during the prolonged period of reserve. . ." resulting in "a loss of momentum which
resulted in excessive casualties." He also thought these Marines showed insufficient
training. The effect of a reserve "letdown" was not confined to the 7th Marines. The CO
of 2/5 also admitted that his battalion had had some increased inefficiency due to the
period of reserve and rest. He ordered his companies to train hard to regain their cutting
Casualties for the day were 5 KIA and 75 WIA in the 7th Marines, and 70 KIA or
MIA, and 274 WIA for the KMCs. The enemy lost 460 counted KIA and 15 prisoners.
Estimated enemy KIA numbered 609 with 345 WIA.65
Division headquarters received orders for a new EUSAK plan called Plan Apache,
that day. IX Corps was to seize a new phase line, Line Etna. This plan was to involve a
task force composed of some elements from the Marine Division moving to ROK I
Corps area and attacking north along the east coat from Kansong to Kobong-ni. The
attack would be supported from the sea by NGF. The division was supposed to
immediately start planning for the operation. Planning commenced, but Task Force Able
(the executing force for the plan) was never formed because the plan was canceled
farther up the chain of command from X Corps. The division was notified of the fact
Day Four: September 3
About this time, Ralph B. Steele arrived at the front with the 12th Replacement
64 "Historical Diary," of the 2nd Battalion 5th Marines, September 1951, 5, 15, 2, 23.
65 Allan R. Millett, Drive North, 42; 1st Mar Div, "Historical Diary," September 1951, 7.
66 st Mar Div, "Historical Diary," September 1951, 2; 1st Marine Regiment, "Historical Diary," September,
1951, Operational orders and plans for this operation are in the appendices of the diary.
Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War. Denton, Texas. UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/. Accessed August 1, 2014.