is to clarify the main concepts of the argument by discussing the field of hostage negotiation resolutions.

Crisis Situations

Crisis situations are the consequences of unexpected and unforeseen events. The term of 'crisis' refers to a number of themes, including but not limited to threat, concern, anxiety, damage, illness, risk, injury, and loss of property. Crisis situations might threaten norms, values, goals, and social strengths of society (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003).

There are basically two types of crises/disasters: *(1) God made and (2) man-made.* Natural catastrophes, such as flooding, earthquakes, and severe heat and/or cold might be good examples of God made situations. Fire, nuclear and chemical accidents, or terrorist motivated events are examples of man-made situations. They both have one particular characteristic in

common; they both occur unexpectedly and with either little or no forewarning (McCullough, 2006).

Organizational crisis situations are defined as man-made crisis situations, such as the Chernobyl nuclear accident, occur as a result of some deficiencies and/or mistakes on the part of some individuals. Nevertheless, responsibilities and liabilities cannot be given to individuals' deficiencies and/or mistakes in God made crisis situations since they occur as a result of some natural catastrophes (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003). There are numerous definitions of crisis situations made by today's scholars and practitioners.

As Gilliland and James revealed that:

Our composite definition of crisis, derived from all six sources, is a perception of an event or situation as an intolerable difficulty that exceeds the resources and coping mechanisms of the person... the worth of the definition is enhanced by considering several important principles and characteristics of crisis:
1. Crisis embodies both danger and opportunity for the person experiencing the crisis.
2. Crisis is usually time limited but may develop into a serious of recurring transcrisis points.
3. Crisis is often complex and difficult to resolve.
4. The life experiences of workers may greatly enhance their effectiveness in crisis intervention.
5. Crisis contains the seeds of growth and impetus for change.
6. Panaceas or quick fixes are not applicable to crisis situations.
7. Crisis confronts people with choices.
8. Emotional disequilibrium and disorganization accompany crisis.
9. The resolution of crisis and the personhood of crisis workers interrelate (1997, p. 24-25).

There are several common characteristics that usually signify crisis situations (Gilliland and James, 1997). As Charles Hermann stated, crisis situations have three basic characteristics: *(1) they are unforeseen events, (2) they threaten organizations and stakeholders, and (3) they occur in a restricted time manner* (as cited in Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003). Crisis situations start unexpectedly as a result of some trigger events and they cease through the implementation of chosen resolutions (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003). Rapid fixes and/or

resolutions might not be available for individuals and/or organizations in responding to the crisis situation due to the time frame of crisis situations (Gilliland and James, 1997).

Crisis situations have both 'danger and opportunity' (Gilliland and James, 1997). Crisis situations are defined as life changing events because they have influence and impact on individuals and/or organizations, and make individuals and/or organizations either primary victims or secondary victims. The victims might be the organizations, companies, employers, employees, stockholders, stakeholders, family members, public practitioners, media, and/or other third parties (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003). A stakeholder might be either an individual or a group of individuals having relationships with the organizations in crisis situations (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997). The victims of the crises are likely to be the most vulnerable and defenseless parties (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003). Danger might exist in a crisis situation because it can devastate both individuals and/or organizations. Opportunity exists in crisis situations because it can drive individuals and/or organizations to do something to resolve the crisis situation immediately (Gilliland and James, 1997).

As stated earlier, crises force individuals and/or organizations to change their lifestyles and public policy. After the 9/11 attacks, a number of policies and strategies regarding the way Americans deal with criminals and terrorists were changed in accordance with the lessons learned from the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Significant changes were made in the working structures of law enforcement professionals, airport securities, crisis management strategies, and the lifestyles of entire communities. In addition, they created new forewarning systems to be able to prevent potential future terrorist attacks or other crisis situations. Since crises are part of today's contemporary societies, understanding their underlying reasons and interpreting their consequences help the individuals and organizations reduce the incidence of crises (Seeger,

Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003). Managers in the organizations, therefore, are compelled to make critical evaluations of their previous crises management experiences and knowledge to enhance their perceptions of handling crisis situations in the future (Coombs, 2004).

Organizational Learning in Crises

In crisis situations, there is no doubt that organizations try to keep their reputations and positive image in the eyes of the general public. Maintaining their image and good reputation during the crisis situations can be achieved through the right crisis response strategies. There is not a perfect crisis response strategy that will ensure success in a situation. There are, however, some guidelines and procedures that can help lead to the successful resolution of a crisis situation. If they know how to use these crisis response strategies and effective communication techniques to shape the general public's perceptions and maintain their positive image, they are likely to be successful in managing the crisis situations they face (Coombs, 1995).

According to the sense making theory, the organizations are able to reduce the frequency of the crises if those managers and stakeholders understand the crisis situation clearly (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003). In the approach of the sense making theory, individuals make rational and reasonable decisions when they take any action during the crisis situation (Weick, 1993). As long as the managers and stakeholders in the organizations interpret correctly the meanings and understand the underlying reasons of the previous crisis situations, they can use their retrospective information and knowledge to respond to the present crisis situation accurately. Using effective communication strategies is a major issue in retaining the policies on the part of organizations. Moreover, if organizations change the crisis response strategies in accordance with the quality of the organizational progress, they are likely to have a longer organizational learning process compared to their past practices. The organizations are able to

adapt the new systems and models through the organizational learning process because they become more open to the new skills and necessary tools in dealing with crisis situations (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer, 2003).

Just as America changed its protection strategy following the 9/11 attacks, as Hancerli stated many police departments improved their communication skills and negotiation strategies after the Munich Olympic Games crisis situation. Due to this tragic loss, not only the German government but also some other governments learned some important lessons. Many of the governments changed their hostage/crisis response strategies from using the police rescue team intervention to using negotiation as a primary option while responding to the hostage/crisis situations (Hancerli, 2005).

Issue Management in Crises

Organizations dealing with crises use various impression management strategies in order to shape the perceptions of the public in favor of their own interests. There are a number of impression management strategies used by organizations to be able to impress the stakeholders in the crises events (Allen and Caillouet, 1994). They attempt to change the public perceptions through various strategies in favor of their own interests and goals (Vibbert and Bostdorff, 1993). Those strategies are the processes that the organizations use in shaping public perceptions during crises (Taylor, Vasquez, and Doorley, 2003).

Crisis situations might potentially damage the images of the organizations. Therefore, organizations use guidelines to select their crisis response strategies when a crisis hits them. They look at their past experiences with managing crises and the type of crisis they are faced with in order to select the proper response strategies to achieve positive consequences. Their past experiences with handling crises might be either positive or negative. Those performances are

likely to be the determinative factors on how they handle the current crises. If the past performance is positive, there will be confidence on the part of the organization in dealing with crises (Coombs, 1995).

When the organizations ignore public perception, they might have legitimacy problems. Image restoration is then required to recover the legitimacy of the organizations because there is no doubt that organizations place high importance on their reputations. If they have legitimacy, they are able to show that they have respect for the norms, regulations, and values of the general public (Metzler, 2001). Likewise, when governments face hostage/crisis situations, they must take care of their victimized citizens in order to maintain a positive image and good reputation.

Governments should allow their hostage/crisis negotiation units to negotiate with hostage takers. It is a very critical point to note that allowing the negotiation units to negotiate with hostage takers does not mean that the professionals will give any concessions to the hostage takers. The government, therefore, should not reject use of the negotiation process with the hostage takers because saying 'no' to the use of negotiation or agreeing to make payments for ransoms does not work toward resolving the hostage/crisis situations (Clutterbuck, 1992). Although some governments make concessions, they do not do so publicly since they are concerned about being examined by their own citizens -the general public- and the other governments involved in hostage situations (Faure, 2003).

Agreeing to concessions and/or paying ransoms to hostage takers are not a dependable or consistent response strategy for any government. If a government makes any concessions, they probably cannot prevent becoming a repeat target for hostage takers in future situations (Hancerli, 2005). Based on the above findings, during hostage/crisis situations, governments are expected to use their best issue management strategy, which is likely to be the use of negotiation.

This is not only to get the hostages back peacefully, but also to maintain a positive image and reputation among their own citizens and the public.

Hostage/Crisis Situations

In this section, I put the principle focus on hostage negotiation resolutions of the police in the light of the argument mentioned above. I analyze the notion of hostage situations, the primary actors involved in hostage situations, their primary roles and specific activities in order to gain insights into implementing negotiation responses.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the police were using tactical team interventions to deal with the politically motivated hostage takers (Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner, and Gelles, 1998). In fact, in 1967, the first paramilitary-based police tactical team intervention approach was created by the Los Angeles Police Department, LAPD, to counteract politically motivated hostage takers (Call, 2003). Lieutenant Frank Bolz from the New York Police Department, NYPD, suggested a new negotiation technique to replace the tactical intervention option (Hatcher et al., 1998). This new negotiation technique was likely to be used in the second generation of hostage resolution (Call, 2003). Expressive hostage situations were more frequent than instrumental hostage situations in the 1980s. The professionals focused on negotiation strategy and practice as the first option to save hostages' lives as well as the lives of others (Hatcher et al., 1998). A number of lives were saved through the implementation of negotiation strategy and the practice of the negotiators (Regini, 2002).

Historically about 80 % of the people who have been killed during hostage holding incidents have lost their lives while the on-scene rescue teams are using force, instead of cold-blooded execution of the hostages by hostage takers (Michalowski, Kersten, Koperczak, Matvin, Szpakowicz, and Connolly, 1988). As Noesner stated, many individuals lose their lives during

the use of force in responding to hostage situations. For that reason, after the professionals in the command post on-scene scrutinize the existing danger to the lives of individuals involved in situations, they should determine if the use of force is necessary or not in resolving the situations (Noesner, 1999). It can be clearly stated that negotiation is the first and best option to rescue hostages and to bring hostage takers to justice (Michalowski et al., 1988).

This does not mean that police tactical intervention is not a good option. The police should be aware of three things. First, they should know when to initiate and how to maintain negotiation strategy and practice to rescue hostages. Second, they should know when to cease the negotiation process, which is likely to be when the negotiation option isn't working anymore to rescue the hostages. Third, they should know when to use tactical intervention against hostage takers to rescue hostages in hostage situations (Hancerli, 2005). As Noesner suggested, professionals should determine the answer to the three critical questions prior to implementing any decided response. The professionals consider *(1) if the intended response is essential; (2) if the intended response contains risk-effective action; and (3) if the intended response is workable or not for implementation in responding to hostage situations* (Noesner, 1999).

The good thing is that today's police agencies are fully aware of negotiation's value and significance to end hostage situations peacefully (Hancerli, 2005). In addition, the negotiation teams are aware of the tactical team(s) on-scene because both teams work together hand-in-hand in resolving hostage situations effectively. The negotiators attempt to hear everything by talking to subjects and the tactical team attempts to see every action so that both teams share the collected information about the subjects in order to implement the best available resolutions (Noesner, 1999).

The negotiators use special communication skills and negotiation tools and techniques while implementing the negotiation strategy and practice in hostage situations (Hancerli, 2005). The negotiation strategy and practice is implemented and maintained by well-trained hostage/crisis negotiators to induce hostage takers to release hostages and surrender to the police peacefully (Kocak, 2007; Noesner, 2007; Hancerli, 2005). Either by implementing the negotiation practice by the negotiators or using force by the police tactical team during hostage situations is not performed by the two teams only; in fact, there are some other key players affecting the response strategies of the police on-scene. In the following section, I analyzed the roles and natures of the several primary key players in hostage/crisis situations.

<center>*Primary Key Players in Hostage Situations*</center>

There are usually six key players having essential roles in a hostage/crisis situation. They are *(1) incident commander, (2) negotiation team, (3) tactical team, (4) mental health professional, (5) hostage taker(s), and (6) hostage(s).* It must be revealed that the first four key parties play their roles under the authority of the chain of the command post on-scene. In addition, the first responding officers arriving at the scene play the first important role in hostage situations even though they are not part of the command post structure. That is why I started going through with the first responding officers and their tactical roles as well as their training needs before putting the principle focus on the key players in hostage situations.

First responding officers usually encounter hostage takers at the very beginning of hostage situations since they are the first officers arriving at the location where hostage takers keep hostages. Many police agencies advise their first responding officers to avoid doing anything further until the command post professionals arrive at the location where the situation is taking place. They are taught to only evacuate the public from the perimeter, saving lives that

<center>25</center>

might be at risk during situations, and to hold their positions on-scene until the required special units arrive at the scene. It is a fact that besides the phase of rescue and/or tactical team intervention in responding to hostage takers, the most hazardous moment in a hostage situation is the first 15 to 45 minutes due to the fact that the vast majority of hostage takers are likely to be thrilled and they usually act emotionally instead acting rationally. The first responding officers, therefore, should be very careful with their actions since they might be escalating situations they are involved in while responding to the very early phases of hostage situations. Many police departments luckily are aware of this fact, and they train their line officers how to handle the situations they respond to as first responding officers (Noesner and Dolan, 1992).

Whenever a hostage/crisis situation occurs, a command post consisting of some key players, such as incident commander, negotiation unit, police tactical unit, and some other third parties, is established at the scene of the crime in order to implement the required and most effective police responses (Hancerli, 2005). In the following section, the roles of the primary key players in hostage situations are reviewed to better clarify the elements of negotiation strategy and practice and decision making of the negotiators in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. Before explaining the roles of the key players, the role of the command post on-scene is evaluated.

In the decision making structure, consisting of an incident commander, police tactical team and negotiation team leaders, the two leaders convey their opinions about ongoing situations to the incident commander, who is the one that has the last word (Birge, 2002). In hostage situations, each team might be entertaining competitive notions for resolution (Birge, 2002; Hare, 1997). The roles and effectiveness of both teams are valuable to the command post on-scene. Both teams have different roles to play in responding to hostage situations. It is similar

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to a football game. One team plays its part from the offensive perspective and another team plays

its part from the defensive perspective (Hare, 1997)

One team attempts to continue the communication with hostage takers as much as

possible (Noesner, 1999), while the other team deploys at the scene. If negotiation does not work

to resolve the situation, then the on-scene incident commander determines the use of the tactical

team intervention, taking into consideration if it is truly the best and appropriate option (Hare,

1997). There is only one primary goal for both, the tactical and negotiation teams, which is to

save the hostages' lives. It is a critical point that both teams perform their roles depending on

their own missions while responding to hostage situations. The negotiators usually attempt to

calm the subjects and help them vent their anger and emotions, whereas the tactical team is

usually concerned about the safety of the parties involved in hostage situations (Birge, 2002).

If it is required, the number of the command post on-scene might be more than one.

There are usually two perimeters established by the police on-scene. First, the inner perimeter is

created to ensure that hostage takers are isolated from the outside world and cannot escape from

the scene. Second, the outer perimeter is designed to ensure that the police are able to implement

the right responses to situations without being interrupted by the third parties and/or outsiders.

The primary command post is positioned in a location which is close to the inner perimeter but

not inside the inner perimeter. It can be located somewhere near the outer perimeter. It can be

located in a place somewhere between the inner and outer perimeters, but it should be closer to

the outer perimeter for safety reasons (Davidson, 2002).

In addition, the on-scene command post should be established in a place in which the

radio connection as well as some other special tools and required police equipment is functioning

properly. The on-scene command post can be established in an appropriate vehicle or building

(Iannone and Iannone, 2001). Depending on the necessity, there might be some other parties working under the authority of the command post, including but not limited to an intelligence officer(s), liaison officer(s), and other required third parties (Davidson, 2002).

Incident Commander

As stated above, an incident commander is in charge of managing on-scene law enforcement resources while applying the resolutions to hostage/crisis situations. The first priority for the incident commander is to attain a peaceful resolution to the hostage/crisis situation. The incident commander is responsible for controlling and coordinating the law enforcement units working on-scene. The incident commander coordinates the interactions between all professional units, including but not limited to the negotiation unit, police tactical unit, perimeter controlling unit, liaison officer, additional support units, and so on. All incident commanders are supposed to complete incident commander training courses to be able to manage hostage/crisis situations effectively and precisely (Davidson, 2002).

Negotiation Team

A negotiator is the key player to resolve hostage situations peacefully. Police officers, patrol officers, detectives, correction officers, and even administrative officers might be working as hostage/crisis negotiators in responding to hostage situations as long as they are trained as professional negotiators. The negotiator is likely to be a lower ranking officer because the rank of a negotiator is not an important issue. In some politically motivated hostage situations, the rank of the negotiators might be important to the hostage takers. The negotiators do not dress in their uniforms while negotiating with hostage takers. They do not introduce themselves to hostage takers by stating their ranks. If the hostage takers ask to be informed of the negotiators' ranks, then the negotiators tell them their true ranks (Poland and McCrystle, 1999).

The majority of professionals accept the statement that the negotiators and decision makers should both be present while responding to hostage situations. This statement is acceptable for several good reasons. First, the roles of the decision makers should be separate from the negotiation task which is driven by the negotiators usually under stressful conditions during hostage situations. The decision makers make their own assessments by not only getting the opinions of the other experts but also staying away from the situational pressures the negotiators experience while negotiating with hostage takers (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979).

Second, if the negotiators are not the decision makers, they might have some extra room while executing their negotiation maneuvers. By doing this, the negotiators bring the demands and expectations of the hostage takers to the decision makers one-by-one. This process helps the negotiators buy some time by going back and forth between the decision makers and the hostage takers. The negotiators, however, must keep in mind and be aware of the fact that the hostage takers might be impatient and annoyed because the negotiators are using some delaying techniques (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979).

Third, by separating the role of the negotiators from being the decision makers in hostage situations, the negotiators are driven to carry out their professional tasks in a way that only well-trained negotiators can. Thereby, the negotiators should give their principle focus and attention on handling hostage takers, dealing with tensions, using effective communication skills, and learning how to maintain their poise in responding to hostage situations. Separating the role of the negotiators from the role of the decision makers in responding to hostage situations helps the negotiators promote the utilization of effective skills and tools by maintaining their expected roles. The negotiators will definitely be cognizant of the importance of having their significant

roles and using the negotiation effectively by separating their tasks from being the decision makers of the hostage situations (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979).

This does not mean that they are not part of the decision making process in the resolutions of handling the hostage takers. Birge stated that the negotiation team leader is one of the critical parties working in a decision making structure of a chain of the command post (Birge, 2002). The rank of the negotiation team leader should be equal with the rank of the tactical team leader to be able to discuss the best available options for responding to situations. Unfortunately, this is not the case yet because some negotiator team leaders are still working in a secondary role along with the tactical team leaders (Regini, 2002).

There are usually three negotiators in each hostage/crisis situation. Each member in this team has an important part in resolving situations (Wind, 1995). In a hostage situation, while the primary negotiator talks to hostage takers, the secondary negotiator is there to assist and support the primary negotiator (Wind, 1995; Poland and McCrystle, 1999; Hancerli, 2005). Negotiation is a job that can only be implemented by trained hostage/crisis negotiators. The negotiation process is performed by the negotiation team using special skills and knowledge in response to hostage situations. The nature of this team, therefore, might be changing regarding the characteristics and risk levels of hostage situations (Poland and McCrystle, 1999).

Negotiation Team Selection

In 1992, roughly 600 hostage/crisis negotiators from the federal, state, and/or local police agencies/departments in the US got together in a seminar program to talk about their negotiation strategies and decision making processes. In this program, the participants were asked 44 survey questions including the demographic and professional qualifications of the negotiators who were attending the program. As a result of this study, the professionals collected notable findings of

the perceptions of the participant hostage negotiators. According to the findings of this study, about 45 % of the negotiation teams in the police departments have followed their negotiator team members' selection procedures (Hammer, Van Zandt, and Rogan, 1994).

The police departments and agencies are aware of the importance of careful selection and training of hostage negotiators. The selection process of a negotiation team leader is the most important step in selecting the overall negotiation team members. The team leaders are required to have many special skills, knowledge, and information about behavioral sciences to be able to manage the situations successfully. The selection process of the rest of the team members is also an important step in establishing the negotiation team. The team members are required to have some special negotiation skills, too. They should know how to calm hostage takers and how to approach a man pointing a pistol at a boy's head and making irrational demands, such as providing a getaway car within a couple of minutes (Regini, 2002).

The Crisis Management Unit, CMU, working under the authority of the FBI Academy, formed the Critical Incident Negotiation Team, CINT. The aim of formulating this special mobile team was to be able to respond to more complex and sophisticated hostage and barricade incidents effectively. In the selection process of the team members, the police managers look at the past experience of the negotiator's training and investigation backgrounds, and make the candidates take some special exams, such as a psychological exam and verbal interview (Botting, Lanceley, and Noesner, 1995). Many police departments might not have a sufficient budget to get through this critical negotiator selection process. The police agencies, however, are expected to have a written negotiator selection process enabling them to recruit the acceptable officers into the negotiation team appropriately.

Negotiation Team Training

Dr. Harvey Schlossberg and Frank Bolz from the NYPD formulated the negotiation approach as a new tool for dealing with hostage takers in the 1970s. The professionals in the police agencies developed this technique over the course of time. The professionals promoted the value of using the negotiation techniques and strategies given to the negotiators in the negotiator trainings. In the training, the professionals give the negotiators some primary and essential negotiation techniques and strategies based on past police experiences that have occurred in the field (Hare, 1997). The negotiator training programs highlight the fact that keeping the officers safe on-scene is the principal subject matter for the negotiators to learn while discovering how to use effective communication skills, showing empathy, and acquiring the ability to assess hostage takers (Bower and Pettit, 2001). In addition, as Botting et al., (1995) stated, the negotiators in training take some lessons from the psychologists and criminal profilers in order to get the insights of hostage takers' personalities.

As Hare (1997) indicated, today's negotiator training programs provide essential help and effective approaches for the negotiators to understand even the more complicated situations. The existing negotiator training programs might include information about new theories and progress that has been made. Many police departments might still be using old-fashioned or traditional negotiation techniques. Very few departments have the procedures to enable them to evaluate and analyze the past hostage taking events in order to construct their future strategies, guidelines, and new policies in responding to hostage situations.

Hammer, Van Zandt, and Rogan (1994) revealed, as stated earlier, in order to make possible the information exchange between the participants and to learn the negotiation team profiling, a survey study was conducted by professionals and scholars in 1992 over the 600

negotiators from several federal, state, and local police agencies in the US. Based on the findings

of this study, Hammer et al., discovered that about 75 % of the research participants responded

that they attended negotiator training courses initially lasting 10 days and/or less. This is

compared to the 1 % of the research participants who attended the training lasting 21 days and/or

more. In addition, about 60 % of the research participants stated that every year they attended

negotiator in-service training courses (advanced course) lasting 5 days and/or less. About 6 % of

the research participants stated that they attended negotiator in-service training courses lasting

between 15 to 20 days.

Hare (1997) recommends that negotiators use the contingency in the negotiation process

based on the innovative approach, allowing the negotiators to use more flexible techniques and

strategies compared to the traditional negotiation approach. The traditional approach is based on

the guidelines that are likely to tell the negotiators about what to do and what not to do while

negotiating with hostage takers. Hare also stated that:

> A contingency approach is applicable to cases where the traditional guidelines are clearly
> inadequate. These situations require the negotiator to analyze the situation and the
> underlying interaction dynamics to determine what negotiation strategy should apply.
> Clearly, the innovative negotiator should be well versed in the traditional guidelines and
> possess a satisfactory knowledge of applicable behavioral science findings (1997, p. 154).

This new approach -the contingency approach- is practiced more effectively by using

some critical tools, such as using role playing scenarios and evaluating past hostage situations

carefully in negotiator trainings. The aim of this is to make the negotiators learn their lessons

from the real life events that have occurred in the past (Hare, 1997). Van Hasselt and Romano

(2004) asserted that using role playing scenarios is a vital tool used by the professionals in the

training.

As Sharp stated, the vast majority of the police departments use role playing scenarios in the training when teaching the negotiators how to use the required skills and tools (as cited in Van Hasselt and Romano, 2004). The content of the scenarios are formulated by the professionals either based on the real events having once occurred in the past or anticipated events that will happen in the future. Through implementing the role playing scenarios in the training, the negotiators learn how to act by playing their roles in the scenarios instead of sitting passively in a class activity (Van Hasselt and Romano, 2004). Hare (1997) revealed that the best method of training is to teach the negotiators what they need to know in interactive format. The training format should match the format occurring in real life events.

The negotiators usually have no previous relationships with hostage takers that they encounter; therefore, opening up a new conversation with the hostage takers and building trust between the parties might be challenging. The remedy might be to use the core elements of the science of communication in order to better understand the interactions and relationships between the parties involved in hostage situations. The field of communication has an important role in constructing the basic needs of the hostage negotiators (Womack and Walsh, 1997) through well-prepared negotiator trainings as mentioned above.

Police Tactical/Rescue Team

Using the police tactical team intervention is an effective instrument for resolving hostage incidents (Hancerli, 2005). There are several reasons for deciding on the implementation of the tactical team intervention while responding to a hostage situation. First, the likelihood of being in danger and threat to the hostages might be increased by the hostage takers. Second, the police start worrying about the injured and/or hurt hostages. Third, the police start worrying about the attitudes and behaviors of the hostage takers as they become more escalated. Fourth,

the police are satisfied with accomplishing the safe entry into the perimeter in which the hostage takers hold the hostages by using the tactical team intervention. Fifth, the police start worrying about containing the hostage takers by using some techniques and strategies other than using force. Sixth, the police determine the use of force as necessary since using force is a better strategy than not using it (Lanceley, 2003).

The tactical team intervention might be comprised of several techniques, including but not limited to using chemical agents, dynamic entry, stealth, air attack, physical attack, rappelling, using snipers, taking advantage of the tactical role of negotiation team, and/or consolidation of those techniques as well as some other required and available options. To be able to perform the tactical team intervention against hostage takers, the members of the tactical team need to have completed the specialized trainings successfully (Davidson, 2002).

Mental Health Professional

Since dealing with hostage takers is a very challenging and emotional task, the negotiators receive assistance, assessments of hostage takers' personalities, from mental health professionals (Terhune-Bickler, 2004). These professionals are indispensable parties to the negotiators while they negotiate with hostage takers. Their job is to provide valuable assessments to the negotiators on-scene. The psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, psychotherapists, and/or consultants might be working as mental health professionals while on-scene command post implements the resolutions to hostage situations. Mental health professionals try to collect the information and knowledge about hostage takers' medication backgrounds, mental health conditions, psychological conditions, criminal behaviors, violent behaviors, suicidal tendencies, and family backgrounds to be able to provide useful assistance and advice to the negotiation

team. And the negotiators use that assistance and advice while initiating and implementing the

negotiation on-scene (Slatkin, 2005).

It is accepted that consulting with mental health professionals and psychologists when

dealing with depressed and emotionally upset hostage takers is likely to be necessary for the

negotiation team to assess the situations properly (Strentz, 2006). The study presented in the

article of Hammer, Van Zandt, and Rogan (1994) revealed that about 56 % of the respondents

get assistance from mental health professionals as professional advisors.

In addition, Hammer et al., revealed that:

In a significant number of agencies, mental health professionals also act as on-scene
advisors to negotiation teams (40 %) and become involved in the training (34 %) and
selection of team members (32 %). However, only 6 % of the team leaders stated that
they use mental health professionals as primary negotiators (1994, p. 10).

Taken together, mental health professionals might be working as either counselor to the

negotiation unit or a part of the on-scene negotiation unit. Since they work as a part of the

negotiation team, they complete the negotiator training courses so that they can comprehend the

paramilitary and hierarchical configuration of the law enforcement professionals and the nature

of the responses to hostage situations (Slatkin, 2005).

Hostage Taker

During a negotiation process in a hostage situation, if the negotiators are able to discover

the typologies of hostage takers and their characteristics, the negotiators are more likely to

determine the precise response strategies to use in their decision making process (Gilliland and

James, 1997).

I specified the hostage taker typologies for the readers to better understand the

classifications of hostage takers and hostage situations as well. Many scholars and professionals

make these classifications regarding different aspects of hostage takers and hostage situations as

well. At this point, the question is 'what kind of factors affects dividing the typologies of hostage takers?'

Miron and Goldstein revealed two types of hostage takers: *(1) instrumental hostage takers who usually make monetary demands, such as payment; and (2) expressive hostage takers who usually make emotional demands, such as attention.* Countless hostage situations are initiated as instrumental types but change into the expressive types for a variety of reasons. This happens especially in some types of skyjacking and inmate hostage situations. For instance, after the hostage takers understand that the police will not give any concessions, they might continue insisting on other demands, such as getting attention. Miron and Goldstein created this classification by considering the types of the demands of the hostage takers (as cited in Poland and McCrystle, 1999).

Frank Bolz determined that there are three types of hostage takers: *(1) predator criminal hostage takers; (2) psychotic hostage takers; and (3) politically motivated hostage takers.* Bolz made this classification considering the motivations of hostage takers. Hacker and Stratton, too, defined three types of hostage takers: *(1) politically, religiously, and/or socially motivated hostage takers; (2) predator criminal hostage takers; and (3) mentally ill hostage takers.* Hacker and Stratton made this classification by considering the individual differences of hostage takers (as cited in Poland and McCrystle, 1999). Misino (2004) represented four types of hostage takers: *(1) predator criminals, (2) mentally ill, (3) emotionally disturbed, and (4) politically motivated hostage takers.*

Based on the summary of classifying hostage takers, it is clear that hostage takers are classified by the scholars and professionals regarding the types of demands, motivations, and/or individual differences of hostage takers. These classifications made by the scholars and

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professionals are quite similar to each other. Based on the typologies mentioned above, some differences between the typologies of hostage takers appear, but there are also some characteristics in common in the typologies that the negotiators should consider while responding to hostage situations.

Hancerli (2005) suggested five types of hostage takers relating to the motivations, demands, and individual differences of hostage takers: *(1) terrorist hostage takers, (2) criminal hostage takers, (3) inmate hostage takers, (4) emotionally disturbed hostage takers, and (5) mentally ill hostage takers.* All types of hostage takers possess some differences and similarities that the negotiators should keep in mind while responding to hostage situations.

Noesner and Webster (1997) stated that the negotiators responding to hostage situations usually face two types of hostage takers: *(1) instrumental and (2) expressive.* The behaviors of the instrumental hostage takers are based on the substantive and clear demands of hostage takers compared to the behaviors of the expressive hostage takers based on the emotional and highly scattered demands and thoughts. Instrumental hostage takers carry out much more goal-directed behaviors, while expressive hostage takers carry out much more irrational and unfounded behaviors. The negotiators are expected to use problem solving focused strategies and effective negotiation skills in responding to instrumental types of hostage takers, while they are expected to use much more active listening skills in responding to experimental types of hostage takers.

Based on the above summary presented, the types of terrorist, criminal, and inmate hostage takers address the nature of instrumental hostage takers, whereas the types of emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage takers address the nature of expressive hostage takers. In the following section, I probe the underlying characteristics and insights of instrumental and expressive hostage takers addressed by the research questions in the study.

Instrumental Hostage Takers

Instrumental hostage takers are usually able to express their goal-oriented demands and clear intentions compared to expressive hostage takers. Using problem solving and skillful negotiation strategies, therefore, might be very helpful for the negotiators in handling instrumental hostage takers (Noesner and Webster, 1997). In other words, the term of 'instrumental hostage takers' refers to terrorist, criminal, and inmate hostage takers since they are likely to show instrumental and goal-oriented behaviors during hostage situations.

As Sandler and Scott stated, terrorist hostage takers usually take hostages as a result of their political motivations and/or monetary goals (Sandler and Scott, 1987). Criminal hostage takers and kidnappers usually take hostages for monetary gains (Jenkins, Johnson, and Ronfeldt, 1977). Inmate hostage takers take hostages for the purpose of either getting safe passage from prison or articulating their complaints about the particular correction systems where they are held (Gilliland and James, 1997). In the following section, I summarized each type of instrumental hostage taker to reach a better understanding of the distinctive natures of hostage takers.

(A) Terrorist Hostage Taker

Making a worldwide definition of terrorism is very difficult since one state might accept that a particular group of individuals are terrorists, while another state might accept that they are not. However, almost every definition of terrorism covers either the same or at least similar characteristics of terrorism accepted by all nations worldwide (Hancerli and Nikbay, 2007). The definition of terrorism quoted from the American Heritage Dictionary (2000) in its fourth edition from the website of www.bartleby.com/61/26/T0122600.html is:

> The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons.

Terrorist organizations strike fear in not only the primary victims but also states, nations, organizations, and economies in a current timeframe. Terrorism creates an atmosphere of psychological and physical distress, fear, and concern in societies (Hancerli and Nikbay, 2007). Terrorist organizations particularly aim to influence the behaviors and thoughts of individuals by using their attacks to construct an atmosphere of terror, strain, and intimidation. While terrorists carry out their attacks, they are likely to regard the cost-benefit analysis and probability of dealing with the law enforcement professionals (Mickolus, 1987). Terrorists attempt to force governmental professionals into carrying out counter attacks very severely in responding to the terrorists' attacks. Their aim is to cause civilians and innocent people to suffer at the hands of governmental professionals due to the implementation of counter attacks. By doing this, they intend to get support from the general public (Durna and Hancerli, 2007).

There are two important features distinguishing terrorist hostage taking situations from various forms of criminal action. Terrorist hostage taking situations are likely to be *(1) executed by a group of individuals (2) in places usually open to the general public* (Wilson, 2000). These features make the negotiators initiate the negotiation process in terrorist hostage situations earnestly. In addition, as Zartman (2003) pointed out, the negotiators responding to terrorist hostage situations always struggle to get more concessions from hostage takers while giving them less consideration. Dealing with such goal-oriented hostage takers might be difficult for negotiators who carry the task of requiring more concessions and/or information from hostage takers while giving them less. As Misino, (2004) stated, terrorist hostage takers are hardly ever eager to get along with the negotiators during negotiation since they are usually motivated by their strong political beliefs, religious beliefs, and/or combination of the two.

Canter and Fritzon point that current research studies indicated that there are some patterns of criminal behaviors in relevant crimes; for instance, as Canter and Heritage stated, studies of criminal behaviors in rape confirm that there are some patterns of the criminal behaviors constantly taking place in rape (as cited in Wilson, 2000). Likewise, there are some certain patterns of criminal behaviors in terrorist taking hostage situations. This means that the criminal behaviors in terrorist hostage situations might be used to determine not only the earlier actions but also the future actions of terrorist hostage takers. The behaviors of these hostage takers are likely to be patterned and prearranged; therefore, those behaviors should be carefully analyzed to understand their insights for preventing the future terrorist actions (Wilson, 2000). All this implies that there are some criminal patterns that terrorist hostage takers follow, which can be tracked by the police to determine their future strategies for resolving terrorist hostage situations.

As Knutson expressed, in addition to political extremists, there are two subtypes of terrorist hostage takers: reluctant and deliberate. According to her interviews with surviving captors, the reluctant types of hostage takers were not willing to execute their hostages. They usually performed their behaviors due to an ideal of how things should be. They attempt to affect change through hostile actions. The second type is the deliberate hostage takers, who are usually willing to kill their hostages. Their behavior is goal-oriented as opposed to idealistic. They use hostages as leverage and do not hesitate to execute violent action (as cited in Call, 2003).

The negotiators should know that each hostage situation is unique and has its own characteristics. Hence, the insight of every situation needs to be carefully analyzed by well trained professionals. This analysis should consider the relevant norms and values of the existing situations (Cristal, 2003). The professionals need to be very cautious while classifying hostage

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situations into categories. For instance, as the police realized after the Waco standoff in 1993, they should not have categorized such a very complex situation into the form of typical hostage situation. This might escalate the results of the hostage situations. So, the professionals are expected to use several sources of information and knowledge, including assessments and opinions from experts, which compensate for the professionals' categorizing of decisions regarding the situation (Edwards, 2001).

Terrorist hostage takers should be aware of the findings in the study of Sandler and Scott (1987) when determining the factors affecting their expected success or failure. In fact, Sandler and Scott notably discovered that terrorists might be getting wanted attention from the news media by the pre-meditated execution of their hostages, but executing hostages has no significant influence upon reaching either logistical goals or negotiation achievement. Sandler and Scott, suggested that terrorist organizations should be aware of this fact and give up taking innocent people as hostages and executing them.

 (B) Criminal Hostage Taker

Most criminal hostage holders take hostages when they get trapped inside the buildings in which they commit their crimes. They basically only seek safe passage to leave the scene of the crime (Miller, 1979). For instance, if a bank robbery fails and criminals take some hostages to get safe passage, they will probably realize how desperate their situation is and will work with the negotiators (Misino, 2004). Those types of hostage takers originally do not intend to take hostages, but something goes wrong during the commitment of their crimes and they take hostages in order to secure safe passage from the crime scene (Miller, 1979). As Goldaber revealed, most criminal hostage situations occur impulsively and unexpectedly (as cited in Poland and McCrystle, 1999). It is an important distinction that criminal types of hostage takers

do not intend to take hostages during the commission of a crime, but the crimes they commit turn into hostage events.

Criminal hostage takers usually think rationally, so they might be more prone to surrender to the police (Miller, 1979). Negotiating with criminal hostage takers might not be complex since those criminals are likely to know what their demands and true intentions are (Misino, 2004). As revealed above, Goldaber mentioned that they are usually interested in having safe passage from the place in which they are surrounded by the police. However, the negotiators always keep in mind that it is possible that criminal hostage takers might start acting unpredictably during the negotiation process (as cited in Poland and McCrystle, 1999).

(C) Inmate Hostage Taker

Inmate hostage situations are accepted as the most dangerous types of hostage holding situations. In these situations, hostage takers are likely to have premeditated demands and expectations, including safe passage from the correction a system, which is not, of course, a viable demand (Poland and McCrystle, 1999).

The police always keep in mind that as Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) suggested negotiation may not be the first available option to use in responding to inmate hostage situations because of the difficulties of situational conditions in the correction systems. Therefore, the police might have to use a tactical team intervention first. Using tactical force might be the first available and most favored option to save the lives of individuals and to prevent the injuries of the parties involved in these situations.

The negotiators attempt to buy time by using stalling and delaying techniques in responding to these types of hostage situations. Unlike other hostage situations, as Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) indicated, buying time may not work for the authorities while responding to

inmate hostage situations. The reason is that very sharp factional structures of inmate

organizations might increase the difficulty of managing these hostage situations by the command

post professionals. The professionals first determine if a situation includes hostages or if it is a

barricaded situation. Then they decide whether to use tactical force depending on the conditions

of the injuries of individuals, as well as the property damage in order to save the lives of

individuals and to protect the order and discipline in the correction systems.

Expressive Hostage Takers

A large number of hostage taking situations which the police respond to are committed

by expressive types of hostage takers, usually presenting frustration, anger, indignation, and

irrational behaviors based on emotion-oriented feelings. That is why expressive types of hostage

takers might have difficulty expressing their feelings while talking to the negotiators even though

they need to talk with somebody and are willing to talk. The negotiators are expected to help

expressive hostage takers articulate their thoughts and feelings. Their negative emotions and

feelings can be reduced by the negotiators using active listening skills and showing empathy for

hostage holders (Noesner and Webster, 1997).

The term 'expressive hostage takers' refers to emotionally disturbed and mentally ill

hostage holders and since they are likely to show expressive behaviors and emotional feelings.

Some scholars and professionals consider emotionally disturbed and mentally ill types of hostage

takers as the same type since both types have some characteristics in common. I summarized

each type of hostage taker in expressive types of events to better understand their distinction.

(A) Emotionally Disturbed Hostage Taker

As Goldaber revealed, emotionally disturbed hostage takers usually take hostages from

among the people who are known to them. Taking of hostages occurs spontaneously; and the

subjects usually present irrational behaviors (as cited in Poland and McCrystle, 1999). Hostage takers might be experiencing some breakdowns in their relationships with the others around them. They usually attempt to keep their relationships workable by taking hostages, who might be a spouse or other loved one (Gilliland and James, 1997). If hostage takers are under the influence of alcohol and/or illegal drugs while taking and holding hostages, the negotiators should know what the overdose and side effects are of taking drugs and alcohol in determining their strategies (Lanceley, 2003).

As Goldaber emphasized, the principal focus of the negotiators is to make a decision about whether the subjects are experiencing their anger and frustration temporarily or they suffer from anger and frustration because of an illness (as cited in Poland and McCrystle, 1999). I found that this is the most significant point, which is to make a distinction between emotionally disturbed hostage takers and mentally ill hostage takers. As Gilliland and James (1997) stressed, the negotiators encountering emotionally disturbed hostage takers are expected to use appropriate strategies and techniques, such as active listening skills and showing empathy for hostage takers, in order to resolve situations peacefully.

(B) Mentally Ill Hostage Taker

Because of the importance of knowing the common behaviors of mentally ill hostage takers, I examined the personalities and major characteristics of the motivations of each type of mentally ill hostage taker. Gaining insights into their behaviors and attitudes helps the negotiators in determining their decision making and using the right negotiation techniques precisely in dealing with mentally ill hostage situations. Lanceley (2003) mentioned that the aim of learning the characteristics of mentally ill hostage takers is not to educate the negotiators as diagnosticians, but the goal of the negotiators is to be familiar with the common characteristics

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for implementing the true negotiation strategy and practice. Borum and Strentz, (1992) stated

that the negotiators are trained in the psychological classifications of the mentally ill hostage

takers so that they can choose the better communication skills and negotiation tools as well as the

strategies.

Mentally ill hostage takers take hostages due to their frustrations, anxieties, and stressed

personalities. The negotiators might struggle while attempting to negotiate with them (Gilliland

and James, 1997). The negotiators, therefore, are expected to be familiar with the characteristics

and attitudes of their personality disorders (Lanceley, 2003). There are several types of mentally

ill hostage takers. They are *(1) schizophrenic, (2) depressive, (3) inadequate, (4) antisocial*

(Gilliland and James, 1997), *and (5) borderline personalities* (Borum and Strentz, 1992).

Schizophrenic hostage takers usually apply their behaviors based on delusions, anxiety,

belligerence, and aggression. They might be very dangerous to those around them when they

suffer from paranoid and hostile delusions. Often, they describe their delusions to the police via

telephone. When they encounter the police, the police make their assessments about the potential

dangers of these types of subjects immediately. If the subjects present some concerns about

themselves, then the danger to others is minimal. However, if they have some concerns based on

their delusions, then there is potential danger for the others (Strentz, 2006).

Many schizophrenic subjects suppose that they have important commitments to carry out

in their life because of their very special capabilities and/or talents. The negotiators should use

delaying techniques through active listening skills. The subjects are encouraged to talk in order

to vent their angers as much as possible. The negotiators do not attempt to induce subjects to

surrender immediately and do not expect subjects to trust them immediately because these

subjects generally never trust anybody. The negotiators usually do not allow the third parties to

talk to these types of subjects because this might cause the subjects to lose control. Instead, the

police take advantage of the third parties as sources of information while constructing their

strategies and negotiation techniques (Strentz, 2006).

The vast majority of depressive hostage takers suffer from depression that is likely to be

caused by loss of family members (Divasto, Lanceley, and Gruys, 1992), anxiety, fear of not

having some positive stimulus (Strentz, 2006) and having negative viewpoints on their life

(Gilliland and James, 1997). Depressive hostage takers are likely to be driven by hopeless

situations in their lives (Strentz, 2006). These types of subjects usually take hostages from

among the individuals known to them (Gilliland and James, 1997). The negotiators should ask

subjects if they want to talk about their problems and feelings. By doing this, they are able to

show empathy for these subjects and are then able to build rapport between the subjects and

themselves. Since certain depressive hostage takers might not be able to talk about their feelings,

the negotiators should try to get some information and knowledge about these subjects from

external sources, such as family members, colleagues, and/or friends (Divasto, Lanceley, and

Gruys, 1992).

Inadequate hostage takers usually perform illogical and inappropriate behavior in their

activities. They attempt to resolve their problems by applying imperfect and counterproductive

means. They usually fail at whatever they do in their daily lives. For example, they can be

observed while they fail in an attempted bank robbery. They take hostages since they believe that

taking hostages can help them resolve some of their problems. Since they are likely to have

numerous failures in their life, the negotiators should avoid making them think about their

failures once again in taking hostages. Instead, the negotiators can tell them that they can get

through to the end of the hostage situation peacefully by working hand-in-hand. It has been

clearly demonstrated that thinking about failures once again makes them dangerous. The negotiators should employ the terminology of "withdrawing" instead of "surrendering" to resolve the hostage situation since the term "surrender" carries the connotation of failure (Strentz, 2006).

Antisocial hostage takers usually exhibit very cynical, scornful, and arrogant behaviors (Lanceley, 2003). Antisocial subjects can easily be recognized by the police because of their noticeable narcissist behaviors and high level of verbal skills. Antisocial subjects ask the question 'what's in it for me' because they are prone to taking something from other people instead giving. That is why they eagerly manipulate the people around them to get whatever they want. They are not concerned with the rules of society; they believe that the rules do not apply to them. Antisocial hostage takers are reckless about the others around them (Strentz, 2006).

Even though antisocial subjects usually lack experience and knowledge, they might tend to be seen as intellectual individuals. They might use sophisticated words and terms to charm others even if they know nothing about the particular topic. The negotiators should attempt to keep them busy by talking to them. This strategy helps prevent injuries hostages taken by these subjects (Lanceley, 2003). The negotiators can flatter these subjects by implying that their understanding of the importance of releasing hostages peacefully is esoteric. It should also be stated by the negotiators that their decision to release the hostages will bring them personal advantages. Since most antisocial hostage takers really enjoy their life, they usually do not have any suicidal tendencies. The negotiators are expected to use reality-oriented strategies and behaviors to deal with these types of hostage takers (Strentz, 2006).

Borum and Strentz (1992) revealed that borderline hostage takers usually engage in both logical and illogical behaviors. They might present very quick mood changes while talking to the

negotiators. They also present dependent personality disorders. For instance, even if they are adults, they do not act like adults. They, therefore, frequently ask others around them for their reassurance while doing something important to them. Often they encounter the police because their behavior might include threats and dangerous attitudes toward others in society. For instance, if they take hostages, often they ask the negotiators for affirmation that they have made the right decision in holding the hostages. They also want to get attention from third parties, such as families, friends, and/or news media by taking and holding the hostages. The negotiators should be very careful with the possible suicidal intentions and psychotic symptoms of these individuals. The negotiators ask them if they have any intentions of committing suicide. The negotiators must attempt to keep them calm and show their empathy for them. The negotiators should cautiously aim to help them vent their anger. The negotiators are advised that these types of subjects might lose control while venting their anger. If this happens, the negotiators should attempt to use the technique of distraction by making them talk about some other emotions.

Taken together, based on the above summary, the negotiators might encounter several types of mentally ill subjects in responding to expressive hostage situations. Applying the wrong strategies and following up with deficient guidelines might cause situations to deteriorate, which definitely affects both hostages and expressive subjects. The negotiators, therefore, are expected to be familiar and well trained in the common behaviors and characteristics of each type of mentally ill subject in expressive hostage situations. In addition, the negotiators should get the assessments of mentally ill subjects' personalities from experts -mental health professionals-. The negotiators must also get more intelligence about mentally ill subjects from the external parties, such as family, friends, and co-workers in order to respond with the proper strategies while dealing with these types of hostage takers. As Slatkin (1996) stated, if the negotiators

receive some insights into the therapeutic communication technique, it will help the negotiators to construct their negotiation strategies, and hopefully the negotiators will be able to resolve hostage situations carried out by mentally ill subjects.

(C) Suicide-By-Cop

In addition to some types of mentally ill hostage takers presenting suicidal intentions while holding hostages, I also analyzed the phenomena of 'suicide-by-cop' in this section.

As Lord stated, there are several reasons that individuals seek to commit suicide. Those reasons might be mental illness, alcoholism, illegal drug use, poor health, employment problems, life difficulties, aggressiveness, social segregation, suicidal contemplations (Lord, 2000), suicide attempt in their past, and a history of family violence. Sometimes individuals seeking to commit suicide might have more than one of risk factors. Individuals seeking to commit suicide are unsure if they want to die or not. They may want to be rescued by the people around them. They usually give some signs that they are contemplating committing suicide. These signs might be either verbally stated or unintentionally displayed by these suicidal individuals (Davidson, 2002).

In suicide-by-cop, individuals thinking of committing suicide lack to courage to do it themselves (Miller, 1980). That is why they do something dangerous, such as aiming their gun at the police officers or directly asking the officers to kill them in order to provoke the officers that they face (Lord, 2000). They might design some detailed plans and deadlines for being killed by the officers (Davidson, 2002). They usually present illogical and unpredictable behaviors in their actions. That is why they might be dangerous to both hostages and themselves (Miller, 1980; Poland and McCrystle, 1999). They usually have prior violent experiences in their lives. The negotiators should keep this in mind and avoid making any instrumental demands. Likewise, these hostage takers usually do not attempt to leave the scene (Davidson, 2002).

The negotiators might encounter certain difficulties while communicating with these hostage takers. The police, therefore, should be extremely careful in responding to these types of individuals (Poland and McCrystle, 1999). The negotiators should learn more about these subjects to prevent them from committing suicide. Same directions and guidelines used by negotiators to prevent suicide by general individuals can be used to handle suicide-by-cop subjects (Davidson, 2002). Since the directions and guidelines used by the negotiators to prevent suicidal individuals overall were revealed in detail in the former section of this study, they are not discussed again. As Lord (2000) stated, many police officers today are aware of the importance of understanding suicidal individuals during hostage holding situations. Lord also recommends that the police officers interview people who have attempted 'suicide-by-cop' to gain the insights into these types of individuals and their underlying suicidal intentions.

Hostages

As revealed earlier, there are usually six key players who have important roles in every hostage situation. I have analyzed the roles and characteristics of the first five key players above. In the following section, I discuss the Stockholm syndrome as well as the hostage survival strategies.

Stockholm Syndrome

In 1973, two criminal hostage takers took four hostages in the Kreditbank in Stockholm/Sweden. This hostage situation lasted about 131 hours, which is more than five days (Fuselier, 1999; Lanceley, 2003; and Davidson, 2002). After this situation ended, the hostages clearly articulated that they did not fear the hostage takers, but instead feared the on-scene police officers (Fuselier, 1999). This showed that a close bond and rapprochement, considered a new

syndrome, was constructed between the hostages and hostage takers (Lanceley, 2003). This syndrome was then tagged by the professionals as the Stockholm syndrome (Fuselier, 1999).

As the FBI investigators revealed, there must be some conditions for this syndrome to be developed by the both parties involved in hostage situations:

1. There must be a significant amount of time to promote this syndrome between the parties.

2. The syndrome is developed if there is some sort of connection between the parties during their ordeal. The syndrome does not develop if there is minimal interaction between the parties.

3. If the syndrome exists, then it shows that hostage takers do not abuse or beat their hostages; hostage takers will even behave very kindly to hostages (Fuselier, 1999).

During hostage situations, the negotiators will encourage the hostage takers to interact with hostages. Thereby, the negotiators are able to help increase the positive associations between hostages and hostage takers by using certain strategies. For instance, the negotiators may talk to the hostage takers about the hostages' health conditions, medical situations, family responsibilities, and so forth. This is likely to make hostage takers interrelate with hostages (Dolnik, 2004).

The Stockholm syndrome can be promoted by both parties in one of the following conditions or in the combination of these conditions:

1. Hostages believe that they have good feelings about hostage takers

2. Hostages have bad feelings about law enforcement professionals

3. Hostage takers have good feelings about hostages in hostage situations (Fuselier, 1999; Lanceley 2003; and Davidson, 2002).

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For the first two conditions, hostages usually believe that the hostage takers behaved very well toward hostages and never intended to hurt them throughout situations. They also believe that the hostage takers would only do something to hurt hostages as the result of some mistake caused by the police (Fuselier, 1999). If hostages are abused or tortured by the hostage takers; or if hostages see that hostage takers are abusing other hostages, this syndrome is much less likely to be promoted between the parties (Fuselier, 1999). In order to give an example about promoting this syndrome, I present an actual hostage situation below.

In 1980, six terrorist hostage takers took twenty four hostages for the six days in the Iranian Embassy in London (Moysey, 2004). The hostages were the embassy's employees and some visitors to the embassy (MacWillson, 1992). The hostage takers killed one of the hostages on the sixth day of the situation (Moysey, 2004) stating that it was due to the fact that the police did not comply with their demands and completely ignored the deadlines the hostage takers set (MacWillson, 1992). The police resolved the situation by using deadly force against the hostage takers. As a result of this action, the police tactical team killed five hostage takers. Meanwhile, some of the hostages in this hostage event were trying to defend the sixth hostage taker against the police by claiming that he had treated the hostages very gently during the six days of the situation (Moysey, 2004). The Stockholm syndrome presented in this particular situation.

On the other hand, as Fuselier (1999) revealed, the findings of the hostage barricade database system of the FBI (HOBAS) indicated that about 92 % of the hostages in the situations reported to the FBI national database did not report that the Stockholm syndrome developed between the parties in the past situations. In disagreement with the Stockholm syndrome's over-publicized popularity as a theory in the public as well as the mass media, the findings of the HOBAS clearly show that the Stockholm syndrome does not occur very often in hostage

situations. The professionals should look at the Stockholm syndrome from the right point of view (Fuselier, 1999) to be able to take advantage of this syndrome in dealing with hostage takers.

Survival Strategies

As stated before, hostages are taken by hostage takers for several reasons, such as monetary gain, political reasons, and/or other reasons. Anyone could be taken hostage, but the most widely accepted theme is that individuals who have high profiles are likely to be taken hostage (Katz and Caspi, 2003). Jenkins et al. (1977) revealed that they analyzed 77 worldwide hostage taking situations occurring between 1968 and 1975 and found that the citizens and officials of the US abroad were the primary targets of international hostage holding situations. In fact, about 38 % of the hostages captured in the 77 situations presented and analyzed in their study were American citizens.

It is a fact that regardless of the type of hostage situation, hostages are the parties who are more likely to be disturbed and traumatized by the situation. There are some countermeasures to avoid being held hostage and some guidelines for being able to survive in hostage situations (Poland and McCrystle, 1999). In this section, I discussed the guidelines only for individuals to survive when they are taken hostage. Regarding the research questions in the study, I am only interested in researching the negotiation process started after individuals are taken hostage. This negotiation process certainly includes the captivities' survival because the primary focus is to save the hostages' lives during the negotiation process.

As Poland and McCrystle (1999) revealed, there are several guiding principles for hostages to follow throughout hostage situations to increase their chances of survival. Hostages should adjust to being captivities because the hostage situations might last several hours and/or days. The guiding principles for hostages are:

1. Hostages should avoid complaining about anything

2. Hostages are expected to present cooperative behaviors

3. Hostages are expected to avoid arguing with the hostage takers

4. Hostages are expected to follow the rules presented by hostage takers

5. If the hostage takers do a favor, hostages are expected to accept this favor

6. Hostages are expected to promote the Stockholm syndrome if this is possible

7. Hostages are expected to know that either negotiation or a tactical team intervention option is available to the police to save the lives of the hostages

8. Hostages are expected to remain calm when on-scene tactical teams use force because the team might not be able to distinguish the hostage takers from the hostages.

Any movement of hostages can be considered as a threat and a danger to the team while the team is using force against the hostage takers. The phase of using force by the tactical team is a critical moment. As the studies suggested, about 75 % of the victimized individuals in hostage situations suffer injury/death during the tactical team interventions (Poland and McCrystle 1999).

The final focus suggested here is that individuals who might be possible targets for hostage takers can be taught how to survive when they are taken hostage. If the hostages know how to conduct their behaviors throughout the hostage situations, they might enhance the ongoing negotiation process and increase their chances of being able to survive.

<center>Communications and Negotiations</center>

During the course of this section, I focus on presenting the primary components of interpersonal communications, implementing successful negotiations, using effective negotiation phases, and negotiation tools used by the negotiators in hostage situations, and the core elements of Dervin's sense making and Shannon-Weaver communication model. By analyzing the core

elements of the two theories, I pay attention to conveying the messages between the parties and the meanings of the messages in the communication systems.

<p style="text-align:center;">*Effective Communications*</p>

The action of interpersonal communication takes place between the parties, which include families, relatives, co-workers, and/or friends, of the individuals. Several definitions can be made of the communications depending on the different communication methods. It is a basic definition of the information exchange practice presented between the parties involved in the communication settings by using one of the available channels. In communication settings, the principle aim of a source party is to convey the message to another party by using an available method. In this process, the sent message is encoded by the message sender first. The aim is to put the message into understandable wording and/or a symbol that helps the message receiver understand the true meanings of the sent message. The action of communication between the parties is completed when the receiver has encoded the received message. The aim of encoding the message is to interpret the received message by putting it into understandable wordings and/or symbols (Grubb and Hemby, 2003).

There might be some negatives to implementing the action of effective communication. Those negatives either obstruct the process of information exchange between the parties or hinder the process of interpreting the messages precisely. Fortunately, there are several techniques used by parties to diminish the roadblocks to implementing effective communication (Grubb and Hemby, 2003).

First, if the parties, message senders, know how to be more proactive in communicating with the message receivers, then they can ensure that the other parties understand their messages properly. The aim of this action is to reduce the potential of either misunderstanding or

<p style="text-align:center;">56</p>

misinterpreting the received messages. Second, if the parties are able to consider each other's level of understanding, then they can increase the likelihood of understanding the messages by the receivers (Grubb and Hemby, 2003).

Third, if the parties know how to listen to each other in communications, then they can ensure that they are able to truly understand each party's messages. The aim of this action is to use active listening skills. The parties use these techniques to be able to hear and understand the other parties' messages: the parties attempt to stop excessive talking; the parties attempt to hear something deemed necessary while listening; the parties attempt to put their principle focus on the received messages; the parties attempt to reduce the noise in the location where they are; the parties attempt to use words of acknowledgment, such as 'okay, yes, understand, and so forth'; the parties attempt to use paraphrasing techniques to show the other party that they are listening to them; the parties attempt to take some notes to record the sent information and knowledge in the messages (Grubb and Hemby, 2003).

Fourth, if the parties remove the physical barriers of hearing the other parties' messages, then they are likely to hear and understand the received messages. The aim of this action is to ensure that physical negatives and difficulties, such as noise, negative weather conditions, and other environmental conditions, of understanding the received messages are removed by the parties (Grubb and Hemby, 2003).

Based on the above summary, communication is an interpersonal relationship between the parties exchanging information through one of the available channels. The primary aim is to convey a message to the receiver by using an available method. Successful communication strategies are based on the active listening skills of both parties. This and other skills, as well as tools help the parties remove negatives to implementing successful communications.

Successful Negotiations

Using the negotiation process as an effective tool in conflict situations is an essential key. The negotiation process is also used in non-conflict situations, including the everyday life of individuals (Goodwin, 2004). Individuals negotiate with others (Goodwin, 2004; Webber, 2003) to deal with the issues in their daily life events (Goodwin, 2004).

A married couple might negotiate over the place where they live. Friends might negotiate over hanging out together. A client might negotiate with a car dealer while buying a new car or a worker might negotiate with his/her boss to get a promotion. Everybody uses negotiation practice in their everyday life events. Some individuals are afraid of negotiating with others due to their introverted personalities. Therefore, they might not be able to get what they want from other parties during the course of negotiation. Some others might not be able to effectively negotiate with other individuals because of their indignant behavior. Everybody can learn to negotiate in order to fulfill their needs because negotiation is a skill that can be learned. They are to listen closely to what the other party states, to try to understand the other party's psychology, and to see negotiation as a tool to get their needs met through other parties (Webber, 2003).

Contrary to using negotiation in everyday life of individuals, using the negotiation process in conflict situations must be handled by professional negotiators using special skills and techniques (Goodwin, 2004). The negotiators in hostage situations try to understand situational behaviors, messages, and the true intentions of hostage takers by using their professional negotiator qualifications. As Goodwin (2004) stated, there is one significant difference between implementing negotiation in those two different environments. Threat levels, volatile behaviors, and possible dangers of other parties in conflict resolutions make the biggest difference in implementing negotiation practice in those two different negotiation environments.

Taken together, individuals usually negotiate over subject matters in their daily life events, while negotiators and hostage takers usually negotiate over non-negotiable subject matters in hostage situations. This marks the difference between the negotiation process in hostage situations and the negotiation process in the everyday life of individuals.

Hostage/Crisis Negotiations

Hostage holding situations might take place anywhere and at any time. They take place either unexpectedly or deliberately. Because of this broad nature of hostage situations, dealing with hostage takers brings some notably grueling challenges on the part of the professionals. There are two types of preventive strategies for the law enforcement professionals. The first one places emphasis on the deterrence strategies aiming at hindering the root causes of hostage taking situations. The second one places emphasis on the operational strategies aiming to implement tactical strategies of the law enforcement professionals. The officials usually give their principle focus on operational based preventive tactics and strategies (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979) that might be either *(1) using hostage negotiations or (2) implementing tactical team interventions while the professionals are responding to hostage holding situations.*

During the course of this section, I specifically analyzed the former operational tactic (negotiation practice). I also discussed several difficulties and challenges the negotiators have to deal with while responding to hostage situations.

In 1972, several terrorist hostage takers, the members of the Black September Organization, took some Israeli athletes as hostages in the Munich Olympic Village. Two of the hostages were killed by the terrorists at the very beginning of the incident because the hostages resisted the terrorists (Aston, 1982). During the negotiation process in this event, the police allowed the terrorists to believe they would grant one of their demands; leaving the country.

After the terrorists arrived at the airport from which they were planning to leave the country, the police used force because talking to the hostage takers could not be improved in order to end this situation. The gunfight between the police and the terrorists was started by the police at the airport. All of the hostages were killed by the terrorists in the gunfight (Miller, 1993). All of the nine hostages, five hostage takers, and one police officer lost their lives in this gunfight. Overall, seventeen people were killed, and three hostage takers surrendered to the police in this tragic event (Aston, 1982).

A number of politically motivated hostage situations occurred in the 1960s and 1970s (Hatcher et al., 1998). As Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) revealed, the Munich hostage taking situation was accepted as a cornerstone event among the world's police professionals. After this tragedy, the police started looking for new strategies to end hostage situations successfully. As Hatcher et al. (1998) stated, Lieutenant Frank Bolz from the NYPD suggested using a new strategy, which was a negotiation technique, to replace the police tactical intervention. As Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) suggested that negotiation technique was developed as a new strategy in response to hostage situations. The NYPD started using this new strategy, hostage negotiations. The FBI also started using and developing this technique while responding to hostage situations.

In implementing this new practice in responding to hostage situations, as Hancerli and Durna (2007) assumed, hostage takers are allowed by the negotiators to believe that they will be able to get some concessions from the third parties by speaking with the negotiators. As Noesner (2007) stated, using the negotiation practice is implemented by the professional and well-trained hostage negotiators because dealing with hostage takers is a very challenging and difficult job.

The term of negotiation is defined as a *'two-way communication process'* between the parties, the negotiators and hostage takers. It cannot be called a negotiation process if

communication does not exist between two parties. In an ongoing negotiation process, both

parties have to be involved in give and take. For resolving hostage situations, the negotiators use

the negotiation process as the primary technique or as a part of the overall strategies depending

on the factors of constructing the hostage situations. If the objectives/demands of hostage takers

are negotiable subject matters, then using the negotiation option should be the favored strategy,

but if the objectives/demands of hostage takers are not negotiable subject matters, the using the

negotiation option should be only a part of the overall strategy (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979). In

both situations, the negotiation option is always the first option to use.

According to Gettinger's assessment, about 80 % of individuals killed in hostage/crisis

incidents lose their lives during rescue team interventions rather than the negotiations (as cited in

Michalowski et al., 1988). Using the negotiation option might be the best way for the

professionals to save individuals' lives in responding to hostage situations (Michalowski et al.,

1988). In hostage situations, all available negotiation tools and communication skills should be

utilized and exhausted before using tactical team interventions unless it is so high risk that

immediate force is necessary. Using negotiation is the first option and using tactical team

intervention is always the last resort (Hancerli, 2005) depending on the factors, such as the risk

level of the hostage takers, affecting and constructing the negotiations in hostage situations.

Once the professionals make a decision about using the negotiation option and selecting

the relevant negotiators in a hostage situation, they talk about some of the proceedings and

strategies the negotiators take while implementing the negotiation process (Crelinsten and Szabo,

1979). There are several reliable proceedings and strategies I will focus on in the subsequent

section, 'negotiation phases.'

Applying Negotiation Phases

The professionals immediately establish a command post structure on-scene after a hostage taking event takes place. An incident commander, negotiation team, rescue team, other decision makers, and some other special experts get together in the command post on-scene (Crelinsten and Szabo, 1979). The negotiators always keep in mind that they are part of a team playing under the authority of the chain of command post. The negotiation and rescue teams have their own roles and tasks under the authority of the command post in a well collaborated approach. The negotiators are taught how to communicate with the other parties in the command post on-scene (Hare, 1997).

As Fuselier, Van Zandt, and Lanceley (1991) pointed out, the essential point the professionals give their attention to while responding to hostage situations is to determine when to use the rescue team intervention. Fagan (2000) revealed similar statements, which include the negotiators' concerns about implementing hostage negotiations. For instance, Fagan stated that the negotiators frequently ask themselves 'where shall I begin talking from' or 'what will happen if I do something that might offend the subjects?'

In addition to the above critical questions and points, Bohl (1992) stressed that the negotiators also feel the stress and anxiety of performing their skills. Even though the negotiators are very skilled and talented professionals, they still might feel tension and anxiety at the initiation of negotiation with hostage takers. The sources of stress the negotiators might be feeling are either internal or external. The source of the internal stress refers to all kinds of pressures and anxieties the negotiators might have about failing in negotiating with the hostage takers. On the other hand, the source of the external stress refers to all kinds of restraints and interference that might be coming from the other parties.

Based on the summary the literature review presented so far, even though these difficulties are handled under the authority of the command post on-scene, the professionals still might be feeling some types of stress and pressure while they do their jobs. Likewise, Fagan (2000) revealed that using the negotiation phases step-by-step might be the remedy for dealing with all these possible difficulties and frustrations. In doing so, the professionals reserve their energy and focus for evaluating the progress in each step separately. This approach also allows the other parties in the command post, such as the incident commander, to know if everything is going as planned. Similarly, Poland and McCrystle (1999) revealed that the police make their own evaluation in each step in order to determine when to proceed to the next.

In this section, I set out to examine the above questions and any associated difficulties by presenting the negotiation phases from the different sources. This is done for two reasons. The first is to provide a worthwhile model to guide the negotiators in the future. The second is to increase the understanding of the potential results of the implementation of negotiation.

As Holmes and Fletcher-Bergland pointed out, there are three phases the negotiators should pursue while responding to hostage situations. They are *(1) initiation, (2) problem solving, and (3) resolution.* As Holmes stated, in the first phase, the negotiators identify the argument and formulate their plan by considering the formation of the dialogue between the parties. Sometimes the preparation might be completed in the prenegotiation phase, which immediately precedes the starting phase. If the parties attempt to achieve control over each other, the first phase ends. As Holmes and Fletcher-Bergland revealed, the presentation of the first phase might change depending on the conditions of each hostage negotiation. The second phase is about solving the problem. The negotiators are likely to use a therapeutic approach, while the hostage taker is likely to use intimidation and compulsion. The negotiators try to work together

with the other party hand-in-hand. The other party in negotiations, however, might not be willing to comply with the combined problem solving approach. The third phase is about reaching resolution. The parties usually reach resolutions with some degree of confidence. If there is no resolution, as in case of a stalemate situation, the negotiators might request some help from the third parties -other experts- (as cited in Womack and Walsh, 1997).

Poland and McCrystle (1999) stressed that there are four phases that can be pursued by hostage situation professionals. They are *(1) 'response, (2) containment, (3) negotiation, and (4) resolution'*. In the first phase, the first responding police officers attempt to control the situation and crime scene immediately. In the second phase, the police attempt to evacuate the bystanders from the crime scene and establish the command post on-scene. In the third phase, negotiation is initiated by the negotiators. The negotiators are cognizant of the fact that applying some principles to negotiation will lead to successful outcomes. They are:

- The negotiators ask subjects to release any sick hostages

- The negotiators make assessments about the typologies of subjects

- The negotiators avoid discussing the demands of subjects

- The negotiators give the impression that the subjects' demands are negotiable

- The negotiators do not place any deadlines for anything

- The negotiators do not provide subjects anything unless they get something in return

- The negotiators remain aware that subjects might make several demands.

In the final phase, the police determine the outcome. If subjects surrender, the operation ends. If the police believe that there is still threat and danger to hostages' lives, after the police ensured that all available means and techniques were exhausted, they settle on using force to save the hostages (Poland and McCrystle, 1999).

The negotiators can conceptualize negotiation practice by using numerous updated techniques and strategies. But, there are six effective phases achieved when negotiators use the step-by-step guide for negotiation while responding to hostage situations (Fagan, 2000). The readers are advised that I put the principle focus on the aspects and guidelines of the six phases in depth presented by Fagan below due to its notable and clear advantages for negotiators.

In the first phase, the negotiators decide how to initiate the conversation with the hostage takers on-scene. They usually determine the most effective and preferred way of doing this depending on the immediate conditions. The professionals are likely to use a bullhorn, land line, cell phone, face-to-face, and/or crisis telephone provided by the police (Fagan, 2000). The police usually do not prefer to use the face-to-face technique for security reasons. If they believe that there are advantages in using it, they resolve to use it by considering some very critical conditions of hostage takers and situations (Lanceley, 2003). There are several aspects of hostage situations affecting and constructing the duration of the first phase, such as how many subjects are involved, the characteristics of the crime scene, and/or the readiness of subjects to speak with the police (Fagan 2000).

As Lanceley (2003) stated, the very beginning of a hostage situation is always a critical time period on the part of the police. This critical period is usually supervised by the first responding officers. The professionals try to get through this stage without losing any lives. The idea of buying time in hostage situations is usually initiated by the first responding officers as soon as they arrive at the scene.

As Lanceley revealed, most subjects are likely to have a high level of emotion and irrationality. In the second phase, as Lanceley; Bolton; and McMains and Mullins stressed in their studies, the negotiators, therefore, attempt to calm the subjects down by using active

listening skills. Subjects are encouraged by the negotiators to vent their emotions and anger (as cited in Fagan 2000). The second phase is complete if subjects become calm and act rationally. The end of this phase is determined by the negotiators by considering the subjects' current behavior compared to their behavior at the beginning of the situation (Fagan, 2000).

In the third phase, the negotiators attempt to learn the motivation, demands, and other information from the subjects by using active listening skills and asking open ended questions. The negotiators try to shed light on the hostage situation. Whether or not the negotiators are able to move to the next phase is usually determined by factors, such as the number of subjects and whether these subjects are inclined to speak with the negotiators (Fagan, 2000).

In the fourth phase, the negotiators and other commanding units under the authority of the chain of command post make their own assessments from different perspectives of the demands and motivations made by subjects. This is done to determine the most advantageous plan to use while responding to hostage situations. In this phase, the negotiators also establish what they will ask subjects to trade and what they will give them in return (Fagan, 2000).

In the fifth phase, the negotiators carry out the plan approved by the authority of the command post on-scene. The most important thing in performing plan is for the negotiators to be able to present the most cogent strategies by being flexible and stable. The negotiators will move to the final phase if this phase is successfully completed (Fagan, 2000).

In the sixth and final phase, the negotiators ensure that the subjects are ready to release the hostages and surrender to the police. Most importantly, both the professionals and subjects should know the details of the surrender plan. The professionals and negotiators might be asked by the subjects for one last demand and/or need that is called a '*surrender ritual*' in Fagan's words. Lastly, if something goes wrong with pursuing the directions in each phase of the step-

by-step approach, the professionals will consider going back to the previous phase and meeting the requirements of the phase once again. This helps the police achieve the goals and aims for the positive outcomes (Fagan, 2000).

In sum, as emphasized earlier, using the step-by-step approach presented by Fagan and other scholars helps the negotiators and other professionals concentrate on each phase's difficulties and challenges. In doing so, they are likely to realize what to do and how to do it while responding to hostage situations. Also, each unit in the chain of command post is able to know what the other unit is doing.

Even if all above explanations of implementation are followed in the negotiation phases, the negotiation still might not work effectively to save the hostages lives. As Fuselier, Van Zandt, and Lanceley (1991) stated, in dealing with hostage takers, the professionals must determine if the negotiation is not working. If so, then they will decide to use rescue team intervention. There are some criteria the professionals must examine in order to decide if they have to use the rescue team intervention. Those criteria consist of asking three very critical questions before implementing the tactical team intervention.

1. If using force really is unavoidable

2. If using force is less risky compared to the other options

3. If using force is acceptable within the boundaries of the statutes and ethical rules.

The professionals assess all risk factors and threat levels of hostage situations by using the gathered information and knowledge about hostage takers before determining whether to use rescue team interventions (Fuselier, Van Zandt, and Lanceley, 1991).

Using Negotiation Skills and Tools

Good negotiators always mirror the other parties messages by listening and reflecting them back so that the negotiators can reassure the other parties that they understand what they say. Negotiators have to be unflappable and competent in negotiating with the other parties in communications (Gray, 2003). The negotiators attempt to use communication skills and negotiation tools by establishing trust and building rapport between the negotiators and hostage takers in order to gather relevant information from the hostage takers.

In this section, emphasis is placed on the primary communication skills and negotiation tools used by the negotiators to gain greater insights into using empathic relationships, which build trust, rapport, and a personal communication style between the negotiators and hostage takers.

By using those skills and tools, the negotiators are able to show that they are there to help and assist the hostage takers instead harming hostage takers (Noesner and Webster, 1997). The negotiators using active listening skills are able to understand hostage takers' emotions. This means that they are more likely to show their empathy for others and to establish trust/build rapport between the parties in the negotiation process (Lanceley, 2003).

Using Active Listening Skills

Using effective communication techniques, such as use of active listening skills, is the core element of responding to hostage/crisis situations (Slatkin, 2005). Although using active listening skills seems to be *'passive behavior',* it is not because the negotiators are able to call for behavioral changes in the hostage takers. While talking to hostage takers, the negotiators never threaten, criticize, or humiliate them. The negotiators work at showing their empathy for the hostage takers; otherwise, the hostage takers do not consider the demands of the negotiators. The

negotiators develop a personal communication style with the hostage takers by using active listening skills (Noesner and Webster, 1997).

Being able to use empathy is a necessary skill for the negotiators to use in implementing the hostage negotiations. The negotiators show the evidence of empathy for subjects while attempting to negotiate with the subjects in hostage situations. Showing empathy can be performed through the act of active listening while the negotiators focus on emotions, such as frustration, sadness, and anger displayed by the hostage takers. By doing this, they do not tell the hostage takers whether or not they are right and do not try to assist hostage takers in handling their emotions/problems because the negotiation process is not a rehabilitation and/or therapy session. Instead, the negotiators attempt to encourage the hostage takers to talk about their problems so that they can vent their emotions (Regini, 2004).

The FBI and many police agencies have been using active listening skills while responding to hostage situations. Due to the effectiveness of using those skills, the police have begun to teach how to use active listening skills in the negotiator training courses. There are several active listening techniques used by the police negotiators. They are: *(1) minimal encouragement, (2) paraphrasing, (3) emotion labeling, (4), mirroring, (5) asking open-ended questions, (6) using 'I' message, and (7) using effective pauses during negotiation with hostage takers* (Noesner and Webster, 1997).

Use of the minimal encouragement technique refers to using precise words by the negotiators such as 'okay', 'when', and similar words. By using these words, the hostage takers are ensured that the on-scene negotiators are there to assist them. Second, use of paraphrasing technique refers to restating some words addressing hostage takers messages after determining what hostage takers' messages are. Third, use of the emotion labeling technique refers to

showing an emotional response toward hostage takers. In this practice, the principle focus is on

hostage taker's feelings. This technique is usually used at the very early stage of negotiation

process in hostage holding situations (Lanceley, 2003).

Fourth, use of the mirroring technique refers to repeating some words stated by hostage

takers. The negotiators are likely to gain information about hostage takers by using this

technique. Fifth, the technique of using open-ended questions refers to asking hostage takers

detailed questions instead of talking excessively because this is the way the negotiators can get

information about hostage takers' intentions. Sixth, the use of 'I' message is one more technique

that helps the negotiators express how they feel about the feelings and emotions of the hostage

takers. Using this technique makes hostage negotiations more comfortable and relaxed. Finally,

use of the effective pause technique refers to creating some space and remaining silent for a

while during the conversation between the negotiators and hostage takers. If this technique is

used correctly, it might encourage hostage takers to give more information about their intensions

and actions (Noesner and Webster, 1997).

Building Trust and Rapport

Negotiators build trust and rapport between hostage takers and themselves through the

negotiation process. Building trust and rapport between the parties can be done through

developing personal communication styles with hostage takers. The aim of the negotiators is to

gather more information about hostage takers in order to determine their strategies and decision

making about how to respond. In this section, I discuss the strategy and practice used by the

negotiators in establishing trust and rapport between the parties in hostage negotiations.

The negotiators attempt to show the other party their concern in establishing trust and

rapport between them (Misino, 2004). When the negotiators are able to establish trust between

the parties in the negotiation process, they ensure the other party that the negotiation is going well. The parties can establish trust by talking willingly and avoiding being skeptical, mistrustful, or distrustful of each other. The negotiators do not have to trust the other party to continue the negotiation process. The vital point is to be aware of the value of establishing trust in order to keep the other party talking (Wu and Laws, 2003).

In establishing trust between the parties, as the direct quote from Wu and Laws revealed "instead of asking, 'can I trust Bob?' the relevant question becomes, 'can Bob and I construct a relationship in which trust is possible?" (2003, p. 331). This occurs if both parties are willing to take part in the interaction during the negotiation process.

This is possible as Womack and Walsh (1997) stressed, if each party keeps moving toward to the other party's position in the communication settings. By doing this, both parties are expected to present their knowledge, demands, and concerns to each other. This type of communication is based on the interdependence of both parties. As Lax and Sebenius (1986) stated, the interdependence in the negotiation process is created by the joint -combined- actions of both parties. Each party needs the other party in the negotiation practice. As an analogy, it is easy to see the dependence of employees on their manager in a work place; but it is also possible to see the dependence of this manager on his/her employees in many ways.

Regarding the analysis above, Womack and Walsh (1997) also provided an example; when the negotiators are able to move towards the hostage takers and establish trust between the parties, the dialogue between the negotiators and hostage takers can be turned into a type of conversation maintained by both parties paying attention to instant needs of both parties. Likewise, hostage takers might try to establish trust by being true to their word when they release

a hostage after they have promised to do so. In this way, both parties attempt to pay attention to each other's most pressing needs in resolving the situation effectively.

Gaining the trust of the other party during the implementation of the negotiation is not an easy practice. As Womack and Walsh (1997) revealed, implementing a personal communication style with hostage taker is a challenging task because the negotiators are expected to build a relationship based on trust with hostage takers, who are usually strangers to the negotiators. In most hostage situations, the hostage takers were previously unknown to the negotiator.

As Lanceley (2003) stated, establishing trust is a critical step. Nobody wants to come to an agreement unless one definitely trusts the other party in the negotiation process. Therefore, either the first responding officers or the negotiators are expected to be truthful while talking to hostage takers. Telling the unembellished truth to hostage takers brings about credibility.

Based on the summary presented so far, the negotiators attempt to build trust and rapport in responding to hostage situations in order to gain insight into hostage holding situations and the hostage takers as well. The more information and intelligence the negotiators have, the better the negotiators are at implementing negotiation and decision strategies. This is the basis of hostage negotiation resolutions. As Womack and Walsh (1997) mentioned, it is expected in hostage negotiations that the negotiators initiate a personal communication style-based dialogue with hostage takers in order to gain their trust; this trust begets the cooperation between the negotiators and hostage takers.

Dealing with Demands and Deadlines

In every hostage situation, the principal focus of the negotiators is on two major factors: *(1) demands and (2) motivations of hostage takers.* Based on the assessments of the negotiators with those two major aspects, the negotiators are able to determine their negotiation abilities and

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strategies. By analyzing the demands of the hostage takers, the negotiators are also able to

classify what kind of hostage situation they are dealing with. The demands made by the hostage

takers might be either substantive or non-substantive. The negotiators are usually able to use

their negotiation abilities when they encounter hostage takers making substantive demands

regardless of if these substantive demands are instrumental or expressive. This means that the

substantive demands of hostage takers might show up either in instrumental or expressive forms.

In some cases hostage takers do not make any demands from the negotiators (Call, 2003).

Table 3

Demand Typologies (This table is a direct quote from Call, 2003, p. 76)

"Demand Typologies	
General Category	Descriptive
Instrumental	Demand characteristics best described as "objective," e.g., money, transportation, food, liquor, drugs.
Expressive	Demand characteristics best described as "subjective," e.g., perpetrator wants to talk to family member, perpetrator wants to talk make a statement to the media regarding delusional beliefs.
Substantive	Victims are threatened to obtain concessions from a third party; the demands may be instrumental or expressive.
Non-substantive	Demands are not made, or, if they are, they are trivial and related to the reason(s) the victim(s) are threatened."

There are several techniques the negotiators frequently apply when they negotiate with

hostage takers over demands. I focused on some of those appropriate techniques and strategies in

the following section.

The negotiators prolong the negotiation with hostage takers by focusing on the demands.

When hostage takers make demands, it is a signal to the negotiators that negotiation exists

between the two parties (Mc Mains and Mullins, 1996). For instance, when hostage takers make

demands, such as asking for a getaway car by setting a deadline, the negotiators might interpret

those demands as the initiation of the negotiation process. It must be expressed that the

negotiators must never ignore the demands and deadlines set by hostage takers. The well trained

hostage negotiators know how to take advantage of the demands and deadlines as negotiation

tools in hostage negotiations (Wind, 1995).

The negotiators are expected to know how to exceed the deadlines without endangering

the hostages. In general, negotiators have to use some acceptable excuses for explaining why

they cannot meet the demands of hostage takers by the deadlines set. The characteristics of the

demands, combined with the deadlines, are usually used as justification tools by the negotiators

for not meeting the demands by the set deadlines (Dolnik, 2004). It is a rather surprising fact that

a very small number of hostages have been executed even when the police overlooked the

deadlines set by hostage takers (Wind, 1995).

As Dolnik (2004) stressed, the negotiators pay attention to particular demands by asking

some detailed questions of the hostage takers. As an example, some hostage takers made several

demands, including a getaway car to leave the scene of the crime. The negotiators focus on each

demand separately. If the negotiators ask the hostage takers about the details of the getaway car,

such as its color, year, and/or model, they might have the hostage takers to forget about the other

demands that have been made.

Meanwhile, effective negotiators will never say 'no' to the demands even though most

certainly will never be met. The negotiators never remind hostage takers of their demands unless

there is a clear benefit for the negotiators in doing so. The negotiators avoid any suggestion that

the hostage takers' demands will soon be met (Lanceley, 2003).

The negotiators always ask for some concessions when hostage takers make their

demands. For instance, if hostage takers ask the negotiators for food, then the negotiators use this

request as negotiation tool by asking for some concessions, such as for the release of the

hostages (Misino, 2004). Some of the demands made by hostage takers are negotiable, but others are not. The negotiators always assess every demand made by hostage takers in accordance with the conditions of each situation. There are some types of demands which are never negotiated by the police, such as providing hostage takers guns, explosives, hostage exchanges, and/or illegal drugs (Mc Mains & Mullins, 1996).

Based on the above summary, the negotiators avoid making hostage takers think that their demands and deadlines are ignored or underestimated by the police. The negotiators aim to make hostage takers think that following the negotiation with the police is the only way to get their needs met. The negotiators also attempt to make hostage takers forget some of their demands and deadlines by using stalling and delaying techniques.

Dealing with News Media

The news media's role is to notify the general public about what is going on around the world (Faure, 2003). The news media always pay attention to police activities, such as hostage holding situations (Higginbotham, 1994). If the news is about hostage situations, then the public pays attention due to the complicated and dramatic nature of the events (Faure, 2003). The interest of the news media can potentially have either positive or negative effects on the ongoing police activities and on-scene hostage situation (Dolnik, 2004).

As for the positive effects, the news media could help the police while the police are responding to hostage situations. As in some events, hostage takers, especially terrorist hostage takers, might request to have contact with the news media to be able to convey their messages and demands to the general public. In 1972, a couple of hostage takers hijacked a Frontier Airlines flight. The police resolved this situation peacefully after the news media broadcasted the messages of the hostage takers, which was about world peace and the education problems of

deprived Mexican kids (Dolnik, 2004). Hostage takers employ the media as a leveraging tool to reach the public in order to make announcements about their demands and motivations. In doing so, both parties, the hostage takers and the news media, fulfill their needs (Faure, 2003).

As for the negative effects, the news media might be putting hostages' lives in danger by acting negligently (Dolnik, 2004). Their actions might cause the hostage situation to deteriorate and could have an effect on the continuing police responses on-scene (Faure, 2003; Fletcher, 1998). Their interference in hostage situations might make the police experience additional difficulties. The news media have a job to do, but their jobs must be restricted with boundaries (Higginbotham, 1994). For instance, in 1977, terrorist hostage takers hijacked a plane in Somali. In this hostage incident, the pilot informed the control tower about the hijacking. Then a reporter came to the control tower and made contact with the radio channel about this ongoing hijacking. After the news of this hijacking was broadcasted, the hostage takers killed the pilot since the hostage takers understood that the pilot sent a message to the control tower. This situation illustrated why the news media should have a limited role while the police are responding to hostage situations. The news media should stay away from the crime scene while the chain of command is dealing with hostage situations (Faure, 2003).

The news media should be allowed to stay in a place where in the police liaison officer can provide them the information they need to inform the public about ongoing hostage situations. It is coordination that keeps the parties safe and content (Higginbotham, 1994). In today's societies, there are numerous police agencies that have assigned liaison officers to deal with the news media while the police are responding to hostage situations. In this way, while the police attempt to resolve the situations, the news media are fully aware of their responsibilities and boundaries on-scene (Poland and McCrystle, 1999).

In the following section, I analyze the core elements and directions of Brenda Dervin's sense making theory and Shannon-Weaver's communication model in order to see if they are applicable to the field of hostage negotiation resolutions. These two theories are not measured to discern if they are parsimonious theories or not, but they are measured to see if the directives and elements of the two theories are workable in resolving certain conflicts, such as hostage holding situations.

Theoretical Framework of Communications

There are two theories used in this study to address the research question 3a. They are Brenda Dervin's sense making theory and Shannon-Weaver's communication model. In this section, I discuss the elements and directives of those two theories in order to formulate the relevant survey questions (survey questions 8 through 14, 17, 18, and 37) in the study and to create a new model of communication theory-based negotiation approach for negotiators.

Brenda Dervin's Sense Making Theory

Brenda Dervin constructed a model to explain a new way of listening to other parties in communications (Dervin, 1989). Dervin tested the current model based on the overview of user interest in knowledge and information seeking behaviors (Dervin, 1998). She provided an overview of the formulation of communication gaps as well as its primary reasons and found out that gaps exist in communication systems because some individuals are not capable and/or willing to get the right information they require. The early research studies explained the gaps in communications by using some socioeconomic traits (race, culture, income, and education) or information contextual traits (media contact, public participation, and getting in touch with experts). With reference to this approach, some individuals might be less capable of getting and

using the right information. Those individuals might be thinking that the information required to fix their communications problems doesn't exist (Dervin, 1980).

However, there are two contradictions and/or deficiencies in explaining the gaps in communication systems in the perspective of the traditional approach. Those two contradictions help in reconceptualizing the gaps in communications. In the first challenge, the receiver is blamed for the gaps in communications; however, the party that should be blamed for creating the communication gaps is the source itself. The attention should be focused on the source rather than the receiver. The first challenge provides two results: (1) the message itself has no power to change or fix the gaps in communication systems. The system must be changed in communications; (2) communications must be based on the receiver-centered approach. In the second challenge, the central approach is concerned with both the nature of information itself and the nature of the receiver. Although each challenge has its own direction, both challenges have some general literature in the common ground. Both of the challenges focus on changing attention from the source-centered communication approach, which is based on the situational theory, to the user-centered communication approach. According to the situational theory, each situation is evaluated under its own conditions individually. Profitable use is made by individuals in each situation and this is known to make sense (Dervin, 1980).

Individuals try to convey their messages to their audiences by communicating with others in their daily life events. They face some challenges, and/or gaps when communicating with others. The aim of the sense making theory is to show individuals how to design a bridge across the gaps. They are able to see the gaps and bridge them in communication systems. If individuals know how to listen, what to ask others in formulating communications, how to make sense, and

how to respond to the gaps through the directives and elements of the sense making theory, they are able to fill the gaps in their communication settings (Dervin, 1989).

If users know what their needs are in their interactions, they will be sensitive and successful. To become successful, the users are not changed, but the ways of thinking, personality, and life style characteristics of the users are changed because these characteristics are more flexible toward change. These changes are customized by a number of conditions, such as barriers, gaps, time, space, and/or internal/external behaviors of the users. It is required that more emphasis be placed on the user-oriented and learner-centered approaches in order to eliminate the gaps in communication systems (Dervin, 1998). The traditional approach is in favor of ignoring individuality, whereas the user-oriented and learner-centered approaches are in favor of the directions and elements of the sense making theory (Dervin, 1989).

Conceptualizing communication helps individuals focus on finding more efficient ways to create new communication systems and designs in their daily lives. The sense making theory provides methodical approaches for individuals to see their communication systems in the broader perspectives and to make sense in their interactions by focusing on listening to other parties and their audience. Since the applications of the sense making theory have been used in a number of fields for over three decades, developing new ways of listening to other individuals is not only for the public but also for institutions and organizations (Dervin, 1998).

Having communication in a dialogue manner is a new way of listening to information users in communication systems (Dervin, 1989). Each communication may be seen in a different manner by each user. The same situation might be evaluated from a different angle by each user. The sense making theory, therefore, built some principle categories that help users resolve the gaps in communication depending on some variables, such as time and space characteristics.

These principle categories might be *(1) finding new ways of looking at communication systems; (2) getting professional support from the other -experts- in their movements; and (3) reevaluating what the users want to do to make sense of their questions in the interactions with other individuals* (Dervin, 1998).

Reconceptualization of the Gaps

Knowledge management is focused on both uniformity and diversity in communications. The information users should understand not only the agreements but also disagreements -gaps- in communication situations in considering time and place characteristics. Focusing on those characteristics helps individuals deal with the disharmony of diversities in a communication system. Those contradictions -gaps- have merited attention in the sense making theory; and the theory has been used to find out what/how users are supposed to think, feel, make sense, and wish in their communications. To generate more useful communication systems and designs, the theory is interested in how the users make sense of situations they are involved in and how they look at communication (Dervin, 1998).

The sense making approach is preferred over the traditional approach in knowledge management systems. In the traditional approach, the user may ask the librarian if they have a book on a certain subject, and the librarian replies 'yes, we do'. However, in the sense making questioning approach, the librarian asks what kind of questions he/she would like to ask that day. This approach creates more workable and useful interactions between the social actors compared to the questioning presented in the traditional approach (Dervin, 1998). The librarian asks the users the questions in a more sensible way because the librarian tries to understand and see the client from a different viewpoint through the directives and elements of the sense making theory (Dervin, 1989).

This proposed approach suggests some mandates for designing communications. This approach focuses on both the material and emotional aspects of communication because both aspects are very important for measuring the outcomes of communication situations. There is a need to see all viewpoints within the situations. As long as individuals feel good and fearless, they are going to be more productive and fruitful in their interactions with others. In some cases, disagreeing with those in power might be intimidating. Essentially, the users should be able to tell what they really think and how they feel without being frightened in situations because this is one of the central mandates of the sense making theory (Dervin, 1998).

Information and knowledge are likely to be applicable not only at a particular time and in a particular space but also in relation to self-interests and learning capacities of other parties, and audiences. This helps us to understand how the social actors conceptualize their interpersonal interactions and how the audience calls for a change. Dervin illustrates this situation with a fitting example; medical checkups, such as breast exams, are recommended by doctors and health advocates for every woman. The likelihood of getting a disease, like breast cancer, of course, rises as a woman gets older. There is no doubt that early diagnosis increases the chance for the recovery. The woman should know what to change and how to call for a change in her particular lifestyle first. This means that if one knows how to call for a change at a particular time and in particular circumstances, then she/he can increase the chances of being successful in the intended purpose in communication systems (Dervin, 1989).

Taken together, when individuals are faced the gaps and contradictions in their communication systems, they use the sense making method in order to apply all available directives and elements of the theory into their communicative movements (Dervin, 1989). The theory tries to change the system designs rather than change the users because if the way of

looking at the users is changed, the working system is likely to be functional and make sense to users, causing them to be more productive and successful in knowledge management. Dervin claims that roughly 40 research studies proved that changing working systems and institutions, which are based on the user-centered approach, instead of changing the users, makes this theory more parsimonious (Dervin, 1998). Dervin also agreed that the principle remains the same when using the sense making method in order to apply all available elements and directives of the theory into the field of hostage negotiation resolutions (Dervin Brenda, personal communication, October 4, 2007)

Shannon-Weaver's Communication Model

In 1949, Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver published their book about the mathematical theory of communication based on the proceedings explaining transferring information from message sender to message receiver through a selected transmitter (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Shannon and Weaver pointed out the factual meaning of the word of 'information' in their model for the readers to understand clearly.

> To be sure, this word information in communication theory relates not so much to what you do say, as to what you could say. That is, information is a measure of one's freedom of choice when one selects a message. If one is confronted with a very elementary situation where he has to choose one of two alternative messages, then it is arbitrarily said that the information, associated with this situation, is unity (1949, p. 100).

In this theory, the term of 'communication systems' addresses all the procedures including verbal, written, and visual materials and/or behaviors presented in the field of communication systems. Communication systems presented in this model comprise several vital parties and/or elements, such as *(1) information source (message sender), (2) message (information), (3) transmitter, (4) channel, (5) message receiver, and (6) destination* (Shannon and Weaver, 1949).

Figure 1. Schematic diagram of a general communication system in the Shannon-Weaver model (This figure is a direct quote from Shannon and Weaver, (1949, p. 5).

I discussed the meanings of the vital parties and/or elements presented in Figure 1 in order for the readers to gain the insight into the Shannon-Weaver's communication model. Shannon and Weaver stated that an information source creates selected messages to send to a message receiver. The selected messages of a source might be comprised of verbal, written, and visual materials and/or behaviors, such as letters, telephone conversations, pictures, music, and/or combinations of those materials and/or behaviors (Shannon and Weaver, 1949).

A transmitter creates the signals of selected messages depending on the types of the channels used by individuals purposely in communication systems. In a telephone conversation, the messages of a source are put into the electric current to be able to send messages to a message receiver, which is known as a procedure of encoding the selected information in messages (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). As Shannon and Weaver stated, "in oral speech, the information source is the brain, the transmitter is the voice mechanism producing the varying sound pressure (the signal) which is transmitted through the air (the channel)" (1949, p. 98).

A channel presented is the system itself to convey the signals of selected information in the sent messages to the message receiver. For instance, using a power line, radio frequency, electric cable/wire, and/or incandescent lamp might be good examples for the channels used by sources as presented in the model of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949).

A receiver carries out the reverse function of what a transmitter does in the system. Upon getting the signals of the selected information in messages, the receiver rebuilds this information in the sent messages into the original form. This is known as decoding the meanings of the received messages. Finally, the destination in communication systems might be either a human being or an item that gets the sent messages (Shannon and Weaver, 1949).

Noises in the Received Signals

Shannon and Weaver mentioned that, there are some 'noises' in the received signals. They revealed that there are three levels of communications problems:

> Relative to the broad subject of communication, there seems to be problems at three levels. Thus it seems reasonable to ask, serially:
> LEVEL A. How accurately can the symbols of communication be transmitted? (The technical problem.)
> LEVEL B. How precisely do the transmitted symbols convey the desired meaning? (The semantic problem.)
> LEVEL C. How effectively does the received meaning affect conduct in the desired way? (The effectiveness problem) (1949, p. 95-96).

As presented in the level A, the technical problems might be referring to the concerns of sending the symbols of information and messages accurately to the destination through the transmissions. As presented in the level B, the semantic problems might be referring to the concerns of using the transmitted symbols if they are able to transmit messages precisely while protecting the original meanings and forms of the messages. Lastly, as presented in the level C, the effectiveness problems might be referring to the concerns regarding whether received and interpreted information and messages produce an intended performance on the part of the message receiver (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Shannon and Weaver also revealed that "the effectiveness problem is closely interrelated with the semantic problem, and overlaps it in a rather vague way; and there is in fact overlap between all of the suggested categories of problems" (1949, p. 97).

The following fictional examples describe the three types of communications problems presented above. The following is an example of the technical problem (Level A): 'I was riding as a passenger in a car with my friend Alex driving. We were listening to loud music on the radio. Suddenly from my side of the car, a child began running into the street. I said "STOP", but the music kept Alex from hearing me. In this situation, the symbols could not be transmitted precisely. The following is an example of a semantic problem (Level B): In the same situation, I was riding in the car with my friend Alex driving. We were having a conversation, so the radio was not on. A child started to run into the street. I shouted "DUR!" which means "stop" in Turkish, but Alex did not stop because he is an American and does not understand the Turkish language. My word was appropriate for my context but not for his context. The following is a fiction example of the effectiveness problem (Level C): Once again, in the same situation, I yelled "Stop!", but instead of stopping, Alex pulled the car over to the side of the road. In this situation, the word -symbol- was accurately transmitted, and the word -symbol- conveyed the desired meaning, but the received meaning did not affect Alex's conduct in the desired way.

Shannon and Weaver stated the following:

In the process of being transmitted, it is unfortunately characteristic that certain things are added to the signal which were not intended by the information source. These unwanted additions may be distortions of sound (in telephony, for example) or static (in radio), or distortions in shape or shading of picture (television), or errors in transmission (telegraphy or facsimile), etc. All of these changes in the transmitted signal are called *noise* (1949, p. 99).

According to the communication model of Shannon and Weaver, if the noise has influence over the symbols of the sent message, then the received message is likely to be carrying some inaccuracies and/or deformations compared to the sent message in its original and intended form (Shannon and Weaver, 1949).

Shannon and Weaver stated the following:

> The word *communication* will be used here in a very broad sense to include all of the procedures by which one mind may affect another. This, of course, involves not only written and oral speech, but also music, the pictorial arts, the theatre, the ballet, and in fact all human behavior. In some connections it may be desirable to use a still broader definition of communication, namely, one which would include the procedures by means of which one mechanism (say automatic equipment to track an airplane and to compute its probable future positions) affects another mechanism (say a guided missile chasing this airplane) (1964, p. 3).

Based on the above statement, it is clear that the communication model of Shannon-Weaver can be adapted to any sort of communication system performed between individuals. Aksakal (2005) indicated that a situation in which the physical noises might affect the symbols of the sent message, as originally revealed in the model of Shannon-Weaver, can be adapted to interpersonal communication systems performed between social actors in their daily lives. Aksakal also stated that the types of physical noises affecting the symbols of the sent messages might be varying depending on the characteristics of the channels of communication systems.

In order to strengthen the above statement, Aksakal (2005) imagined a scenario related to the field of patrolling within a police department. Based on this case study, a new commanding officer is assigned to a patrolling division of a police department. After being informed of each patrol unit's arrest rate in this jurisdiction, the commanding officer orders each patrol unit to increase the arrest rate by running a minimum of two operations per week. Attempting to comply with this order, some units feel greater stress. Without considering the situational difficulties and challenges of working as patrol officers in the streets, the new unit chief of the patrolling division contributes to the stress and pressure on the patrol officers. The explained source of the stress and pressure in this study might be a good example for explaining the physical noise affecting the symbols of the messages relating to interpersonal communication systems in the field of police patrolling units.

Core Elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's

Theories Applied to Hostage Negotiations

The argument is made about the applications of the core elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories into the field of hostage negotiation resolutions. I discuss applying the principle directives of the two theories into the field of hostage negotiations. This is done to determine if the elements of the theories are workable in using hostage negotiation techniques. The argument made here was used in formulating the survey questions regarding the two theory elements. I discuss why these two theories have been used in particular in this study. It must be stated once again that I have not attempted to test or measure the two theories. In fact, these two theories have been tested and measured by scholars and researchers numerous times. These two theories have already been proven by such a wealth of empirical research that it can be stated that they are parsimonious theories and/or models.

I used those two theories in this study for two primary reasons. First, both theories are addressing very similar elements, which relate to fixing the problems or gaps in communication environments. When one takes into consideration the findings with the summary of the literature review presented in this chapter so far, it can be noticed that the elements addressed by the two theories are quite applicable to the field of hostage negotiation resolutions. Second, Dervin's theory puts its principle focus on the function of the meanings in sent message in the sense making theory approach, while Shannon-Weaver model puts its principle focuses on the sent message itself in communications, trying to discern if the sent message is accurately conveyed to the other party. The two points of the examination presented here are not contradictory; in fact, they complement each other. While examining the field of hostage negotiations, I used the concepts, 'meanings' and 'messages' addressed by the two theories.

Similar to the ideas and thoughts based on the summary of the theories presented earlier, the hostage negotiators attempt to hear the signals from hostage takers and look for the patterns in hostage takers' reactions in responding to hostage situations. To resolve hostage situations, the negotiators need clear understanding of the meanings of the hostage takers' messages. The probability of clear understanding of the meanings is increased by clear reception of the sent messages. When the negotiators determine if a hostage situation they are dealing with is instrumental or expressive, they are likely to predict what types of messages, or demands, they will receive from the hostage takers. The negotiators receive and interpret hostage takers' messages so that they can predict what the next one will be. To do this, the negotiators try to use appropriate word choices and to ask open-ended questions.

In a hostage situation, an interpersonal communication is carried out between the two parties; the negotiators and hostage takers. As expected in communication situations, both parties, the negotiators and hostage takers, take turns in the roles of the message sender and message receiver. Hostage takers, however, are more likely to act as the source, while the negotiators act as the message receiver. That is why the negotiators are usually the ones opening up the channel between those two parties. By doing this, the negotiators attempt to hear and know what hostage takers really mean to say in their sent messages. The probability of understanding the meaning is increased by accurate reception of the messages. To do that, the negotiators are expected to reduce the noises affecting the symbols in the messages of hostage takers. The interaction between the two parties, the negotiators and hostage takers, is followed by several third parties, such as the parties in the command post, families, bystanders, news media, and public. This means that in hostage situations, the physical noises might vary depending on the characteristics of the hostage situations and the actors involved. The negotiators, therefore,

are encouraged to use active listening skills and knowledge of previous hostage situations -prior negotiator experience- in order to reduce any sort of noise in the symbols of the message coming from hostage takers.

Based on Dervin's notions, the probability of making good sense in communicating with hostage takers increases the likelihood of better performance on the part of the negotiators. If the negotiators know how to listen, what to ask hostage takers in formulating hostage negotiations, how to make sense, and how to respond to the barriers to effective hostage negotiations, they are likely to bridge the gaps in responding to hostage holding situations effectively. The notion of using the sense making approach in hostage negotiations might vary depending on variables, such as time and space constraints. The negotiators should consider that every hostage situation is a different case that should be evaluated under its own unique conditions and challenges. The negotiators will find new ways of looking at negotiations in responding to hostage situations. As long as the negotiators know how to call for a change at particular time and in a particular space while implementing hostage negotiations in instrumental and expressive hostage situations, they are able to promote new methods of communication with hostage takers in order to resolve hostage situations without bloodshed. The negotiators might get some professional support in their critical movements from other parties, such as other negotiators, professionals, and/or mental health experts. It helps the negotiators reevaluate what hostage takers want to do and make sense of interactions with hostage takers.

The survey questions related to the elements of the two theories, Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories, addressed by the third research question in the study are based on the discussion and evaluation presented above in this section. The questions 8 through 14, 17, 18, and 37 in the survey instrument were formulated considering the core elements of the two

theories and findings with the summary of the field of hostage negotiations presented throughout

chapter.

Previous Research Studies

Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner, and Gelles, (1998) reviewed the historical background of

hostage situations and the field of hostage negotiation resolutions, described negotiation strategy

and practice for negotiators, and discussed the roles of mental health professionals as well as

psychologists with the other key players, especially the negotiation team, in the command post

structure on-scene. According to Hatcher and his colleagues, hostage situations have increased in

the last 30 years. The motivations of hostage takers have been either instrumental or expressive.

Hatcher and his colleagues stated that mental health professionals and psychologists made

valuable contributions to negotiation resolutions of negotiators after the police agencies started

using negotiation strategy more frequently in order to end situations peacefully. The police

agencies started taking advantage of mental health professionals during negotiation

implementations since use of negotiation strategy is more likely to reduce the amount of death

and/or injuries in responding to hostage situations.

Jenkins, Johnson, and Ronfeldt, (1977) reviewed 77 worldwide hostage situations

occurring between August 1968 and June 1975. The researchers of this study examined some

demographic characteristics of these 77 international hostage holding situations, including but

not limited to the types of the hostage situations, the types of demands, the fate of the hostages

and the hostage takers, the nature of the target countries, and the duration of the hostage

situations. Jenkins and his colleagues uncovered valuable findings; for instance, they stated that

Americans were more likely to be the hostages in these hostage situations; hostage takers made

demands in roughly 66 % of the situations; hostage takers were more likely to demand that local

governments release some inmates from prison; the hostages were more likely to be killed during police tactical interventions, instead direct execution by the hostage takers.

Soskis and Van Zandt (1986) in their study examined negotiation strategy based on establishing trust and building rapport between the negotiators and hostage takers. Hostage negotiation technique can easily be applied to all types of hostage takers including, terrorist, criminal, prisoner, emotionally upset, and mentally ill hostage takers. The researchers stated that hostage negotiation is a special task performed only by the negotiators. The third parties, including family members of hostages and/or hostage takers might provide valuable help and assistance to the negotiation team while implementing the negotiation practice on-scene. Lastly, the researchers focus on the negotiation team selection and their training processes. They clearly stated that having precise negotiator selection and training programs is likely to prepare the negotiators to be successful in dealing with even very stressful and critical hostage situations.

Call (2003) stated that in the past three decades the field of negotiation resolutions has been developed to determine the best strategies and techniques for the negotiators. Call in his study analyzed this progress within the field of negotiation process in hostage situations. Call discussed negotiation strategy and practice as well as crisis, demand, and hostage taker classifications. Call revealed that there are two types of primary demands in hostage holding situations: *(1) instrumental demands, such as monetary gains, drugs, and/or weapons, and (2) expressive demands, such as isolation, and/or speaking with family members.* Demands might be either substantive, which are instrumental and/or expressive, or non-substantive, which are likely to be minor or not associated with hostage holding situations. Call also examined the hostage/crisis database systems that have been created by either governmental professionals or scientists. Lastly, Call made some recommendations about promoting negotiation strategies,

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having local hostage incident database systems, and developing hostage recovery studies for the police and scholars.

Summary

Throughout this chapter, I discussed and analyzed crisis situations, hostage situations, communication systems, and hostage negotiations used by the negotiators in hostage situations. In addition, I discussed the key players and their roles in hostage situations and primary activities affecting and constructing hostage negotiations and decision making of the negotiators. I also analyzed Dervin's sense making theory and Shannon-Weaver's communication model in order to better describe the communications/negotiations addressed by the relevant research questions. The aim of this chapter was to make clearer the concepts of the argument by discussing the literature review of the field of hostage negotiation resolutions.

I found that hostage situations are critical events that the police frequently encounter in today's societies. The police are likely to use the negotiation practice in responding to hostage situations instead using police tactical team practice. Using the components of negotiation in conflict resolutions, such hostage holding situations are quite similar to using the components of communication in the daily life of individuals. Since hostage negotiations are prone to being subjected to noises and gaps, the techniques of the field of hostage negotiations should be practiced by well-trained negotiators. These professionals use special skills, tools, and techniques based on the fields of communication and psychological sciences. Today's police departments, knowing the importance of using hostage negotiation strategy, have saved countless lives of hostages and hostage takers as well since they frequently use hostage negotiation resolutions based on the cooperation and collaboration between the police and scholars of the sciences of psychology and communication.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research design, methodology of the research, and limitations in the study. In this chapter, I discuss the target populations, sampling frame, survey design, survey instrument, data collection, data analysis, reliability and validity issues. The limitations are discussed at the end of the chapter.

Methodology

In this study, what kinds of dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools are used by the negotiators, what elements of negotiation strategy and practice differ in instrumental and expressive hostage situations, and if the negotiators' beliefs in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories have impact on handling instrumental and expressive situations differently are measured.

The aim of this study is to look at the similarities and differences between the insights of the negotiators in implementing negotiation strategies and decision making in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. What the perceptions of the negotiators are when implementing negotiation strategies in instrumental and expressive situations are examined. For the purpose of this study that the term of *'instrumental hostage situations'* refers to terrorist, criminal, and inmate hostage events, whereas the term of *'expressive hostage situations'* refers to emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage holders.

In this chapter, I examined the data gathering method of the research issues. I used an online survey instrument geared toward research participants working as professional negotiators in law enforcement agencies in the US and Canada. I used non-probability sampling to select the research participants for the study. The research participants were selected to complete the survey questions based on their expertise include negotiation experience in the field of hostage holding situations.

The statements in the survey instrument were formulated through the summaries of the field of hostage negotiations and the core elements/directives of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories presented throughout the second chapter in this study. The questions in the survey instrument in this study are theory guided questions. By formulating the survey instrument, I aimed to identify the primary components affecting and contributing to hostage negotiation strategies and decision making of negotiators and to establish a model of communication theory-based negotiation strategies, which are the research interests in this study.

I also received expert validation while constructing the survey questions. After formulating the survey questions, I sent the prepared survey questions to the four well-known and professional hostage/crisis negotiators in the US and Canada for their expert reviews. They are *(1) Barney McNeilly, the President of the Canadian Critical Incident Incorporated and retired chief hostage/crisis negotiator from the Toronto Police Service, (2) Gary Noesner, the current Vice President of the Control Risks and former chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit, (3) Steve Romano, the retired chief negotiator from the FBI, and (4) Robert J. Louden, the former Commanding Officer of the Hostage Negotiation Unit at the New York City Police Department, NYPD, and current faculty member at the Department of Criminal Justice in the Georgian Court University.*

To better understand the results of research studies, researchers are supposed to know how to design and implement research studies in approved manners. There are some well known research designs, such as *(1) descriptive, (2) explanatory, (3) predictive, and (4) intervening* (Dantzker & Hunter, 2006) research designs. In addition, Pentti Routio mentions an exploratory research design (Routio, 2007).

In the descriptive research design, researchers try to collect information and knowledge about research interests that they focus on. They aim to collect data with their research interests to better define the characteristics, opinions, and/or perceptions of the focused issues. The descriptive research design has affectively been used by researchers in the field of criminal justice and criminology (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006). For the purpose of the first research question in this study, I aimed to identify the primary components affecting and contributing to negotiation strategies and decision making of the negotiators. How the negotiation process is put into practice by the negotiators and what the perceptions and opinions of the negotiators are while implementing negotiation are the research interests examined for the purpose of answering the first research question. The first research question fits with the notion of the descriptive research design presented above. This study has a descriptive research design regarding the first research question.

Researchers are likely to prefer using an exploratory research design if there are not any previous models to explain their focused research interests. Researchers often use the relevant earlier models in order to take advantage of the directions and elements while implementing their own studies. Though earlier models exist for researchers to use while implementing their own research studies, researchers still might not prefer to use the earlier models for three reasons.

First, they might have concerns about having restricted descriptions from the notion of the previous models. Second, researchers might have some concerns that the previous models might have limited objectives for extending their own research interests. Third, researchers might be suspicious of the fact that the directives and elements of the previous models could be misdirecting their own studies (Routio, 2007). For the purpose of the second research question, I aimed to measure the perceptions of the negotiators about affecting factors and elements of performing negotiation strategy in two types of hostage holding environments: instrumental and expressive. I could not find any previous relevant research models analyzing and/or discussing the same topic as the second research question. Even though there were some previous studies, they were limited. The nature of the second research question necessitates that this study has an exploratory research design.

In the explanatory research design, researchers are likely to explain the causes of a relationship that exists in focused research interests (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006). Cause-effect relationships between the variables regarding the research interests are identified by this type of design (Bachman and Schutt, 2003). For the purpose of the third research question, I tried to measure if the negotiators' beliefs in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories affect their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. I sought to determine if there is a significant relationship between the elements of the two theories and implementing negotiation strategies differently in responding to instrumental and expressive hostage situations. The nature of the third research question necessitates that this study has an explanatory research design.

In sum, all the information within the research designs reveals that once one determines what kind of research design is used in a particular study, the primary focus is placed on how

questions in survey instruments will be designed and/or formulated. This is done in order to make sure the preferred research design fits with the interests/issues of the particular study.

To construct the research design in this study, I identified the target population (research participants) first. As mentioned earlier, the primary focus in this study is to learn the perceptions and opinions of the negotiators performing negotiation strategy and practice in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. In order to perform this plan, the survey participants, who are the negotiators in the US and Canada, were chosen for the survey study.

For the purpose of the survey in this study, the respondents were chosen non-randomly. The research participants were selected with regard to their expertise. The non-probability sampling allowed to identify the characteristics of the research participants and to select them based on their expertise. The main focus in this study is to attain the insights of experts into implementing negotiation strategy in responding to hostage situations. Although non-probability sampling seems to diminish generalizability of the research findings to other cases and studies, it might not be true all the time. If the findings of this study, for instance, are true for the research participants, they are likely to be true for other negotiators working in the field of hostage situations in those two countries. The findings will give the professionals wider viewpoints since the evaluations and findings in this study include future recommendations coming from the science of communication.

The selected survey participants were able to reveal a wide range of expert opinion and knowledge through the web survey method. This helped find significant results relating to the research questions in the study. To illustrate the characteristics of the research participants, the definition of the term of *'hostage/crisis negotiator'* is stated in the chapter one. The goals of

giving the conceptual definition of this term are to clarify the main concept of the research issues

and to keep the reader's understanding of the terms used in this study consistent.

Target Population

The survey in this study was completed to by hostage/crisis negotiators in the U.S. and

Canada. Indeed, the negotiator members of the Canadian Critical Incident Incorporated, CCII,

were the research participants in this study. The CCII has roughly 300 hostage/crisis negotiator

members across Canada. I reached the CCII members via e-mail to Barney McNeilly, the

President of the CCII. I used a purposive sampling technique to reach the participants. More

information about the CCII and its membership can be found from the official website at

http://www.commandpost.tv/

I obtained the data from the CCII by selecting their members. Because of three reasons,

the target frame was the same with the sampling frame that the data was collected from. First,

this made the study more accurate in terms of representing the full list of the members of the

CCII. Second, the full list of the members of the CCII was exposed to the survey questions

because it was possible to reach all of them. Third, this survey was a self-administered study, so

the research participants had the opportunity to complete the survey questions by visiting the

survey website at any time. Since in self-administrated survey studies, the response rate of the

participants might be low, the full list of the members of the CCII was exposed to the questions.

As a trained hostage/crisis negotiator, I had initial personal contacts with the police in the

US. It was possible to reach the research participants in the US via e-mails and/or telephone. I

made contact with negotiators in several police departments and police associations in the US by

using a purposive sampling technique. Since there are not many trained negotiators in police

departments, I had to make contact with negotiators from several departments and associations in order to get a sufficient response rate.

I made contact with some officers in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, the New York City Police Department, NYPD, the Texas Association of Hostage Negotiators, TAHN, the Ohio Association of Chiefs of Police, OACP, as well as other small police departments in the U.S. Contact letters were sent to the chiefs of the police departments and the presidents of the police associations in the U.S. listed above. The crisis negotiation unit chief of the FBI, the chief of the NYPD, the president of the TAHN, and the executive director of the OACP agreed to distribute the survey questions to their membership by sending them the survey link address of this study via e-mails.

Sampling

In contrast to the idea of giving equal chance to each party in the population to be selected into the sample in the probability sampling technique, a party in the population is selected deliberately into the sample by a researcher in the non-probability sampling technique. There are, of course, some logical reasons to conduct the non-probability sampling technique instead probability sampling technique. For instance, if there is not a population census and/or if there is not any apprehension with the larger population in the study, researchers might use the non-probability sampling techniques (Bachman and Schutt, 2003). The purposive sampling is the most known non-probability sampling technique (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006).

In the purposive sampling technique, researchers choose research parties in the population deliberately. Since they use their own discretion in selecting certain parties into the sample, this technique is known as judgment sampling. There are several reasons for researchers to use this particular technique. First, if researchers want to use the full list of research parties in

a population which is more likely to be a limited group of people; if selected research parties have special data, information, and/or experience fitting research interests/issues (Bachman and Schutt, 2003); and if selected research parties are reachable and available to researchers in their studies, then the purposive sampling technique can be used by researchers for the purposes of their own studies (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006).

This study has the non-probability sample design, in particular the purposive sampling technique in selecting the negotiators as research participants in the US and Canada for the following six reasons: First, there is no hostage/crisis negotiator census in both countries. This means that there is not population list to use. Second, the research participants in both countries are not random police officers, but experts in the field of hostage/crisis negotiations. There are not many hostage/crisis negotiators in police the agencies. Finding hostage/crisis negotiators to complete the survey questions is not an easy task, especially for scholars and researchers who have much more limited access to the sources. Third, there is not any apprehension with the larger population in the study. Therefore, there was no need to generalize the results of this study to the larger population of police officers. Fourth, the expert sample is more appropriate in terms of obtaining more appropriate results. Fifth, the selected research participants were reachable and available. Sixth, the selected research participants have special information and knowledge that fit the needs of the research issues in addressing the research questions.

All of the research participants' responses to the survey questions in this study, regardless of whether or not they answered all the survey questions or left some items unanswered were included in the dataset and their valid responses are included in the analyses in order to reduce the risk of any potential respondent bias. The SPSS program uses only the valid responses when computing the statistics in each analysis. If a participant did not provide a valid response to any

of the items included in a statistical analysis, the SPSS program automatically drops this response from the computations and calculates the statistics by using cases who provided a valid response to all the items included in that analysis. However, a missing response in one analysis might be a valid response in another analysis if the research participant provided a valid response to the items included in the latter analysis. Therefore, there is no basis for deleting responses who did not answer part of the survey questions and excluding them from all the computations since this causes significant loss of information.

Survey Design

Researchers usually use survey studies in order to gather new data regarding research interests and issues, including but not limited to information, experiences, beliefs, perceptions, and procedures collected from the research participants. The characteristics of the respondents might be changed depending on the topics of research interest. In survey studies, researchers choose their interests first. They then formulate survey questionnaires and submit the questions to their research participants. Some researchers use available (existing) scales, whereas some others design their own scales if they cannot find available scales used before by other researchers related with their own research topics and interests. If researchers formulate their own survey questionnaires, they are supposed to consider creating valid and reliable survey instruments. They cautiously decide word choice in creating the questions (reliability) so that all questions are understood by the research participants in the same way. In addition to the reliability issue, researchers are supposed to measure what they originally intended to measure with their survey questions (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001).

According to the professional observation based on the literature review, there are very few empirical research studies within the field of hostage negotiation resolutions, and very few

research studies stating the primary factors affecting negotiation strategy used by the negotiators. If the negotiators are taught the elements affecting negotiation process, they are likely to be effective in deciding what the right negotiation strategy is for them to use in responding to hostage situations effectively. I used the online survey method to measure which factors affect negotiation strategies and decision making of the negotiators.

There is potential effectiveness with using an electronic survey method. Some negatives related to implementing survey studies are removed by using the electronic survey method, such as using e-mail and/or web survey studies over the internet. Researchers using a web survey method are able to avoid postal costs, mail out, document, and data collection as well as data entry costs. In addition, the only required primary capability of the research participants involved in electronic survey studies is to know enough basic computer skills to access and complete the survey (Dillman, 2000).

I chose to use the web survey method to take advantage of the efficiencies of performing an electronic survey because according to the literature review, many negotiators only work part time in their police departments, also work as either patrol officers or police detectives. In some police departments, being negotiators are purely voluntary jobs. Their work schedules, therefore, might be very busy. This could affect the response rate of the research participants in the study.

Dantzker and Hunter (2006) suggested, self-administered survey studies consisting of written survey instruments formulated by researchers to facilitate completion and return within a restricted amount of time have both advantages and disadvantages. Having a problem with the response rate of respondents, skipping of some questions, and misreading and/or misinterpreting the questions might be some disadvantages of conducting self-administered survey studies. Conversely, there are some advantages of conducting self-administered survey studies, including

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but not limited to having a financially viable research design and simple data collection and analysis methods. I favored using a self-administered survey study due to the apparent tight working schedules of the research participants.

Survey Instrument

Formulating the questions in a survey instrument is a critical step. That is why any survey question prepared by researchers could be criticized by their peers. Therefore, researchers have to be very careful while formulating their survey questionnaires. There are some directions and instructions for designing good survey questions (Travers, 1978).

First, survey questions should be stated by researchers clearly enough for all research participants to understand every idea and thought presented in the questions. This might be tested by researchers through implementing pilot studies that would discern whether or not the questions could be clearly understood. Second, survey questions that evoke respondents to give stereotyped answers should be avoided. Third, the answer of a research participant to a particular survey question at present should be the same or similar when it is asked of the same participant a second time. When the extent in a study is measured with a group of participants a number of times, the same and/or similar results should be made at each measurement. Fourth, researchers should avoid asking hypothetical questions. Fifth, researchers should avoid asking questions which are too long or very complex because participants might be confused by lengthy and sophisticated questions (Travers, 1978).

Sixth, researchers are expected to start formulating questionnaires with simple and interesting questions at the very beginning of their surveys (Dillman, 2000). This makes research participants feel relaxed toward answering the survey. The middle section of the survey instrument is likely to be based on thoughtful decisions for the participants. The questions in the

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middle section of the survey instrument might be more challenging. The last section in the survey instrument might be about personal issues -demographic questions-. This type of survey format is likely to encourage the respondents to complete the entire survey (Alpert and MacDonald, 2001). Finally, researchers should avoid asking dual-purpose questions; if survey questions are double-ended, responses to such questions will not be coherent (Travers, 1978).

In this survey study, the questions were designed by the researcher himself. Despite the crucial directions and guidelines mentioned above, I could not find any available scales related to the field of research interest. I received expert validation while formulating the questions. After the questions were created, they were sent to the four chief hostage/crisis negotiators in the US and Canada for review. This ensured that the most used terms by negotiators as well as the vocabulary of US and Canadian negotiators would be used in designing the survey questions.

In addition, the survey questions in this study are theory-guided, reflecting the communication theories of Brenda Dervin and Shannon-Weaver. They were present to help guide in preparation of the survey instruments. I aimed to look at whether or not the model of communication theory-based negotiation strategy for the negotiators can be strengthened through the elements of those two theories. I embedded the essential elements and directions of the theories into the research questions, and put the questions on the survey website. I did not mention that the 12 elements of the two theories were embedded into the survey questions. Otherwise, the research participants might be confused since the research participants are most likely to have no idea about the two theories, even though they already may use the elements and directives of the theories.

In a survey study, to increase the response rate of research participants, researchers may have contact their target populations during the studies through several means of communication,

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including but not limited to telephone, fax, and/or internet connection (Alpert and MacDonald, 2001). For this purpose, I made contact several times, through telephone calls and/or e-mail contact with the chiefs of the target police departments, the presidents of the target associations, and the unit commanders of target police agencies. The goal was to achieve the highest response rate of the research participants to the survey study.

There were 46 multiple-choice and yes-no questions in this survey. At the very beginning of the survey instrument, all of the research participants were advised that it should take about 25 minutes to complete the survey questions. Even though the research participants are experts in the practical field of hostage negotiations, some of the most used terms and concepts in the survey questions were defined in order to assure all of the participants understood the questions in the same way. The research participants were also informed about the aims of implementing this research study. They were told that the statements in the survey had been formulated in order to identify primary components affecting and constructing negotiation strategies and decision making of the negotiators and to establish a model of communication theory-based negotiation strategies.

In addition to the quantitatively prepared 46 questions in the survey questionnaire, one qualitative statement was positioned at the very end of the survey instrument. That was *'please add any comments and opinions about the survey and about hostage/crisis negotiation.'* The goal was to obtain some qualitative information and knowledge from the respondents in order to learn how they implement negotiation strategies and decision making in hostage situations. I aimed to illuminate the quantitative findings of this study -gained through using some statistical methods- by citing some relevant quotes gained from the valuable input of the research participants.

248 participants in the US and Canada responded to the online survey study, but only 64 respondents left written input that included some personal opinions about the survey. These critiques or comments included personal information, such as the respondents' real names, their ranks, police agencies' names, their contact e-mails and/or addresses as well as some valuable input about implementing negotiation strategies and decision making of the negotiators in responding to instrumental and expressive hostage situations. I removed any personal comments, and contact information from the statements. After that process, there were 40 items of input written by the 40 different respondents. I used them throughout this study to consolidate and strengthen the general findings. These 40 qualitative statements were put into APPENDIX C.

Reliability

The reliability issue concerns the accuracy and consistency of the measurement in a research study. When the extent in a study is measured a number of times and consistent results are found in each measurement, then there is reliability in this particular study (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006). For instance, if you have car trouble, you go to a mechanic, who gives you a list of the problems with your car. Then you might go to another mechanic to get a second opinion. If the second mechanic gives you the same and/or similar list of the problems with the car, then reliability with the diagnosis of both mechanics is established (Slavin, 2007).

To increase the reliability of the study, I conducted the following instructions in the data collection phase. The responses of 18 research participants who first completed the survey questions were used in the reliability test used to measure the reliability of the scales in the survey instrument. In this section, two different reliability measures were reported. The first measure shows the reliability analysis for the first 17 survey questions focusing on the primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by the responding

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negotiators. These 17 survey questions measure whether the elements of Dervin's sense making theory and Shannon-Weaver's communication model are useful as a framework for negotiation strategy. The Alpha for this scale is 0.7946.

The survey question 18 was not added into this measurement because I used different five level categories for this item.

Table 4

Reliability Test Result for the Questions 1-17 in the Survey Instrument

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)
Reliability Coefficients
N of Cases = 18.0   *N* of Items = 29
Alpha = .7946

The second measurement shows the reliability analysis for survey questions 19 through 36 (questions with instrumental and expressive scenarios presented in the survey instrument) regarding the second research question, which specifically measures what elements of hostage negotiations and factors influencing hostage negotiations differ while the negotiators are responding to instrumental and expressive hostage situations.

The Alpha for this scale is 0.8138. Both of the values presented in Tables 4 and 5 clearly show that these scales have the high reliability necessary for future analysis.

Table 5

Reliability Test Result for the Questions 19-36 in the Survey Instrument

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS - SCALE (ALPHA)	
Reliability Coefficients	
N of Cases = 18.0	*N* of Items = 26
Alpha = .8138	

I attempted to ensure the research participants understood all of the survey questions in the same way. After formulating the survey, I sent the prepared questions to the four senior hostage/crisis negotiators retired from the police agencies either in the US or Canada. These negotiators have deep experience, knowledge, and high-quality backgrounds in the doctrine of hostage negotiation resolutions. After they received the questions, they reviewed the questions to see if they had any ideas, thoughts, recommendations, and opinions about the content and/or design of the questions. These experts reviewed the survey instrument considering its accuracy and comprehensiveness. I then prepared an orientation at the very beginning of the 'Informed Consent Notice' in the survey instrument for the respondents to know what to do, how to do it, and what the aim of this study was. This also helped the respondents participating in the study to understand the questions and its aims in the same way.

Validity

Better research evaluations bring more dependable outcomes. It is not about finding precise outcomes, but obtaining more credible results in research studies. Researchers should attempt to provide more dependable outcomes by reducing any uncertainty issues with the results of their studies (Berk and Rossi, 1999). Researchers should be very careful with measurement issues in carrying out their studies. As Slavin (2007) stated, researchers are supposed to measure

what they intended in conducting their research studies. Use of precise measurement techniques does not prove that they effectively measure what they had originally planned in their studies.

In the abstract, the validity issue is classified as both internal and external. The internal validity indicates that the outcomes of a research study are accurate regarding the sample in the study, whereas the external validity indicates that the outcomes of a research study are accurate even regarding the parties who were not selected as a sample in the population of the study (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006). At the same time, there are some factors (threats) that should be discussed that might affect internal and external validities in studies. Slavin revealed there are factors, such as testing effect and selection bias, which might be good examples of threats to internal validity. There are also factors, such as the reactivity effect (Hawthorne effect) and artificiality effect, which might be good examples of threats to external validity (Slavin, 2007).

There are several critical points regarding the internal and external validity issues in this study. First, since the research participants in this study were exposed to the survey questions only once, it can be stated that there might not be a testing effect. Second, the respondents were not selected randomly because I used the non-probability sampling technique, which made the sample size in the study biased by some definitions. The content and uniqueness of the research interest/issue required that I use the non-probability sampling technique instead of the probability sampling technique. Third, the respondents were hostage/crisis negotiators, which mean that they were well-trained and expert police and/or correction/sworn officers. The respondents were expected not to perform differently when they were being monitored. Fourth, the nature of the survey study reflected the elements of the practical field of hostage negotiations because I received validation from the experts while formulating the survey questions. The artificiality effect might be considered irrelevant in this study.

The four critical points mentioned above might give reasonable assurance of the extent and value of the internal and external validity issues, although there might be some other threats to the internal and/or external validity of this study other than the threats mentioned above. Nevertheless, it is a fact that this is the nature of receiving data from respondents in conducting a research study.

There are several validity issues for researchers to take into consideration, such as face, content, predictive, concurrent, and construct validities (Slavin, 2007). There are two important validity issues in this study: *(1) content and (2) face validations.*

First, according to content validity, the elements related to the measurement issue in a research instrument should be measuring the concept covered by intended research interests and issues (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006). The content validity is the idea that the test instrument in a research study measures the full breadth and depth of the intended concept. In addition, Thorkildsen (2005) stated that researchers are supposed to select appropriate items to evaluate the contents in their research. Researchers also might get expert opinions about their measurement tools in order to make their studies more logical and adequate for the purposes of the conducted studies. As Slavin (2007) mentioned, researchers in educational research studies, ask experts, including but not limited to senior teachers and principals, to review the prepared elements in their test instruments in order to verify that they measure what they planned to measure in the scope of their own research.

In this study, to be able to measure the full breadth and depth of the concept of the research issue, I received expert validation. This helped me chose the right terms and concepts in formulating the questions and helped make sure the concepts related to the scope of the research were measured through the appropriate test instruments.

Second, researchers measure what they intend to by asking the right research questions in the face validity issue (Slavin, 2007). To claim that there is face validation in a research study, a measurement means should be measuring what one is supposed to be measuring in the study at face value (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006). After determining what kind of research design fits the research interest in this study, I focused on creating an appropriate survey instrument and carefully formulated. This study has face validation because the measurement device and word choices in the survey instrument were carefully inspected through expert validation to test if they fit what I intended to measure in the study.

Data Collection

Data collection is an important procedure for researchers to use while conducting research studies. Making major mistakes with data collection in a research study might cause delay or termination of the study on the part of researchers because inaccurate data collection and/or inappropriately collected data cannot be used. Researchers, therefore, are supposed to know how to select the precise data collection method that best fits their research interests (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006).

After conducting the online, self-administered survey study, I had data about the perceptions of the 248 participant hostage/crisis negotiators in the US and Canada relating to the implementation of negotiation strategy in responding to hostage situations. After obtaining this insightful information, I analyzed the collected data to answer the research questions.

A high rate of response in a research study suggests the generalizability of the research findings to the larger population. Response rate to web surveys, therefore, is a critical and crucial matter (Alpert and MacDonald, 2001). The best procedure for researchers is to use available methods to increase the response rate to survey questions without any additional interventions. In

addition, researchers should keep in mind that formulating easy and understandable survey questions, making additional contact with respondents, and/or making some additional forms for research participants to be able to complete survey questions might help researchers increase the response rate (Fowler, 2002).

To increase the response rate in this particular survey study, I used the purposive sampling technique which is a non-probability sampling technique. In addition, the full lists of the members of the target populations in the US and Canada were exposed to the survey questions in order to increase the overall response rate to the survey questions. As mentioned earlier, I made additional contact with some officers in the US and Canada through e-mails and via telephone to increase the response rate of the respondents.

Data Analysis

After the data was collected from the respondents, I analyzed the collected data by using appropriate statistical methods to address:

1. The primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by the hostage/crisis negotiators in responding to hostage situations in the first research question

2. If the elements of hostage negotiations and factors influencing hostage negotiations differ while the negotiators implement negotiation strategies and decision makings in responding to instrumental and expressive hostage situations in the second research question

3. The relationship between the independent variable (the negotiators' beliefs in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories) and the dependent variable (implementing negotiation in hostage situations) in the third research question.

Limitations

There are at least three primary limitations in this study. First, there is no objective criterion to measure whether negotiation is successful or not during response to hostage situations because each hostage situation has its own unique characteristics, such as motivations, demands, deadlines, responses, and resolutions. Thus, each situation should be evaluated under its own conditions whether the negotiation response has a successful outcome or not. Although some general aspects of hostage situations can be compared to determine if negotiation strategy and practice is successful and appropriate, there might not be a single unified hostage negotiation model for the negotiators. I established a model of communication theory-based hostage negotiations. The directions and concepts of this model are derived from the findings of the collected data from the research participants and the summary of the literature review in this study. There is no guarantee that this negotiation model may be applicable to all types of hostage situations. This revised model might not include unified and workable concepts and resolutions due to the attempt to apply its elements to all types of hostage situations.

Second, as mentioned before, I am a member of the hostage/crisis negotiator community, and am aware of the possibility that the police might be reluctant to be involved in any empirical research studies. Police departments and agencies may not be willing to share their updated and current information and data with scholars and researchers. Often they reject any involvement in empirical research studies. As a result, this might have affected this particular study's generalizability. Also, some updated hostage negotiation strategies and techniques which police agencies frequently employ while dealing with hostage situations might not be available in this study.

Third, although there are some questions which can be answered through the sole implementation of empirical research studies, in many cases researchers' involvements in these studies might be limited due to environmental risks, dangers and difficulties inherent to hostage situations. However, negotiation resolutions in responding to hostage incidents are based on the behavioral interactions among the different key players, such as hostages, hostage takers, negotiators, incident commanders, psychologists, and the tactical team. Those parties are likely to be available to researchers only after hostage situations end without the demise of those parties. Executing empirical research studies on the behavioral interactions between the key players in hostage situations might be difficult due to the rational reasons mentioned above. I looked at the perceptions of one of the key parties in hostage situations presented in this instrument. I measured the perceptions of the negotiators in the US and Canada regarding the implementation of negotiations in different hostage environments. The findings and SPSS results in this study are based on the perceptions of the research participants. These perceptions might have a generalizability problem because of the very limited numbers of negotiators who participated in this study. This means that the negotiators' beliefs and perceptions about the research interests in this study may not be representative of the opinions and perceptions of the entire community of the hostage/crisis negotiators in the US and Canada.

Also, I cannot be certain the research participants were truthful while answering the questions. Although there would be no reason known to me that would cause the respondents to intentionally lie in their answers. It seems that research participants answered the questions truthfully because they are professionals in the field. Therefore, I am comfortable with the basic assumption that they were cooperative and truthful while answering the survey questions.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter analyzes the collected data in the study and discuses how the data speaks to the three topics:

- What the primary dynamic activities of implementing negotiations, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by the negotiators are

- What elements of negotiations and factors influencing negotiations differ in instrumental and expressive hostage situations

- Whether the negotiators' beliefs in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories result in differences in negotiations between instrumental and expressive situations.

I discuss the workability of the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories in resolving hostage situations effectively as well. Before analyzing the collected data, to address the research questions precisely, I ran diagnostic tests to guarantee that the statistical methods used in the study fit the research design.

Findings of the Research Study

Regarding whether or not each research question is addressing a different research issue in this study, the findings and results were organized into four levels. This organization helped me answer each of the research questions precisely. They are:

1. Analyzing the demographic characteristics and professional qualifications of the research participants

2. Analyzing the perceptions of the respondents on the primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by the negotiators

3. Analyzing the perceptions of the respondents on what elements of negotiations and factors influencing negotiations differ in instrumental and expressive hostage situations

4. Analyzing the perceptions of the respondents on whether the negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories have impact on their handling of instrumental and expressive situations differently as well as measuring the perceptions of the respondents on if the elements of the theories are workable as a framework for hostage negotiators.

Descriptive Analysis of Demographics

In this section, I give background information on the demographics and professional characteristics of the research participants described. The demographics present the larger viewpoint of the general characteristics of the respondents and their professional qualifications in service. In addition, the research participants' perceptions about implementing the negotiation strategy and practice in hostage situations were described in the frequency tables.

Comparisons were made between the findings in the literature review and findings from the research study including both quantitative and qualitative data collected from the sample. In doing so, I used not only the negotiators' perceptions of the survey questions but also some written statements -direct quotes- provided by some of the research participants at the very end of the survey instrument. The objective was to reinforce the results and findings through the 40 items of input written by the respondents in answering the very last question in the survey

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instrument (survey question number 46). Each of the findings is presented and discussed

separately, and the summary is presented at the end.

Primary Characteristics of the Sample

In this section, I focused on discussing the general characteristics of the research

participants in the sample, such as their nationalities, genders, education levels, and ages.

Table 6

Participant Nationality

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	US	173	69.8	70.0	70.0
	Canada	74	29.8	30.0	100.0
	Total	247	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.4		
Total		248	100.0		

As is seen in Table 6, the research participants are from two different countries: the US

and Canada. 70 % of the respondents are from the U.S. and 30 % of the respondents are from

Canada. For this study, I chose those two target countries since the working characteristics,

professional qualifications, and backgrounds of law enforcement professionals in these countries

are very similar.

Table 7

Participant Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	156	62.9	83.0	83.0
	Female	32	12.9	17.0	100.0
	Total	188	75.8	100.0	
Missing	System	60	24.2		
Total		248	100.0		

As is seen in Table 7, the research participants in the study are both male and female, 83

% of the respondents are male officers, while 17 % of the respondents are female officers.

Regarding the situational difficulties and challenges of working as hostage/crisis negotiators in the field, it is interesting to note that there are some female negotiators working in the field.

Table 8

Participant Education Level

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	High School	35	14.1	18.6	18.6
	2 year College	67	27.0	35.6	54.3
	4 year University	55	22.2	29.3	83.5
	MA	21	8.5	11.2	94.7
	Doctorate	10	4.0	5.3	100.0
	Total	188	75.8	100.0	
Missing	System	60	24.2		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 8, regarding educational background, shows that about 19 % of the respondents are high school graduates; about 36 % of the respondents are graduates of 2 year colleges; about 29 % of the respondents are graduates of 4 year universities; and about 17 % of the respondents have graduate level degrees. The table shows that the negotiators in the sample come from a variety of educational levels.

Table 9

Participant Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	30 and below	4	1.6	2.1	2.1
	31-40	51	20.6	27.3	29.4
	41-50	79	31.9	42.2	71.7
	51 and above	53	21.4	28.3	100.0
	Total	187	75.4	100.0	
Missing	System	61	24.6		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 10

Minimum and Maximum Age

	N	Minimum	Mean	Std. Deviation
What is your age?	187	27	45.66	8.516
Valid N	187			

Tables 9 and 10 show that about 2 % of the respondents are 30 years old or younger;

about 27 % of the respondents are between 31 and 40 years old; 42 % of the respondents are

between 41 and 50 years old; and about 28 % of the respondents are 51 years old or above.

About 72 % of the respondents are between 27 and 50 years old.

Professional Qualifications of the Sample

In this section, I focused on discussing the professional qualifications of the research

participants, such as distributions of the participants by years in service, the negotiators' rank

distributions, training levels, and part-time or full-time job status.

Table 11

Distribution of the Participants by Years in Service

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1-5 years	76	30.6	40.6	40.6
	6-10 years	55	22.2	29.4	70.1
	11-15 years	21	8.5	11.2	81.3
	16 and above	35	14.1	18.7	100.0
	Total	187	75.4	100.0	
Missing	System	61	24.6		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 12

Years in Service

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Years in service as a negotiator	187	1	35	9.39	7.746
Valid *N*	187				

The survey results show that the length of service of the research participants in the sample ranged between 1 and 35 years, with about 41 % of the respondents at 5 years or less; about 29 % of the respondents at 6 to 10 years; about 11 % of the respondents at 11 to 15 years; and about 19 % of the respondents at 16 years or more.

Table 13

Rank Distribution of the Participants

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Sworn/Correction	39	15.7	20.7	20.7
	Line officer/Detective	80	32.3	42.6	63.3
	Sergeant	36	14.5	19.1	82.4
	Lieutenant	23	9.3	12.2	94.7
	Captain and above	10	4.0	5.3	100.0
	Total	188	75.8	100.0	
Missing	System	60	24.2		
Total		248	100.0		

In this study, due to the fact that the respondents are from a number of police departments and agencies in the US and Canada, the rank orders and titles in the police departments differ. Therefore, the police in the sample have different ranking systems. I had to make them unified to be able to analyze the rank distribution of the participants:

- The rank of sworn/correction refers to sworn and/or correction officers

- The rank of line officer refers to police officers, constables, and/or detectives

- The rank of sergeant refers to sergeants, sergeant majors, and/or team supervisors

- The rank of lieutenant refers to lieutenants, inspectors, and/or unit chiefs; and

- The rank of captain and higher refers to captains, chief inspectors, majors, superintendents, colonels, and/or higher level.

The results of Table 13 show that the research sample covers the hostage/crisis negotiators from different rankings in the American and Canadian law enforcement agencies. In

the sample, about 21 % of the respondents are civilian; about 43 % the respondents are line officers; about 19 % of the respondents are sergeants; about 12 % of the respondents are lieutenants; and about 5 % of the respondents are captains and/or higher ranked. The table shows that the negotiators in the sample come from a variety of rankings in police agencies. The table shows that working as a negotiator in the field is not restricted to only line officers.

Table 14

Working as a Negotiator is a Part-Time or Full-Time Job

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Part-time	174	70.2	92.6	92.6
	Full-time	14	5.6	7.4	100.0
	Total	188	75.8	100.0	
Missing	System	60	24.2		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 14 shows that about 93 % of the respondents in the sample stated that working as a negotiator is a part-time job, while the other 7 % of respondents stated that working as a negotiator is a full-time job in their agencies.

In 1992, thanks to some FBI agents and several scholars, roughly 600 hostage/crisis negotiators from the federal, state, and/or local police agencies/departments in the US met to confer on the negotiation strategies and decision making in a seminar program. The participants in this program were asked 44 survey questions including the demographic and professional qualifications of the negotiators attending this program. As a result of the analysis in this study, the professionals collected very notable findings regarding the perceptions of the negotiators regarding the interests and issues in the study (Hammer, Van Zandt, and Rogan, 1994).

Hammer et al., revealed that:

Respondents indicated that most of the negotiation team members' duties were either in investigation or patrol, with some in administration. Specifically, 51 % of the respondents stated that more than 40 % of their teams had primarily investigative responsibilities,

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while 47 % stated that 40 % or more of their team members served primarily in patrol. Overall, 72 responded that fewer than 20 % of their team members were actively involved in administrative duties (1994, p. 9).

Table 15

If Negotiators Completed Hostage/Crisis Negotiator Training Course

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	185	74.6	98.4	98.4
	No	3	1.2	1.6	100.0
	Total	188	75.8	100.0	
Missing	System	60	24.2		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 15 shows that 98 % of the respondents stated that they completed a hostage/crisis negotiator training course. The reliability of the research participants in the sample on responding to the survey questions is likely to be dependable due to the fact that this high number of respondents attending the hostage/crisis negotiator trainings shows that the respondents have hostage negotiation qualifications and skills through the training experiences in which they were involved.

In the study presented in the article of Hammer, Van Zandt, and Rogan (1994), about 75 % of the research participants stated that they attended negotiator trainings (initial), which are 10 days and/or less compared to the 1 % of the research participants who attended the trainings more than 21 days. In addition, about 60 % of the research participants stated that they attended 5 days and/or less of negotiator in-service trainings every year. About 6 % of the research participants stated that they attended negotiator in-service trainings between 15 to 20 days.

Table 16

If Negotiators Participated in a Negotiator Course with Tactical Team(s)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	160	64.5	85.1	85.1
	No	28	11.3	14.9	100.0
	Total	188	75.8	100.0	
Missing	System	60	24.2		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 17

If Negotiators Participated in a Negotiator Course with Incident Commander(s)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	161	64.9	85.6	85.6
	No	27	10.9	14.4	100.0
	Total	188	75.8	100.0	
Missing	System	60	24.2		
Total		248	100.0		

In Table 16, about 86 % of the participants stated that they participated in a negotiator training course with tactical team(s). However, the remaining 14 % of the respondents stated that they never participated in a negotiator training course with tactical team(s). Table 17 also shows that about 86 % of them participated in a negotiator training course with incident commander(s). The remaining 14 % of the research participants did not participate in a negotiator training course with incident commander(s). It is noteworthy that the vast majority of the negotiators in the sample completed the negotiator training courses with tactical team(s) and/or incident commander(s).

To reinforce the findings of Tables 16 and 17 presented in the above paragraph, I quote some of the research participants. There are four statements related to the findings in the tables above. The first statement is: "I am lucky with my SWAT team; we have a commander that is trained in negotiations and tactical, and a staff psychologist available. We are a multi-

jurisdictional team spanning two counties, and approximately 25 police agencies. We train every

month and we do several trainings a year with both tactical and negotiations units present. This

has been unbelievably helpful in knowing what each unit is doing and why, and the information

they are looking for and why."

Another statement is: "I feel that the interaction/conversation between the negotiator and

the hostage taker is the key to any negotiation. You have to be a listener. I also believe that the

Negotiation Team, SWAT, and Incident Command should constantly train as one. The teams

would each practice their own discipline but always towards a unified ending." Another

statement is that "It is very important that the negotiators, tactical team and command train

together…" One final statement is that 'I don't think there is one set of rules that should be

followed, every situation is different and every person is in crisis for a different reason. More

training needs to be done with the tactical units in our area."

The findings of both Tables, 16 and 17, and the direct statements of the respondents

clearly show that attending the training courses together with the other key players is imperative

for knowing what to do and how to do things while responding to hostage situations on-scene.

The assumption is that they will better understand each other and avoid miscommunication while

responding to hostage situations.

Findings with the Research Question 1:

Negotiators' Attitudes toward Components of Hostage Negotiations

In this section, I focused on analyzing and interpreting the statistical findings related to

the first research question:

'What are the primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by hostage/crisis negotiators in implementing negotiation strategy and practice in hostage situations?' (RQ-1)

There are three expressions that should be defined to better understand this research question: *(1) dynamic activities, (2) communication skills, and (3) negotiation tools used by the hostage/crisis negotiators.* The agreement levels of the research participants with the first 27 survey questions addressing negotiators attitudes toward components of negotiation basically covers using dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation skills of the negotiators. Thus, before analyzing the responses of the negotiators to the survey questions, a very short definition is provided in each relevant section.

Dynamic Activities

Dynamic activities refer to the activities the negotiators perform while negotiating with hostage takers. This term covers the formal procedures and required activities that the negotiators should take into consideration either before initiating negotiations or during implementation of negotiation in hostage situations. Considering this definition, I looked at the agreement levels of the respondents regarding the negotiators' attitudes toward components of negotiations addressing the use of dynamic activities in hostage situations. I specifically analyzed 9 components of the dynamic activities used by the negotiators. I also discussed each component mentioned above by interpreting the findings with the relevant frequency tables and citing some statements provided by the respondents. The dynamic activities analyzed in this study are:

1. Negotiation is a special task performed only by trained negotiators
2. While the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker, the secondary negotiator assists the primary negotiator

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3. A mental health professional providing assistance affects negotiation strategies

4. Negotiators attempt to learn what hostage takers' messages/demands are

5. Negotiators attempt to determine hostage takers' motivations

6. Negotiators decide negotiation strategies and decision making based on the prior criminal history of hostage takers

7. Negotiators interview family members of hostage takers

8. Negotiators do not compete with the on-scene rescue team

9. Negotiation is utilized and exhausted before using tactical team intervention.

Table 18

Hostage negotiation is a Task that should be Performed only by Trained Negotiators

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	146	58.9	60.6	60.6
	2	66	26.6	27.4	88.0
	3	15	6.0	6.2	94.2
	4	12	4.8	5.0	99.2
	5	2	.8	.8	100.0
	Total	241	97.2	100.0	
Missing	System	7	2.8		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 18 indicates that 88 % of the respondents in the sample agree with the statement that hostage negotiation is a special task which should be performed only by trained hostage/crisis negotiators. Even though the other 6 % of the respondents do not agree with this statement, this high level of agreement of the respondents shows that the negotiators are aware of the importance of the statement presented here. As Poland and McCrystle (1999) stated, negotiation is a job that can only be implemented by several trained negotiators. Likewise, Hancerli, 2005; Hancerli and Durna, 2007; Kocak, 2007; and Noesner, 2007 asserted that

negotiation is a very special skill that must only be performed by professional and well-trained negotiators.

To reinforce the findings here within table 18, I provided direct quotes from research participants. There are 4 congruent statements here. One stated that "trained hostage/crisis negotiators are essential in resolving crisis situations peacefully without the use of force." Another stated that "the need for hostage/crisis negotiators is stronger than ever with an increased number of people being affected by daily pressures. The key to successful negotiations is to train and learn from experiences, good and bad..." The other negotiator cited that "as much training, including role playing as possible." One other negotiator said that "...I believe that properly selected negotiators given proper training and exposure can almost always match their target, and, if they cannot it is likely more of an indicator of mismatched personalities versus incorrect communication style."

The last participant pointed out that even a trained negotiator should be selected to match the personalities of hostage takers. This means that selecting a trained negotiator might not be good enough rather the negotiator's personality should match that of the hostage taker.

Table 19

While the Primary Negotiator Talks to the Hostage Taker, the Secondary Negotiator Assists the Primary Negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	179	72.2	77.8	77.8
	2	48	19.4	20.9	98.7
	3	1	.4	.4	99.1
	5	2	.8	.9	100.0
	Total	230	92.7	100.0	
Missing	System	18	7.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 19 shows that about 99 % of the respondents in the sample believed that while the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker, the secondary negotiator assists the primary negotiator. The respondents agree with the idea that negotiation is team work. In addition, Wind (1995) recommended that three negotiators work together in a hostage situation. Each negotiator has an important role on the team. As Wind, 1995; Poland and McCrystle, 1999; and Hancerli, 2005 stated, in a hostage/crisis situation, while the primary negotiator talks to hostage taker, the secondary negotiator is there to assist and support the primary negotiator at all times.

Table 20

A Mental Health Professional Providing Assistance Affects the Negotiation Strategies of the Negotiator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	15	6.0	7.1	7.1
	2	80	32.3	38.1	45.2
	3	70	28.2	33.3	78.6
	4	39	15.7	18.6	97.1
	5	6	2.4	2.9	100.0
	Total	210	84.7	100.0	
Missing	System	38	15.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Mental health professionals gather information about hostage takers to provide useful assistance to the negotiation team so the team can use this assistance while performing their strategies on-scene. Mental health professionals work as either counselor to the negotiators or as a part of negotiation. In either scenario, they have to work with other negotiators (Slatkin, 2005).

Likewise, Table 20 shows the level of agreement among negotiators with the statement 'a mental health professional providing assistance affects the negotiation strategies of the negotiator.' The findings in the table indicate that 45 % of the negotiators who participated in the survey agree with the statement that the assessment of hostage takers' personalities by mental

health professionals affects negotiation strategies. About 33 % of the respondents are neutral, and about 22 % of the respondents disagree with the idea that mental health professionals' assessments of hostage takers affect decision making. It is noteworthy that the findings in Table 20 differ from the findings in the other tables because the disagreement level of the respondents is 22 %, which is somewhat high in comparison.

One of the research participants, in his/her written statement in the survey study, specified that "from looking at the questions I would caution that mental health professionals assisting negotiators at the scene can be a source of useful assessment concerning the hostage takers behaviors. They should not be the driving force behind strategy development nor are they optimally used to conduct direct negotiations. They are a tool of the negotiation team only."

Table 21

Learning the Hostage Takers' Messages/Demands Ensure the Correct Interpretations of the Message by Paraphrasing Them Back to the Hostage Takers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	117	47.2	50.6	50.6
	2	84	33.9	36.4	87.0
	3	17	6.9	7.4	94.4
	4	11	4.4	4.8	99.1
	5	2	.8	.9	100.0
	Total	231	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	17	6.9		
Total		248	100.0		

The findings in Table 21 pointed out that 87 % of the respondents agree with the idea that during the negotiation process, the negotiators should learn what hostage takers' messages and/or demands are to ensure correct interpretation of the messages compared to 6 % of the respondents who do not agree with this notion. In addition, there are two valuable statements written by two of the respondents in the sample. One is that "active listening skills… assist with

deescalating the emotional charge of the situations. Dwelling on demands keep the demands in the forefront of the negotiations. The goal of negotiations is not to grant demands. The goal is to gain peaceful surrender. Demands should be catalogued and stalled." Another direct quote is that "demands are demands - whether they are instrumental or expressive - underlying all demands are significant concerns for the individual that need to be acknowledged and understood in order to come to resolution."

They clearly indicated that the negotiators should be using active listening skills to not only learn the demands but also to stall hostage takers. The point is not to grant the demands of hostage takers but to use the demands of hostage takers as negotiation tools regardless of whether they are negotiable or not. The negotiators buy time by stalling hostage takers while using the demands of hostage takers as negotiation tools.

Table 22

Negotiators Attempt to Determine the Hostage Takers' Motivations to Adjust Their

Negotiation Strategies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	112	45.2	46.7	46.7
	2	116	46.8	48.3	95.0
	3	10	4.0	4.2	99.2
	4	1	.4	.4	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	240	96.8	100.0	
Missing	System	8	3.2		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 22 shows the agreement levels of the participants with the statement that 'negotiators attempt to determine the hostage takers' motivations to adjust the negotiation strategies.' The findings indicated that 95 % of the negotiators participating in the survey agree with the statement. Less than 1 % of the participants do not agree with the statement here.

Table 23

Negotiators Decide Their Negotiation Strategies and Decision Making Based on the Prior

Criminal History of the Hostage Taker

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	7	2.8	3.3	3.3
	2	83	33.5	39.5	42.9
	3	52	21.0	24.8	67.6
	4	60	24.2	28.6	96.2
	5	8	3.2	3.8	100.0
	Total	210	84.7	100.0	
Missing	System	38	15.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 23 shows the agreement levels of the participant negotiators with the statement

'negotiators decide their negotiation strategies and decision making based on the prior criminal

history of the hostage taker.' The findings in the table indicated that about 43 % of the

negotiators participating in the survey agree that the negotiators choose their negotiation

strategies based on the prior criminal history of the hostage taker compared to the 32 % of the

respondents who do not agree with this idea.

Table 24

Interviewing Family Members of the Hostage Taker might be Helpful in Determining the

Negotiation Strategies and Decision Making

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	49	19.8	23.3	23.3
	2	135	54.4	64.3	87.6
	3	23	9.3	11.0	98.6
	4	2	.8	1.0	99.5
	5	1	.4	.5	100.0
	Total	210	84.7	100.0	
Missing	System	38	15.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 24 shows the agreement levels of the negotiators with the statement 'interviewing family members of the hostage taker might be helpful in determining negotiation strategies and decision making.' The findings specify that about 88 % of the respondents agree with the statement presented here compared to about 1 % of the respondents who do not agree with the statement here. Regarding this statement, one respondent specified that "...the information from hostage takers, observers, outside interviews, and an overall on-going assessment of the situation are factors most likely to influence negotiation strategy and decision making."

Regarding the statements in Tables 23 and 24, one respondent specified that "although criminal history, information from family, a psychological assessment, etc. may be equally important in each case, the intelligence you gather from those sources and how you use it will likely be different in each of the two types of situations." Based on the findings above, knowing how to use some collected information -criminal history, psychological assessment, and so forth about hostage takers- gathered from either hostage takers or some other external sources, such as family members, observers, bystanders, or outsiders is very important in determining the negotiation strategies and decision making used by negotiators.

Table 25

Negotiators do not Compete with the Rescue Team; the Negotiation Team is not Subordinate and/or Superior to the Rescue Team

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	145	58.5	60.4	60.4
	2	77	31.0	32.1	92.5
	3	12	4.8	5.0	97.5
	4	2	.8	.8	98.3
	5	4	1.6	1.7	100.0
	Total	240	96.8	100.0	
Missing	System	8	3.2		
Total		248	100.0		

It is remarkable that Table 25 shows that 93 % of the respondents in the sample agree with the statement presented above. The negotiators do not compete with the rescue team; in fact, they work together.' Only about 3 % of the respondents do not agree with this statement. This high level of agreement strongly suggests that both teams on-scene have to work hand-in-hand as a team to resolve situations. Each team is part of the big team on-scene. Regini (2002) indicated that in a hostage situation, the negotiation team pays attention to every sound and the tactical team pays attention to every movement on-scene.

Table 26

Negotiation should be Utilized and Exhausted before Using Tactical Intervention Unless

It is so High Risk that Immediate Force is Necessary

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	175	70.6	72.6	72.6
	2	56	22.6	23.2	95.9
	3	7	2.8	2.9	98.8
	4	2	.8	.8	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	241	97.2	100.0	
Missing	System	7	2.8		
Total		248	100.0		

According to Table 26, about 96 % of the respondents in the study agree with the statement that 'negotiation should be utilized and exhausted before tactical intervention unless it is so high risk that immediate force is necessary' compared to about 1 % of the respondents who do not agree with this statement. Hancerli (2005) insisted that negotiation is used as a first option, while using force is the final option unless the situation includes too high of a risk on the part of hostages. In addition, regarding the findings here, one respondent specified that "...let the negotiators conduct their business first. If that fails, the commanders and emergency response teams can do what they came to do at the scene, boom the door."

In sum, based on the summary of the findings within the survey study, we can say there are certain important dynamic activities used by the negotiators and that negotiation is a process utilized and exhausted before using tactical force. Hostage negotiation is a task performed by well-trained officers in a team work approach only. While negotiating with hostage takers, the negotiators also work together with the on-scene rescue team since they are another party in the chain of command post on-scene. While implementing negotiations, the negotiators attempt to learn the messages, demands, and motivations of hostage takers in order to determine accurate negotiation strategies and decision making. Meanwhile, the negotiators attempt to collect more information, such as prior criminal history and personality profiles of hostage takers either from hostage takers or some other external sources, such as family members of hostage takers. In doing this, the negotiators are provided some assistance by mental health professionals about hostage takers' current psychological conditions as well as personalities that help the negotiators determine their negotiation strategies.

Communication Skills

The term of 'communication skills' presented in the first research question refers to using some required verbal and non-verbal negotiation and communication skills, such as skills in overcoming the barriers to effective communications and in employing active listening techniques in dealing with hostage takers. Considering this description, I looked at the agreement levels of the respondents about the negotiators' attitudes toward the use of the components of communication skills. In this section, I analyzed the 10 components of communication skills used by negotiators. I then discussed each component presented here by interpreting the findings of the relevant frequency tables, citing some statements provided by the respondents, and stating some connected information and knowledge from the literature presented in the second chapter.

The components of communication skills used by the negotiators in dealing with hostage takers
are:

1. Prior negotiator experience affects the negotiator's decision making

2. Combined training with on-scene incident commanders helps negotiators

3. Combined training with on-scene tactical teams helps negotiators

4. Negotiators try not to have any communication problem with hostage takers

5. Negotiators know what to ask hostage takers

6. Negotiators know how to ask the right questions of hostage takers

7. Negotiators use correct word choice

8. Negotiators use appropriate tone of voice

9. Negotiators paraphrase the messages/demands of hostage takers

10. Negotiators use active listening skills.

Table 27

In a Hostage Situation, a Prior Negotiator Experience Affects His Decision Making in a

Positive Manner

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	80	32.3	33.1	33.1
	2	128	51.6	52.9	86.0
	3	25	10.1	10.3	96.3
	4	7	2.8	2.9	99.2
	5	2	.8	.8	100.0
	Total	242	97.6	100.0	
Missing	System	6	2.4		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 27 shows the level of agreement with the statement 'a prior negotiator experience
affects his/her decision making in a positive manner.' The findings in the table indicated that 86
% of the negotiators, 208 respondents, agree with that statement compared to about 4 % of the

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respondents, 9 negotiators, who do not agree with the importance of prior negotiator experience in the decision-making process in dealing with hostage takers.

Regarding the findings in Table 27, there are three remarkable statements made by the respondents in the survey study. One respondent expressed, "the more actual situations you are activated in the more comfortable you become as a negotiator and the negotiation process as well." Another respondent said, "when you are a negotiator working a situation, a lot of what you say and how your react is what your guy is telling you, and what your team is saying. No situation is the same, and there is not a playbook to follow. You know by your training and through your experience what are the hot buttons and sensitive areas and try to avoid them. No two negotiations will go the same way." The other respondent asserted that "the need for hostage/crisis negotiators is stronger than ever with an increased number of people being affected by daily pressures. The key to successful negotiations is to train and learn from experiences, good and bad..."

In the above statements, the respondents basically emphasized that prior negotiator experience makes the negotiator more comfortable with what to say and how to deal with hostage takers during the implementation of hostage negotiations. Prior negotiator experience helps the on-scene negotiators in not only what to say but also what not to say to hostage takers. No matter if the prior experience is bad or good, the professional negotiators always learn lessons from their past experiences. Prior experiences increase the likelihood the negotiators will say the right things to hostage takers during hostage negotiations. This means that prior negotiator experience affects negotiation strategies and decision making of the negotiators. These evaluations made in previous hostage situations might help the negotiators create some new rules and guidelines for dealing effectively with hostage takers.

Table 28

Joint -Combined- Training with Tactical Teams Help Negotiators Avoid Miscommunication

between Themselves and the On-Scene Tactical Team

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	182	73.4	75.5	75.5
	2	47	19.0	19.5	95.0
	3	9	3.6	3.7	98.8
	4	1	.4	.4	99.2
	5	2	.8	.8	100.0
	Total	241	97.2	100.0	
Missing	System	7	2.8		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 28 points out the agreement levels of the negotiators with the statement 'combined training with on-scene tactical team help negotiators avoids miscommunication between themselves and the tactical team.' The findings indicated that 95 % of the respondents, 229 negotiators, agree with the statement compared to about 1 % of the respondents, 3 negotiators, who do not agree with the importance of getting combined training with tactical teams to avoid miscommunication between the both teams on-scene.

Table 29

Joint -Combined- Training with Incident Commanders Help Negotiators Avoid

Miscommunication between Themselves and the On-Scene Incident Commander

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	159	64.1	66.0	66.0
	2	69	27.8	28.6	94.6
	3	9	3.6	3.7	98.3
	4	3	1.2	1.2	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	241	97.2	100.0	
Missing	System	7	2.8		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 29 points out the agreement level of the negotiators with the statement 'combined training with incident commanders help negotiators avoid miscommunication between themselves and the on-scene incident commander.' The findings indicated that 95 % of the respondents, 228 negotiators, agree with the statement compared to about 2 % of the respondents, which is only 4 negotiators, who do not agree that getting combined training with incident commanders to avoid miscommunication between the negotiation team and on-scene commanders is vital.

Regarding the findings within Tables 28 and 29, there are a few relevant statements expressed by the respondents. The first one is: "I don't think there is one set of rules that should be followed, every situation is different and every person is in crisis for a different reason. More training needs to be done with the tactical units in our area." Another statement is "...I also believe that the Negotiation Team, SWAT, and Incident Command should constantly train as one. The teams would each practice their own discipline but always towards a unified ending." Another statement is that 'it is very important that the negotiators, tactical team and command train together..."

And the final statement is that "...we train every month and we do several trainings a year with both tactical and negotiations units present. This has been unbelievably helpful in knowing what each unit is doing and why, and the information they are looking for and why." In sum, the statements here suggest that as long as the key parties of the chain of command post responding to hostage situations are trained together in joint -combined- training courses, the parties are able not only to avoid miscommunications between each other but also to achieve a unified ending in responding to hostage situations effectively.

Table 30

If Negotiators have Communication Problems with the Hostage Takers, They are Less

Likely to Learn What the Hostage Takers Want

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	92	37.1	39.8	39.8
	2	109	44.0	47.2	87.0
	3	16	6.5	6.9	93.9
	4	11	4.4	4.8	98.7
	5	3	1.2	1.3	100.0
	Total	231	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	17	6.9		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 30 shows that 87 % of the respondents, 201 negotiators, agree with the statement that 'if negotiators have communication problems with the hostage takers, they are less likely to learn what the hostage takers want' compared to the 6 % of the respondents, 14 negotiators only, who do not agree with the statement here. The findings indicated that being able to communicate with hostage takers successfully is the key to learning more about hostage takers.

In fact, one research participant stated, "I think that the more information you have on the hostage taker the better." Another research participant said, "I feel that the interaction/conversation between the negotiator and the hostage taker is the key to any negotiation. You have to be a listener..."

The statements of the two respondents and the findings of the above tables stated that as long as the negotiators initiate and maintain good communications with hostage takers on-scene, they are able to get more information from and about hostage takers. This helps the negotiators determine the use of the right strategies and responses.

Table 31

If Negotiators Know What to Ask the Hostage Takers during Negotiation, They are more Likely

to Gather Accurate Information about the Hostage Takers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	108	43.5	46.8	46.8
	2	99	39.9	42.9	89.6
	3	19	7.7	8.2	97.8
	4	3	1.2	1.3	99.1
	5	2	.8	.9	100.0
	Total	231	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	17	6.9		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 31 shows that about 90 % of the respondents, 207 negotiators, agree with the statement 'if negotiators know what to ask the hostage takers during negotiation, they are more likely to gather accurate information about the hostage takers' compared to the 2 % of the respondents, 5 negotiators only, who do not agree with the statement presented here. The findings showing this high level of agreement of the respondent negotiators support the idea that knowing what to ask hostage takers is tremendously important for the negotiators to get more accurate information and intelligence about hostage takers.

One of the research participants in this study made a very relevant observation with the thought that "each situation has to be handled using information that can be gathered about that situation and the persons involved. There is no way to make a 'blanket statement' about a particular type of situation without having more information." In sum, it can be stated that the negotiators are expected to know what to ask hostage takers in order to get more reliable information from them.

Table 32

If Negotiators Know How to Ask the Right Questions of Hostage Takers, Then They will Increase

Their Chances of Gathering Accurate Information about Hostage Takers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	120	48.4	51.9	51.9
	2	96	38.7	41.6	93.5
	3	13	5.2	5.6	99.1
	5	2	.8	.9	100.0
	Total	231	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	17	6.9		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 32 shows that 94 % of the respondents, 216 negotiators, agree with the statement 'if negotiators know how to ask the right questions of hostage takers, then they will increase their chances of gathering accurate information about hostage takers' compared to the 1 % of the respondents, 2 negotiators only, who do not agree with the statement. The high level of agreement of the participant negotiators presented in the above table proves that knowing how to ask the right questions of hostage takers aids negotiators in gathering more accurate information and knowledge about hostage takers, such as their criminal records, medical records, family relationships, work information, and so forth.

Table 33

Negotiators' Word Selections are Important to Send the Appropriate Message to Hostage Takers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	126	50.8	54.5	54.5
	2	93	37.5	40.3	94.8
	3	9	3.6	3.9	98.7
	4	1	.4	.4	99.1
	5	2	.8	.9	100.0
	Total	231	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	17	6.9		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 33 indicates that 95 % of the respondents agree with the statement that 'negotiators' word selections are important for sending the appropriate message to the hostage takers' compared to the 1 % of the respondents who do not agree with this statement. The findings of this table support the findings in Tables 31 and 32. The findings of the three tables show that the negotiators should be aware of selecting appropriate words while negotiating with hostage takers throughout hostage situations both to give hostage takers the right messages and to get the meanings of the messages (information) coming from hostage takers. All gathered information about hostage takers and hostage situations may affect the ongoing negotiations. As one of the research participants in the sample remarked, "...the information from hostage takers, observers, outside interviews, and an overall on-going assessment of the situation are factors most likely to influence negotiation strategy and decision making."

Table 34

Negotiators Use Right Tone of Voice to Establish a Good Rapport and Trust While Implementing Negotiation Strategies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	148	59.7	65.8	65.8
	2	74	29.8	32.9	98.7
	3	2	.8	.9	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	225	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	23	9.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 34 represents the findings that 99 % of the respondents, which are 222 negotiators, agree with the statement that 'negotiators use right tone of voice to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation.' The findings in this table are congruent with the findings in Tables 31 through 33 since all the elements presented in these three tables are interdependent components of verbal communications and negotiations used by the negotiators in hostage

situations. As long as the negotiators use the components of the right communication strategies presented in Tables 31 through 34 effectively while dealing with hostage takers, the negotiators are likely to be able to collect more accurate information about hostage takers affecting and constructing negotiation strategies and decision making.

Table 35

Negotiators Use Paraphrasing the Messages/Demands of Hostage Takers to Establish a Good Rapport and Trust While Implementing Negotiation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	128	51.6	56.9	56.9
	2	78	31.5	34.7	91.6
	3	14	5.6	6.2	97.8
	4	4	1.6	1.8	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	225	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	23	9.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 35 shows that 92 % of the negotiators in the sample believed the statement that 'negotiators use paraphrasing the messages/demands of hostage takers to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation' compared to the 2 % of the respondents who do not agree with the statement.

Table 36

Negotiators Use Active Listening Skills to Establish a Good Rapport and Trust While Implementing Negotiation Strategies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	184	74.2	81.8	81.8
	2	38	15.3	16.9	98.7
	3	2	.8	.9	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	225	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	23	9.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 36 shows that 99 % of the respondents in the sample strongly believed the statement that 'negotiators use active listening skills to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies.' This high level of agreement shows the negotiators are aware of using active listening skills while negotiating with hostage takers.

Regarding the findings in Table 36, there are a couple of significant statements the research participants made. The first statement is that "...the vast majority of demands are driven by some expressive (emotional) need - fear, power/control etc. even if they are instrumental in nature (a getaway car). Based on this position the focus is to develop rapport with the offender through empathetic communication and active listening skills." Another respondent remarked that "the fundamental approach to any situation is the use of active listening skills. The goal of negotiations is to move through the emotion of the incident and get the offender to a place of rational thought. Active listening skills are fatiguing and assist with deescalating the emotional charge of the situations. Dwelling on demands keep the demands in the forefront of the negotiations. The goal of negotiations is not to grant demands. The goal is to gain peaceful surrender. Demands should be catalogued and stalled."

Another respondent emphasized that "...active listening is crucial to both situations yet the situations do require different strategies..." One other respondent expressed that "no matter what, you still have to play it by ear!" All the statements point to why the negotiators use active listening skills while negotiating with hostage takers. In sum, based on the statements and the findings in Table 36, use of active listening skills is a very important tool for negotiators to establish trust and rapport between the negotiators and hostage takers, leading to the procurement of more clues about hostage takers' motivations and movements.

In sum, there are several components of communication skills mentioned above that the negotiators frequently use while responding to hostage situations. The data suggest that knowing how to ask the right questions of hostage takers, using right word choice, using right tone of voice, paraphrasing the messages of hostage takers, knowing how to avoid having communication problems with hostage takers, and using active listening skills in responding to hostage takers are considered to be important communication components. If the negotiators initiate and maintain negotiations with hostage takers by using these components, they are able to obtain more accurate information, which helps the negotiators determine the use of accurate responses.

I suggest that the components of 'communication skills' and 'negotiation tools' presented in this section are interrelated elements. The components of communication skills presented above and components of negotiation tools that will be presented below support are similar arguments to each other. Even though I evaluated them by putting them into different sections, realistically they cannot be separated from each other in the field of hostage negotiations.

Negotiation Tools

The term of negotiation tools presented in the first research question refers to use of some communication components as negotiation tools. The negotiation tools establish trust and build rapport between negotiators and hostage takers by developing a personal communication style with hostage takers, using information gathering techniques from external sources on-scene, using the presence of tactical team on-scene, and using role playing in negotiations. The components of the negotiation tools tend to be used by the negotiators to gather more information about both hostage takers and hostage situations. The goal of knowing more about hostage takers is to determine what strategies, skills, and tools might work to end hostage

situations peacefully. Considering the description of this term, I looked at the agreement levels of

the respondents about the negotiators' attitudes toward the use of negotiation tools in responding

to hostage situations. The components of the negotiation tools discussed in this section are:

1. Attempting to establish trust between negotiators and hostage takers

2. Attempting to build rapport between negotiators and hostage takers

3. Attempting to develop a personal communication with hostage takers

4. Attempting to gather information from external sources on-scene

5. Asking open-ended questions of hostage takers

6. Using the presence of the tactical team on-scene as a negotiation tool

7. Using hostage takers' demands as a negotiation tool.

Table 37

Factors Relating to Gathering Information: Establishing Trust between Negotiators and

Hostage Takers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	148	59.7	65.8	65.8
	2	70	28.2	31.1	96.9
	3	5	2.0	2.2	99.1
	4	1	.4	.4	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	225	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	23	9.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 37 shows 97 % of the respondents, 218 negotiators, accepted the statement that

'negotiators attempt to establish trust between negotiators and hostage takers in order to gather

information from hostage takers.' Only 2 of the respondents did not accept the importance of this

statement. I suggest that the three concepts, *(1) establishing trust, (2) building rapport between*

the negotiators and hostage takers, and (3) developing a personal communication style with

hostage takers, are virtually interconnected with each other. The findings in Tables 37, 38, and

39, supporting similar arguments, are jointly discussed in the following section.

Table 38

Factors Relating to Gathering Information: Building Rapport between Negotiators and

Hostage Takers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	169	68.1	75.1	75.1
	2	52	21.0	23.1	98.2
	3	3	1.2	1.3	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	225	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	23	9.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 38 indicates that about 98 % of the respondents, 221 negotiators, agree with the

statement that 'negotiators attempt to build rapport between negotiators and hostage takers in

order to gather information from hostage takers.'

The negotiators build trust and rapport between hostage takers and themselves in hostage

negotiations to gather more information about hostage takers in order to determine their decision

strategies. However, gaining trust of another party during hostage negotiations is not an easy

practice. As Womack and Walsh (1997) asserted, implementing a personal communication style

with hostage takers is a very challenging task because the negotiators are expected to build a

relationship based on trust with hostage takers, who are likely to be strangers to the negotiators.

In many hostage situations, the negotiators, in fact, encounter hostage takers who were unknown

to the police prior to the current hostage situation.

The parties in communications can establish trust by talking willingly and avoiding the

appearance of being skeptical, mistrustful, or distrustful of each other. The vital point is to be

aware of the value of establishing trust in order to keep the other party talking (Wu and Laws,

2003). The parties are expected to present their knowledge, demands, and concerns to each other. When the negotiators are able to move towards hostage takers and establish trust, the dialogue between the negotiators and hostage takers can be turned into a type of conversation maintained by the parties, paying attention and responding instantaneously to the needs of each side (Womack and Walsh, 1997). The negotiators attempt to build rapport with hostage takers to gather information from hostage takers while determining their strategies.

Table 39

Factors Relating to Gathering Information: Developing a Personal Communication Style with Hostage Takers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	97	39.1	43.1	43.1
	2	103	41.5	45.8	88.9
	3	21	8.5	9.3	98.2
	4	3	1.2	1.3	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	225	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	23	9.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 39 represents that 89 % of the respondents, 200 negotiators, agree with the statement, 'negotiators attempt to develop personal communication style with hostage takers in order to gather information from hostage takers', compared to the 2 % of the respondents, 4 negotiators, who do not agree with this statement.

This high level of agreement from the participants in the sample over the importance of the arguments presented in Table 37, 38, and 39 show that the techniques of 'establishing trust, building rapport, and developing a personal communication style with hostage takers' are the techniques frequently used as negotiation tools in gathering more information from the hostage takers themselves. In addition, there are two relevant statements given by research participants.

One stated that "…based on this position the focus is to develop rapport with the offender through empathetic communication and active listening skills." The other said "each hostage situation is fluid and needs to be negotiated as the situation dictates. A person's behavior is unpredictable in most hostage situations; however building rapport seems to be an important factor in success."

In sum, based on the findings of the above tables and the statements of the research participants, the negotiators use specific techniques to establish trust/rapport and a personal communication style with hostage takers through empathetic communication systems and active listening skills in order to collect more information about hostage takers' motivations, demands, and movements while determining their negotiation and decision strategies. Wu and Laws (2003) stated one should be able to establish trust in a communication system by talking willingly and avoiding skepticism, mistrust, or distrust of the other party. By doing this, as Womack and Walsh (1997) asserted, parties present their knowledge, demands, and concerns to each other.

Table 40

Factors Relating to Gathering Information: Gathering Information about Hostage Takers from External Sources

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	133	53.6	59.1	59.1
	2	82	33.1	36.4	95.6
	3	8	3.2	3.6	99.1
	4	1	.4	.4	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	225	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	23	9.3		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 40 shows that 96 % of the respondents agree with the statement that 'in a hostage situation, negotiators attempt to gather information about hostage takers from external sources'

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compared to the less than 1 % of the negotiators who do not agree with this statement. Regarding the findings within the table, there are two relevant statements indicated by the research participants. One expressed that "each situation has to be handled using information that can be gathered about that situation and the persons involved. There is no way to make a 'blanket statement' about a particular type of situation without having more information." Another respondent stressed that "I think that the more information you have on the hostage taker the better." These statements and findings within the above table show that having more information about situations and hostage takers involved helps the negotiators use more reliable and workable negotiation and decision strategies.

Table 41

Technique to Establish a Good Rapport: Asking Open-Ended Questions

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	125	50.4	55.6	55.6
	2	82	33.1	36.4	92.0
	3	14	5.6	6.2	98.2
	4	3	1.2	1.3	99.6
	5	1	.4	.4	100.0
	Total	225	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	23	9.3		
Total		248	100.0		

The findings in Table 41 show that 92 % of the respondents, 207 negotiators, agree with the statement that 'negotiators ask hostage takers open-ended questions to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies' compared to the 2 % of the respondents, 4 negotiators, who do not agree with the statement presented here. The findings reveal that the negotiators use the technique of asking open-ended questions in negotiating with hostage takers in order to buy time and get more information about situations and hostage takers

involved. Asking open-ended questions requires the negotiators to use active listening skills because the negotiators have to pay attention to hostage takers' responses to questions.

Negotiators are trained in how to ask open-ended questions of hostage takers by practicing with actual video tapes and real case scenarios of hostage situations. The negotiators are also trained in role playing techniques and the utilization of active listening skills. Van Hasselt and Romano (2004) asserted, about 80 % of negotiator trainings practice role playing scenarios to learn how to establish rapport with hostage takers.

Table 42

The Presence of the Tactical Team may Influence the Hostage Takers Behavior and This may Affect the Negotiation Process

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	46	18.5	21.9	21.9
	2	125	50.4	59.5	81.4
	3	19	7.7	9.0	90.5
	4	17	6.9	8.1	98.6
	5	3	1.2	1.4	100.0
	Total	210	84.7	100.0	
Missing	System	38	15.3		
Total		248	100.0		

The findings in Table 42 represent that 81 % of the respondents, 171 negotiators, accepted the statement that 'the presence of the tactical team may influence the hostage takers behavior and this may affect the negotiation process' compared to the 10 % of the respondents, 20 negotiators, who do not accept the statement presented in the above table. This means that in some situations, depending on the characteristics of hostage situations, the negotiators might use the presence of the on-scene tactical team as a negotiation tool in order to induce hostage takers to surrender. As stated earlier, using the on-scene police tactical team intervention is sometimes a very effective instrument in resolving hostage situations.

Table 43

Negotiators should Focus on Hostage Takers' Demands Whether They are Negotiable or not

Because This may Buy Time for the Negotiation Team

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	34	13.7	16.2	16.2
	2	94	37.9	44.8	61.0
	3	38	15.3	18.1	79.0
	4	36	14.5	17.1	96.2
	5	8	3.2	3.8	100.0
	Total	210	84.7	100.0	
Missing	System	38	15.3		
Total		248	100.0		

The findings in Table 43 indicate that 61 % of the respondents, 128 negotiators, agree with the statement that 'negotiators focus on hostage takers' demands whether they are negotiable or not because this may buy time for the negotiation team' compared to the 21 % of the respondents, 44 negotiators, who do not agree with the statement expressed in the table.

Lanceley, (2003) asserted that the negotiators never say 'no' to hostage takers even though the demands made by the hostage takers are not negotiable and/or will never be met. Mc Mains and Mullins, (1996) stated that the negotiators prolong the negotiation process with hostage takers while focusing on the demands. So long as the hostage takers make any type of demand, they have joined in a negotiation process. For instance, Wind (1995) suggested, if subjects ask for a getaway car within a deadline, the negotiators interpret this demand as the beginning of the negotiation process with the police. In the meantime, good negotiators never ignore either demands or deadlines set by subjects. A well-trained negotiator knows how to make good use of the demands made by hostage takers as negotiation tools.

Table 44

If Negotiators Learn What the Hostage Takers' Messages/Demands are, They Ensure the Correct

Interpretations of the Message by Paraphrasing Them Back to the Hostage Takers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	117	47.2	50.6	50.6
	2	84	33.9	36.4	87.0
	3	17	6.9	7.4	94.4
	4	11	4.4	4.8	99.1
	5	2	.8	.9	100.0
	Total	231	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	17	6.9		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 44 indicates that the 87 % of the respondents, 201 negotiators, accept the statement

that 'during negotiation process in hostage situation negotiators learn what the hostage takers'

messages/demands are to ensure the correct interpretations of the messages compared to the 6 %

of the respondents, 13 negotiators, who do not accept the statement made here.

There are two valuable contributions from two research participants in the study. One

respondent expressed that "active listening skills are fatiguing and assist with deescalating the

emotional charge of the situations. Dwelling on demands keep the demands in the forefront of

the negotiations. The goal of negotiations is not to grant demands. The goal is to gain peaceful

surrender. Demands should be catalogued and stalled." Another respondent stressed that

"demands are demands - whether they are instrumental or expressive - underlying all demands

are significant concerns for the individual that need to be acknowledged and understood in order

to come to resolution." Both respondents indicated that the negotiators use active listening skills

to learn demands made by hostage takers; they use demands as negotiation tools regardless of

whether they are negotiable or not. The findings within Tables 43 and 44 as well as each of the

respondents' statements show that the negotiators attempt to learn demands/messages of hostage

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takers whether they are negotiable or not. This helps the negotiators buy the time they need in

stalling hostage takers. It also helps the negotiators make correct interpretations of the messages

sent by hostage takers.

In sum, negotiation tools are likely to be used to gather more information about both

hostage takers and situations since the more information, the better. These tools vary depending

on the characteristics of hostage takers and situations. Some are establishing trust/rapport with

hostage takers, developing a personal communication style with hostage takers, using

information gathering techniques from external sources on-scene, using the presence of the on-

scene tactical team, and using role playing in hostage negotiations.

Identifying the Underlying Factors

In this section, I used the factor analysis function to seek explanations regarding the

findings of the first research question in the study, to see if there is a logical relationship between

the variable load on a factor, and if so, what kind of relationship exists. There are two goals of

the factor analysis function. First, I sought to strengthen the understanding of the first research

question addressing the primary activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by

the negotiators. Second, I intended to generate the extracted factor loadings for future research in

the field of hostage negotiation resolutions. A 'Scree Plot' was requested in the SPSS factor

analysis and varimax rotation method is used. Regarding the number of components to be

retained, I used SPSS default criteria and selected the components whose Eigen-Values are

greater than 1. For all other options SPSS defaults are used.

Table 45

Total Variance Explained

Components	Initial Eigen Values		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	7.259	30.247	30.247
2	2.402	10.007	40.254
3	1.559	6.495	46.749
4	1.410	5.875	52.624
5	1.148	4.784	57.408
6	1.042	4.340	61.748

Based on the above criteria, SPSS retained six components that explain a total of 61.7 %

of the total variance in Table 45. The "Total Variance Explained" table indicates that the first

component accounted for about 30 % of the total variance and the second component accounts

for 10 % of the variance. Each of the remaining four components account for between about 4 %

and about 6 % of the total variation. Table 46 gives the varimax rotated loadings.

> A description of the 'criteria for extracting factors' quoted from Suhr is:
> Interpretability criteria:
> a. Are there at least 3 items with significant loadings (>0.30)?
> b. Do the variables that load on a factor share some conceptual meaning?
> c. Do the variables that load on different factors seem to measure different constructs?
> d. Does the rotated factor pattern demonstrate simple structure? Are there relatively
>   i. high loadings on one factor?
>   ii. low loadings on other factors? (2007, p. 3).

Based on above criteria by Suhr, the items in Table 46 have loadings over 0.40 that are

higher than 0.30 threshold suggested by Suhr. There are some other items with loading over 0.30

in Table 46, but as suggested by Suhr, these items are not included in the components since they

do not share similar conceptual meanings with the other elements. In regards to the third criteria

suggested by Suhr, each group of items measures a different construct from other components.

Finally, the items in each component have either high or low loadings on their own factors

compared to the other factors.

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Table 46

Factor Analysis

Items	Components					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Knowing what to ask hostage takers (A9)	.719	-.010	.006	.249	.217	.142
Knowing how to ask the right questions (A10)	.796	.138	.044	.111	.211	.114
Understanding hostage takers' messages (A12)	.647	.201	.171	-.164	.073	.012
Having less miscommunication with hostage takers (A13)	.695	.173	.178	.018	-.097	.272
Using right word selections (A14)	.655	.315	.119	.079	.199	-.022
Establishing trust b/w negotiators and hostage takers (A15.1)	.202	.634	.005	.133	-.028	.500
Building rapport b/w negotiators and hostage takers (A15.2)	.198	.703	-.088	.249	.136	.332
Developing a personal communication style (A15.3)	.219	.610	.130	.402	.025	-.092
Presence of the media on-scene (A16.3)	.032	.000	.893	.144	.091	.048
Presence of by-standers on-scene (A16.4)	.124	-.059	.902	.109	.060	.065
Number of hostages in a situation (A16.1)	.079	.108	.298	.815	-.009	.029
Number of hostage takers in a situation (A16.2)	.137	.034	.252	.785	.148	.180
Attending joint trainings with tactical teams (A4)	.173	.158	.063	.082	.817	.086
Attending joint trainings with incident commanders (A5)	.222	.151	.039	.116	.807	.073
Using negotiators' prior experience (A1)	.176	.107	.142	.040	.068	.713
Hostage situations are handled by trained negotiators (A2)	.063	-.001	.003	.027	.445	.509
Exhausting negotiation before tactical intervention (A3)	.218	.494	.036	-.150	.412	-.045
Learning hostage takers' motivations (A6)	.490	.381	.020	.195	.271	.019
No competition with the tactical team on-scene (A7)	.214	.545	.254	-.219	.183	.098
Consider using different strategies in miscommunication (A8)	.421	.502	.024	.072	.248	.014
Primary negotiator/secondary negotiators relationship (A11)	.583	.291	-.045	.255	.156	.092
Gather info with hostage takers from external sources (A15.4)	.215	.427	-.052	.438	.164	-.069
Language difference b/w negotiator and hostage taker (A15.5)	.390	.355	-.072	.156	-.163	.304
Presence of Stockholm syndrome (A16.5)	.124	.250	.592	.323	-.072	.040

For the purpose of analyzing the first component in Table 46, based on the standards stated above, there are eight items sharing exactly the same conceptual meaning exactly addressing communication skills used by the negotiators. These variables are *(1) knowing what to ask; (2) knowing how to ask; (3) understanding hostage takers' messages; (4) having less miscommunication with hostage takers; (5) using appropriate word selections; (6) learning hostage takers' motivations; (7) consideration of using different strategies in*

miscommunications; and (8) managing the relationship between the on-scene primary and secondary negotiators.

These eight variables are either the same or similar to the items that I retrieved from the survey study and the literature review while responding to the first research question. The eight variables are also the same and/or similar items presented in the directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories. This means that the findings of research questions 1 and 3a fully support the result of the first component of using factor analysis function. In sum, the variables revealed by the factor analysis function of SPSS that load on a factor strongly suggest that the communication skills presented in answering the first research question are appropriate skills for the negotiators to use; and the directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories are workable elements for the negotiators as a framework for implementing hostage negotiations.

To analyze the second component in Table 46, four items with the same conceptual meaning address the negotiation tools used by the negotiators. These four meaningful items are *(1) establishing trust between negotiators and hostage takers; (2) building rapport between negotiators and hostage takers; (3) developing a personal communication style with hostage takers; and (4) gathering information about hostage takers from external sources.* These four elements are exactly the same and/or similar with the items that I retrieved from the survey study and the literature review discussed within the first research question. The result presented here supports the findings with the negotiation tools analyzed in responding to research question 2.

To analyze the third component in Table 46, three items with the same conceptual meaning address the factors constructed by situational characteristics of hostage incidents affecting negotiation. The three meaningful items are *(1) presence of the media on-scene, (2) presence of by-standards on-scene, and (3) presence of the Stockholm syndrome.* To analyze the

fourth component in the table, two items with the same conceptual meaning address the factors constructed by situational characteristics of hostage incidents affecting negotiation including *(1) number of hostages and (2) number of hostage takers.* Unsurprisingly, the third and fourth components address different items. However, the items presented in both components are virtually completely created by situational and/or environmental characteristics observed in hostage incidents. I assigned the same title for describing the items presented in both components in the above table.

To analyze the fifth component in Table 46, two items with the same conceptual meaning address the factors constructed by negotiators' professional qualifications affecting negotiation including *(1) attending joint trainings with tactical team(s) and (2) attending joint trainings with incident commander(s).* To analyze the sixth component in Table 46, two items with the same conceptual meaning address the factors constructed by negotiators' professional qualifications that affect negotiation, including *(1) negotiators' prior negotiation experience and (2) the statement that hostage negotiation should be handled by trained negotiators.* Likewise above, the fifth and sixth components address the different items. However, the items presented in both components are constructed by the professional qualifications of the hostage negotiators. Therefore, I assigned the same title for describing the items presented in the fifth and sixth components in Table 46. The variables in both components are related to the experience and knowledge of the negotiators gained either from training programs taken together with the other key players in a command post resolution or gained through working as on-scene negotiators in the field.

Taken together, the factor analysis function was used here to identify the underlying factors explaining the pattern of correlations within the observed variables. There are four

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extracted categories grouped by the factor analysis function of SPSS: *(1) the communications*

skills and (2) negotiation tools used by the negotiators, (3) the factors constructed by the

negotiators' professional qualifications that affect negotiations, and (4) the factors constructed

by situational characteristics of hostage incidents that affect negotiations. I asserted that the

statements within these four groupings by the factor analysis function of SPSS support the results

responding to the first research question.

<p align="center">*Findings with the Research Question 2:*</p>

<p align="center">*Negotiations and Decision Making in*</p>

<p align="center">*Instrumental and Expressive Hostage Situations*</p>

In this section, I focused on analyzing the collected data and interpreting the statistical

findings related to the second research question, which consists of three different parts:

RQ-2: 'What elements of negotiation strategies differ in instrumental and expressive

hostage situations?

RQ-2a: What factors influencing negotiation and decision strategies of hostage/crisis

negotiators are different in instrumental and expressive hostage situations?

RQ-2b: Are negotiation strategies implemented by hostage/crisis negotiators different in

instrumental and expressive hostage situations?

In the analysis of this section, I investigated whether or not the 7 elements of hostage

negotiation (pairs 1 through 7 in Table 47 below) and the 6 factors affecting hostage negotiation

strategies and decision making of the negotiators (pairs 8 through 13 in Table 47) differ

depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive.

In order to make this comparison, I used the two case scenarios in the survey

questionnaire. The first scenario provided the characteristics of an instrumental hostage situation

<p align="center">159</p>

and the second scenario presented the characteristics of an expressive hostage situation. The 13

items (survey questions) were asked following the first scenario and the exact same 13 items

were asked following the second scenario.

Each item in the survey study had five level categories from *1 (Strongly Agree) to 5*

(Strongly Disagree). For the purpose of paired samples t-test comparison, each variable was

recoded into a new dummy variable. In these dummy variables, 'strongly agree' and 'agree'

responses were coded as '1' and the other three responses, 'neutral', 'disagree', and 'strongly

disagree', were coded as '0'. The mean scores in Table 47 represent the percentage of the

negotiators who agree and/or strongly agree with each item.

Table 47

Paired Samples Statistics

Items	Situation Type	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Mental health professional providing assistance (Pair 1)	instrumental hostage situation	.4712	191	.50048	.03621
	expressive hostage situation	.8377	191	.36970	.02675
Focusing on the hostage taker's demands (Pair 2)	instrumental hostage situation	.6230	191	.48590	.03516
	expressive hostage situation	.6126	191	.48844	.03534
Using of face-to-face negotiation (Pair 3)	instrumental hostage situation	.1990	191	.40026	.02896
	expressive hostage situation	.2565	191	.43787	.03168
Developing a personal communication style with the hostage taker (Pair 4)	instrumental hostage situation	.8848	191	.32008	.02316
	expressive hostage situation	.9476	191	.22333	.01616
Considering criminal history of the hostage taker (Pair 5)	instrumental hostage situation	.4346	191	.49700	.03596
	expressive hostage situation	.3717	191	.48454	.03506
Psychological assessment of the hostage taker (Pair 6)	instrumental hostage situation	.4921	191	.50125	.03627
	expressive hostage situation	.8586	191	.34931	.02528

(table continues)

Table 47 *(continued).*

Items	Situation Type	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Interviewing family members of the hostage taker (Pair 7)	instrumental hostage situation	.8901	191	.31365	.02269
	expressive hostage situation	.9476	191	.22333	.01616
Hostages' prior relationships to the hostage taker (Pair 8)	instrumental hostage situation	.7120	191	.45400	.03285
	expressive hostage situation	.9215	191	.26972	.01952
Presence of a deadline set by the hostage taker (Pair 9)	instrumental hostage situation	.6178	191	.48720	.03525
	expressive hostage situation	.6597	191	.47506	.03437
Threat level of the hostage taker (Pair 10)	instrumental hostage situation	.9529	191	.21245	.01537
	expressive hostage situation	.9529	191	.21245	.01537
Duration of the hostage situation (Pair 11)	instrumental hostage situation	.7801	191	.41526	.03005
	expressive hostage situation	.7487	191	.43491	.03147
Presence of hostage taker demands (Pair 12)	instrumental hostage situation	.7592	191	.42872	.03102
	expressive hostage situation	.7016	191	.45877	.03320
The presence of the tactical team (Pair 13)	instrumental hostage situation	.8115	191	.39212	.02837
	expressive hostage situation	.7906	191	.40797	.02952

For the purpose of responding to research questions 2 and 2a, I looked at whether the 13 different pairs (the 7 elements of negotiations addressed by the RQ-2, and the 6 factors influencing negotiation and decision strategies of the negotiators addressed by the RQ-2a), are handled differently or not in an instrumental and expressive hostage situation.

Table 48

Paired Samples Test

Items	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	t	df	Sig. (2 tailed)
Mental health professional providing assistance (Pair 1)	-.3665	.50443	.03650	-10.041**	190	.000

(table continues)

Table 48 *(continued)*.

Items	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	t	df	Sig. (2 tailed)
Focusing on the hostage takers' demands (Pair 2)	.0105	.51288	.03711	.282	190	.778
Using of face-to-face negotiation (Pair 3)	-.0576	.46093	.03335	-1.727	190	.086
Developing a personal comm. with the hostage taker (Pair 4)	-.0628	.30128	.02180	-2.882*	190	.004
Considering criminal history of the hostage taker (Pair 5)	.0628	.45449	.03289	1.910	190	.058
Psychological assessment of the hostage taker (Pair 6)	-.3665	.51476	.03725	-9.840**	190	.000
Interviewing family members of the hostage taker (Pair 7)	-.0576	.32740	.02369	-2.431*	190	.016
Hostages' prior relationships to the hostage taker (Pair 8)	-.2094	.44499	.03220	-6.504**	190	.000
Presence of a deadline set by the hostage taker (Pair 9)	-.0419	.43326	.03135	-1.336	190	.183
Threat level of the hostage taker (Pair 10)	.0000	.20520	.01485	.000	190	1.000
Duration of the hostage situation (Pair 11)	.0314	.33882	.02452	1.281	190	.202
Presence of hostage taker demands (Pair 12)	.0576	.42530	.03077	1.871	190	.063
The presence of the tactical team (Pair 13)	.0209	.39680	.02871	.729	190	.467

* Significant at 0.05 alpha level
** Significant at 0.01 alpha level

Elements of Negotiation Differing in Situations (RQ-2)

In this section, I focused on analyzing the collected data and interpreting the statistical

findings related with only research question.

RQ-2: 'What elements of negotiation strategies differ in instrumental and expressive

hostage situations?

In the analysis part of the RQ-2, I investigated whether the 7 elements of negotiation

strategies differ depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive. The 7

elements tested in this study are: *(1) the presence of mental health professional on-scene; (2)*

focusing on the hostage takers' demands in order to buy time that the negotiators need; (3) using

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face-to-face communication during hostage negotiations; (4) developing a personal-bond

communication style with hostage takers; (5) considering criminal histories of hostage takers;

(6) having psychological assessments of hostage takers performed; and (7) interviewing family

members of hostage takers.

Once again, the 7 elements of the negotiation strategies were put into the two case-

scenario questions in the survey instrument in order to answer research question 2. In the survey

questionnaire, questions 19 through 26 (except for question 20) address the first case study,

whereas questions 28 through 35 (except for question 29) address the second case study.

As mentioned earlier, two key hypotheses related to the second research question in the

study exist. The first key hypothesis is addressed by research question 2, while the second key

hypothesis is addressed by the research question 2a. I focused on the first key hypothesis in this

section only.

H1: Some elements of negotiation strategies differ depending on whether the hostage

situation is instrumental or expressive.

This hypothesis addresses the idea that 'some elements of negotiation strategies' differ

depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive. The concept of 'some

elements' in this hypothesis refers to the 7 elements of the negotiation strategies mentioned

above. This means that this key hypothesis has 7 sub-hypotheses. Regarding research question 2,

the 7 sub-hypotheses are: *'the element of the negotiation strategy and practice differs depending*

on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive. (The 7 elements mentioned below

are put in the blank of the hypothesis above in creating the 7 sub-hypotheses).

1. Mental health professionals providing assistance
2. Focusing on hostage takers demands to buy time

3. Using face-to-face communication during negotiation

4. Developing a personal communication style with the hostage taker

5. Considering criminal history of the hostage taker

6. Having psychological assessment of the hostage taker

7. Interviewing family members of the hostage taker.

I tested the above 7 sub-hypotheses to find out if there are significant differences in implementing the elements of negotiation strategy and practice depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive. I looked at the findings of the first seven paired comparisons in Table 47 and 48 in responding to research question 2. Only four pairs are handled by the research participants in the sample differently in the expressive and instrumental hostage situations. The differences in these paired are statistically significant. The four pairs having significant relationships are *the first pair (getting assistance from mental health professionals about the hostage takers), the fourth pair (developing a personal communication with the hostage taker), the sixth pair (getting psychological assessment of the hostage taker), and the seventh pair (interviewing with the family members of the hostage taker).*

For the first paired comparison, I looked at whether getting assistance on the hostage takers' personalities from mental health professionals is handled differently or not in an expressive and instrumental hostage situation. Approximately 47 % of the research participants believed that assistance from a mental health professional is necessary in instrumental hostage negotiation situations compared to about 84 % of the research participants who believed that assistance from a mental health professional is necessary in expressive hostage negotiation situations. The difference in this pair is significant at 0.01 alpha level ($t = 10.041$; $df = 190$). The sub-hypothesis, *'the element of negotiation, 'providing assessment of hostage taker's personality*

by a mental health professional', differs depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive, is supported by the findings with the first paired comparison in Tables 47 and 48.

For the fourth paired comparison, I looked at whether 'the negotiators develop a personal-bond communication style with the hostage taker so that they can gather information from the hostage taker' is handled differently or not in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. Approximately 88 % of the research participants in the sample believed that developing a personal-bond communication style with the hostage taker is necessary in dealing with instrumental hostage negotiation situations compared to about 95 % of the participants in dealing with expressive hostage negotiation situations. The difference in this pair is statistically significant at 0.05 alpha level ($t = 2.882$; $df = 190$). The sub-hypothesis, *'the element of negotiation, 'negotiators develop a personal-bond communication style with the hostage taker so that they can gather information from the hostage taker differs depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive',* is supported by the findings of the fourth paired comparisons presented in Tables 47 and 48.

For the sixth paired comparison, I looked at whether 'the negotiators decide their negotiation strategies based on the psychological assessment of the hostage taker' is handled differently or not in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. Approximately 49 % of the research participants in the sample believed that psychological assessment of the hostage taker is necessary in instrumental hostage negotiation situations compared to about 86 % of the participants in expressive hostage negotiation situations. The difference in this pair is significant at 0.01 alpha level ($t = 9.840$; $df = 190$). The sub-hypothesis, *'the element of negotiation, 'the negotiators decide their negotiation strategies based on the psychological assessment of the*

hostage taker', differs depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive, is supported by the findings of the sixth paired comparison in Table 47 and 48.

For the seventh paired comparison, I looked at whether 'interviewing family members of the hostage taker might be helpful in determining negotiation and decision strategies' is handled differently or not in the instrumental and expressive hostage situations. Tables 47 and 48 show that about 89 % of the research participants in the sample believed that interviewing family members of the hostage taker in determining negotiation and decision strategies is necessary in instrumental hostage negotiation situations compared to about 95 % of the participants in expressive hostage negotiation situations. The difference in this paired is significant at 0.05 alpha level ($t = 2.431$; $df = 190$). The sub-hypothesis, *'the element of negotiation strategies, 'interviewing family members of the hostage taker in determining negotiation and decision strategies', differs depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive,* is supported by the findings of the seventh paired comparison presented in Tables 47 and 48.

Regarding the remaining 3 paired comparisons below (the pairs: 2, 3, and 5 presented in Tables 47 and 48); there is not any significant difference in handling them whether they be instrumental or expressive hostage negotiation situations. The sub-hypotheses related to these 4 paired comparisons are not supported by the findings presented in Tables 47 and 48.

1. Focusing on the hostage takers' demands (Pair 2)

2. Using face-to-face communication during negotiation (Pair 3)

3. Considering the criminal histories of the hostage takers (Pair 5).

For the third paired comparison (using face-to-face communication during negotiation), Tables 47 and 48 provide that about 20 % of the research participants in the sample believed that using face-to-face technique during negotiation might be an effective method in instrumental

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hostage negotiation situations compared to about 26 % of the participants in expressive hostage negotiation situations. The alpha level is .086; $t = 1.727$; and $df = 190$. For the fifth paired comparison (considering the criminal histories of the hostage takers during negotiations), Tables 47 and 48 show that about 43 % of the research participants believed that the negotiators consider prior criminal histories of the hostage takers in handling instrumental hostage negotiation situations to determine their negotiation and decision strategies compared to about 37 % of the participants in handling expressive hostage negotiation situations. The alpha level is .058; $t = 1.910$; and $df = 190$. As is seen here, the differences in the third and fifth paired comparisons are not significant since the alpha level is a little higher than the 0.05 benchmark. Although this is the case, they might be accepted as significant at 0.06 alpha levels. The differences in these paired comparisons might be accepted as significant items at 0.06 alpha levels.

In sum, using the four elements of the negotiation strategies clearly differs depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental and expressive. These elements are: *(1) obtaining the assessments of hostage takers' personalities from mental health professionals; (2) developing a personal-bond communication style with the hostage taker so that they can gather information from the hostage taker; (3) obtaining assessments of the hostage takers' psychological conditions (this element is quite similar with the first one); and (4) interviewing family members of the hostage takers in determining the negotiation and decision strategies.* It can be suggested that taking the four elements into consideration while dealing with expressive hostage takers is perceived to be more important than in dealing with instrumental hostage takers.

In determining the negotiation and decision strategies, learning about the personalities and psychological conditions of expressive hostage takers from the mental health professionals,

the family members of the hostage takers, and/or the hostage takers themselves are more important than learning about these factors in handling instrumental hostage situations due to the following reason. Noesner and Webster (1997) stated that the behaviors of instrumental hostage takers are based on the substantive and clear demands compared to the behaviors of the expressive hostage takers, which are based on emotional and highly scattered thoughts. Instrumental subjects carry out much more goal-directed behaviors, while expressive subjects carry out much more irrational and unfounded behaviors. The negotiators are expected to use more problem solving focused strategies in responding to the instrumental types, while they are expected to use more active listening focused strategies in responding to the experimental types.

Factors Influencing Negotiation in Situations (RQ- 2a)

In this section, I focused on analyzing the collected data and interpreting the statistical findings related with research question 2a:

RQ-2a: What factors influencing negotiation and decision strategies of hostage/crisis negotiators are different in instrumental and expressive hostage situations?

In the analysis part of the RQ-2a, I investigated whether the 6 factors influencing the negotiation and decision strategies of the negotiators are different in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. The 6 factors tested in this study are: *(1) the hostages' prior relationships to the hostage takers; (2) the threat level of hostage takers; (3) the duration of hostage situations; (4) the existence of any demands made by the hostage takers; (5) the presence of any deadlines set by the hostage takers; and (6) the presence of the tactical team on-scene.* Once again, these 6 factors were put into the two case-scenario questions in the survey. Questions 20, 27, 29, and 36 in the survey questionnaire address these 6 factors. There is only one key hypothesis regarding the RQ-2a in the study:

H2: Some factors influencing negotiation and decision strategies of hostage/crisis negotiators are different depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive.

This hypothesis posits the fact that some factors influencing negotiation and decision strategies of the negotiators might be different depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive. The concept of *'some factors'* stated in this hypothesis refers to the 6 factors mentioned earlier. This means that this key hypothesis has 6 sub-hypotheses. The 6 sub-hypotheses are: *'the factor, '....', that influences negotiation strategies and decision making of hostage/crisis negotiators is different depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive.* (The factors mentioned below are put in the blank of the hypothesis above in creating the 6 sub-hypotheses).

1. The hostages' prior relationships to the hostage taker

2. The threat level of the hostage taker

3. The duration of the hostage situation

4. The presence of hostage taker demands

5. The presence of a deadline set by the hostage taker

6. The presence of the tactical team on-scene.

I tested the above 6 sub-hypotheses to discern whether there are significant differences on handling the factors influencing negotiation and decision strategies of the negotiators depending on if the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive.

For the eight paired comparisons, I looked at whether the factor, 'hostages' prior relationships to the hostage taker', influences negotiation process and decision strategies of negotiators when handling either instrumental or expressive hostage situations. Tables 47 and 48

show that about 71 % of the research participants believed that the factor, 'the hostages' prior relationships to the hostage takers', is handled differently in instrumental hostage negotiation situations compared to about 92 % of the participants who believed that the same factor is handled differently in expressive hostage negotiation situations. The difference in this pair is significant at 0.01 alpha level ($t = 6.504$; $df = 190$). The sub-hypothesis related to the research question 2a, *'the factor, hostages' prior relationships to the hostage takers, that influences negotiation and decision strategies of the hostage/crisis negotiators is handled differently depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive',* is supported by the findings of the eight paired comparison presented in Tables 47 and 48.

Conversely, regarding the remaining 5 paired comparisons (factors influencing negotiation and decision strategies of the negotiators) listed below; there is not any significant difference in handling instrumental and expressive hostage negotiation situations. Therefore, the sub-hypotheses stated before related to the 5 paired comparisons below are not supported by the statistical findings in this section.

1. Threat level of the hostage taker

2. Duration of the hostage situation

3. Presence of hostage taker demands

4. Presence of a deadline set by the hostage taker

5. Presence of the tactical team on-scene.

It is evident that there is no significant difference between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in the face of an active threat. On the contrary, regarding the results of pair 11 in Tables 47 and 48, the presence of a threat supersedes the idea of handling situations

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differently. It is noteworthy that the respondents see 'threat' as an overwhelmingly important valuable.

For the twelfth paired comparison (considering the presence of the hostage taker demands during negotiations), Tables 47 and 48 show that about 76 % of the research participants believed that the negotiators consider deciding their negotiation and decision strategies based on the presence of the demands made by the hostage takers in handling instrumental hostage situations compared to about 70 % of the participants in handling expressive hostage negotiation situations. In the twelfth paired comparison, the alpha level is .063; $t = 1.871$; and $df = 190$. As is seen, the difference with the twelfth paired comparison is not significant since the alpha level is a little higher than the 0.05 benchmark. Although it is true, it might be accepted as significant at 0.06 alpha levels.

In sum, the hostages' prior relationships to the hostage takers, is handled differently by the negotiators depending on whether the situation they are faced with is instrumental or expressive. The negotiators are likely to consider the hostages' prior relationships to the hostage takers more in determining their negotiation and decision strategies while responding to expressive hostage situations compared to instrumental hostage situations. The possible explanation for this is that many emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage takers are likely to take hostages from among the people they know. This finding is strongly supported by the literature.

Goldaber stated that this type of emotionally disturbed hostage takers usually takes hostages from among the people they know. Therefore, the hostages are likely to be the acquaintances of emotionally disturbed hostage takers. In these types of situations, taking the hostages occurs spontaneously; and the subjects usually present irrational behaviors (as cited in

Poland and McCrystle, 1999). Hostage takers might be experiencing breakdowns in their relationships with those around them. They often attempt to influence a relationship by taking hostages, who might be a spouse and/or other loved one (Gilliland and James, 1997).

Mentally ill hostage takers take hostages due to their frustrations with life, anxieties, and stress. The negotiators might struggle while attempting to negotiate with them (Gilliland and James, 1997). The negotiators, therefore, are expected to be familiar with the characteristics and attitudes of their personality disorders (Lanceley, 2003). As stated earlier, there are several types of mentally ill hostage takers, such as *(1) schizophrenic, (2) depressive, (3) inadequate, (4) antisocial* (Gilliland and James, 1997), *and (5) borderline personalities* (Borum and Strentz, 1992). For instance, schizophrenic hostage takers usually apply behaviors based on delusions, anxiety, belligerence, and aggression to their lives. They might be very dangerous to the others around them while suffering from their paranoid and hostile delusions (Strentz, 2006). Also, the vast majority of depressive hostage takers suffer from depression that is likely to be caused by the loss of family members (Divasto, Lanceley, and Gruys, 1992), anxiety, fear of not having some positive stimulus (Strentz, 2006) and having a negative outlook in their life (Gilliland and James, 1997). The depressive hostage takers are likely to be driven by hopeless situations in their lives (Strentz, 2006). These types of subjects usually take hostages from among the target individuals known by them (Gilliland and James, 1997). Lastly, the types of borderline hostage takers want to get attention of the third parties, such as families, friends, and/or news media by taking and holding hostages (Borum and Strentz, 1992). Taken together, emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage takers are likely to take hostages from among the people they know. In emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage situations, taking the hostages occurs spontaneously; and the subjects usually present irrational behaviors.

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Implementing Negotiation Strategies Differently (RQ-2b)

In this section, I focused on analyzing the collected data and interpreting the statistical findings related to research question 2b only:

RQ-2b: Are negotiation strategies implemented by hostage/crisis negotiators different in instrumental and expressive hostage situations?

Regarding the RQ-2b, I added two more critical questions into the survey questionnaire. One asks 'do you handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently?' The second is 'do you believe the negotiators should handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently?'

In this section, there are two tables that show the agreement levels of the research participants on handling the negotiation strategies differently in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. In coding the variables with the output of the SPSS, 'strongly agree' and 'agree' responses were coded as '1' and other three responses, 'neutral', 'disagree', and 'strongly disagree' responses, were coded as '0'. The mean scores in Tables 49 and 50 represent the percentage of the respondents who strongly agree and/or agree with the each item.

Table 49

Do You Handle Instrumental and Expressive Hostage Situations Differently?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	145	58.4	64.7	64.7
	2	79	31.9	35.3	100.0
	Total	224	90.3	100.0	
Missing	System	24	9.7		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 49 shows that about 65 % of the research participants believed that they handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently compared to about 35 % of the research participants who believed that they handle these hostage situations similarly.

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Table 50

Do You Believe that Negotiators should Handle Instrumental and Expressive Hostage Situations Differently?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	138	55.6	72.3	72.3
	2	53	21.4	27.7	100.0
	Total	191	77.0	100.0	
Missing	System	57	23.0		
Total		248	100.0		

Table 50 shows that about 72 % of the research participants in the sample believed that the negotiators should handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently compared to about 28 % of the research participants who believed that the negotiators should handle both types of situations without distinction. In sum, both Tables 49 and 50 show that the vast majority of the research participants in the sample believed that instrumental and expressive hostage situations should be handled differently by the hostage/crisis negotiators. (We must remember that the figures -level of disagreements with the statements made in Tables 49 and 50- are for the total of 'reluctant, disagree, and strongly disagree' categories).

As mentioned earlier, in addition to the 46 quantitative questions in the survey instrument, I made space for the individual qualitative responses. That statement is '*please add any comments and opinions about the survey and about hostage/crisis negotiation.*' I aimed to give the respondents a chance to write their opinions and knowledge about their negotiation and decision strategies. There are 40 valuable items of input written by the research participants. Several thoughts taken from the written statements strengthen the findings of the RQ-2b.

One research participant stated that "although my responses may have been similar regarding both scenarios, I still believe both types of hostage situations would be handled differently. Although criminal history, information from family, a psychological assessment, etc.

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may be equally important in each case, the intelligence you gather from those sources and how you use it will likely be different in each of the two types of situations." Another stated that "I think you were trying to find out if there is a significant difference in the way expressive vs. instrumental hostage situations are handled. I agree that they are handled differently to some extent. Active Listening is crucial to both situations yet the situations do require different strategies. I think we experience more expressive situation in the USA according to our HOBAS [the Hostage Barricade Statistics of the FBI] statistics."

A third respondent stated "so, of course they should be handled differently." One other statement is that "each negotiation should be handled based on the situation involved. Some of the tactics and techniques used may be similar in each negotiation, but each should be handled based on the merits of the incident. The only common thread for all negotiations is the need to resolve the situation." Finally, considering the findings in the frequency Tables 49 and 50 as well as the findings in the research participants' written input, the results reveal that the negotiators definitely implement their negotiation and decision strategies differently depending on whether the situations they handle are instrumental or expressive.

Findings with the Research Question 3:

Beliefs in the Elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's Theories

In this section, I analyzed and interpreted the findings addressing whether the negotiators belief in some elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories has impact on their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. I also investigated whether the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories are workable for use in handling hostage situations by looking at the research participants' agreement levels with the stated elements of the theories. The third research question consists of two parts, research questions 3 and 3a:

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RQ-3: Does hostage/crisis negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories have impact on their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently? This question addresses if the negotiators' belief in the 12 elements of the two theories affect negotiation strategy and practice in responding to hostage situations.

RQ-3a: Are the directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories useful -workable- as a framework for negotiation and decision strategies of hostage/crisis negotiators in responding to hostage situations?

I used a binary logistic regression statistic method to answer the third research question. I also used some cross tabulations and frequency tables to answer the third research question. In this section, I specifically measured two things. First, I measured whether the negotiators' beliefs in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories have impact on their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. The expression of *'the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories'* refer to the 12 different elements taken from the core directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories. Second, I also measured whether the directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories are useful -workable- as a framework for negotiation and decision strategies of the negotiators.

There is only one key hypothesis addressing the third research question in this study.

H3: Hostage/crisis negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories has an impact on their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. In other words, the negotiators' belief in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories predicts more sophisticated understanding of the difference in instrumental and expressive hostage situations.

This hypothesis refers to the 12 sub-hypotheses addressed by the 12 elements of both theories. Each sub-hypothesis is constructed by using one of the 12 elements of the theories. The 12 sub-hypotheses are: *Hostage/crisis negotiators' belief in the element, '…', of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories has impact on their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently.* The elements mentioned below are put in the blank of the hypothesis above in creating the 12 sub-hypotheses:

1. Considering different strategies to deal with hostage takers

2. Knowing what to ask hostage takers during hostage negotiations

3. Knowing how to ask the right questions of hostage takers

4. Knowing how to participate in team work during hostage negotiations

5. Learning hostage takers' messages/demands during hostage negotiations

6. Having fewer communication problems with hostage takers in hostage negotiations

7. Having appropriate word selection to send the right messages to hostage takers

8. Using right tone of voice to establish a good rapport and trust in hostage negotiations

9. Using right word choice to establish a good rapport and trust in hostage negotiations

10. Asking open-ended questions to hostage takers in hostage negotiations

11. Using active listening skills in hostage negotiations

12. Paraphrasing the messages/demands of hostage takers in hostage negotiations.

I measured the above 12 sub-hypotheses to see whether there are significant relationships between the independent variables (negotiators' beliefs in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories) and dependent variables (implementing their negotiation strategies differently in responding to instrumental and expressive hostage situations). Agreement levels of the respondents over the 12 elements of the theories are presented in Table 51.

Table 51

Agreement Level of the Respondents

Survey Item #	Survey Items	Agreement Levels
SQ-8	If there is miscommunication between negotiators and hostage takers, negotiators should know how to consider different strategies	97 %
SQ-9	Negotiators should know what to ask the hostage takers during negotiation	90 %
SQ-10	Negotiators should know how to ask the right questions of hostage takers during negotiation	94 %
SQ-11	While the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker, secondary negotiator assists him (Negotiators know how to play the team player)	99 %
SQ-12	If negotiators learn hostage takers' messages, they ensure the correct interpretations of the message by paraphrasing them back to the hostage takers	87 %
SQ-13	If negotiators have communication problems with hostage takers, they are less likely to learn the message of hostage takers	87 %
SQ-14	Negotiators use right word choice to send the appropriate message to hostage takers	95 %
SQ-17.1	Negotiators use right tone of voice to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies	99 %
SQ-17.2	Negotiators use right word choice to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies	94 %
SQ-17.3	Negotiators use asking open-ended questions to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies	92 %
SQ-17.4	Negotiators use active listening skills to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies	99 %
SQ-17.5	Negotiators use paraphrasing the messages of hostage takers to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation	92 %

The two dependent variables are measured by using the two questions in the survey instrument: the first DV is *'do you handle expressive and instrumental situations differently'*; and the second DV is *'do you believe negotiators should handle instrumental and expressive situations differently.'*

Table 52

Do You Handle Instrumental and Expressive Hostage Situations Differently?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No (0)	79	31.9	35.3	35.3
	Yes (1)	145	58.5	64.7	100.0
	Total	224	90.3	100.0	
Missing	System	24	9.7		
Total		248	100.0		

The first DV is *'do you handle instrumental and expressive situations differently?'* For the purpose of the analysis here, 'always' and 'usually' categories for the item 18 instrument were coded as '1'. The other categories, 'sometimes', 'not usually', and 'never', were coded as '0'. In this new variable, category '1' refers to the negotiators who handle situations differently, whereas category '0' refers to the negotiators who do not make any distinction between them.

Table 53

Do You Believe That Negotiators should Handle Instrumental and Expressive Hostage Situations Differently?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	53	21.4	27.7	100.0
	1	138	55.6	72.3	72.3
	Total	191	77.0	100.0	
Missing	System	57	23.0		
Total	248		100.0		

The second DV is *'do you believe that negotiators should handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently?'* In this new variable, category '1' refers to the respondents who believed that the respondents should handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently, while category '0' refers to the respondents who do not make any distinction between handling situations differently. Since the DV is a dichotomous variable (variable with two attributes), I used a binary logistic regression model to answer the RQ-3.

Table 54

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variables	Metrics[1]		
DV 1: Do you handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently?	0 = No 1 = Yes	N Mean St. Deviation	231 .65 .48
DV 2: Do you believe negotiators should handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently?	0 = No 1 = Yes	N Mean St. Deviation	191 .72 .45
Explanatory Variables			
IV 1: Considering different strategies to deal with negotiation (SQ-8)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	240 1.50 .60
IV 2: Knowing what to ask hostage takers during negotiation (SQ-9)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	231 1.67 .76
IV 3: Knowing how to ask the right questions of hostage takers (SQ-10)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	231 1.56 .68
IV 4: Knowing how to play team work during negotiation (SQ-11)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	230 1.25 .55
IV 5: Learning hostage takers messages/demands (SQ-12)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	231 1.69 .87
IV 6: Having less communication problems with hostage takers (SQ-13)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	231 1.81 .86
IV 7: Having right word selections to send appropriate messages to hostage takers (SQ-14)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	231 1.53 .68
IV 8: Using right tone of voice to establish a good rapport and trust (SQ-17.1)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	225 1.36 .55
IV 9: Using right word choice to establish a good rapport and trust (SQ-17.2)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	225 1.52 .66
IV 10: Asking open-ended questions to hostage takers (SQ-17.3)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	225 1.55 .71
IV 11: Using active listening skills (SQ-17.4)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	225 1.20 .48
IV 12: Paraphrasing the messages/demands of hostage takers (SQ-17.5)	1 = Strongly agree 5 = Strongly disagree	N Mean St. Deviation	225 1.54 .73

Note. The entries in each cell are the respective number of cases, mean, and standard deviation. [1] Only the lowest and highest attributes are displayed. See the independent variables section for details.

Beliefs in the Elements of the Theories (RQ-3)

Model 1

Based on the above variables, I specified the binary logistic regression model 1:

LOG Y (Do you handle instrumental and expressive situations differently)$_1$ = a + b$_1$ (considering different strategies $_i$) + b$_2$ (knowing what to ask $_i$) + b$_3$ (knowing how to ask $_i$) + b$_4$ (knowing how to play $_i$) + b$_5$ (learning messages/demands $_i$) + b$_6$ (less communication problem $_i$) + b$_7$ (word selection $_i$) + b$_8$ (tone of voice $_i$) + b$_9$ (word choice $_i$) + b$_{10}$ (asking open-ended questions $_i$) + b$_{11}$ (using active listening skills $_i$) + b$_{12}$ (paraphrasing the messages/demands $_i$).

Findings with the R-square

The first finding with the R-square is that the 12 independent variables in the model explain about 9 % of the variation in the dependent variable 1. This means that the predictors (the negotiators' agreement levels with the 12 elements of the both theories) are not strong enough in explaining whether the negotiators handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently.

Coefficients

Among all predictors, the 'using active listening skills (SQ-17.4)' variable is the only significant predictor of handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. Other things being equal, for each unit increase in the level of agreement with the importance of active listening skills, the odds for making a distinction between instrumental and expressive hostage situations decreases 0.35 times (*b*= -1.045; *S.E.*= 0.488; p < .05). The negotiators who perceived that an ability to employ active listening is important are more likely to handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently compared to those who believed that active listening

skill is not that important. Other findings did not reveal any significant relationship between the

dependent variable and other independent variables in Model 1.

Table 55

Binary Logistic Regression Coefficients

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Constant	1.390	.521	7.122	1	.008	4.014
Considering different negotiation strategies (A8)	-.116	.298	.152	1	.697	.890
Knowing what to ask to hostage takers (A9)	-.296	.275	1.166	1	.280	.743
Knowing how to ask the right questions (A10)	.000	.357	.000	1	.999	1.000
Knowing how to play team work (A11)	.375	.374	1.004	1	.316	1.455
Learning messages/demands of hostage takers (A12)	.308	.268	1.322	1	.250	1.361
Having less communication problem with hostage takers (A13)	-.230	.225	1.045	1	.307	.794
Having right word selections to send appropriate messages (A14)	.081	.302	.071	1	.789	1.084
Using right tone of voice during negotiation (A17.1)	-.136	.423	.103	1	.748	.873
Using right word choice during negotiation (A17.2)	.043	.306	.020	1	.888	1.044
Asking open ended questions (A17.3)	.586	.316	3.437	1	.064	1.797
Using active listening skills (A17.4)	-1.045	.488	4.575	1	.032	.352
Paraphrasing the messages/demands (A17.5)	-.199	.342	.338	1	.561	.820
Cox & Snell R Square	.066					
Nagelkerke R Square	.090					

Model 2

In Model 2, I changed the dependent variable, using the survey item asking whether the

research participants believe that the negotiators should handle instrumental and expressive

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hostage situations differently. In this model, I used the same set of independent variables as in the first model. The second binary logistic regression model is specified as follows:

LOG Y (Do you believe that the negotiators should handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently)$_1$ = a + b$_1$ (considering different negotiation strategies $_i$) + b$_2$ (knowing what to ask $_i$) + b$_3$ (knowing how to ask $_i$) + b$_4$ (knowing how to play negotiation team work $_i$) + b$_5$ (learning messages/demands $_i$) + b$_6$ (less communication problem $_i$) + b$_7$ (word selection $_i$) + b$_8$ (tone of voice $_i$) + b$_9$ (word choice $_i$) + b$_{10}$ (asking open-ended questions $_i$) + b$_{11}$ (using active listening skills $_i$) + b$_{12}$ (paraphrasing the messages/demands $_i$).

Findings with the R-square

The finding with the R-square is that all the 12 independent variables explain about 6 % of the variation in Model 2. This means that the predictors (negotiators' agreement levels with the elements of the both theories) are not strong enough to explain whether the negotiators handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently.

Coefficients

As stated above, the findings did not reveal any significant relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables in this model. None of the predictors is a significant predictor of handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently.

Table 56

Binary Logistic Regression Coefficients Variables in the Equation

	B	*S.E.*	Wald	*df*	Sig.	Exp (B)
Constant	1.762	.582	9.162	1	.002	5.823
Considering different negotiation strategies (A8)	.284	.353	.649	1	.420	1.329

(table continues)

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Table 56 *(continued).*

	B	*S.E.*	Wald	*df*	Sig.	Exp (B)
Knowing what to ask to hostage takers (A9)	-.289	.295	.961	1	.327	.749
Knowing how to ask the right questions (A10)	.225	.406	.305	1	.581	1.252
Knowing how to play team work (A11)	-.488	.437	1.243	1	.265	.614
Learning messages/demands of hostage takers (A12)	.242	.315	.588	1	.443	1.273
Having less communication problem with hostage takers (A13)	-.364	.243	2.247	1	.134	.695
Having right word selections to send appropriate messages (A14)	.021	.330	.004	1	.950	1.021
Using right tone of voice during negotiation (A17.1)	.177	.486	.132	1	.716	1.193
Using right word choice during negotiation (A17.2)	-.150	.333	.204	1	.652	.860
Asking open ended questions (A17.3)	.270	.357	.571	1	.450	1.310
Using active listening skills (A17.4)	-.158	.539	.086	1	.770	.854
Paraphrasing the messages/demands (A17.5)	-.314	.396	.628	1	.428	.731
Cox & Snell R Square	.045					
Nagelkerke R Square	.064					

In sum, the findings did not reveal any significant relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables in the two models presented above. The findings from the two binary logistic regression analyses did not support a significant relationship between the beliefs in the 12 elements of the both theories and the negotiators' handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. The predictors (the negotiators' agreement levels with the 12 elements of the both theories) are not strong enough to explain whether the negotiators handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. In Model 1, among all predictors, 'using active listening skills (SQ-17.4)' variable was the only one significant predictor of handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently; it was presented in Model 1. This shows that the negotiators who perceived that an ability to employ active

listening is important are more likely to handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently compared to those who believed that active listening skill is not that important. I also found out that 'asking open-ended questions to the hostage takers (SQ-17.3)' can be accepted as a significant predictor at 0.06 alpha level. It was also presented in Model 1. Other findings did not reveal any significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In Model 2, none of the predictors is a significant predictor of handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently.

I, therefore, failed to reject the null hypotheses. There are several elements and directions of both Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories, but I selected only 12 elements to use in this research study. Perhaps some other elements of these theories impact handling hostage situations differently. Future research might focus on the hostage negotiator's professional qualifications, such as having prior negotiator experience, attending joint -combined- trainings with tactical teams and incident commanders, and education levels of the negotiators, to find out whether they impact handling hostage situations differently.

Workable Directions of the Theories (RQ-3a)

In this section, I analyzed and interpreted the findings of the cross tabulation, chi-square, and frequency tables addressed in research question 3a, which is the final research question in the study. By doing this, I looked at the participants' agreement level with each element of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories to see if they are useful -workable- as a framework for negotiation and decision strategies.

RQ-3a: Are the directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories useful as a framework for negotiation and decision strategies of hostage/crisis negotiators in hostage situations?

I explicitly specified which element is being addressed by which theory in detail in the second chapter. However, the directions of the theories used to formulate the survey items are presented here again for the readers' convenience. Once again, Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories were not tested and/or measured to see if they are parsimonious. Instead I looked at the agreement levels of the respondents on using the mentioned 12 elements of the theories by negotiators while implementing hostage negotiations. I analyzed if the elements and directions of the two theories might be useful as a framework for the negotiators in determining their negotiation and decision strategies by looking at the agreement levels of the respondents on the relevant survey items.

The directions and elements of the theories used to create the survey items are:

1. Negotiators know how to consider using different strategies

2. Negotiators know what to ask hostage takers

3. Negotiators know how to ask the right questions of hostage takers

4. Negotiators know how to be a team player (first/secondary negotiators)

5. Negotiators learn hostage takers' messages to ensure correct interpretation

6. Negotiators try not to have communication problems with hostage takers

7. Negotiators use right word choice to send the appropriate message

8. Negotiators use right tone of voice

9. Negotiators use right word choice

10. Negotiators ask open-ended questions of hostage takers

11. Negotiators use active listening skills

12. Negotiators paraphrase the messages of hostage takers.

I did not mention the founders of the two theories or the theories themselves while formulating the survey items. I also did not mention that the 12 elements of the two mentioned theories were embedded into the survey questions. Otherwise, the research participants might be confused since the negotiators in the sample are most likely to have no idea about the two theories even though they use elements and directions of the theories.

While answering research question 3a, I looked at two things. The first one is whether there is any difference between the negotiators who are making distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who are not making such a distinction while supporting the 12 arguments of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories. The second one is that I also looked at the respondents' agreement levels with the 12 survey items addressing the elements and directions of both theories. For the purpose of the analysis in this section, 'strongly agree' and 'agree' categories used to answer the items in the survey refer to the sum of the agreement level of the respondents in Table 81.

Negotiators Handling Situations Differently Equal

Support for the 12 Survey Items

I concluded that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the arguments presented in Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories. In order to test this final statement, I looked at the uncontrolled effects of the elements on the dependent variable. The cross-tabulations 1 through 12 presented below show the distribution of the cases among the levels of each independent variable *(1= Strongly Agree; 2=Agree; 3=Neutral; 4=Disagree; 5=Strongly Disagree)* for each group (the negotiators who make distinction between instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the

negotiators who do not make such a distinction). It is very clear from the following Tables 57

through 79 that the negotiators in the two groups equally support the arguments presented in the

theories. The chi-square tests (Tables 58 through 80) of significance for each table also support

this conclusion. None of the tests revealed significant difference between the groups. The

findings with each cross tabulation and chi-square test below were evaluated separately.

Table 57

Cross Tabulation 1

	Do you handle situations differently?		
If there is miscommunication in the negotiation process between negotiators and hostage takers, negotiators should know how to consider different strategies in order to deal with the negotiation.	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree	41	79	120
	51.9%	54.9%	53.8%
Agree	34	61	95
	43.0%	42.4%	42.6%
Neutral	3	4	7
	3.8%	2.8%	3.1%
Strongly Disagree	1	0	1
	1.3%	.0%	.4%
Total	79	144	223
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
X^2=2.080; *df*=3; p>0.05			

Table 58

Chi-Square Tests 1

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.080 (a)	3	.556
Likelihood Ratio	2.329	3	.507
Linear-by-Linear Association	.839	1	.360
N of Valid Cases	223		

Table 57 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the arguments presented in Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's communication theories. Table 57 shows that 54.9 % of the negotiators who make distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 51.9 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree that if there is miscommunication in negotiation between negotiators and hostage takers, the negotiators should know how to consider different strategies in order to deal with the negotiation. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (42.4 % vs. 43.0 % for the 'agree' category; 2.8 % vs. 3.8 % for the 'neutral' category; and 0 % vs. 1.3 % for the 'strongly disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for the table 58 ($X^2 = 2.080$; $df = 3$; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The findings in Tables 57 and 58 provide that the negotiators in the two groups equally support the argument presented in Tables 57.

Table 59

Cross Tabulation 2

If negotiators know what to ask the hostage takers during negotiation, they are likely to gather accurate information about the hostage takers.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree	30	74	104
	38.0%	51.0%	46.4%
Agree	37	59	96
	46.8%	40.7%	42.9%
Neutral	10	9	19
	12.7%	6.2%	8.5%

(table continues)

Table 59 *(continued).*

If negotiators know what to ask the hostage takers during negotiation, they are likely to gather accurate information about the hostage takers.	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Do you handle the situations differently			
Disagree	1	2	3
	1.3%	1.4%	1.3%
Strongly Disagree	1	1	2
	1.3%	.7%	.9%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
X^2=5.034; *df*=4; p>0.05			

Table 60

Chi-Square Tests 2

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.034(a)	4	.284
Likelihood Ratio	4.956	4	.292
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.897	1	.048
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 59 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the arguments presented in Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's communication theories. Table 59 shows that 51.0 % of the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 38.0 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators know what to ask the hostage takers during negotiations, they are more likely to gather accurate information about the hostage takers. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (46.8 % vs. 40.7 % for the 'agree' category; 6.2 % vs. 12.7 % for the

'neutral' category; 1.4 % vs. 1.3 % for the 'disagree' category; and 0.7 % vs. 1.3 % for the 'strongly' disagree category respectively for the group 1 and the group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for Table 60 ($X^2 = 5.034$; $df = 4$; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The findings in Tables 59 and 60 looking at the bivariate relationship between the DV and IV reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups presented here. The research participants in the two groups equally support the argument presented in Table 59.

Table 61

Cross Tabulation 3

	Do you handle situations differently?		
If negotiators know how to ask the right questions of hostage takers during negotiation, then they will increase their chances of gathering accurate information about hostage takers.	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree	37	78	115
	46.8%	53.8%	51.3%
Agree	34	60	94
	43.0%	41.4%	42.0%
Neutral	7	6	13
	8.9%	4.1%	5.8%
Strongly Disagree	1	1	2
	1.3%	.7%	.9%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

$X^2=2.671$; *df*=3; p>0.05

Table 62

Chi-Square Tests 3

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.671(a)	3	.445
Likelihood Ratio	2.569	3	.463
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.955	1	.162
N of Valid Cases	224		

The findings in Table 61 of cross-tabulation suggest that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the argument presented in Table 61. This table shows that 53.8 % of the negotiators who make a distinction between handling situations (Group 1) compared to the 46.8 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators know how to ask the right questions of hostage takers, then they will increase their chances of gathering information about hostage takers. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (41.4 % vs. 43.0 % for the 'agree' category; 4.1 % vs. 8.9 % for the 'neutral' category; and 0.7 % vs. 1.3 % for the 'strongly' disagree category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for Table 62 ($X^2 = 2.671$; $df = 3$; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups.

Table 63

Cross Tabulation 4

While the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker, the secondary negotiator is there to assist and support the primary negotiator.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	61	113	174
	77.2%	78.5%	78.0%
Agree (2)	16	30	46
	20.3%	20.8%	20.6%
Neutral (3)	1	0	1
	1.3%	.0%	.4%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	1	2
	1.3%	.7%	.9%
Total	79	144	223
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

$X^2=2.027$; $df=3$; p>0.05

Table 64

Chi-Square Test 4

	Value	*df*	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.027(a)	3	.567
Likelihood Ratio	2.272	3	.518
Linear-by-Linear Association	.299	1	.584
N of Valid Cases	223		

Table 63 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the argument presented in table 63. In fact, Table 63 shows that 78.5 % of the negotiators who make distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 77.2 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that while the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker, the secondary negotiator is there to assist and support the primary negotiator. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (20.8 % vs. 20.3 % for the 'agree' category; .0 % vs. 1.3 % for the 'neutral' category; and 0.7 % vs. 1.3 % for the 'strongly' disagree category respectively for the group 1 and the group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for the table 64 ($X^2 = 2.027$; $df = 3$; p>0.05) reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The findings within Tables 63 and 64, looking at the bivariate relationship between the DV and the IV, reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups presented here. The respondents in the two groups equally support the argument presented in Table 63.

Table 65

Cross Tabulation 5

	Do you handle situations differently?		
If negotiators learn what the hostage takers' messages and demands are, they should ensure the correct interpretations of the message by paraphrasing them back to the hostage takers.	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	43	70	113
	54.4%	48.3%	50.4%
Agree (2)	26	56	82
	32.9%	38.6%	36.6%
Neutral (3)	5	11	16
	6.3%	7.6%	7.1%
Disagree (4)	4	7	11
	5.1%	4.8%	4.9%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	1	2
	1.3%	.7%	.9%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
X^2=1.148; *df*=4; p>0.05			

Table 66

Chi-Square Test 5

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.148(a)	4	.887
Likelihood Ratio	1.145	4	.887
Linear-by-Linear Association	.182	1	.669
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 65 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling

instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not

make such a distinction equally support the argument. Table 65 shows that 48.3 % of the

negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage

situations (Group 1) compared to the 54.4 % of the negotiators who do not make such a

distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators learn what the hostage

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takers' messages and demands are, they should ensure the correct interpretations of the message by paraphrasing them back to the hostage takers. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (38.6 % vs. 32.9 % for the 'agree' category; 7.6 % vs. 6.3 % for the 'neutral' category; 4.8 % vs. 5.1 % for the 'disagree' category; and .7 % vs. 1.3 for the 'strongly disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for the table 66 ($X^2 = 1.148$; $df = 4$; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The findings in Tables 65 and 66 looking at the bivariate relationship between the DV and the IV reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups presented here. The respondents in the two groups equally support the argument presented in Table 65.

Table 67

Cross Tabulation 6

If negotiators have communication problems with the hostage takers, they are less likely to learn what the hostage takers want.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	29	59	88
	36.7%	40.7%	39.3%
Agree (2)	33	73	106
	41.8%	50.3%	47.3%
Neutral (3)	9	7	16
	11.4%	4.8%	7.1%
Disagree (4)	7	4	11
	8.9%	2.8%	4.9%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	2	3
	1.3%	1.4%	1.3%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
X^2=7.968; *df*=4; p>0.05			

Table 68

Chi-Square Tests 6

	Value	*df*	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.968(a)	4	.093
Likelihood Ratio	7.591	4	.108
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.419	1	.064
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 67 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the argument. Table 67 shows that 40.7 % of the negotiators who make distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 36.7 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators have communication problems with the hostage takers, they are less likely to learn what the hostage takers want. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (50.3 % vs. 41.8 % for the 'agree' category; 4.8 % vs. 11.4 % for the 'neutral' category; 2.8 % vs. 8.9 % for the 'disagree' category; and 1.4 % vs. 1.3 for the 'strongly disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for the table 68 ($X^2 = 7.968$; *df* = 4; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups. Taken together, the respondents in the two groups equally support the argument presented in Table 67.

Table 69

Cross Tabulation 7

Negotiators' word selections are important to send the appropriate message to the hostage takers.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	40	82	122
	50.6%	56.6%	54.5%
Agree (2)	34	56	90
	43.0%	38.6%	40.2%
Neutral (3)	4	5	9
	5.1%	3.4%	4.0%
Disagree (4)	0	1	1
	.0%	.7%	.4%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	1	2
	1.3%	.7%	.9%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
X^2=1.644; df=4; p>0.05			

Table 70

Chi-Square Tests 7

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.644(a)	4	.801
Likelihood Ratio	1.951	4	.745
Linear-by-Linear Association	.683	1	.409
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 69 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the argument presented here. Table 69 shows that 56.6 % of the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 50.6 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators' word selections are

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precise enough, it sends the appropriate message to the hostage takers. The distributions of the

cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also

quite close to each other (38.6 % vs. 43.0 % for the 'agree' category; 3.4 % vs. 5.1 % for the

'neutral' category; .7 % vs. .0 % for the 'disagree' category; and .7 % vs. 1.3 for the 'strongly

disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of

significance for Table 70 ($X^2 = 1.644$; $df = 4$; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant

difference between the two groups. The findings in Tables 69 and 70 reveal that there is no

significant difference between the two groups.

Table 71

Cross Tabulation 8

Techniques to establish a good rapport - Using right tone of voice.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	48	100	148
	60.8%	69.0%	66.1%
Agree (2)	29	44	73
	36.7%	30.3%	32.6%
Neutral (3)	1	1	2
	1.3%	.7%	.9%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	0	1
	1.3%	.0%	.4%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

$X^2=3.182$; $df=3$; p>0.05

Table 72

Chi-Square Tests 8

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.182(a)	3	.364
Likelihood Ratio	3.419	3	.331
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.665	1	.103
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 71 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the argument. Table 71 shows that 69.0 % of the negotiators who make a distinction between handling situations differently (Group 1) compared to 60.8 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators use the right tone of voice, they can establish a good rapport with the hostage takers. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (30.3 % vs. 36.7 % for the 'agree' category; 0.7 % vs. 1.3 % for the 'neutral' category; and .0 % vs. 1.3 for the 'strongly disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for Table 72 ($X^2 = 3.182$; $df = 3$; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The two groups equally support the argument presented in Table 71.

Table 73

Cross Tabulation 9

Techniques to establish a good rapport - Using right word choice.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	44	81	125
	55.7%	55.9%	55.8%
Agree (2)	26	59	85
	32.9%	40.7%	37.9%
Neutral (3)	7	5	12
	8.9%	3.4%	5.4%
Disagree (4)	1	0	1
	1.3%	.0%	.4%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	0	1
	1.3%	.0%	.4%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

$X^2=7.283$; $df=4$; p>0.05

Table 74

Chi-Square Test 9

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.283(a)	4	.122
Likelihood Ratio	7.642	4	.106
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.651	1	.199
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 73 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the argument presented here. Table 73 shows that 55.9 % of the negotiators who make distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 55.7 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators use right word choice while negotiating with hostage takers, they can establish a good rapport with the hostage takers. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (40.7 % vs. 32.9 % for the 'agree' category; 3.4 % vs. 8.9 % for the 'neutral' category; .0 % vs. 1.3 for the 'disagree' category; and .0 % vs. 1.3 for the 'strongly disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for the table 74 ($X^2 = 7.283$; *df* = 4; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The findings within Tables 73 and 74, looking at the bivariate relationship between the DV and the other IV, reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The respondents in the two groups equally support the argument presented in Table 73.

Table 75

Cross Tabulation 10

Techniques to establish a good rapport – Asking open-ended questions.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	47	78	125
	59.5%	53.8%	55.8%
Agree (2)	24	57	81
	30.4%	39.3%	36.2%
Neutral (3)	7	7	14
	8.9%	4.8%	6.3%
Disagree (4)	0	3	3
	.0%	2.1%	1.3%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	0	1
	1.3%	.0%	.4%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

X^2=6.227; *df*=4; p>0.05

Table 76

Chi-Square Test 10

	Value	*df*	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.227(a)	4	.183
Likelihood Ratio	7.419	4	.115
Linear-by-Linear Association	.040	1	.841
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 75 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling

instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not

make such a distinction equally support the argument presented here. Table 75 shows that 53.8

% of the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive

hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 59.5 % of the negotiators who do not make such a

distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators ask open-ended

questions, they can establish a good rapport with the hostage takers. The distributions of the

cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (39.3 % vs. 30.4 % for the 'agree' category; 4.8 % vs. 8.9 % for the 'neutral' category; 2.1% vs. .0 for the 'disagree' category; and .0 % vs. 1.3 for the 'strongly disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for Table 76 (X^2 = 6.227; df = 4; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The findings within Tables 75 and 76 reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The respondents in the two groups equally support the argument presented in Table 75.

Table 77

Cross Tabulation 11

Techniques to establish a good rapport - Using active listening skills.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	59	125	184
	74.7%	86.2%	82.1%
Agree (2)	18	19	37
	22.8%	13.1%	16.5%
Neutral (3)	1	1	2
	1.3%	.7%	.9%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	0	1
	1.3%	.0%	.4%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

X^2=5.754; *df*=3; p>0.05

Table 78

Chi-Square Test 11

	Value	*df*	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.754(a)	3	.124
Likelihood Ratio	5.885	3	.117
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.546	1	.019
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 77 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the argument presented here. Table 77 shows that 86.2 % of the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 74.7 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement presented in Table 77. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (13.1 % vs. 22.8 % for the 'agree' category; .7 % vs. 1.3 % for the 'neutral' category; and .0 % vs. 1.3 for the 'strongly disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for Table 78 ($X^2 = 5.754$; $df = 3$; p>0.05) reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The findings within Tables 77 and 78 reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups.

Table 79

Cross Tabulation 12

Techniques to establish a good rapport - Paraphrasing the messages/demands of hostage takers.	Do you handle situations differently?		
	.00 (No)	1.00 (Yes)	Total
Strongly Agree (1)	45	83	128
	57.0%	57.2%	57.1%
Agree (2)	27	50	77
	34.2%	34.5%	34.4%
Neutral (3)	5	9	14
	6.3%	6.2%	6.3%
Disagree (4)	1	3	4
	1.3%	2.1%	1.8%
Strongly Disagree (5)	1	0	1
	1.3%	.0%	.4%
Total	79	145	224
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
X^2=2.023; df=4; p>0.05			

Table 80

Chi-Square Test 12

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.023(a)	4	.731
Likelihood Ratio	2.283	4	.684
Linear-by-Linear Association	.064	1	.800
N of Valid Cases	224		

Table 79 suggests that the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the argument presented here. Table 79 shows that 57.2 % of the negotiators who make a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations (Group 1) compared to the 57.0 % of the negotiators who do not make such a distinction (Group 2) strongly agree with the statement that if negotiators paraphrase the messages/demands of hostage takers while negotiating with hostage takers, they can establish a good rapport with the hostage takers. The distributions of the cases between the two groups across the other categories of the independent variable are also quite close to each other (34.5 % vs. 34.2 % for the 'agree' category; 6.2 % vs. 6.3 % for the 'neutral' category; 2.1 % vs. 1.3 for the 'disagree' category; and .0 vs. 1.3 for the 'strongly disagree' category respectively for the Group 1 and the Group 2). The chi-square tests of significance for Table 80 ($X^2 = 2.023$; $df = 4$; p>0.05) reveals that there is no significant difference between the two groups. The findings in Tables 79 and 80, looking at the bivariate relationship between the DV and the other IV, reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups.

Taken together, the findings from the above cross tabulations and chi-square tests (Tables 57 through 80) strongly suggest that the negotiators making a distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators not making

such a distinction equally support the 12 arguments (presented in Tables 57 through 80) based on Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories. The findings in Tables 57 through 80 show that the negotiators in the two groups equally support the arguments presented in the elements of the both theories. Also, none of the chi-square tests revealed a significant difference between the groups. This means that regardless of whether the negotiators propose handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently, the negotiators believe in the importance of using the 12 elements of both theories while responding to hostage situations effectively.

Respondents' Agreement Levels with the 12 Survey Items

I also derived the respondents' level of agreement with the survey items addressing the elements and directives of the theories. For the purpose of the analysis in this section, 'strongly agree' and 'agree' categories used to answer the items in the survey refer to the sum of the agreement level of the respondents in the table.

Table 81

Agreement Level of the Respondents

Survey Questions	Survey Items	Agreement Levels
SQ-8	If there is miscommunication between negotiators and hostage takers, negotiators should know how to consider different strategies	97 %
SQ-9	Negotiators should know what to ask the hostage takers during negotiation	90 %
SQ-10	Negotiators should know how to ask the right questions of hostage takers	94 %
SQ-11	While the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker, secondary negotiator assists him (They know how to play the team player)	99 %
SQ-12	If negotiators learn hostage takers' messages, they ensure the correct interpretations of the message by paraphrasing them back to the hostage takers	87 %
SQ-13	If negotiators have communication problems with hostage takers, they are less likely to learn the message of hostage takers	87 %
SQ-14	Negotiators use right word choice to send the appropriate message to hostage takers	95 %
SQ-17.1	Negotiators use right tone of voice to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies	99 %

(table continues)

Table 81 *(continued)*

Survey Questions	Survey Items	Agreement Levels
SQ-17.2	Negotiators use right word choice to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies	94 %
SQ-17.3	Negotiators use asking open-ended questions to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies	92 %
SQ-17.4	Negotiators use active listening skills to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies	99 %
SQ-17.5	Negotiators use paraphrasing the messages of hostage takers to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation	92 %

As is seen in Table 81, the vast majority of the respondents agree with the statements revealed in this table. The high level of agreement shows that using the elements and directives of both theories is useful and workable as a framework for negotiation and decision strategies. The negotiators are aware of the importance of using the elements and directives of the theories while implementing their negotiation and decision strategies. However, this does not imply that the negotiators are likely to have any idea that the 12 elements are the core elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories.

<center>Summary</center>

In the course of this chapter, I analyzed the data collected through the survey instrument and interpreted the findings of the collected data in this research study. Regarding the findings of the first research question, I found that negotiation is a process utilized extensively by professional, well-trained hostage/crisis negotiators in a team work approach. While implementing negotiation strategies, the negotiators attempt to learn more about hostage takers, such as their messages, demands, motivations, prior criminal histories, and personalities either from the hostage takers or the other external sources. The negotiators use some primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools in working together with the other on-scene professionals in the chain of command post in responding to hostage situations. One key to

effective hostage negotiation seems to be the training of the negotiation team, tactical team, and incident commanders together because the team members are taught how to use the communication skills and negotiation tools previously mentioned.

Regarding the findings of the second research question, I found that the negotiators use some elements of the negotiation strategies, such as *(1) receiving the assessment of the hostage takers personalities from mental health professionals; (2) developing a personal-bond communication style with the hostage taker; (3) getting psychological assessments of the hostage takers; and (4) interviewing family members of the hostage takers, differently in determining their negotiation and decision strategies depending on whether the hostage situation they deal with is instrumental or expressive.* I also determined that the two elements of the negotiation strategies, *(1) using of face-to-face negotiation technique and (2) considering their negotiation and decision strategies based on the prior criminal histories of the hostage takers, are handled differently depending on whether the hostage situation they face is instrumental or expressive.* In addition, I determined that the factor, hostages' prior relationships to the hostage takers influencing the negotiation process and decision strategies of the negotiators, is handled differently by the negotiators depending on whether the situation is instrumental or expressive. This means that, regarding some elements and factors stated above, the negotiators handle the instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. The reason is that as stated earlier, the behaviors of the instrumental hostage takers are based on the substantive and clear demands compared to the behaviors of the expressive hostage takers, which are based on emotional and highly scattered thoughts. Instrumental hostage takers, in fact, carry out much more goal-directed behaviors, while expressive hostage takers carry out much more irrational and unfounded behaviors.

Regarding the findings of the third research question, the findings did not reveal any significant relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables in the two models presented earlier. The findings from the two binary logistic regression analyses did not support a significant relationship between the beliefs in the 12 elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories and the negotiators' handling of instrumental/expressive hostage situations differently. This means that the predictors (the negotiators' agreement levels with the 12 elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories) are not strong enough to explain whether the negotiators handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. Among all predictors, 'using active listening skills' was the only variable which was a significant predictor of handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently; it was presented in Model 1. This shows that the negotiators who perceived that active listening skill is important are more likely to handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently compared to those who believed that active listening skill is not that important.

In addition, I discovered that the 12 elements of the theories are fully workable for the negotiators in hostage situations because they have very practical directives for dealing with the stress, dangers, and difficulties in the field of negotiation resolutions. I also found that the negotiators who make distinctions between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in their practices and the negotiators who do not make such a distinction equally support the 12 elements and/ or arguments of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories. This means that regardless of whether the negotiators believe in handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently, the negotiators believe in the importance of using these 12 elements and/or arguments of both theories in order to respond to hostage situations effectively.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

In this chapter, I explain why this research is important and discusses the ways in which

the statistical findings suggest policy implications and future recommendations for police. I also

make recommendations for future research studies in the field of hostage negotiation resolutions.

Importance of the Research

This study has enhanced understanding of communication and information flow in

hostage situations and should help working negotiators improve their performance. The

objectives of this study are to make valuable contributions to the negotiation, communication,

and decision making strategies of hostage negotiators and to make some future recommendations

for the negotiators. For the purpose of the research questions, I looked at the nature of

negotiation resolutions, the elements/factors affecting the negotiation and decision strategies of

the negotiators, and the negotiators' level of agreement using the elements of Dervin's and

Shannon-Weaver's communication theories. I aimed to determine whether the research

participants in the sample would validate the use of two communication theory-based models

when responding to the hostage situations. The existing literature regarding the field of hostage

negotiation resolution usually focuses on case studies, but I added a theory base and empirical

data gathered from working negotiators.

Discussion

This research presents a clear road map for the negotiators and researchers because quantitative analysis of working negotiators shows a strong relationship with well-known models in the field of information science and communications. This relationship enables us to study hostage negotiation as an information and communication process. It uncovers some new paths for hostage negotiation research. It may reveal some new ways to look at other areas of information science. For instance, if Dervin and Shannon provide a useful framework for the extreme case of hostage negotiation, perhaps they would also work well in more common information settings, such as library reference interviews and on-line interface design.

Regarding the findings of the first research question, I discussed the findings of the primary dynamic activities of implementing negotiations, communication skills, and negotiation tools used by the negotiators. Based on the interpretations of these findings, I revealed what the primary dynamic activities, communication skills, and negotiation tools are, and how these three factors/elements are effectively used by the negotiators. I found that there are some important dynamic activities performed by the negotiators. For instance, I found that negotiation is a process utilized and exhausted before using tactical force in responding to hostage situations; hostage negotiation is a task that should be performed by well-trained officers using only a team work approach. The negotiators must also work together with other professionals working in the chain of command on-scene. While implementing negotiation strategy, the negotiators attempt to learn the desires, demands, and motivations of hostage takers. The negotiators also attempt to collect more information about the hostage takers, such as their prior criminal histories and personalities, either from the hostage takers themselves or from some other external sources, such as the hostage takers' family members. In doing this, the negotiators are often provided

with assistance by mental health professionals on the current psychological condition of hostage takers, as well as their personality profiles, which helps the negotiators to determine their negotiation and decision strategies. There might be some other dynamic activities not mentioned in this study for various reasons, but they can be explored in future research studies.

Several components of communication skills are frequently used by the negotiators when responding to hostage situations; knowing how to ask the right questions of the hostage takers, using appropriate word choice, using an appropriate tone of voice, paraphrasing the demands of the hostage takers, knowing how to avoid having communication problems with hostage takers, and using active listening skills are the most important communication components. If the negotiators initiate and maintain negotiations with the hostage takers by using these components, they are able to get more accurate information about the hostage takers, thereby assisting the negotiators in determining the best response. The key to effective hostage negotiations is to train the negotiation team, tactical team, and incident commanders together in joint -combined-trainings. The professionals in the joint training sessions should evaluate both failures and successes in their responses to previous hostage situations. This evaluation helps the negotiators create new effective negotiation rules and guidelines for use in future events. The components of the communication skills mentioned above can be gained through completion of joint training because this also helps the negotiators learn to use these skills while negotiating with the hostage takers. There might be some other communication skills not mentioned in this study, but they can be covered in future research projects.

Some important tools are also used by the negotiators to gather more information about the hostage takers. These tools are important because they allow more information to be collected by the negotiators, resulting in a better negotiating position. Several tools used by the

negotiators allow them to come to peaceful resolutions. These tools vary depending on the characteristics of the hostage takers and situations themselves. The tools are establishing trust/rapport with hostage takers, developing a personal-bond communication style with hostage takers, using information gathering techniques from external sources on-scene, using the existence of the on-scene tactical team, and using role playing in implementing hostage negotiations.

To strengthen the conclusions reached while answering the first research question, I used the factor analysis function to identify underlying factors, communication skills, and negotiation tools. I found that there are four extracted categories grouped by the factor analysis function: *(1) communications skills, (2) negotiation tools, (3) the factors constructed by the negotiators' professional qualifications that affect negotiation strategies, and (4) the factors constructed by the situational characteristics of hostage incidents that affect negotiation strategies.* I assert that these statements are strongly supported by the results presented while answering the first research question. Future studies in the field of hostage negotiations can take advantage of the results of the factor analysis function.

Regarding the findings of the second research question, the results reveal that the negotiators implement their negotiation and decision strategies differently depending on whether the situations they deal with are instrumental or expressive. I found that some elements of the negotiation strategies differ in their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations. Using the four elements of the negotiation strategies differs depending on whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive. The four elements are: *(1) obtaining assessments of the hostage takers' personalities from mental health professionals; (2) developing a personal-bond communication style with the hostage taker so that the negotiators can gather information from*

the hostage taker; (3) receiving an assessment of the hostage takers' psychological conditions (this element being similar to the first element); and (4) interviewing the family members of the hostage takers to assist in determining negotiation and decision strategies. Taking into consideration these four elements while negotiating with expressive hostage takers is more important than while negotiating with instrumental hostage takers. The reason is that in determining the negotiation and decision strategies, learning about the personalities and psychological conditions of expressive hostage takers is more important than learning about these factors in dealing with instrumental hostage situations. The behaviors of instrumental hostage takers are based on the substantive and clear demands compared to the behaviors of expressive hostage takers, which are based on emotional and highly scattered thoughts. Instrumental subjects carry out much more goal-directed behaviors, while expressive subjects exhibit much more irrational and unfounded behaviors.

I also realized that an important factor is whether there is any prior relationship between the hostages and the hostage taker(s). This factor will control the actions of the negotiators depending on whether the situation they encounter is instrumental or expressive. The reason is that many emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage takers are likely to take hostages from among the people they know. In emotionally disturbed and mentally ill hostage situations, taking the hostages usually occurs spontaneously, and the subjects usually present irrational behavior.

Regarding the findings of the third research question, the data did not reveal any significant relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables in the two models presented in Table 54. The findings from the two binary logistic regression analyses did not support a significant relationship between the beliefs in the 12 elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories and the negotiators' decisions to handle instrumental and expressive

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hostage situations differently. This means that the predictors (the negotiators' agreement levels with the 12 elements of the both theories) are not strong enough to explain if the negotiators handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. In Model 1, among all predictors, 'using active listening skills' was the only variable which was a significant predictor of handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently. This shows that the negotiators who perceived that an active listening skill is important are more likely to handle instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently than those who believed that the active listening skill is not significantly important. I also found that 'asking open-ended questions of the hostage takers' can be accepted as a significant predictor. Other findings did not reveal any significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In Model 2, none of the indicators is a significant predictor of handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently.

Regarding the third research questions, I failed to reject the null hypotheses. There are two reasons for this. First, there are, several elements and directives of   Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories, but I selected only the 12 elements to use in this particular research study. It is possible that some other elements and directives of these theories would impact handling hostage situations differently. Other elements and directives of the two theories which have not been used in this study might be used by future researchers in conducting their studies. I recommend that other researchers look at the hostage negotiators' professional qualifications, such as prior negotiator experience, attending joint -combined- training with tactical team and incident commanders, and the education levels of the negotiators, to determine if those variables impact the handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently.

In contrast, I also found that both theories' 12 elements are appropriate for the negotiators to use for an effective response during negotiations with hostage takers. The theories' 12 elements have very practical and workable directions for the negotiators to cope with the difficulties which are encountered during negotiations with hostage takers. I also found that the negotiators who are making the distinction between handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations in actual practice and the negotiators who are not making such a distinction equally support the 12 elements of the theories. Regardless of whether the negotiators believe in handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations differently, all negotiators -research participants in the sample- believe in the importance of using these 12 elements and/or arguments of both theories while responding to hostage situations.

Policy Implications

Based on all findings in this study, I discovered that the negotiators are inclined to pay attention to learning more about the psychological conditions, criminal background, and the behavioral characteristics of hostage takers involved in the hostage situations during negotiations. In this common approach, the negotiators are eager to learn more about the psychological, behavioral, and criminal distinctiveness of the hostage takers in order to determine their negotiation and decision strategies. This helps the negotiators determine what kind of hostage situations they are facing. As stated earlier, the negotiators determine their negotiation, communication, and decision strategies depending on whether they are handling instrumental or expressive hostage situations. While negotiating with hostage takers, the negotiators pay attention to behavioral characteristics, criminal background, and psychological conditions of hostage takers.

The model suggested by this research adds Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's perspectives to the common approach. This revised model suggests that the negotiators pay attention to the dynamics of the interactions between the two parties; the negotiators themselves and hostage takers, during hostage negotiation resolution. Negotiation is a very dynamic and conversational process performed by the two parties involved in the hostage situation. During this process, the negotiator opens a dialog with the hostage taker, the hostage taker responds to the negotiator, the negotiator replies to the hostage taker, and this process continues until the hostage situation ends peacefully or the professionals decide to use another type of response, such as the use of force. Overall, under the model of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's communication theories-based negotiation strategy, while determining the appropriate negotiation, communication, and decision strategies, the negotiators focus not only on the hostage takers' behavioral, criminal, and psychological conditions and characteristics but also the meaning of the dialog, and concentration is placed on the interaction itself as performed between the negotiators and hostage takers. When the dynamics of these reciprocal interactions based on the sending of messages from the source to the destination and coding the sent messages properly are understood correctly, the negotiators are likely to determine the right negotiation, communication, and decision strategies.

Looking at the behavioral, criminal, and psychological distinctiveness of hostage takers involved in the hostage situations helps the negotiators decide whether they should handle the situation as instrumental or expressive. Looking at the negotiation process from the interactive and communicative perspective of the new model should also help the negotiators determine what particular kind of dynamic activities, communication skills and negotiation tools will be used while responding to the hostage situations. By using the perspective of the new model, the

negotiators should be able to build trust and rapport with hostage takers and to establish personal communication-bond style with them. The negotiators will be able to look at the negotiation process from the personal communication perspective instead looking at the negotiations from the negotiator-criminal interaction perspective. The negotiators focus on the communicational dynamics of both parties: the negotiators and hostage takers, instead of focusing on the hostage takers' personal, criminal, and psychological distinctiveness only. By using the perspective of the new model, the negotiators also gather more information about the hostage takers involved in the situations so that they can determine the right strategies while negotiating with them. It can be inferred that Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories help explain what is effective in hostage negotiation resolutions. They give the theoretical explanations required to improve hostage negotiation resolutions.

The model of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories-based negotiation strategy is not an alternative approach to the common approach most negotiators use. Instead, this new model uses the perspective and direction of the common approach and extends its meaning and content by also focusing on the two communication theories' perspectives. The use of the perspective of this new model is one more tool for the negotiators to use to promote new methods and strategies in forming effective response to hostage situations. In negotiator trainings, the police administrators and negotiators can further develop this model by discussing the elements and directions of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories with communication scientists.

Future Recommendations

I make some future recommendations for the negotiators to follow while determining their negotiation, communication, and decision strategies, and some recommendations for scholars to use while conducting future research studies.

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Recommendations for Police

I make several recommendations for the police. First, if the police perform poor negotiation practices and/or applications while dealing with hostage takers, they are likely to be criticized. I, therefore, recommend all police departments have their own negotiation units to be able to deal directly with hostage situations occurring in their jurisdiction. The reason for this is that negotiation with hostage takers is a professional police job that should be performed by well-trained negotiators. Even small police departments which have a small budget should establish their own negotiation units to deal with hostage situations effectively. I also recommend that the police departments have a formal negotiator selection and training process. This will help the departments handle hostage/crisis situations precisely and effectively.

Second, every hostage/crisis situation is unique due to different motivations, demands and deadlines made by the hostage takers, and various police applications and resolutions. Also, every situation has its own difficulties, challenges, and dangers. Therefore, each situation should be evaluated under its own conditions and characteristics. Different negotiation, communication, and decision strategies might be required in responding to hostage situations.

Formulating the negotiation, communication, and decision strategies for the negotiators, however, might help them to be more precise when dealing with hostage takers. The unified and consolidated strategies/techniques that can be acquired by well prepared negotiator training based on cooperation and collaboration between the police and scholars also increases the credibility of the police. During such training, the negotiators overview different aspects of negotiation resolutions, evaluate their existing negotiation performances, and learn more about improving their communication skills, negotiation tools, and other activities. I recommend a two-week negotiator course schedule that is based on the revised model suggested by this study. The

goal of this recommendation is to make contributions to negotiation, communication, and

decision strategies of the negotiators.

Table 82

Two-Week Course Schedule for the Hostage/Crisis Negotiators (First Week)

Day	Time	Subjects

Monday	08-12 a.m.	Crisis Situations
		    Organizational Learning in Crisis
		    Issue Management in Crisis

	01-05 p.m.	Hostage/Crisis Situations History of Negotiation Resolutions

Tuesday	08-12 a.m.	Key Players in Command Post
		    Incident Commander
		    Tactical Team

	01-05 p.m.	Key Players in Command Post
		    Mental Health Professional
		    Negotiation Team

Wednesday	08-12 a.m.	Key Players in Command Post Negotiation Team(s) (Continue...)

	01-05 p.m.	Instrumental Hostage Situations
		    Terrorist Hostage Takers
		    Criminal & Inmate Hostage Takers

Thursday	08-12 a.m.	Expressive Hostage Situations
		    Emotionally Disturbed Hostage Takers
		    Mentally Ill Hostage Takers

	01-05 p.m.	Lecture 1 by Mental Health Professionals Lecture 2 by Mental Health Professionals Case Studies
Friday	08-12 a.m.	Lecture 3 by Mental Health Professionals Lecture 4 by Mental Health Professionals Case Studies
	01-05 p.m.	Lecture 5 by Mental Health Professionals Lecture 6 by Mental Health Professionals Case Studies

The negotiators are advised that this two week course schedule is a basic-level course

schedule, not an advanced training schedule. The course manual is this dissertation itself for the

negotiators attending this recommended training course.

Table 83

Two-Week Course Schedule for the Hostage/Crisis Negotiators (Second Week)

Day	Time	Subjects

Monday	08-12 a.m.	Primary Activities
		    Working in a Team Approach
		    Other Primary Activities -Presented in the Study-

	01-05 p.m.	Communication Skills
		    Active Listening Skills
		    Other Skills -Presented in the Study-

Tuesday	08-12 a.m.	Negotiation Tools
		    Establishing Trust/Rapport
		    Other Tools -Presented in the Study-

	01-05 p.m.	Dealing with Demands & Deadlines Dealing with News Media

Wednesday	08-12 a.m.	Implementing Negotiation Phases
		    Case studies
		    Case studies

	01-05 p.m.	Communication Theories Dervin's Sense Making Theory
Thursday	08-12 a.m.	Communication Theories Shannon-Weaver's Model
	01-05 p.m.	Role Playing Scenario #1 (Instrumental) Role Playing Scenario #2 (Instrumental) Evaluations of the Scenarios
Friday	08-12 a.m.	Role Playing Scenario #3 (Expressive) Role Playing Scenario #4 (Expressive) Evaluations of the Scenarios
	01-05 p.m.	Role Playing Scenario #5 (Instrumental) Role Playing Scenario #6 (Expressive) Evaluations of the Scenarios

Third, in such training, police administrators can ensure the negotiators take part in negotiator training with incident commanders, tactical team members, and mental health professionals. This is called joint -combined- training, which helps the negotiators learn how to work together with the other key players working in the command post on-scene, as well as helping them learn how to avoid miscommunication between these key players on-scene. In such training, the negotiators learn how to determine their negotiation, communication, and decision

strategies depending on whether they face instrumental or expressive hostage situations. The negotiators are taught how to evaluate the behavioral, criminal, and psychological distinctiveness of hostage takers involved in the situations that the negotiators encounter while determining their negotiation, communication, and decision strategies. The negotiators are also taught how to look at negotiation process from the interactive and communicative perspective presented throughout this study. This perspective should help the negotiators determine what kind of dynamic activities, communication skills and negotiation tools will be most productive.

Recommendations for the Scholars

In this section, I make two recommendations for future researchers. First, since I am a member of the hostage/crisis negotiator community, I am aware of the fact that the police lack empirical research studies to enhance their negotiation, communication, and decision strategies, although they deal with a number of hostage situations in their jurisdictions every year. There are very few academic studies on the subject of hostage negotiation resolutions since many researchers do not have access to events in this field. Researching hostage situations could be very dangerous. Researchers might have difficulty making close observation of dangerous situations while staying out of the way of the actual negotiators. Often their involvement would be limited because of some environmental and situational difficulties and the inherent dangers in hostage situations.

In addition, few databases within the field of negotiation resolutions are available for the researchers to study. There have been individual efforts to collect data from this field, but they are too limited in scope to make significant contributions to police activities. The police could make better evaluations for their future strategies and practices by understanding the historical

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criminal, behavioral, psychological, and communication distinctiveness of previous hostage situations.

However, the police would be able to evaluate their past performance through reliable database studies made by only researchers. It would help them create some new rules, guidelines, and policies in dealing with hostage situations. To promote new standards for the police, researchers are expected to conduct more empirical research studies in order to achieve the objectives stated above. Strong cooperation and collaboration between the police and the researchers is required to improve negotiation, communication, and decision strategies, making the negotiators more effective in their dealings with the hostage takers. Hammer, Van Zandt, and Rogan (1994), report on a survey conducted by the scholars in 1992 over 600 hostage/crisis negotiators from several federal, state, and local police agencies in the US. Based on the findings of this study, Hammer, Van Zandt, and Rogan concluded that:

> The overwhelming majority (92 %) of the respondents cited a need for a national clearinghouse to collect, analyze, and disseminate information regarding crisis negotiation. Further, 94 % of the team leaders indicated a willingness to use such a clearinghouse, and 93 % of the team leaders indicated a willingness to assist the clearinghouse by providing both information and audio visual materials on their crisis negotiation experiences (1994, p. 10).

Second, I also recommend further research study in the following areas: (1) how do the elements of negation and communication strategy differ?; (2) how do the influential factors, as they relate to hostage negotiators, of negotiation strategy and decision strategy differ?; (3) how do various levels of hostage negotiator's beliefs in the elements of Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories impact their handling of instrumental and expressive hostage situations?

Conclusion

By conducting this theory based empirical study, gathering data from working negotiators in the US and Canada, I have determined what primary dynamic activities, communication skills,

and negotiation tools are used by hostage/crisis negotiators. I have determined that negotiators implement their negotiation and decision strategies differently depending on whether the situations they deal with are instrumental or expressive; what elements of negotiations and factors affecting negotiations are differing while handling instrumental and expressive hostage situations; the collected data did not reveal any significant relationship between handling instrumental/expressive hostage situations differently and belief in the elements of Brenda Dervin's and Shannon-Weaver's theories; have also determined that the belief in the elements of the two theories is workable and practical for negotiators to use while handling hostage situations.

The negotiators look at the behavioral, criminal, and psychological distinctiveness of the hostage takers involved in the hostage situations to decide whether they should be handled as instrumental or expressive. Looking at the negotiation process from the interactive and communicative perspective also helps the negotiators determine what kind of dynamic activities, communication skills and negotiation tools should be used while responding to hostage situations. By doing this, the negotiators build trust and rapport with the hostage takers, enabling the negotiators to gather greater quantities of useful information about the hostage takers and are thereby able to determine the appropriate negotiation, communication, and decision strategies. Hostage negotiation is a format extreme information management. By looking at such extreme case, we can add to our understanding of Weaver's explanation of info as "any means by which."

APPENDIX A

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Hostage/Crisis Negotiator Survey Instrument
(Informed Consent Notice)

The following statements in this survey have been formulated to identify primary components affecting and contributing to negotiation strategies and decision making of negotiators and to establish a model of communication-based negotiation practice for negotiators in hostage situations.

The aim of this survey is to look at similarities and differences between the insight of negotiators in implementing negotiation strategies and decision making in instrumental and expressive hostage situations. In fact, how the negotiation strategies are implemented, what kind of negatives affect negotiation strategies and decision making of negotiators, and what the perception of negotiators are while implementing negotiation strategies in instrumental and expressive hostage situations are being examined by the researcher in this study.

All research participants are advised that for the purpose of this study: instrumental hostage situations include terrorist, criminal, and inmate hostage events, whereas expressive hostage situations include emotionally upset and mentally ill hostage holders. In addition, the terms 'negotiation practice' and 'hostage/crisis negotiator' are used frequently by the researcher in this survey. The term 'negotiation practice' includes all the resources, intelligence, communication skills, strategies and active listening that a negotiator may use while working to resolve a hostage incident as a critical incident team member.

This survey is an anonymous and self-administered study. Therefore, your name and/or your department's name will not be requested in this study. Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have the right to skip any question you choose not to answer. There are no foreseeable risks involved in this study. This survey should take about 25 minutes to complete. Your responses are an extremely valuable contribution to this research project. The results of this study will be available to all participants. This survey was prepared by Suleyman Hancerli, a Police Major in the Turkish National Police, currently a Ph.D. candidate in Information Science Department at The University of North Texas, UNT. The researcher is also a trained hostage/crisis negotiator.

If research participants have any questions, they can either call the researcher, Suleyman Hancerli, (940.595.6620), or send e-mails (hancerli@hotmail.com). In addition, the chair person of this project, Dr. Brian O'Connor, can be reached either from his office number (940.565.2445), or from his e-mail address (boconnor@lis.admin.unt.edu).

This research project has been reviewed and approved by the UNT Institutional Review Board, IRB. Please contact the UNT IRB at 940.565.3940 with any questions regarding your rights as a research subject. If you agree to participate, you may print this document for your records.

By clicking below, you are giving your informed consent to participate in this study. Thank you very much in advance for taking the time to contribute to this important project.

Survey Questions				
The following questions are multiple choices and each question has five options. Please select the answer that best corresponds with your agreement level to each of the question. 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree				
RQ1				
1) A prior negotiator experience affects his/her decision making in a positive manner.				
1	2	3	4	5
RQ1				
2) Negotiation in a hostage situation is a special task that should be performed only by trained hostage negotiators.				
1	2	3	4	5
RQ1				
3) In a hostage situation, negotiation and communication skills should be utilized and exhausted before tactical intervention unless it is so high risk that immediate force is necessary.				
1	2	3	4	5
RQ1				
4) Joint -combined- training with tactical teams help negotiators avoid miscommunication between themselves and the on-scene tactical team.				
1	2	3	4	5
RQ1				
5) Joint -combined- training with incident commanders help negotiators avoid miscommunication between themselves and the on-scene incident commander.				
1	2	3	4	5
RQ1				
6) Negotiators attempt to determine the hostage takers' motivations in order to adjust their negotiation strategies.				
1	2	3	4	5
RQ1				
7) During a hostage situation, negotiators should not compete with the tactical team because the negotiation team is neither subordinate nor superior to the tactical team.				
1	2	3	4	5
RQ1 / RQ3				
8) In a hostage situation, if there is miscommunication in the negotiation process between negotiators and hostage takers, negotiators should know how to consider different strategies in order to deal with the negotiation.				
1	2	3	4	5

RQ1 / RQ3				
9) In a hostage situation, if negotiators know <u>what to ask</u> the hostage takers during negotiation, they are more likely to gather accurate information about the hostage takers.				
1	2	3	4	5

RQ1 / RQ3				
10) In a hostage situation, if negotiators know <u>how to ask</u> the right questions of hostage takers during negotiation, then they will increase their chances of gathering accurate information about hostage takers.				
1	2	3	4	5

RQ1 / RQ3				
11) In a hostage situation, while the primary negotiator talks to the hostage taker, the secondary negotiator is there to assist and support the primary negotiator.				
1	2	3	4	5

RQ1 / RQ3				
12) In a hostage situation, if negotiators learn what the hostage takers' messages/demands are, they should ensure the correct interpretations of the message by paraphrasing them back to the hostage takers.				
1	2	3	4	5

RQ1 / RQ3				
13) In a hostage situation, if negotiators have communication problems with the hostage takers, they are less likely to learn what the hostage takers want.				
1	2	3	4	5

RQ1 / RQ3				
14) In a hostage situation, negotiators' word selections are important in order to send the appropriate message to the hostage takers.				
1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the following scale. <u>The same number can be used as often as necessary</u>.

1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree

RQ1					
15) The following factors relating to gathering information from hostage takers will influence the negotiation strategies and decision making of negotiators in hostage situations. The same number can be used as often as necessary.					
Establishing trust between negotiators and hostage takers	1	2	3	4	5
Building rapport between negotiators and hostage takers	1	2	3	4	5
Developing a personal communication style with hostage takers	1	2	3	4	5
Gathering information about hostage takers from external sources	1	2	3	4	5
Language difference between negotiators and hostage takers	1	2	3	4	5

RQ1						
16)	The following factors in hostage situations will influence the negotiation process and decision making of negotiators. The same number can be used as often as necessary.					
	Number of hostages	1	2	3	4	5
	Number of hostage takers	1	2	3	4	5
	Presence of the media on-scene	1	2	3	4	5
	Presence of by-standers on-scene	1	2	3	4	5
	Presence of Stockholm syndrome	1	2	3	4	5
RQ1 / RQ3						
17)	It is important for negotiators to use the following techniques to establish a good rapport and trust while implementing negotiation strategies in hostage situations? The same number can be used as often as necessary.					
	Using right tone of voice	1	2	3	4	5
	Using right word choice	1	2	3	4	5
	Asking open-ended questions	1	2	3	4	5
	Using active listening skills	1	2	3	4	5
	Paraphrasing the messages/demands of hostage takers	1	2	3	4	5

The following question is multiple choices and has five options. Please select the response that best corresponds with your agreement level to the question.

1=Always,   2=Usually,   3=Sometimes,   4=Not Usually,   5=Never

RQ2b / RQ3				
18)	Do you handle instrumental (terrorist, criminal, and inmate hostage situations) and expressive (emotionally upset and mentally ill hostage holder situations) differently?			
Always	Usually	Sometimes	Not Usually	Never

Scenario Number I
(Instrumental Hostage Situation)

One gang member, Curt McMullen, goes to a bank to commit a robbery. His plan is to get the money and leave the bank immediately. However, his intended criminal action fails for some reason and before he leaves, the police arrive at the bank. Since there is no way for him to escape from the police, he takes two bank employees and two customers as hostages at gunpoint to make a safe escape with the money. He did not intend to take hostages in his original bank robbery plan. After the four hostages are held by the hostage taker in this bank surrounded by the police, the hostage taker makes demands and gives a deadline. He says to the police that he wants to leave the bank with the money and asks them to leave the perimeter. You are the primary negotiator in this situation. Please answer the following questions (number 19 - 27) regarding the conditions of this particular <u>instrumental hostage situation</u> case study.

The following questions are multiple choices and each question has five options. Please select the response that best corresponds with your agreement level to the question.

1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree

	RQ2				
19)	In this hostage situation, a mental health professional providing assistance (assessment of hostage taker's personality) could affect the negotiation strategies of the negotiator.				
	1	2	3	4	5

	RQ2				
20)	The presence of the tactical team may influence the hostage taker's behavior and this may affect the negotiation process.				
	1	2	3	4	5

	RQ2				
21)	In this hostage situation, the negotiators should focus on the hostage taker's demands whether they are negotiable or not because this may buy time for the negotiation team.				
	1	2	3	4	5

	RQ2				
22)	In this hostage situation, use of face-to-face negotiation might be an effective method for the negotiators.				
	1	2	3	4	5

	RQ2				
23)	In this hostage situation, the negotiators should develop a personal communication style with the hostage taker rather than a police-criminal relationship so that they can gather information from the hostage taker.				
	1	2	3	4	5

	RQ2				
24)	In this hostage situation, the negotiators should decide their negotiation strategies and decision making based on the prior criminal history of the hostage taker.				
	1	2	3	4	5

	RQ2				
25)	In this hostage situation, the negotiators should decide their negotiation strategies based on the psychological assessment of the hostage taker.				
	1	2	3	4	5

	RQ2				
26)	In this hostage situation, interviewing family members of the hostage taker might be helpful in determining negotiation strategies and decision making.				
	1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the following scale. The same number can be used as often as necessary. 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree					

RQ2a					
27)	The following factors in this <u>instrumental hostage situation</u> will influence the negotiation process and decision making of the negotiators? The same number can be used as often as necessary.				
	Hostages' prior relationships to the hostage taker	1	2	3	4	5
	Presence of a deadline set by the hostage taker	1	2	3	4	5
	Threat level of the hostage taker	1	2	3	4	5
	Duration of the hostage situation	1	2	3	4	5
	Presence of hostage taker demands	1	2	3	4	5

Scenario Number II
(Expressive Hostage Situation)

Alex Brown has been suffering from frustrations in his life. He has had marriage and career failures recently. He finally decides to do something important in his life. He goes to the store, in which he used to work as a salesman before he was fired by the owner of this store, and takes this man, one other salesperson, and two customers as hostages at gunpoint. When the police arrive at the location, they find the hostage taker is screaming and yelling at the hostages, telling them he has lost his job, career, and family, so there is nothing left to live for. After the four hostages are held by the hostage taker in this store surrounded by the police, the hostage taker makes demands and gives a deadline. He says to the police that this is not police business and asks them to leave the perimeter. You are the primary negotiator in this situation. Please answer the following questions (number 28 - 36) regarding the conditions of this particular <u>expressive hostage situation</u> case study.

The following questions are multiple choices and each question has five options. Please select the response that best corresponds with your agreement level to the question.

1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree

RQ2				
28)	In this hostage situation, a mental health professional providing assistance (assessment of hostage taker's personality) could affect the negotiation strategies of the negotiator.			
1	2	3	4	5

RQ2				
29)	The presence of the tactical team may influence the hostage taker's behavior and this may affect the negotiation process.			
1	2	3	4	5

RQ2
30) In this hostage situation, the negotiators should focus on the hostage taker's demands whether they are negotiable or not because this may buy time for the negotiation team.

1	2	3	4	5

RQ2
31) In this hostage situation, use of face-to-face negotiation might be an effective method for the negotiators.

1	2	3	4	5

RQ2
32) In this hostage situation, the negotiators should develop a personal communication style with the hostage taker rather than a police-criminal relationship so that they can gather information from the hostage taker.

1	2	3	4	5

RQ2
33) In this hostage situation, the negotiators should decide their negotiation strategies and decision making based on the prior criminal history of the hostage taker.

1	2	3	4	5

RQ2
34) In this hostage situation, the negotiators should decide their negotiation strategies based on the psychological assessment of the hostage taker.

1	2	3	4	5

RQ2
35) In this hostage situation, interviewing family members of the hostage taker might be helpful in determining negotiation strategies and decision making.

1	2	3	4	5

Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the following scale. The same number can be used as often as necessary.

1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree

RQ2a
36) The following factors in this <u>expressive hostage situation</u> will influence the negotiation process and decision making of the negotiators? The same number can be used as often as necessary.

	1	2	3	4	5
Hostages' prior relationships to the hostage taker	1	2	3	4	5
Presence of a deadline set by the hostage taker	1	2	3	4	5
Threat level of the hostage taker	1	2	3	4	5
Duration of the hostage situation	1	2	3	4	5
Presence of hostage taker demands	1	2	3	4	5

	Prior Experiences of Negotiators
	RQ2b / RQ3
37)	Do you believe that negotiators should handle instrumental (terrorist, criminal, and inmate hostage situations) and expressive (emotionally upset and mentally ill hostage holders) hostage situations differently?
	A. Yes
	B. No
	Demographic Questions
38)	Have you completed a hostage/crisis negotiator training course?
	A. Yes
	B. No
39)	Have you participated in a hostage/crisis negotiator training course with a tactical team?
	A. Yes
	B. No
40)	Have you participated in a hostage/crisis negotiator training course with an incident commander?
	A. Yes
	B. No
41)	How long have you been working as a hostage/crisis negotiator?
42)	Is working as a hostage/crisis negotiator a part-time or full-time job in your agency?
	A. Part-time
	B. Full-time
43)	What is your education level?
	A. High School
	B. College (2 year degree)
	C. University (4 year degree)
	D. Masters Degree
	E. Doctoral Degree
44)	What is your rank?

45)	What is your gender?
	A. Male
	B. Female
46)	What is your age?

Please add any comments and opinions about this survey and about hostage/crisis negotiation.

Thank you for participating!

APPENDIX B

LETTER TO SURVEY PARTICIPANTS

Barney McNeilly,
President of Canadian Critical Incident Inc., CCII,
P.O. Box 47679, 939 Lawrence Ave. East,
Toronto, Ontario, M3C 3S7

Dear Barney McNeilly,

Suleyman Hancerli, a Police Major in the Turkish National Police, is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Department of Information Science at the University of North Texas. He has been working on the dissertation topic which is about negotiation strategies in hostage/crises situations.

Major Hancerli aims to identify primary components affecting and contributing to negotiation strategies and decision making of hostage/crisis negotiators and to establish a model of communication-based negotiation practice for hostage/crisis negotiators in hostage situations through the survey questions formulated by him. The aim of this survey is to look at similarities and differences between the perceptions of the hostage/crisis negotiators in implementing negotiation strategies and decision making in instrumental and expressive hostage situations.

There are 46 multiple-choice and yes-no questions in the survey and it should take about 25 minutes to complete the questions. This survey is an anonymous and self-administered study, the research participants, therefore, should be asked to visit the website, in which the survey questions will be put on, and complete the questions electronically. The target populations in this survey study will be 'hostage/crisis negotiators' from the United States and Canada only. Since your agency/organization has members who represent the target population that the survey study aims to have in the country, we kindly ask you to allow Major Hancerli to work over the hostage/crisis negotiator members in your agency/organization.

The survey questions are attached for your information and the link of the website that the survey questions will be put on will soon be notified by Major Hancerli to your agency/organization. The research participants' responses are an extremely valuable contribution to this research project. The results of this study will be available to all survey participants. Please send us a letter certifying your intention with this study. We look forward to hearing from you. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

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APPENDIX C

QUALITATIVE DATA TAKEN FROM THE SURVEY STUDY

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1. Although my responses may have been similar regarding both scenarios, I still believe both types of hostage situations would be handled differently. Although criminal history, information from family, a psychological assessment, etc. may be equally important in each case, the intelligence you gather from those sources and how you use it will likely be different in each of the two types of situations.

2. Just like terrain in the Military, every situation is different, and terrain always dictates which way to go. You have to be like a chameleon and adapt to every type of environment. As a negotiator, I don't get involved with what civilian bystanders or the Media thinks. I am isolated and concentrating on saving lives. Whether or not they are innocent lives or that of the hostage taker.

3. My interpretation of some of the questions concerning what would influence the process was to disagree with most things affecting the process, other than outside information concerning the subject, hostages, and situation at hand. It is important for the negotiation process to be consistent, w/ consistent goals and objectives focused on de-escalating the situation whether it is instrumental or emotional. The process often remains the same. The information from hostage takers, observers, outside interviews, and an overall on-going assessment of the situation are factors most likely to influence negotiation strategy and decision making.

4. I am lucky with my SWAT team; we have a commander that is trained in negotiations and tactical, and a staff psychologist available. We are a multi-jurisdictional team spanning two counties, and approximately 25 police agencies. We train every month and we do several trainings a year with both tactical and negotiations units present. This has been unbelievably helpful in knowing what each unit is doing and why, and the information they are looking for and why.

5. Regardless of whether the hostage situation is instrumental or expressive, all information about the hostage taker and their motives are important in determining strategies.

6. More research is required in hostage negotiation.

7. Every situation is different.

8. Negotiations are a critical component of police work and I think that this study could be very beneficial.

9. All situations are different. You out the same way in all situations but you have to be dynamic and fluid allowing the situation itself dictate your response to it.

10. I feel every situation is different and answering questions about a hostage situation is not the same as when you actually handle a job. In an actual hostage situation you just begin talking and the conversation just flows with the hostage taker. Every job is different and no two hostage jobs are the same.

11. I think that the more information you have on the hostage taker the better.

12. Negotiation strategy is never determined by one factor, but by many that is jointly assessed.

13. As much training, including role playing as possible.

14. I feel that the interaction/conversation between the negotiator and the hostage taker is the key to any negotiation. You have to be a listener. I also believe that the Negotiation Team, SWAT, and Incident Command should constantly train as one. The teams would each practice their own discipline but always towards a unified ending.

15. Each situation has to be handled using information that can be gathered about that situation and the persons involved. There is no way to make a "blanket statement" about a particular type of situation without having more information.

16. It is very important that the negotiators, tactical team and command train together. Unfortunately, this is not the norm.

17. From looking at the questions I would caution that mental health professionals assisting negotiators at the scene can be a source of useful assessment concerning the hostage takers behavior. They should not be the driving force behind strategy development nor are the optimally used to conduct direct negotiations. They are a tool of the negotiation team only.

18. The issue of treating criminal negotiations the same as emotional negotiations is an interesting one. Having successfully negotiated both situations from the same basis my experience tells me that as long as the negotiator follows the guidelines that we use for teaching negotiations (building rapport, active listening, etc) it really doesn't matter what type of incident you are negotiating. In many ways it is more difficult to get emotionally disturbed folks to focus on outcomes that those with criminal intent.

19. No matter what, you still have to play it by ear!

20. Very hard to give definitive sometimes. Crisis negotiation, while based on theory, is delivered as a creative art form.

21. The majority of jobs I responded to with the NYPD where controlled by an incident commander and ESU who did not give the hostage negotiator time to use their skills. It seemed that the commanders and ESU wanted a quick ending to the situation. Let the negotiators conduct their business first. If that fails, the commanders and ESU can do what they came to do at the scene, boom the door.

22. I think you were trying to find out if there is a significant difference in the way expressive vs. instrumental hostage situations are handled. I agree that they are handled differently to some extent. Active Listening is crucial to both situations yet the situations do require different

strategies. I think we experience more expressive situation in the USA according to our HOBAS statistics.

23. The fundamental approach to any situation is the use of active listening skills. The goal of negotiations is to move through the emotion of the incident and get the offender to a place of rational thought. Active listening skills are fatiguing and assist with deescalating the emotional charge of the situations. Dwelling on demands keep the demands in the forefront of the negotiations. The goal of negotiations is not to grant demands. The goal is to gain peaceful surrender. Demands should be catalogued and stalled.

24. So, of course they should be handled differently.

25. Each negotiation should be handled based on the situation involved. Some of the tactics and techniques used may be similar in each negotiation, but each should be handled based on the merits of the incident. The only common thread for all negotiations is the need to resolve the situation.

26. I believe that the vast majority of crisis situations are expressively based. They originate from fear, frustration, loss of control etc. As a result I believe that the majority of instrumental incidents are actually expressively motivated.

27. The more actual situations you are activated in the more comfortable you become as a negotiator and the negotiation process as well.

28. Some of the questions which imply that a singular factor may determine the decision process and the strategy adopted by a negotiator (ie psychological and/or mental assessment) are somewhat unfair, for the reason that I believe when developing strategy and decision making processes, various factors have to be considered not just one factor

29. When you are a negotiator working a situation, a lot of what you say and how your react is what your gut is telling you, and what your team is saying. No situation is the same, and there is not a playbook to follow. You know by your training and through your experience what are the hot buttons and sensitive areas and try to avoid them. No two negotiations will go the same way.

30. I don't think there is one set of rules that should be followed, every situation is different and every person is in crisis for a different reason. More training needs to be done with the tactical units in our area.

31. Input from any agencies/courses that would assist in any degree of negotiating, as I work with all kinds of personalities.

32. Some of the wording in select questions could use some clarification. I believe that instrumental demands are often just a way of delivering an expressive demand so I would have to answer not always instead of yes or no.

33. The need for Hostage/Crisis Negotiators is stronger than ever with an increased number of people being affected by daily pressures. The key to successful negotiations is to train and learn from experiences, good and bad. There will always be those individuals who are very committed to cause and tactic and no matter what you say, a force option will be necessary.

34. Negotiators in my organization are a volunteer position and as such one has to enjoy the task of negotiator to enlist. Negotiation is a dynamic process. Personal styles and negotiator personality will be evident during negotiations.

35. Trained Hostage/Crisis negotiators are essential in resolving crisis situations peacefully without the use of force.

36. Trust your strategy and trust the process.

37. Our program does not identify instrumental vs. expressive situations by the type of situation, rather by the type of demands. This is done with the belief that the vast majority of demands are driven by some expressive (emotional) need - fear, power/control etc. even if they are instrumental in nature (a get away car). Based on this position the focus is to develop rapport with the offender through empathetic communication and active listening skills.

38. Each hostage situation is fluid and needs to be negotiated as the situation dictates. A person's behavior is unpredictable in most hostage situations; however building rapport seems to be an important factor in success.

39. Demands are demands - whether they be instrumental or expressive - underlying all demands are significant concerns for the individual that need to be acknowledged and understood in order to come to resolution.

40. I believe that in an instrumental hostage taking (i.e. aborted hold-up etc) traditional strategies will most likely need to be utilized, whereas expressive and mentally ill (domestic violence, distressed etc) can often require a different approach. I believe a mental health professional should be utilized on all true hostage situations. As far as active listening goes, in an expressive hostage taking I believe it is beneficial, same does not always hold true in my opinion in expressive incidents. One last point, I am always hesitant to say we need to use the exact/precise/best words, I believe this can serve to intimidate new negotiators, and this belief hampers their natural communication style. I believe that properly selected negotiators given proper training and exposure can almost always match their target, and, if they cannot it is likely more of an indicator of mis-matched personalities versus incorrect communication style.

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