ambush technique employed by the enemy consists of throwing hand grenades into a
vehicle as it passes and then following up the grenade blast with small arms fire."31
As for fortifications, the NKPA bunkers were strong and comparable to those of
the Japanese on Tarawa, though on a smaller scale of strength (the Tarawa defenses
also had concrete and were made to withstand NGF (Naval Gunfire), these in Korea
were fortified against artillery and bomb attack). There was at least a rumor that the
enemy was on constant orders to add one meter a day of earth to his emplacements.
The enemy was confident enough in the strength of his bunkers that he often called
down artillery fire on his own positions while yet in them. He often did this when Marines
were almost atop them.32
The tactical doctrine governing the NKPA forces was based on that of the
Chinese and Soviets, particularly that of Mao Tze Tung and his "ten principles of war by
which the CCF fight." These tenets were very like the principles of Sun Tzu.33
A EUSAK report on enemy tactics said:
Since a large portion of the cadre of the North Korean People's Army served with
the Chinese Communist Forces in battle against the Japanese, North Korean
tactics employed against United Nations Forces were similar to CCF and Soviet
Russian tactics.... All Commanding Generals and other key officers of all North
Korean People's Army divisions were Chinese Communist Forces and/or Soviet
trained. Many North Korean People's Army noncommissioned officers also had
undergone extensive Chinese Communist Forces training.34
31 First Battalion, 5th Marines, "Historical Diary," September 1951, 14; Undated Public Information
Document by Sgt. Frank L. Creasy, Marine Combat Correspondent, National Archives: RG 127, Records
of the U. S. Marine Corps, "Division of Information, Publicity Articles Relating to the First Marine Division
in Korea, Final Copies, Oct. 1950-Feb. 1952."
32 Second Battalion, 5th Marines, "Historical Diary," September 1951, 92; Lynn Montross, et al., The East-
Central Front, 192; Second Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, "Historical Diary," September 1951, 7.
33 Headquarters, Eighth U. S. Army Korea, Monograph entitled "Enemy Tactics," December, 1951
(National Archives: RG 407, Records of U. S. Army Field Commands, Command Reports, 1949-1954):
34 Ibid., ix.
Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War. Denton, Texas. UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/. Accessed November 28, 2014.