follow his original route of attack (around 'The Rock') and was believed to have
descended the slopes on both sides .... "89
Hill 812 "stood bleak and bare, its rocky sides beaten to a brown powder by high
explosives, the northern slopes littered with enemy dead." "By 0645, all former positions
had been retaken and one half hour later this message was dispatched by radio to the
Battalion Commanding Officer from the S-3 [Averill]: 'All ground lost has been regained.
Patrols now one hundred yards to the front.'" The 2/5 Marines had taken 11 POWs,
counted 30 enemy KIA, and estimated an additional 20 KIA and 15 wounded had been
sustained by the NKPAs in this attack. "These estimates were said by Easy and Fox
Company officers to be conservative, as most believed the better part of an enemy
company destroyed." An enemy POW said that his battalion was down to 240 men and
that the previous night's attack had been with thirty men, whereas Fox's CO estimated
at least 100 enemy involved, but "it was assumed that what he [the POW] stated was,
rather, the original plan, not what actually happened ... ." The Marines of 2/5 lost 2 KIA
and 31 WIA that day. One of each of the two KIA was in Easy and Fox respectively.
Easy had 21 WIA, Fox 3, Weapons Company 3, H&S Company 2, Dog Company 2.
Twelve of the WIA were not evacuated but chose to remain on the line, or did not have
89 Second Battalion, 5th Marines, "Historical Diary," September 1951, 73.
90 Maj Gerald P. Averill, "Final Objective," 16; Second Battalion, 5th Marines, "Historical Diary,"
September 1951, 73-74, 76, 77.
Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War. Denton, Texas. UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/. Accessed May 3, 2015.