provide effective support, but as a whole, the AF did not care enough about CAS to
make it more effective.20
The factor of training went hand in hand with accuracy (meaning the aviators
trained as infantry, knew what infantry needed, understood infantry tactics, and trained
closely with the infantry in CAS doing the very things that would be expected in a CAS
strike on the battlefield). The pilots to fly CAS in combat needed to have trained
extensively in peacetime to do so. Furthermore, this factor meant that the pilots had not
just trained in CAS, but trained closely with the Marine ground forces they were to
support. You cannot expect to have effective close coordination with ground fire and
maneuver if you do not train in such regularly. The 1 MAW trained closely with the 1Mar
Div before the war and proved itself effective in supporting the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter, making some of the first kills of the feared T-34 tanks in
the war. And in the 1MarDiv request of 30 Oct 1951, wherein the CG 1MarDiv made
requests of what constituted ideal CAS for his division, it was stated that the Marines
preferred Marine aircraft (meaning the 1 MAW) to Navy or AF because of the more
extensive training of the pilots with that division. Training also meant that the Marines
knew the limitations and capabilities of all supporting arms and that Marine pilots knew
these for the infantry.21
20 Allan R. Millett, "Korea, 1950-53," 349.
21 1Mar Div "Report on CAS," letter of 30 Sep 1951, from CG 1 Mar Div to CG EUSAK, via CG X Corps,
"Comments on ORO-R-3 Close Air Support Operations in Korea," page 3; Lynn Montross, et al., U. S.
Marine Operations in Korea Vol I; 1 Mar Div, "Report of CAS," Letter of CG 1 Mar Div to CICFEC
(Commander in Chief, Far East Command), via CG X Corps and CG Eighth Army, "Close Air Support,"
dated 18 Oct 1951, page 2; Letter of CG (commanding general) 1MarDiv, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas,
to CG Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, dated 25 August 1951, page 3. Allan R.
Millett, Semper Fidelis, 447-448: "No new aviator lieutenants were trained in 1946-1950 without first
serving as ground officers."
Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War. Denton, Texas. UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/. Accessed July 30, 2014.