The Battalion CO then called Regiment for permission to commit Dog Company f
necessary. Dog was regimental reserve and could not be used without regimental
permission. This permission was given. Dog was alerted for possible commitment.75
Fox-2 was moved at 0500 to a forward post on the left flank of 812. Lt. Anderson
(no first name supplied) commanded Fox-3 and elements of Fox-2. He then took over
Fox-1 as well and reorganized it to effectively meet attacks.76
At 0400 there was a lull of about a half hour, then "the enemy began to intensify
his fire and the Marines braced themselves for a final assault." The Easy Company
60mm mortars kept their tubes hot punching out rounds into the enemy, 167 total
expended. The radios to the heavier mortars, the 81s and four deuces, went out at this
point so the 60s had to fill the gap. By 0445 the main body of the NKPA assault was
within 75 meters of the center knoll of the 812 ridge line, hurling many grenades and
riddling Marine lines with burp gun bursts. After fifteen minutes of this, the enemy closed
on Easy-1 and Easy-3 and "'assaulted with a veritable shower of hand grenades' that
wreaked havoc on the friendly positions and demoralized certain persons, already
shaken up by three days bombardment, within the defensive area."77
Most of the Marines had had to wait for the attack in reverse slope bunkers (these
were where the enemy had lived and slept), not having had a chance to prepare any on
the forward slope because of enemy incoming and such bunkers were not the best for
repelling an assault. "The main assault came in the center of the hill and under cover of
intense grenade barrage, managed to close with Marines in the center positions.
Marines fought bitterly until they were overcome by superior numbers, then those who
77 Ibid., 71.
Montandon, Joshua W. Battle for the Punchbowl: The U. S. 1st Marine Division 1951 Fall Offensive of the Korean War. Denton, Texas. UNT Digital Library. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3938/. Accessed July 1, 2016.