over the standard Army infantry division besides just those of numbers. However, one
point of note about soldiers in the Korean War was that they were deprived of the same
quality of overall manpower by the KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the U. S. Army)
program. Koreans were integrated with the American soldiers, and because of the
language and cultural problem, the development of effective cohesion or sound primary
groups was hindered severely.25
It is thus unfair to compare the Army in Korea with the Marines, particularly before
Ridgway took command. This is because of KATUSA, comparative lack of pre-war
training, and the formidable morale problem brought on by the first few months'
experiences and defeats. Furthermore, due to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and
the new emphasis on the Air Force and Nuclear weapons before 1950, the Army was
cut very drastically on the eve of Korea. It took time to build back up. A smaller service
that had always been cadre based and very familial like the Corps could do so much
easier than could the larger Army.
Also, the USMC had one division and placed many of its best men therein; the
Army had many divisions and had to spread its best men out more. Furthermore, the
Marines didn't have Europe and other major commitments around the globe to pull
away good men. The Marines in Korea were at the best they had ever been-highly
salted with the cream of the crop of WWII veterans. The Army, in general, though
certain individual units were exemplary, was at a low ebb (before Ridgway came in at
least - though after the stalemate began, the rotation system, the KATUSA program,
and other factors led the quality of manpower in Army ranks to decline), and it is unfair,
25 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 507; Allan R. Millett, Many a Strife, 294.
Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War. Denton, Texas. UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/. Accessed July 30, 2015.