

A CONCEPTUAL MAP FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TERRORIST RECRUITMENT  
PROCESS: OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS OF DHKP/C, PKK, AND TURKISH  
HEZBOLLAH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

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Terrorism is a historical problem; however, it becomes one of the biggest problems in 21st century. September 11 and the following Madrid, Istanbul and London attacks showed that it is the most significant problem threatening world peace and security. Governments have started to deal with terrorism by improving security measurements and making new investments to stop terrorism. Most of the governments' and scholars' focus is on immediate threats and causes of terrorism, instead of looking at long-term solutions such as root causes and underlying reasons of terrorism, and the recruitment style of terrorist organizations. If terrorist recruitment does not stop, then it is safe to say terrorist activities cannot be stopped.

This study focused on the recruitment process by observing two different terrorist organizations, DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah. The researcher brings 13 years of field experience and first-person data gathered from inside the terrorist organizations. The research questions of this study were: (i) How can an individual be prevented from joining or carrying out terrorist activities?; (ii) What factors are correlated with joining a terrorist organization?; (iii) What are the recruitment processes of the DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah?; (iv) Is there any common process of being a member of these three terrorist organizations?; and (v) What are the similarities and differences these terrorist organizations?

As a result of this analysis, a terrorist recruitment process map was created.

With the help of this map, social organizations such as family and schools may be able to identify ways to prevent individuals from joining terrorist organizations. Also, this map will also be helpful for government organizations such as counterterrorism and intelligence to achieve the same goal.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Statement of Problem

Throughout history, terrorism has been one of the most significant problems not only for governments but also for civilians. However, in the last three decades, it has become a more prevalent problem; in fact, after September 11, terrorism has turned into an evil all over the world (September 11, 2003). Many academic studies have been done to understand the roots of the problem, but they have been able to offer only several short-term responses to terrorist acts. In fact, they focused mostly on the idea of “being tough on terrorism”, which utilizes the army to defeat terrorists. However, the use of force may cause many casualties, thus escalating the rancor among of the public and the terrorists alike. This animosity can then help terrorist organizations motivate potential members to join them. Moreover, the use of force causes terrorists to justify attacking civilians. A terrorist, for example, someone who has lost a family member from the use of army force may be eager to attack random targets, which may include innocent civilians.

Even though terrorism doesn't cause as many casualties as traffic accidents, it spreads a massive amount of fear into the public (Yayla, 2005). The FBI defines the terrorism as intimidating and coercing the government and the civilians in furtherance of political goals. This intimidation and coercion can take the form of killing one of the top government representatives, or terrorists may show their power through utilizing high tech communication devices to send their message around the world in a very short

time. The media is often eager to convey the horror of a terrorist attack and help them spread the fear.

When we look at terrorism in today's world and examine past examples of terrorism, we understand there have always been underlying reasons for the terrorism that took place. Even though the reasons are different, the outcome is always same. History teaches us that the basic motivation for terrorism is that people are not happy with some important aspects of their life. In addition, another key element in the motivation for terrorist acts is the social structure of a society. Generally, terrorists try to manipulate social problems for their goals and their propaganda. They never talk about violence at the very beginning; instead, they protest poverty, inequality, or a lack of freedom. Those problems are frequently emphasized in their propaganda so that justification for later violent terrorism acts can be established. Because the social structure is a significant point for the integration of the society, theorists often cite social disorganization and strain as major factors for the occurrence of crime in socially problematic societies; however, their assumptions need to be proven with respect to terrorism. Because the terrorist organizations use societal problems in order to justify the use of violence, they have always been able to recruit new members. The supply of new members makes it almost impossible to destroy a terrorist organization by killing and arresting all of its members. In this regard, this study will focus on the underlying causes of terrorism. Also, this study will look at underlying reasons that individuals join terrorist organizations so that we can understand the causes of terrorism better. If we can successfully understand the causes of terrorism, we can stop terrorist events before they occur.

Terrorist organizations have four main components: ideology, leadership, recruitment pools, and publicity. According to Crenshaw (1982), recruitment is the most important necessity for terrorist organizations to survive over time. In fact, terrorist groups need new members to grow and make replacement for losses.

Also, terrorist organizations have a strict structure to control and to gather intelligence from the government. Most of the time, the body of a terrorist organization is composed of two major components. The first one involves the legal part, which performs legitimate activities in the social groups under the name of youth associations, ethnic organizations, labor unions, and publications of newsletters. The second part is the illegal part, which is composed of small cells that have no contact with each other and is accountable to one person at the top. Those two parts sometimes work in an interconnected manner, which is difficult to detect. However, the decisions are made by a central committee and executed by cells. The structure is so secret that any diffusion by police is very difficult. Members communicate face to face and try not to use technological devices. For all those reasons, it is difficult for the police to gather intelligence about terrorists, especially about the illegal side of the organization, which performs the armed activities, such as bombing, murder, and kidnapping.

As mentioned at the Madrid Terrorism Conference in 2005, the war on terror doesn't look like the other wars. It requires a concerted effort that spans over decades. When the terrorist identity has been shaped gradually over years, the justifications of terrorism become common beliefs for individuals. Jerrold M. Post (2005) believes that in order to understand motivations, pathways, and underlying reasons of the terrorist

recruitment process, researchers need to conduct field research, including interviews with captured terrorist members.

In short, terrorism is a complex and significant problem because it clearly threatens world peace and security. Despite concern throughout the world, there is a dearth of information about terrorism. The reason for the lack of data comes from the strike-structure of terrorist group. Because of the lack of comprehensive data, it is difficult to understand the true scope of terrorism. Although hundreds of studies have been done by academicians, there are many questions which need to be answered. These include questions, such as, “Why does an individual break his or her relations with society and join the terrorist organizations?”, and “How do terrorist members justify killing innocent people?”, and “How can we stop potential members from joining terrorist organizations or carrying out terrorist actions?” Therefore, answering these questions within this study will shed light for future studies.

#### Why This Study is Unique and Significant

As mentioned above, there are many difficulties in obtaining information for academicians because of terrorist organizations' tightly bound, strict structure. Indeed, it is safe to say that it is almost impossible to academicians to get information from inside the terrorist organizations. Also, academicians could not conduct long-term field study inside the terrorist organizations. However, this study is unique because of two reasons: the data and my field experience. Prior to beginning my graduate studies in the US I worked as an investigator and interrogator in the counter-terrorism division in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey, for more than ten years. The data which was obtained from

inside terrorist organizations had been written by terrorist members. Terrorist organizations asked their member to give specific information about their background as well as their families, so they answered those questions and sent them to central committees. TNP counter terrorism divisions caught the terrorist members in different operations. The questions and answers are significant in understanding terrorist motivations and the underlying reasons that people join terrorist organizations.

In addition to data, my experience in the field is also very important because I spent ten years observing, interviewing, and interrogating terrorist members. This opportunity gives me a better understanding about the problem making this study very significant.

### Goals of the Study

The goals of this study are to create a terrorist recruitment map by observing three different terrorist organizations. This map will be useful in understanding the processes which causes an individual to move inside terrorist organizations. In fact, the underlying reasons will be determined by analyzing the data. Also, the differences and similarities will be analyzed among three different terrorist organizations. Moreover, the process of terrorist membership will be defined. Becoming a member of a terrorist organization occurs in several steps. The first step is that an individual breaks his or her bond with society; the new recruit is then exposed to terrorist propaganda by terrorist members. In this way, terrorist organizations create initial contact with the individual. After the first step, terrorist organizations start to groom their prey with political education. Military training comes after political education. During the education

process, both political and military terrorist groups observe the new members' behavior. If the organization sees that the new members are not ready to carry out a terrorist attack, they will be transferred inside the terrorist organizations. After the training process, new members become ready to join terrorist activities. After that point, they begin to justify terrorist actions.

In this research, I create a model which will show the process of becoming a member of a terrorist organization. After creating the recruitment map, it will be easy to see which social entity can be stopped so that individuals refrain from joining a terrorist organization. Also, the map will help society to understand their responsibilities to stop individuals from joining terrorist groups. At the beginning, possibly the best social organization is one's immediate family, and then relatives, and friends. Furthermore, school and social environment may be the next entity to have power and influence on the individuals. Therefore, this map may help social entities as well as government and intelligence organizations to stop individuals from joining a terrorist organization or from carrying out a terrorist attack. Although it is difficult and requires a tremendous effort, it is the only long-term solution for the most significant social and security problems in 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### Research Questions for This Study

The central question for this study is, "How can an individual be stopped before joining or carrying out terrorist activities?" In order to find answers for this question, researcher is going to analyze three different data sets from three different terrorist organizations to answer the following four research questions:

1. What factors are correlated with joining a terrorist organization?
2. What are the recruitment processes of the DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah?
3. Is there any common process of being a member of these three terrorist organizations?
4. What are the similarities and differences between these terrorist organizations?

## Descriptive Definitions of Terms and Concepts

### *Definition of Terrorism*

Terrorism is a widespread problem which threatens the modern world. It is a disease that attacks regardless of nation, religion, language, race, or sect; its members kill innocent people in a way that cannot be justified by any religious, political, or ideological doctrine. Today no nation in our modern world can consider itself safe against terrorism. International and national terrorism have gained their places in the world literature as the most basic and up-to-date concepts of the post-Cold War period. Unfortunately, terrorism is not only threatening the lives and safety of the citizens in countries where it spreads violence, but also it causes serious harm to the economy and politics of the related countries; moreover, it may also create conflicts between the public and the state because of the security measures taken to combat terrorism.

The word “terror” has a Latin origin, and it was first used in its current form during the French Revolution. The term “terror” that we use today is derived from the Latin word “terrere” and it means to be filled with fear, to tremble with fear (Juergensmeyer, 2003). The word “terrere” is derived from “tre,” which means to tremble in Latin. The word “terrorism” was first used in 1795 just after the French Revolution with the meaning “intimidation by state by means of creating fear,” and it was used as

“terrorisme” in France. The concept of terrorism was introduced to world literature by the British in 1798 and was regarded as “the systematic use of terror.” The term “terrorist” in its modern meaning was first used in 1947 referring to the tactics used by the Jews against the British on Palestinian territory. In addition, the word “terrorist” was used for the Revolutionists in Russia in 1866 and for the radicals and reformists, who were called the “Jacobins,” during the French Revolution in 1790s (Online etymology dictionary, 2003).

Unfortunately, a common definition of terrorism has not yet been accepted in either scientific terms or the international arena. One of the most significant reasons of this lack of definition is the fact that the social and political scientists and countries making the definition tend to take into consideration their own political and ideological interests. In addition, the complex structure of terrorism makes it difficult to have a single, widely-accepted definition. The problem of defining terrorism is the main element in the fight against terrorism both in international and national terms. Although there have been various definitions of terrorism, the most frequently used definition contains two basic elements: the use of violence and the desire to change the political system. Politicians, academicians, security experts, journalists, and government representatives use various definitions in order to identify terrorism. While the definition of terrorism set forth by the governments is different from that of the scientists, it may also differ between different state institutions. For instance, the United States has been very cautious when defining terrorism so as not to include the IRA organization. The U.S did not include the IRA for many years in the list of terrorist groups throughout the world, which is declared every year. The underlying reason for this is considered to be due to

the 50 million US citizens with Irish nationality living in the country. Then, in the year 2000, the IRA was included in the list of terrorist groups declared by the United States; however, the US felt the necessity of making an explanation and stated the name of the organization as “the real IRA.” As this example illustrates, it seems difficult to attain a general definition of terror as of today. However, this variety of definitions must be seen as providing us with a comprehensive understanding of terrorism. In the most basic terms, terrorism is the use of force with violence and threats in order to change a political system. Terrorism is a threat, a method of fighting, or a strategy to achieve a particular target that absolutely includes the use of “violence.” Its aim is to create fear in the public by means of merciless and inhuman methods.

If we have a look at the definitions throughout the world, despite the fact that we face various and very different definitions, there are many common points. For instance, in the Encyclopedia Britannica, terrorism is explained as “terror, resorting to systematic violence acts against public or individuals with the aim to achieve a political target” (Terrorism, 2004). In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12th, 1991) terrorism is defined as follows:

Terror is all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security (Law of Terror Prevention, 1991, p, 1).

The definition of the U.N is as follows: " 'Terrorism' means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to

harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States” (Freezing Funds, 2003).

In the British Anti-Terrorism Act (Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989) it is stated, "terrorism is the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public, or any section of the public in fear" (Prevention of Terrorism, 1989). France also refers to the dangers to the public by defining terrorism as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or terror to disrupt public order" (How five foreign countries, 2000). Moreover, “In Germany, terrorism has been described as an enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes” (Martin, 2002).

The FBI’s definition of terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons, or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Terrorism in the United States, 1997). In addition, according to the definition formulated by the US, “Terrorism is any violence perpetrated for political reasons by sub national groups or secret state agents, often directed at noncombatant targets, and usually intended to influence an audience” (Terrorism and America, 1998).

Different governments have different definitions; likewise, different federal institutions have their own definitions of terror. For instance, the definition used by the

FBI is different from that of the U.S. State Department. According to the definition of the FBI, individuals, as well as groups, are capable of carrying out terrorist actions. In addition to political aims, the FBI includes social aims as well. However, the U.S State Department's definition comes from its own field.

As it can be understood from all these definitions, the element of "violence" has a dominant role. Violence is the most common characteristic in all the definitions stated above. Just as we have listed the definitions here, Alex P. Schmid has made a study of about 120 different definitions of terror in his book titled *Political Violence*. He has tried to ascertain the common points in the definitions to reach a general assessment. According to the results of this research, violence and use of force have been the most common element appearing in about 90% of the 120 definitions. Therefore, violence and the use of force turn out to be the elements accepted in most general terms. After violence, ideological or political aim appears in 65% of the definitions, and concepts such as fear, threats, or psychological impact are third following the ideological or political aim. As a result, from all these studies and generally accepted definitions, it can be concluded that in general terms terror is "all kinds of actions performed by a group and include violence and ideological/political aim" (Schmid, 1988).

Today, one of the most important supports of democratic societies is the non-governmental organization. By means of these non-governmental structures, not only does the public find the opportunity to express itself, but the people can also express their wishes and goals for the society to political authorities, hence ensuring the continued development of democracy. Non-governmental organizations carry out their activities so as to attain their demands only within a legal framework, and they do not

resort to violence. This is the clearest difference between non-governmental structures and terrorist organizations. Although there are some similarities between terrorist organizations and non-governmental organizations in terms of structure and aim, the most significant characteristic of terrorist organizations is the fact that they use violence to achieve their goals.

In conclusion, although terrorisms' definitions are numerous and they have been made by many states, international institutions, or scientists, and although each one of these definitions seems to be different, there are two main elements in nearly all of the said definitions:

- Violence and use of force
- The goal of achieving an ideological change in the order as a result of this violence and use of force

Therefore, violence and the use of force have been the most significant and prevalent elements in the definition of terrorism. As a result, today, countries declaring an organization as a terrorist organization in the international arena must be certain that this organization uses violence and force. If not, it is not a terrorist organization.

### *Who is a Terrorist?*

The definition of terrorism is complicated. The judgment that “some people are terrorists, while some people are freedom fighters” is still an accepted opinion in some quarters. Answering the question “Who is a terrorist?” is so difficult that many academicians have not given a specific definition. According to Webster’s Encyclopedia (2004), “The term ‘terrorist’ is a label for one who is an active participant in a ‘terrorist act,’ be it through direct personal action, or through direct funding or logistical support in

the goal of executing a terrorist act -at times the tacit definition is generalized to include 'moral support' for a political agenda that can be associated with a 'terrorist' group."

In addition, the definition of terrorist differs among governments. For example, the U.S. government considers all terrorists criminals, whatever their ethnic, religious, or other affiliations are (Terrorism in the United States, 1997). On the other hand, The Turkish Law of Terror Prevention (12.04.1991) first defines the terrorism as the following:

Terrorism is all kinds of activities to be attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which are stated in the constitution, and the political, legal, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining, or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security (Resmi Gazete, 1991).

In the second article of the Law, which refers to the first article, a "terrorist" is defined as being a member of an organization which aims to realize the goals which are referred to in the first article above and to commit crimes to meet those ends (Resmi Gazete, 1991). In short, a terrorist could be defined as a person who is a member of a terrorist organization and commits crime for the goals of that organization.

### *Terrorist Groups*

Most of the definitions of terrorism mention terrorism as a group activity. According to the Turkish anti-terror law, terrorist activity is defined as an activity which is done by two or more people who come together with common political goals to change the democratic system and set up a new system by using violence (Terror Prevention, 1991) In addition, the E.U (European Union) defines terrorist groups as a "structured

group of persons, acting in concert to commit terrorist acts, regardless of its composition or the level of development of its structure” (Freezing Funds, 2003).

As a result, if a group, an organization or an association uses violence against people and has political goals, the organization is a terrorist organization. In the world, there are a lot of different terrorist organizations. According to the U.S State Department records, there are thirty-six international terrorist groups, but some of them are not currently active (Pattern of Global Terrorism, April 2003). In short, if a group uses violence against innocent people, has political goals, and brings fear and panic to a community, it must be accepted as a terrorist organization.

#### *What are Terrorist Activities?*

According to the E.U, terrorist acts are explained as “intentional acts which may seriously damage a country or international organization by intimidating a population, exerting undue compulsion of various types or by destabilizing or destroying its fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures” (Freezing Funds, 2003).

However, terrorist activities differ with each terrorist group. Nowadays, most of the terrorist organizations use suicide bombings, and they also plant random explosives. Thus, they have captured more attention because these acts are almost impossible to stop. In addition, they are an easy method for the terrorists to receive “more bang for their buck;” that is, to receive maximum publicity with little financial investment.

The types of acts depend on the terrorist group’s ability and background. In 1996,

Ankara, the capital city of Turkey, DHKP/C started to use a different kind of bomb that the police had not seen before. After arresting some of the members, police realized that one of the DHKP/C members had had experience with those types of explosives. Similarly, when we look at the recent El Qaeda attacks, we see that they are similar. The Istanbul Synagogue attack resembles the terrorist attack in Bali. In fact, most of the terrorist attacks which are related to El Qaeda have the same tactics and trademarks because the terrorists have been trained in the same way and in the use of the same materials. The best definition of what constitutes a terrorist act, according to Carlos Marighella (1974), is "terrorist acts are assaults, occupation, ambushes, raids and penetrations, street tactics, strikes and work stoppages, desertions, diversions, seizures, expropriation of weapons, ammunition and explosives, liberation of prisoners, executions, kidnappings sabotage, terrorism, armed propaganda, war of nerves." Although this list has some limitations, his paper, entitled Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla, is a guideline for most of the leftist terrorists organizations.

The European Union has a slightly different list, which includes:

- An attack on a person
- Hostage taking
- Destroying public and private property
- Destroying information and transportation systems
- Use of weapons, explosives, nuclear, biological or chemical weapons
- Destroying public water supply and power units
- Supporting terrorist groups.

In the same way, the U.S State Department terrorist act list, which includes

concepts from both Marighella and E.U terrorist acts, is the broadest list of terrorist activity:

- Taking under control or detaining some one by intimidating to kill and injure.
- High jacking or sabotage
- Attacking an internationally protected person
- Planning and preparation of terrorist attack
- Using any kind of biological and chemical agent (Pattern of Global Terrorism, 2003).

### Organization of the Study

My first chapter includes statement of the problem, purpose of the study, significance of the study, definitions of terms, and organization of the study. The second chapter will contain the literature review that details the history of terrorism, terrorist theories, general hypotheses of terrorism, the definitions of a terrorist, a terrorist organization, and terrorist activities. Moreover, because of having primary source data from the three different terrorist organizations, DHKP/C (a leftist, revolutionary terrorist organization), PKK (an ethnic and separatist terrorist organization), and Turkish Hezbollah (a religiously motivated terrorist organization), I will specifically discuss the structure, goals, and management system of those three terrorist organizations as well as the operations of the terrorist groups. The third chapter describes methodology with data description, research questions, and limitations. Therefore, the literature review will cover the structure, goals, and management system of DHKP/C, PKK and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations. The fourth chapter contains data description, data analysis and findings as well as differences and similarities among three different terrorist organizations. Chapter V will describes a new model for understanding the

terrorist recruitment process and include discussion and recommendation for the future studies. In fact, this study shows the recruitment process of terrorist organizations as well as underlying reasons that cause individuals to join these organizations. Therefore, social entities, government organizations, and societies will be better equipped to find a way to stop individuals from joining terrorist organizations.

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### History of Terrorism

According to Martin, "Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behavior since the dawn of recorded history" (2003, p, 2). However, today terrorism is different from former acts of terrorism. In the modern era, terrorism is a mobile, worldwide threat. Terrorists can easily create and spread fear through sophisticated communication technology. Today, terrorists are better positioned to benefit from technological developments than any other criminals. The tendency to use technology renders terrorism hard to defeat with conventional counter-terrorism techniques.

Modern terrorism started with the French Revolution. However, the modern terrorist organizations differ because they do not view their organizations as powerful enough to go actual war with their own or other nations. Instead, they choose terrorism as the easiest way to struggle for themselves. Although some governments have suffered from terrorism for a long time, September 11th showed terrorism to be the biggest problem all over the world. This problem has grown in scope and severity throughout time. In fact, the history of terrorism could be divided into five main parts: early terrorist organizations, French Revolution and anarchism, colonial era, leftist terrorism, and radical religious terrorism.

#### *Early Terrorist Organizations*

Sicari

"Terrorism is almost as old as the history of human beings" (Martin, 2002). We

see the first recorded terrorist events in religious sources: the Bible and the Torah among other religious writings. The first recorded terrorist groups and series of terrorist events took place in the beginning of the first century. One of the earliest known examples of a terrorist movement was the Sicari. Their violent acts took place in what is known as Jerusalem today (Laqueur, 2002). At that time, Jerusalem was under the control of Roman Empire, The Syrian Governor; acting under the Roman Empire ordered a census in Jerusalem so that he could tax the people in Jerusalem.

At that time, compared with the other citizens of the Roman Empire the Jews who were living in Jerusalem had many privileges, including having their own court system and not paying taxes. Jews had special privileges because they helped Julius Cesar to become the Emperor. Not liking the idea of being taxed, Jews began to establish a group called “Zealots,” who openly opposed the Roman rule. They were against paying taxes and considered the Romans and other Jews who were helping the Romans to be their enemies. A small group called Siccaris among the group of “Zealots” decided that they had to extend the war and began to kill Romans and Jews who were supporting the Romans. Sicaris’ methods were basically to stab people in the market place and run away. Their terror continuously increased and their enemies were eventually afraid to go out of their homes. The Romans had to sign a treaty with the Jews because they wanted to stop the Sicari terror.

### Assassins

“A similar mixture of messianic hope and political terrorism was the prominent feature of a much known sect- the Assassins” (Laqueur, 2002). They existed during the

years 1090 and 1299, again in the same geographic area. This time, it was in Iran just by the Caspian Sea, 90 miles north of Tehran. The leader of this movement was an Ismaili leader named Hassan Sabbah. He established his own terror network to terrorize the region and beat his enemies. Hasan Sabbah was a minister of Ismaili, a Shiite sect of Islam. He decided that he had to demolish the surrounding powers, such as Seljukee Turks so that he could rule the region. He built a castle called “Fake Heaven” to attract the young Ismailiis with the help of beautiful young girls and hashish. He would invite those youngsters and serve them lavish food and make the women and hashish available to them. Those young men, after three or four months, were assigned to assassinate an important figure so that they would be allowed to stay in “Fake Heaven.”

Being addicted to the hashish and the allure of the sexual exploits available in the castle, those young men would go after their targets just to make sure they would be admitted back in the castle. Sabbah’s group was called “Hashisheens.” This group was highly successful in terrorizing the region at the time. They even assassinated the Seljukee Vizier, a title equivalent to Prime Minister. The number of casualties rose every day. At its peak, the hashisheens were killing twenty-five people a day. It took over 200 years for the other countries to get rid of this terrorist network. These terrorists were so influential in history that today’s word “assassination” comes from this organization’s name “Hashisheen.”

### *French Revolution and Anarchism*

The French Revolution is one of the more recent examples of terrorism in history. Mid-nineteenth century France was the first center of terrorism (White, 1997). During

the three years of revolution, the chief revolutionist Maximilien Robespierre imprisoned over 170,000 people without reason and guillotined almost one-third of those who were arrested. This era in history is called "The Reign of Terror." In this era the Committee of Public Safety of National Convention conducted terrorist acts in 1793-1794. Prior to 1792, terror had been used to intimidate and put pressure on their political enemies by using unlawful acts of violence; however, after 1792 the government began using state terrorism. Under the state terrorist policy, in two months the revolutionary courts punished 1,515 people by sending them to the guillotine. (Crenshaw, M & Pimlott, J, 1997). Even though the rationale behind the French Revolution was to bring democracy and human rights, it brought with it the bloodiest terror.

Following the French Revolution through the end of the 18th century, anarchism became the new terrorism for the world. The anarchists, who demanded that there be no authority at all, were able to terrorize many nations, including the United States. They would bomb and assassinate their targets just like they did in the Chicago Hayes Square bombing. They also successfully murdered the Russian Czar and the Italian Prime minister. The French Revolution marked the first wave of terrorism in modern history. Then anarchism was the second wave of terrorism until the beginning of the First World War (Anarchism-Marxism, 2004).

### *Colonial Era*

As the colonial powers invaded countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, the native people living in those countries began to rise up against the invading colonial powers. These movements started just before the First World War and

continued until the independence of the colonized states. The native people who were fighting against colonialism at that time were considered and named terrorists by the invading powers. However, they called themselves freedom fighters. The natives were basically terrorizing those in power because they did not have the means to conduct war or enough power to oppose the invading powers openly. Eventually, all of those invaded countries became independent, and the so-called terrorist leaders became the presidents or prime ministers of newly independent states. This era was the third wave of terrorism in history.

### *Leftist Terrorism*

With the beginning of the Vietnam War, a new kind of leftist terrorism emerged. This leftist terrorism has been the fourth wave of terrorism. Today, there are still some small leftist terrorist groups that are trying to survive. Seeing that the communists could resist the capitalists in the world, many small leftist terrorist organizations were established throughout the world. Those groups were relatively small, and they were only successful because of their organizational structure and strict organizational rules. The Red Brigade, 17th November, Dev Sol, and Tupamaros are good examples of these kinds of organizations. These organizations wanted nationwide communist revolutions just like in Russia. So far, only Fidel Castro's group has succeeded in achieving this goal. The other groups were either crushed by the governments, or they were wiped out because the causes for the terrorism and new members ceased to exist.

## *Radical Religious Terrorism*

The fifth wave of terrorism has come from radicals. Religious fanatics have terrorized the world under the name of God for the last three decades. The common characteristic of those groups, from whatever religion they claim to be, is that they misinterpret the religious scripts and use those misinterpretations to manipulate others. The recruits are typically young people who are later convinced to kill others in the name of religion. Unfortunately, with the help of technology and particularly the Internet, those people were able to spread their philosophies and attract members across the modern world. By using the modern conventional weapons, they usually bombed places such as abortion clinics and business centers. Among those groups, there are hate groups like the KKK (Ku Klux Klan) in the US or radical extremist religious groups like Al Qaeda in the Middle East.

## Terrorism Theories

### *Integrated/ Multi-causal Theory*

Considering each theory alone to explain the reasons of terrorism seems inadequate. For instance, when considering situational circumstances, political environment, and the nature of group dynamic, the psychological approach seems limited (Wasmund, 1994). On the other hand, evidence suggests that political behavior of terrorists is related to both situational and psychological factors (Wasmund, 1994).

Since terrorism is a complex and multi-casual phenomenon, it is difficult to explain the reasons of terrorism with a single cause or theory. An integrated approach

suggests that terrorism usually results from multiple causal factors, which are economic, political, religious, psychological and sociological factors (Hudson, 1999).

Most researchers also share the integrated theory and suggest that terrorism does not typically stem from a single reason. Each factor is closely related to the others. Terrorist behavior can be best understood by analyzing the links of individual, group, and society. Then the interactive and dynamic aspect of terrorism can be fully covered (Crenshaw, 2000).

### *Organizational Theories*

This theory emphasizes the importance of organizational impact on individuals. It offers that terrorism is a result of collective decisions of a group based on commonly held beliefs rather than commitment of individuals (Hudson, 1999). Therefore, organizational theory stresses the significance of structural features of organization in order to understand the underlying reasons of terrorism (McCormick, 2003).

In his study of “Groupthink”, Irving L. Janis (1978) briefly summarizes the influence of organization on individuals. He posits that due to group thinking, an individual’s independent critical thinking of an individual melts down in groupthink pot. This replacement causes irrational and dehumanized acts towards those outside of the group. According to Janis, a person’s involvement in a group affects the his or her attitudes in specific ways. For instance, a group gives its members the emotion of *invulnerability*, which ensures them some degree of encouragement for obvious risks or dangers. Additionally, groupthink helps to *rationalize* the wrong doing and gives a *morality* to its members to justify their selves. *Stereotyping* is one of the most dangerous

characteristics of groupthink. In this step of group socialization, members of the group dehumanize their enemies and justify the killing of others in their mind. In addition, *group pressure, self-censorship, unanimity, and mind guards* provide group solidarity (Janis, 1978).

Della Porta conveys the same approach in her more complex study. She argues that commitment a terrorist act or violence can be best explained by the help of the identification of the group (Crenshaw, 2000). In sum, judgments for terrorist behavior without considering the impact of organization will be inadequate because most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behavior (Hudson, 1999).

By joining a terrorist organization, an individual enters a new life as a member of underground organization. The new life is isolated from outside environment and rejects all preexisting social contacts. The secret and hidden aspect of the group becomes an individual's only resource or reference. With the features of the group described above, individuals lose their own identity and become like a robot in the hand of the group (Wasmund, 1994).

Hudson (1999) concurs with this research and states that extremist groups are similar to religious cults. They require total commitment from members and impose conformity. They prohibit relationships with outsiders. The collective group identity gives a new personality to their members, and this group identity becomes of paramount importance. Subsequently, individual judgment and behavior are strongly influenced by the powerful forces of group dynamics. As a result, the terrorist group becomes the only source of information and security. This situation produces pressure to conform and to

commit acts of terrorism. Peer pressure, group solidarity, and the psychology of group dynamics help to pressure an individual member to remain in the terrorist group

### *The Physiological Approach*

Contrary to strategic and organizational theories, psychological approach tries to explain the psychological reasons why individuals join a terrorist organization. This approach is heavily concerned with the recruitment process, individuals' personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers as terrorists (Hudson, 1999). Psychological theories are mostly based on psychoanalytic theories, such as narcissism (Borum, 2004).

In the words of Crenshaw (1994), "the behavior of terrorist<sup>1</sup> groups often appears rational, in the sense of being a logical means to an end, but some of their actions are puzzling. If no rational explanation can be found, then we must look beyond what might be called a *strategic choice theory* to *psychological* factors." Crenshaw asks why individuals resort to terrorism, when in fact, alternatives ways to voice opposition exist. Normally, there is a high attrition inside terrorist organizations; therefore, it seems that selecting terrorism as a choice among other alternatives is an irrational preference. For this reason, the decision to join a terrorist organization should be also explained with psychological terms in order to able to offer plausible explanations. In this context, Crenshaw (1994) suggests that although terrorism has strategic value, some motivations of terrorism, such as justification of violation, peer pressure, emotion of vengeance, aggression, seeing themselves as a hero, and sense of superiority, can be understood with the contributions of psychology. Besides this, she suggests that since

terrorism is a choice among many others, there is no relationship between circumstances and joining terrorist organizations because even some individuals who share the same ideology do not resort to terrorism as a method to solve their problems. In this respect, the purpose of terrorism can be political, but the intent of violence is psychological; thus, it can be explained with psychological terms or factors (Crenshaw, 1983).

In his outstanding book, *True Believer* (1951), Eric Hoffer observed nearly all mass movements in the world and wrote a book named. He briefly explained historical events and the reasons why people joined mass movements. Although he never directly mentioned narcissism in his book, Eric Hoffer (1951) explained the causes of mass movements with the term of narcissism. He first described the changing situation in the society, then built his approach on this base. For instance, according to Hoffer, before the rise of Nazism and Communism in Germany and Russia, people were feeling as if their lives were spoiled and wasted. At this point, charismatic leaders exploited the emotional neediness of the vulnerable people. He also explained that, under frustrated circumstances, people are more willing to see a strong and charismatic leader to recover their self-worth and self-esteem. This theory suggests that these types of people are ready for movements which offer a better explanation for their future life. It seems Hoffer's theory offers an integrated approach for the psychological theories of terrorism. This approach weighs both situational factors and people characteristics and tries to explain the reasons of mass movements.

Flaherty clearly concurs with Hoffer's thoughts. In this respect, he tries to explain why youth join terrorist organization in summarizing some thoughts of Eric Hoffer. Then he merges this information with the term ideology of terrorist organizations. He states,

Ideology is an essential component of terrorism, has a uniquely powerful appeal young people. Youth is a time when ideology plays a central role. Its appeal is greatest to those for whom other life goals are unattainable or lack meaning. Those who are searching for a place in the world are easily drawn to ideologies that promise to change their social reality and give them a meaningful role in it.

In sum, research in this area can be divided into four main groups. The first attempts to explain common psychological traits of terrorists. The aim is to distinguish the terrorists' shared psychological characteristics and to draw a specific terrorist profile. However, research showed that there is no accurate terrorist personality nor is there a common psychic attribute which can be referred to as terrorist manners (Borum, 2004 Hudson, 1999; McCormick, 2003). Moreover, according to research, terrorists are neither psychotic nor abnormal people. Instead, they are disturbingly normal (Borum, 2004; Hudson, 1999; McCormick, 2003).

The second group of research asserts that terrorism is derived from frustration and aggression. According to "Frustration and aggression hypothesis", aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dollard et al, 1939, As cited in Berkowitz, 1989). Researchers applied this hypothesis to terrorism in order to explain the deprivation of individuals who resort terrorism.

Other researchers try to explain the psychological sources of terrorism with the "narcissism-aggression" model (McCormick, 2000). Narcissistic injury of individuals, such as lack of self esteem or self-respect, can motivate people to join terrorist

organization in order to meet their psychological needs with the help of terrorist organizations (Borum, 2004; Hudson, 1999; McCormich, 2003).

The fourth group of research suggests a developmental model. It can be briefly summarized by saying, "Terrorist do not become terrorist over-night." Becoming a terrorist and committing a violent act is a gradual process, and the manner of terrorist behavior is learned by time (Wasmund, 1994). In this respect, organizations and environment play roles in shaping psychological behavior of individuals (Alkan, 2002; Borum, 2004; Hudson 1999; McCormick, 2003). In other words, developmental model ensures justification of individuals to refrain from self-condemnation, and makes killing or being killed plausible for them. By this way, immoral behaviors, such as killing innocent people, are transformed into moral attitudes. When Wasmund (1994) studied on West Germany terrorist groups, he surmised this reality from the biographies of terrorists:

According to what we know from the biographies of terrorists, they did not immediately leave their previous surroundings in order to enter the terrorist scene. On the contrary, this decision was generally preceded by a disassociation phase in which such a step was prepared consciously and/or unconsciously. This process of disassociation consists of several stages: first, the hitherto existing social and emotional ties generally called question, then a phase follows where these ties are loosened and combined with a process of alienation, and finally, there is a total negation of everything that existed earlier in life. Ultimately, a total break with the existing social milieu follows norms and values and the expectations people had held previously of a "bourgeois" career and future. The break with the past is celebrated then as a form of internal and external liberation, and the process produces the necessary susceptibility for new ties and commitments (Wasmund, 1994:226-227).

### *Strategic Choice Theories/Political Approach*

Strategic choice theories suggest that resorting to terrorism is an instrumental

choice in order to achieve desired long-term or short-term objectives in the political arena. This approach is also named “strategic choice theory”. Individuals see terrorism as reasonable after weighing the cost and the benefit of political environment (Brannan, et al., 2001; Hudson, 1999; McCormick, 2003). In the words of Crenshaw (1994), “significant campaigns of terrorism depend on rational choice. As purposeful activity, terrorism is the result of an organization’s decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government.” In this context, strategic theorists try to explain the political reasons and opportunities behind resorting to terrorism.

In general, the political environment influences individuals and pushes them into terrorist organizations. By resorting to terrorism, they believe and anticipate that desired consequences will be obtained (McCormick, 2003). Choosing terrorism among the other forms of alternative dissent is strongly contingent upon the features of environment. Political scientist Martha Crenshaw (1994) summarizes the features of environment in the term of “permissive factors”, which can stimulate a terrorist strategy. In such environment, individuals can be easily attracted and motivated by that strategy (Hudson, 1999). In this theory, “terrorist violence communicates a political message” (Crenshaw, 1994).

Parallel to these findings, it is believed that terrorism is more likely to appear in areas where people have grievances, such as poverty, inequality, lack of political participation and injustice (Laqueur, 1977). Therefore, people in such areas tend to accept extremist group’s call that offers them a better future.

Crenshaw’s (1994) strategic choice theory contains two terms: *preconditions* and *precipitants*. Preconditions of terrorism are related to situational factors, which invoke a

tendency towards terrorist organizations. On the other hand, precipitants of terrorism are the direct causes which can be compared to the last drop of water which causes the glass to overflow.

Rapid change can be a precondition factor for terrorism because modernization produces disharmony in societies in terms of unbalanced economic growth and communication structures (Cemal, 1999; Crenshaw, 1994; Kizilcelik, 1994; Turkdogan, 1996). For instance, with rapid economic growth, many people migrate to urban areas in order to work in the industrial sector. This, in turn, leads to overcrowding and the necessity for housing. Ghettos or slums spring up around the corners of cities to accommodate this need. This rapid change also brings other vulnerabilities. People, especially the younger generation, try to find the same environment that they were used to in their rural life. However, the city life, in particular ghetto areas, rarely offers the same social interaction. Hence, people become alienated in their new environment. In these areas, people are prone to accept terrorist campaigns, which offer them group solidarity and strong social interaction, which people were used to before. In Turkey, evidence suggests that many terrorists who had grown up in slum areas confirmed this reality (Turkdogan, 1996), which sociologist William Ogburn calls "*cultural lag*" (Kizilcelik, 1994).

For the precipitants of terrorism, perceived injustice, lack of political opportunity, inequality, and being a member of an ethnic minority can be considered. Under the existence of *preconditions*, these *precipitants* can directly motivate individuals to join a terrorist organization as a rational choice.

While terrorists groups select terrorism as a strategic choice to carry out their political aim, they also try to provoke the legitimate regime for using unbalanced power against them. In this way, they want to show to the public the real face of the state (Crenshaw, 1994). Through the help of terrorism, terrorist organizations try to change existing political power, government policies, and political behavior of citizens (Crenshaw, 1983). On the other hand, terrorism can polarize the political view of citizens especially if terrorist organizations use preexisting historical problems, ethnic, racial or religious differences, people from those areas can be more likely to be polarized (Crenshaw, 1983; Laqueur, 1977).

Finally, it should be remembered that terrorism is a “politically loaded term” (Laqueur, 1977); therefore, there will always be shortcomings in defining terrorism. This conceptual confusion hinders the real identity of terrorism. In other words, a terrorist who does despicable acts like killing children might be perceived as a freedom fighter by some people or nations.

#### History of Devrimci-Sol

In 1966, Turkish communists, most of whom were university students, changed their minds about the way that they had attempted to bring about a Turkish socialist revolution. They founded The Federation of Revolutionist Youth Association to organize illegitimate communist activity among the university students. However, the debate about the way to achieve a Turkish socialist revolution caused a split within the association.

This group, which was led by Mahir Cayan, was defined by the use of urban

guerilla tactics, similar to those used by some Latin American groups and took the name of THKP-C (Turkey Public Liberation Party-Front). Mahir Cayan and his friends were involved in many terrorism acts between 1968 and 1972, which ended with the kidnapping of three English technicians in Ordu. They took them to a village in Tokat, where the troops killed them with those technicians on March 30, 1972. The killing of Mahir Cayan and seizure of many important members led to the end of the organization in 1972. However, in 1974 the government ruled a general amnesty, which resulted in the release of many terrorists. Some of the ex-members of the THKP-C started the reorganization of THKP-C in 1974. They accelerated the reorganization process with the foundation of Revolutionist Youth Association in 1976; however, a new debate emerged between Ankara and Istanbul groups within the association, which resulted in the separation of Istanbul group as Dev-Sol under the leadership of Dursun Karatas (History of Devrimci Sol, 1989).

Shortly after this, they changed structure of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth) and set up a new army division, which was named FTKME (Fighting Teams against Fascist Terror). They started to kill government members, police officers, army personnel, and civilians. In fact, in two years, they killed 35 security members, 23 army members, and 240 civilians. The most well-known assassination was when they killed former Prime Minister, Prof. Dr. Nihat Erim, and his body guard, Ali Kartal, on July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1980. (Sol Teror Orgutleri, 1994).

In 1980, the military took power and handled the government due to terrorist activity in Turkey. Most of the terrorists were arrested, but some of the leaders of terrorist groups escaped abroad. However, most of the members of Devrimci-sol were

detained, including Dursun Karatas and his central committee members. The biggest case was opened against Devrimci-Sol in Istanbul; however, Dursun Karatas used the prison as a propaganda and education place. In fact, during his prison term, he reorganized Devrimci-Sol. Moreover, the second appearance of Dev-Sol and its new structure was planned in prison, especially Bayrampasa Prison, which was in Istanbul and which was where most of those people were detained. Based on their ideology, they were resistant to all government rules and principles as well as court rules; for example, they boycotted court summons. Dursun Karatas started an internal investigation and tried to find an answer to why they were arrested, what was wrong, and what would be done in the future. In prison, they wrote a book, called *Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz*, in which he listed his purpose and future plans, including lists of their enemies, some of whom were government officials in the security force, army members, and several judges.

In 1995 Dursun Karatas decelerated activities; in other words, his new tactic was to stop all activities outside prison. While he reorganized his group, they continued to make passive resistance to government rules. At that time the prisons and court activities were the biggest activities of Devrimci-Sol, and in protest, many members did not join trials. They were often imprisoned in the same room with thirty or forty people; therefore, they communicated easily and organized everything without detection or interference.

By 1989, some of the central committee members, including Dursun Karatas, escaped from prison, and because of insufficient evidence, some other members were released. In late 1989 and early 1990, Devrimci-Sol leveled significant attacks against

people who had been listed as their enemies in the book, *Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz*. Those attacks were carried out in big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, and Bursa. Due to a lack of knowledge regarding the new structure, tactics, and strategies of the organization, the police were shocked and caught unprepared. Devrimci-Sol killed seventy-five police, twelve members of the army, four national intelligence members, three Americans, two government attorneys, and thirty-five civilians; they also injured 136 people (Sol Teror Orgutleri, 1994).

In 1990, Bedri Yagan, the number-two man in the organization, was sent to Lebanon to start a camp in order to organize guerilla training. The date July 12, 1991 marks the end of the Devrimci-Sol surge because security forces had found four secret Dev-Sol cells occupied by high-level leaders in Istanbul. Police and terrorists fought, and the police killed eleven terrorists and arrested others. Police found their secret documents, including contacts of local groups, and reports which had been written by their members about their daily activities. This operation gave the police unbelievable amounts of information, and the police learned about the structure, tactics, and system of the organization. Police also learned of more members and where they lived. Police-led operations were carried out all over the country, and most of the underground units were discovered, and their members were arrested.

Although police were able to catch the top members of the organization, Dursun Karatas escaped to Europe. After the July 12th operation, the organization suffered a considerable blow, and this police operation was followed by another. In fact, this was the beginning of the end of the organization after 1980. On the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> of April 1981, the organization took another significant injury by another police operation called

16-17 April. In this operation, Sabahat Karatas, the wife of Dursun Karatas, and Sinan Kukul (the third ranked man in the organization at that time) were killed.

Those operations caused considerable debate within the organization and Dursun Karatas was accused of being careless with his undercover contacts. Bedri Yagan and his two friends, all of whom were international committee members of the organization, found and detained Dursun Karatas on September 13th, 1992 and interrogated him. However, Dursun Karatas managed to escape yet again from detention and contacted his friends in Turkey telling about the coup initiation of Bedri Yagan. This started a new debate within the organization and resulted in a new split in the organization. On March 6th, 1993, Bedri Yagan and his six friends were killed in a police operation in Istanbul, and his group was considerably weakened (From THKP-C to Devrimci Sol to DHKP/C, 1997).

#### *From Devrimci-Sol to DHKP/C*

Those operations and the betrayal of Bedri Yagan weakened the Dev-Sol, so Dursun Karatas needed to gather the top members to reorganize again. On March 30th, he held a new congress in Damascus. After this congress, he declared the foundation of a new organization under the name of DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front). In his declaration, the foundation of Armed Propaganda Group (the military unit responsible for assassinations) was also announced. Since 1994 the organization has continued its activities across Turkey and Europe under the name of DHKP/C to achieve the aim of revolution.

### *Strategies of DHKP/C*

DHKP/C's Political Army Fighting strategy specifies using rural and urban guerillas in order to weaken the government's authority and prepare the environment for a possible revolution. In 1992, Bedri Yagan was sent to the Bekaa Valley to start the guerilla training of the organization. The party trained many of its members in this training camp to send to Turkey. However, after the 1992 split, the activities in the Bekaa Valley stopped and were then closed down by the administration. Nevertheless, the organization today has some small, armed cells in big cities to plot and execute terrorist acts.

The strategies of DHKP/C are different from the other terrorist organizations because they tried to start a revolution in both the cities and countryside at the same time. There are five stages in this revolution:

1. Vanguard war
2. Increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla war
3. Growing and spreading guerilla war out of the country
4. Connecting to local units
5. Victory of communist revolution (Political Program, 1995) In this strategy, although they believe that public support is very important to be successful, the army is the key element of revolution.

They believe that the only way to strike down imperialism and set up communism is an armed struggle. The strategy of Devrimci Sol is the strategy of the People's War, which means they achieve power directly from the working people. According to Mahir Cayan, the founder of THKP/C, this strategy can be defined as: "The strategy which takes armed propaganda as a basis and subordinates all other political, economic, and democratic forms of struggle to this basic form of struggle, is called the politicized-

military war strategy" (Collected Works, 1995). Therefore, DHKP/C depends on armed struggle; in other words, the army unit is the based organization of this terrorist organization.

### *The Goals of DHKP/C*

The main goal of DHKP/C is to overthrow the existing regime in Turkey and in its place, to set up a new regime based on Marxism and Leninism. DHKP/C believes that the party is the pioneer organization that will lead the public on the way of Marxist-Leninist revolution.

According to Karatas, DHKP/C is a party of people who dedicate their life to fighting against imperialism and oligarchy to destroy the imperialist government and set up a communist government and system. DHKP/C plans to start a people's revolutionary war because of the belief that the only way to set up a communist government is through this war of the people to start to destroy the current government. They believe that if the current government were destroyed, the communist system may be founded easily.

### *Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), DHKP/C: A Terrorist Organization?*

Although there is no single definition in the world of terrorism, the common definition includes three important components, which are violence, political purpose, and organization. In fact, according to Turkish counter terrorism legislation (dated December 4, 1991 and numbered 3713), Terror is defined as:

all kinds of activities to be attempted by a member or members of an organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic

which is stated in the constitution, and the political, juridical, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security (p.32).

When we look at the activities of DHKP/C, this group fits all the components of a terrorist group definition. According to Dursun Karatas, DHKP/C is a Marxist-Leninist organization with the purpose of changing the Turkish political system and setting up a new communist country through revolution (Revolutionary People's, 2004). It is clear that DHKP/C is one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations in the world. According to Turkish National Police official record from 1983 to 1994, the terrorist group killed seventy-five police officers, twelve army members, four National Intelligence Agency members, two judges, three American citizens, and thirty-five civilians. In fact, during this time, the organization engaged in direct conflict with law enforcement 171 times (Sol terror orgutler, 1994).

In addition, according to U.S State Department, there are thirty-eight international terrorist organizations and the DHKP/C is the one of them (State Department Identifies, 2004). In fact, most countries, including the EU, consider it a terrorist organization.

### Structure of DHKP/C

#### *The Central Committee*

Central Committee is the top unit that administers the entire organization between congresses. It implements the decisions of the congress and is made up of 10 to 12 members. The Central Committee is divided into specific task units: the army unit, women's commission, worker and civil servant committee, and youth committee. Each

committee is organized as a cell. Central committee members are selected in the congress and take on certain responsibilities in the sub-units of organization. They generally meet at least once every six months. The head of the politburo is also assigned as the leader of the organization. In order to understand structure of the organization better, we should study the tasks of each unit (Dilmac, 1997).

### *Regional Committee*

This committee holds the responsibilities of all regional sub-units, and each region contains city committees and their sub-units. The major role of this committee is to ensure the organization of the party in all parts of the society: such as universities, factories, labor unions, non-governmental organizations, neighborhoods, and civil associations. The committee implements its task through city committees.

### *International Committee*

The main job of this committee is to plan attacks or actions that would benefit the organization if they were done outside of Turkey. In this sense, the committee members are responsible for setting up contact between the Central Committee and cells, to organize and manage the activities abroad and to obtain money for the party by arranging some quasi-legal activities. This committee became very active after Dursun Karatas escaped to Europe. It is believed that this committee directs the entire organization from Europe through courier who travels between Europe and Turkey using fake identities.

### *Military Units*

Che Guevera believes that the army is the only way to eliminate the “brutality of imperialism” and achieve revolution. He states that people can obtain freedom and set up their communist government by using arms. (Guevera, 1998). DHKP/C is the terrorist group which accepts PASS (the strategies of politicized armed war); therefore, the army units are the most important part of the organization. They are well-trained and carefully chosen by the central committee. In fact, these units are the most difficult part of the organization to detect because they use secret cells which involve a strictly controlled number of people. DHKP/C has different kinds of military units, and each unit has its own army units. However, the army units can be divided into four types, which are Armed Propaganda units, Rural Guerilla, FTME (Fighting Teams against Fascist Terror) and Militia Forces.

In addition, the key motivation of the army is a hatred of the government and any others who are seen as their enemies. Hatred fuels the motivation of the army.

According to Che,

Hate will be an element of the battle, a merciless hate for the enemy that will inspire the guerrilla-soldier to superhuman efforts of strength and changes him into an effective, violent, selected, in cold blood killing machine. That is how our soldiers must be; a nation without hate can not triumph over a brute enemy" (Politicks grundlag, 2003).

FTKME (Fighting Against Fascist Terror)

FTKME (Fighting against Fascist Terror) was the first and largest armed unit of Devrimci-Sol that Karatas founded it after left from Devrimci-Yol in 1978. This unit had the responsibility for all armed actions. That is, all assassinations, bombings, and bank

robberies were done by this unit. However, after 1989, he set up new groups that were called SDB (Armed Revolutionary Unit), and he ordered all armed activities to be controlled by this group.

#### SDB (Armed Revolutionary Unit) and SPB (Armed Propaganda Units)

Although the SDB (Armed Revolutionary Unit) and the SPB (Armed Propaganda Units) were founded in 1979, most of their activities took place between 1989 and 1994. They were the most dangerous units in Devrimci-Sol because when they started their activities, police knew nothing about them. They were able to kill many people, including two retired generals, an active duty general, and many police officers.

This was the special team that was directly tied to the central committee and used fake identification and code names so that police were not able to arrest them. They concealed themselves in a community and acted as if they were a part of it; therefore, police or citizens would not be suspicious of them. However, the July 12th operation helped the police to identify their names and their tactics; as a result of that, some of them were killed in several different operations, while most others were arrested.

After March 30, 1994 SDB was renamed SPB, which means Armed Propaganda Units, and all duties, which had been ordered by the Central Committee, were carried out by SPB. The original structure is that the SPB live in cells of two or three people, and each unit consists of between five and eight people. This unit operates under the direct control of the central committee (Committee, cells . . . 2004)

## Rural Guerilla

DHKP/C believes that using urban and rural guerillas will make revolution possible; therefore, DHKP/C sent some militants to Bekaa Valley to get guerilla training in 1991. After that, they started rural guerilla activities in some cities which have mountains and places that guerillas could hide, thus benefiting from the geographical characteristics of those areas. Security forces faced significant difficulties when trying to arrest them. However, DHKP/C had significant difficulties in those places because most of the guerillas had grown up in urban areas, and they could not adapt well to the rugged terrain.

Another difficulty that the DHKP/C guerillas faced was a lack of public support, which they had expected. In fact, DHKP/C lost many members in the guerilla war; therefore, starting the guerilla war was the worst decision for DHKP/C. In sum, the guerilla army is a section of the army unit of the organization, but they were not successful as they were supposed to be.

## Internal Security Unit

Most of the terrorist organizations have internal security units in order to keep the organization safe from police operations. The Central Committee leads this unit, and its main duty is internal security. Sometimes this unit makes a decision and kills someone who is linked to the police force, or if they are suspicious about the behavior of any member, they will interrogate him or her. In fact, if they find evidence showing that this person had shared some secret information about terrorist organization with someone, that person will be killed.

DHKP/C's internal security unit has killed several ex-members, claiming that they leaked some significant information to police; for example, Latife Karaman, a regional committee member and a member of the central committee, was killed in the prison by the other DHKP/C prisoners who claimed that she had shared all her information with Turkish government security forces.

### *Legal Units*

The Legal unit is the other part of DHKP/C, which is not supposed to use any army activity unless an emergency situation arises. The main duties of legal units are that they should find new members, join every kind of legal demonstrations or boycotts, and be involved in propaganda activities. In fact, they find new members, educate them, and then transfer them from the legal unit to the illegal unit. Every unit has their legal organization. These groups have their committees, cells, and organizations, which are tied to the Central Committee.

Although they are sometimes involved in illegal activities, such as throwing Molotov cocktails, most of their activities are legal demonstrations, boycotts, and meetings. These units are open to the public and are set up to attract the sympathy of ordinary people. Strategically, legal units function as the security of DHKP/C to legitimize their activity. Legal units have some sub-units that are responsible for some specific area of the public such as workers, civil servants, and neighborhood relations (Political program of DHKP/C, 1997).

### *Workers and Civil Servants*

Since the communist ideology aim is to realize a proletarian dictatorship, workers

are thought to be the pioneers of possible socialist revolution. Likewise, workers tend to take part in the activities of terrorists since they are mostly promised to be freer after a socialist revolution. Therefore, DHKP/C organizes groups in some factories and labor unions by manipulating the legal rights of workers. For example, workers are encouraged to go on strike in their factories so as to sabotage the routine activity of factories and to gain power against the authority. They are pushed to participate in notably large demonstrations by the labor unions to protest the general policy of authority. Thus, these situations can cause confrontation with the authorities in a public uprising. Workers and civil servants are organized under some sub-units.

#### Revolutionist Workers Movement

This is the illegitimate unit of DHKP/C, which is responsible for organizing the illegal activities. They organize in cells and transfer members from the legal units to train them according to the strategies of DHKP/C.

#### Revolutionist Civil-Servants Movement

DHKP/C also tries to organize civil servants; however, they have less freedom than other workers to be active in a civil organization. They don't have the right to establish a civil service union. However, under Turkey's economic conditions, they have a similar standard of living with the workers, which makes them vulnerable to the agitation of terrorist groups. The unit acts as the workers' cells to organize illegitimate activity among the civil servants.

## Neighborhood Units

The people who live in suburban areas have worse economic and social conditions than people who live in urban areas. Particularly, the economic and resulting physical conditions, such as roads, water supply, electricity, and building conditions, make those people frustrated with the authorities, which in turn makes them a natural target for the terrorist groups. DHKP/C has some sub-units to organize the illegal neighborhood units.

Poor neighborhoods are the specific part of every society that is most vulnerable to terrorist organizations because poverty is used as a propaganda tool. In their propaganda, DHKP/C always blames the authorities for the poverty to attract the attention of poor people. Neighborhood cells are set up to organize the quasi-legal activities of DHKP/C. Those cells sometimes hang banners or posters, hand out pamphlets, or throw Molotov cocktails on certain days for the organizations.

Within the neighborhood units, there may also be some special task groups which are responsible for organizing additional groups. One such group is comprised of the mothers of terrorists who are in prison. Those groups pioneer legitimate activities and encourage confrontation with the police. To illustrate, between 1995 and 1998, DHKP/C organized and urged the mothers of the terrorists to protest the prison policies of the government. Those mothers, called "Saturday Mothers," were involved with confrontations with the police on numerous occasions.

### *Prison and Prisoners' Parents*

DHKP/C organizes the terrorists inside the prison also because under the intense

police control, every active terrorist may easily be determined and imprisoned. Since the terrorists who are members of the same organization are housed together in the Turkish prison system, they easily organize and become a threat for the prison guardians. Moreover, DHKP/C administers some of its illegitimate units from the prison. The reason for this is that sometimes even the top members can be imprisoned and the organization cannot easily fill his or her position within a short amount of time. Ercan Kartal, for example, one of the top members of the DHKP/C, administered all the illegitimate units from inside the prison.

Turkey security forces have had marked success against terrorist organizations. In fact, most of the high level terrorists have been arrested and sentenced to lengthy terms. However, because of living in a same prison dorm with forty other people, they have changed prisons into terrorist training camps. Therefore, imprisonment is clearly a potential problem for the government.

### *Youth Units*

Revolutionary youth is a university student organization. The main goals are to spread DHKP/C opinions among the university students in Turkey and to gain new recruits. Their primary form of recruitment is to start with small, legitimate ideals which influence students. For example, sometimes they complain about overpriced tuition or some campus problems, so the other students may join their activities. Then the terrorist groups gain entrance into the students' activities and can later introduce their ideology. Then student activities may escalate and become confrontations between students and security forces.

According to Lenin (1908), in order to make revolution, terrorist groups have to create conflict between government agencies and the public. This is the same principle when students are encouraged to fight against university administration and security forces. Sometimes security forces arrest them; in fact, they may be taken into custody or sent to jail. This process causes them to become an enemy of the government; therefore, terrorist groups benefit from this situation, and recruitment becomes easier.

In addition, most of the Communist revolutions have been accomplished by workers and farmers; however, the story of Turkey's revolutionary terrorist groups is completely different than the other revolutionary groups. Turkey has a unique position because university students have started most of the terrorist organizations in Turkey. Therefore, DHKP/C has a university student organization federation, which is called TODEF (The Federation of Turkish Student Association). TODEF members participate in almost all anti-government demonstrations whether they are student-related or not.

Every university has a university committee, which is led by regional committee. Moreover, the university committees are supervised by the regional committee. In addition, each year TODEF organizes summer camps where the other unsuspecting students can join. In this way, the terrorist organization can attract new members.

Liseli Devrimci Gençlik (LDG): High School Revolutionary Youth

The LDG has the same structure and a goal as TODEF has; however, its members are in the high schools. They carry out the same activities as the TODEF members do. Also, they have their own committee and management system just like TODEF. If their members graduate from high schools and get into the university, they

would become members of TODEF.

In short, DHKP/C has lost most of its power because of police operations. Since July 12, 1991, and April 16-17 1992, most of the higher level militants have been killed or arrested, or some of them have left the terrorist organizations. Therefore, although it was the most destructive terrorist group in Turkey, it has become a marginal terrorist group. However, the situation of DHKP/C mirrors the situation of Devrimci Sol between 1983 and 1989. If we cannot stop recruitment, we will see the same terrorist activity in the future. Therefore, in my study I am going to research how they recruit new people. If we identify their methods and the reasons people become members, we will be able to stop them. Otherwise, we will see the same problems in the future.

## Turkish Hezbollah

### *History*

Although there is no certain data on the origins of Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organization, the emergence of Turkish Hezbollah goes back to the early 1980s and initially located in the southern part of Turkey as a terrorist organization aiming to establish a Sunni Muslim Theocratic state instead of the secular Turkey. While Turkish Hezbollah shares the same name with the well known terrorist organization Lebanese Hezbollah, it does not have any known official or technical relation with Lebanese Hezbollah. (U.S.D.S., 2003)

The crucial goal of Hezbollah in Lebanon is to establish a radical Shiite Islamist theocracy in Lebanon. The ideology of Hezbollah in Lebanon is Shiite ideology, while Turkish Hezbollah is mainly rooted in Sunni Islam. Hezbollah in Lebanon has been

active throughout Europe, Africa, North America, and South America along with Lebanon. Turkish Hezbollah, as a national terrorist organization, has not carried out attacks outside of Turkey. Also the functions of Turkish Hezbollah are strictly limited to a very secret group. (Ozeren, 2005)

Being composed of Kurds, an ethnic group concentrated in the Southern part of Turkey, Iran and Iraq, Turkish Hezbollah is also known as the Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah (*Hisbullahi Kurdi Shorishger*) in Iraqi Kurdistan. <sup>3</sup> However, the Iranian revolution and the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini had a big effect on Turkish Hezbollah along with other Islamic radicals in Turkey. (Aydinli, 2000)

The Hezbollah period was the first time that Turkey observed the ugly face of the abuse of Islam for the benefit of terrorist activities, and it was the first time that religiously-motivated, violent activism was seen as a challenge to the order within the society.

Turkish Hezbollah originally worked primarily out of the Turkey's southern cities: Diyarbakir, Van, Batman and Mardin. Members of Hezbollah met in bookstores to discuss their ideologies and to find new members for the organization.

Turkish Hezbollah first gathered at one bookstore, *Vahdet*, however, due to ideological differences within the group and leadership struggles, Turkish Hezbollah separated into two main groups which are *Ilimciler* (Scientists) and *Menzilciler* (Rangers). The *Ilimciler*, directed by Huseyin Velioglu, met at the Bookstore named as Ilim, while the *Menzilciler*, directed by Fidan Gungor, gathered at the Menzil bookstore. Not only were there struggles for leadership, but also there was debate about which tactics would be used to accomplish their aims. While the *Ilimciler* believed in armed

struggle, the *Menzilciler* suggested that it was not the appropriate time for radical actions and opposed the *Ilinciler*. The *Ilim* group became the terrorist group which was later called Turkish Hezbollah. Hezbollah spent the late 1980s combating violently against the *Menzilciler* group in southeastern Turkey. The killing of *Menzilciler* leader Fidan Gungor by *Ilinciler* members almost eliminated the clash between *Ilinciler* and *Menzilciler* in 1994, but the peace was ephemeral, and the groups have remained opposed until now. (Ozeren, 2005)

After the struggle for the leadership, Turkish Hezbollah found its new rivals, the PKK terrorist organization, and started killing PKK members in the cities of Southeastern Turkey. The PKK was also active in southeast Turkey, using harsh tactics and a dogmatic ideology to gather support for its attacks against the Turkish government. (Aydintasbas, 2000) Turkish Hezbollah wanted to emerge as a key force in the region and could not tolerate a rival power. Although Turkish Hezbollah had an anti-secularist ideology, its members did not attack the state apparatus because they wanted to avoid direct confrontation with the state authorities (Aydintasbas, 2000). Turkish Hezbollah did not attack the state because in the early phases of the movement its purpose was to control religious and Kurdish groups in the area, then to build support all over the country (Nugent, 2004).

In the mid-1990s, Turkish Hezbollah directed its focus away from PKK and focused on the Turkish state. Turkish Hezbollah and the PKK signed a cooperation protocol in March 1993. In this agreement, both agreed to end attacks against each other so that they could better attack the Turkish state. Turkish Hezbollah wanted to initiate the next stage of the struggle by moving west in order to expand a collective

movement and nationwide organization before taking on the state. Businessmen with Islamic dealings were robbed or ransomed by the Turkish Hezbollah. However, although these attacks were used to fund the organization, they eventually prepared the destruction of the terrorist organization by the security forces. (Karmon, 1997)

Since 1994, police operations against Turkish Hezbollah had been going on; however, due to the secrecy and the sophisticated structure of the Turkish Hezbollah cells operations were taking time. Police operations in 1997 and 1998 increased the amount of intelligence available to the security forces. (Ozeren, 2005)

Operations carried out in the cities Diyarbakir, Mardin, and Batman ended with the seizure of over 20,000 pages of secret Hezbollah documents in March 1999. With a following operation in June 1999, computer discs containing information about Turkish Hezbollah were captured. This information gave the opportunity to implement more operations against Turkish Hezbollah cells and members. New operations in the fall of 1999 resulted with the capture of 90 terrorists. Interrogations of captured terrorists along with documentary and computer evidence led to further arrests. (Zaman, 2000)

In the Beykoz district of Istanbul, a police operation ended with the death of Turkish Hezbollah leader Huseyin Velioglu and gave the opportunity to security forces to destroy the remaining Turkish Hezbollah elements while providing immense information to the security forces. This cell was full of documents as well as computers, videos, and forensic evidence. Other evidence included tortured and killed Turkish Hezbollah victims, identification cards, and video tapes of torturous interrogations were found in the basement. More than 600,000 pages of secret Turkish Hezbollah documents were found. Police also discovered many corpses of missing persons and

videotaped interrogations of Turkish Hezbollah victims in numerous additional terrorist cells. (A.A.N.A., 2000)

### *Ideology of Turkish Hezbollah*

The ideology of Turkish Hezbollah is not different from the other terrorist organizations indeed. For Turkish Hezbollah, Good and Evil are the two forces representing the Ultimate Truth. Thus, the universe is divided between these two forces. Turkish Hezbollah chooses to initiate conflict with all other groups whom they believe deviate from what they believe: the true way of Islam. Thus, they are also in conflict with other Islamic organizations.

The radicalism of Turkish Hezbollah stems from the threat of the Modern Kharijites. The very first rebellion against the rulers of Islamic world was initiated by the inflexible doctrines defended by the Kharijites, or *Hariciler*. For The *Kharijites*, the world is divided in to two parts as the true Muslims and nonbelievers. To get rid of the infidels, they declared *jihad* against all nonbelievers. Moreover, they declared *jihad* against all nonbelievers and apostate Muslims. They believed it was legal to use any means to get rid of all others besides themselves. (Ozeren, 2005)

The final goal of Turkish Hezbollah is to overthrow the constitutional secular system of Turkey in order to initiate a state which is ruled by strictly-interpreted Islamic rules similar to Iran. (Nugent, 2004 & Aydintasbas 2000).

### *Structure of the Turkish Hezbollah Terrorist Organization*

Only after successful police operations were completed could the structure and

practices of Turkish Hezbollah be revealed. Turkish Hezbollah was extremely effective in its secrecy. In this organization, every terrorist member had a code name and several identities. The member was punished severely if he or she revealed any secrets of the organization or put any operations at risk. Bulent Ecevit, who was the prime minister at that time, eventually accepted that the Turkish National Intelligence Service would not be able to break into Turkish Hezbollah.

Each position in the terrorist organization is clearly defined according to the functions given to each member within the structure of Turkish Hezbollah. Leadership is the highest level, followed by the top council (*Sura*), and then the lower-level or city council are the three major levels in the hierarchical structure of the organization.

### The Leadership

The Leadership, which is typically divided between two individuals, the spiritual leader and the political leader, is the first level in the hierarchical structure of Turkish Hezbollah. The spiritual leader does not have power or control of the decision-making or the implementation of the operations. The major function of the spiritual leader is to support the members of the organization by motivating them with religious ideas. The function of the political leader is to carry out the activities of the organization. He has the power to change or modify the directions of operations. While the leadership positions are not designed to be carried out by one person, Huseyin Velioglu served as both the political and the spiritual leader as an exception (Ozeren, 2005).

## The Top Council

The Top Council (*Sura*) is composed of high ranking political and military members within the hierarchical structure of Turkish Hezbollah. The Top Council discusses and makes the important decisions about the organization's political and military activities (Ozeren, 2005).

## The Lower-level City Council

A similar structure to the Top Council is also adapted to the Lower-level Council in cities and towns; the hierarchical structure is divided between the political and military divisions. The military wing is the unit which is responsible for the armed operations of the Turkish Hezbollah. Whether in the Top Council or the Lower-level Council, the military leader is responsible for carrying out the armed operations. Unit leaders and operation teams or units are under the military wing. Unit leaders direct up to three military operation teams within each council. The city leader supervises these unit leaders, and unit leaders direct city leaders' orders to the operation teams. Operation teams are the last structure in the hierarchical level of military wing. Operation teams are usually composed of two to six members. As a regulation, operation teams have extreme secrecy. Members in one team do not have any information about the members of another team; in fact, because of the high level of secrecy and caution, they seldom have information about the members who are in the same team (Ozeren, 2005).

The function of the political wing is to recruit new members and to spread the teachings of Turkish Hezbollah to influence the surrounding community. The leader of

the political wing of Turkish Hezbollah is also a member of the Top Council. The main duties of the high-ranking officials are to delegate propaganda operations and public relations. Hezbollah radicals have the duty to recruit new members and to distribute propaganda in high schools and colleges. Public units are generally structured in and around villages, neighborhoods, and mosques. When it comes to decision-making, public units do not have any influential role within the Turkish Hezbollah (Ozeren, 2005).

*Methods of Operations Used by Turkish Hezbollah:*

In 2000, one of Turkish Hezbollah members was clear in the types of punishments they would dole out to those who did not follow their set of beliefs. This member stated that beatings, assaults using meat cleavers, kidnappings, shootings, arsons, and attacks with acid on women who do not dress in an Islamic manner are activities of Turkish Hezbollah (Ozeren, 2005).

Kidnapping either for ransom or for other reasons is another favored method used in the operations of Turkish Hezbollah. Their targets were PKK members, other religious organization members, and businessmen. Furthermore, these kidnappings usually ended with torture and death. They used extremely brutal techniques during the torture. Victims were tied up and gagged after the brutal torture. Some victims were even buried alive and left to die (Morris, 2000).

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

Terrorism has been a major international problem for years. Hundreds of thousands of people from different parts of the world have been directly or indirectly affected by this problem. It has often been either very difficult to determine and understand the causes for terrorism or those causes have never been effectively studied because of the immediate threat created by terrorism. This research project's primary objective is to analyze the recruitment process of terrorist organizations by examining three different terrorist organizations based in Turkey. These organizations are DHKP/C, a leftist terrorist group mainly active in Europe and Turkey, Turkish Hezbollah, a religiously motivated terrorist group in Turkey, and PKK, a separatist Marxist- Leninist terrorist group also active in Turkey.

Related research questions to be addressed include:

- How can an individual be stopped before joining in a terrorist group? and,
- If already in one, how can that individual be stopped before carrying out terrorist activities?

In order to find answers for this question, I analyzed three different data sets of three different terrorist organizations. The following research questions guided the analysis:

1. What factors are correlated with joining a terrorist organization?
2. What are the recruitment processes of the DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah?
3. Is there any common process of being a member of these three terrorist organizations?

4. What are the similarities and differences of these terrorist organizations in recruiting process?

According to Majchrzak (1984), policy research is a process of conducting research on a fundamental social problem to unearth the underlying causes and to make recommendations accordingly. To find possible answers to those questions I utilized several resources including but not limited to official sources, articles from academic journals, administrative reports, and various types of observations, as well as transcript of interviews, and interrogations in which I was actively involved as an interrogator. In addition, an in-depth analysis of the reports that members of DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah, and PKK wrote to their central committees on regular basis will also be presented. Furthermore, informal sources, such as newspaper articles and Websites, will also be included in the research.

The study will focus heavily on the identification of the fundamental causes of becoming a terrorist. It specifically will focus on the recruitment process which terrorist organizations normally utilize to gain new members. Therefore, the study will involve both the analysis of the problem and exploration of possible solutions. The study will propose solutions for the government agencies, in particular, law enforcement and other security agencies and institutions, including schools, families, and the community. It is believed that these solutions will offer law enforcement agencies powerful tools to combat terrorism. In fact, this study may show directions for family, society and government to stop people from joining terrorist organizations. Therefore, this study will take into account the cultural, political, social, economic, and ethical dimensions of the problem.

In order to conduct this study and get a general outline of the study, a preliminary

literature review will be done. Qualitative data will be collected, including different definitions of terrorism, explanation of the structure of DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah, and PKK terrorist organizations, major tactics of the organizations, and their recruitment processes.

This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first part mainly discusses the general background of terrorism and the structures of these terrorist organizations, and includes statement of the problem, significance of the study, goals of the study, research questions, and conceptual definitions of the terms.

The second chapter comprises the literature review of the study. This chapter starts with the general history of terrorism and terrorism theories. Since the research will focus on three terrorist organizations in Turkey, special emphasis is given to the history of terrorism in Turkey. Also, because of having data and analyzing recruitment process of DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah, the structure, leadership, activities, and current situations of three terrorist organizations is mentioned in the literature review.

In this context, much of the research will be library-based. A literature review, which outlines the state of knowledge and argument in this field, began the study. The University of North Texas (UNT) electronic research databases, which are EBSCO host, JSTOR, Military and Government Collection and ERIC, was searched for books, articles, and administrative and legal documents on the subject. While searching UNT electronic sources, a Website that provides access to legal sources was used to find and read the articles and books. Due to focusing on the most relevant information, articles and books written about the specific field of responding to terrorism were covered. The words are mostly used for the search are "History of terrorism," "What are

the underlying reasons for individuals to join terrorist organizations?” and “Definition of terrorism, terrorist, terrorist group?”

Methodological issues and the actual data description are discussed in chapter III. In this part of the study, I used some reports, which were written by DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah members. This part of the data is considered reliable for a number of reasons. First of all, those reports are very objective and sincere because the members of terrorist groups directly wrote to the leaders of the organization. In fact, they are in the original handwritings of the individuals. The purpose of these documents is to facilitate the internal communication of the organizations. Furthermore, the content of the documents involves straightforward self-criticism of the members, which makes them invaluable in terms of reliability. Finally, the coding system that was used to hide names and identities also reduced the bias in the terrorist reports.

In this study, there are three different data sources which are coming from three different terrorist organizations. The first data set is about DHKP/C, the second data set is about Turkish Hezbollah, and the third data set is about PKK terrorist organizations.

### First Data Set

#### *Where Was Data Collected?*

In this study the original data, which was collected from the DHKP/C terrorist organization between 1990 and 1996, is analyzed. This data is derived from the original handwritten reports of the terrorists. These reports were submitted to the organization before the members were accepted as active participants. The data used in this research was collected as a result of operations by the Turkish National Police against

DHKP/C cells in different cities around Turkey. In 1991, the police carried out the biggest operation against the central committee of DHKP/C in Istanbul, and the police got possession of the archives of the organization; therefore, some of my data include documents from this operation. Also, some of them were acquired from terrorist cells, where terrorist members used to hide in Ankara and Malatya. The rest of them were gathered from people who were arrested as suspects and from their houses. These cities include Istanbul, the economic capital of Turkey; Ankara, the capital city of Turkey; and Malatya, one of the largest cities in eastern Turkey. These cities represent different social and economic backgrounds, with cultural and social diversity. For example, while Istanbul is located in the west part of Turkey, Ankara is located in the center, and Malatya is located in the east part of Turkey. This diversity is critical for the research because of the fact that it represents a wide variety of people. Therefore, the validity of the research can be considered significant.

The organizations had a system for internal communication requiring that each member write reports about all kinds of issues to inform the central committee. The DHKP/C terrorist organization used to communicate between central committee and their members by writing three different reports; intelligence reports, daily activity reports, and evaluation and recruitment reports.

### Intelligence Reports

Members collected information about the potential targets of the terrorist organization. In other words, they gathered information about the current situation of their targets and their vulnerabilities before they would act. In fact, most of the terrorist

actions were planned based on this information.

### Daily Activity Reports

These kinds of reports include all regular activities, such as what they did, when they woke up, and what kind of difficulties they encountered.

### Evaluation and Recruitment Reports

The terrorist organization asked 28 questions of their members about their purposes and reasons for joining the terrorist group. The questions are very useful in understanding the reasons they became members of the terrorist organization. There is every reason to believe that the terrorists responded truthfully. In other words, they did not believe that police would have access to those reports, so they wrote what they believed without any worry. During my twelve years of experience in the same field in the Ankara Anti-Terrorism Unit, I collected all the evaluation and recruitment reports.

### *How was the Data Collected?*

I was appointed to the Ankara Anti-Terrorism Unit in 1990. After one year, I became a member of the Investigation Unit, and most of the time, I tried to understand the underlying reasons why an individual became a terrorist, or the reasons for joining terrorist groups. Luckily, I had the access to read all the secret documents which were written by individual terrorists to the central committee.

After gathering the documents, police decoded them. In order to better understand these reports, all of the documents were typed and duplicated. After that,

police sent them to the criminal lab and the police archives. There were more than one hundred documents; however, only seventy-five of them were readable. Therefore, I took seventy-five documents to analyze. The original copies of the documents are in Ankara, Istanbul, and Malatya Anti-Terrorism Division's archive.

### *Questions for DHKP/C*

First, the original questions could not be located, I looked over the documents and tried to recreate the questions which had been asked to terrorist members by the central committee. I found that there were twenty-eight answers; however, one of them was only "yes" or "no." Thus, I was unable to formulate that question.

- 1 What is your name?
- 2 Where were you born? And what is your birth date?
- 3 What is your ethnicity?
- 4 What is your level of education?
- 5 How many brothers and sister do you have? And what is your family economic situation?
- 6 What is the current situation of your family?
- 7 What is your family's political background?
- 8 Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force?
- 9 Do you have a significant relationship with someone of the opposite sex?
- 10 Do you have any job experience?
- 11 Do you have any special knowledge, such as computers or electronics?
- 12 Have you ever been abroad? And do you have any relatives who live abroad?
- 13 Can you speak any foreign language?

- 14 Do you know how to use a gun?
- 15 Do you have any health problems?
- 16 Have you ever been in (a relation with the) other terrorist organizations?
- 17 Could you briefly give information about your background?
- 18 How did you find out about the organization?
- 19 What are your good and bad behaviors?
- 20 Have you ever been in police custody? Did you give any information about the organization to the police?
- 21 Do you know the purpose of the organization? Did you read the organization's written materials?
- 22 To you, what is the meaning of the organization?
- 23 Can you accept every kind of duty without questioning?
- 24 Why did you join the organization? What was the reason that you are a member of DHKP/C?
- 25 What is your area in the organization, or which part of the organization are you working in?
- 26 Could you make a judgment about your team leader?
- 27 Could you make a judgment about your subordinates?

### The Second Data Set

The second data set is from Turkish Hezbollah, which is a religiously motivated terrorist organization. This data also was captured by Turkish National Police (TNP) in a terrorist cell in Istanbul. In 2001, TNP carried out an operation against Turkish Hezbollah leadership. Their terrorist cell had been found in Istanbul, and counter terrorism division held a massive operation. In this operation the leader of the terrorist group was killed and two high level members were arrested. In this terrorist cell police

found the terrorist group's archives. Actually the archives were stored on computers, and when the terrorists realized that the police were going to get it, they shot the computers. Fortunately, 85% of the archive was recovered. Most of the documents are internal communication documents and they were written by the terrorist organization's members by hand writing like the first data. Although there have been more than a thousand documents seized, only 300 of them were about terrorist members' profiles. I used only 100 of them because of several reasons, which are some of the document are not clearly readable, and some of them do not give sufficient information; therefore, I chose the best 100. In this data, the questions which were asked by central committee to their members are;

#### *Questions for Turkish Hezbollah*

1. Where were you born?
2. What is your date of birth?
3. Gender
4. What is your education level?
5. Where do you live?
6. Have you ever moved?
7. Have you ever been in other terrorist organization?
8. If yes what was the name of the terrorist organization?
9. Why did you leave from that organization?
10. What was your life style before joining the terrorist organization?
11. Who is your initial contact in this organization?
12. When did you join the organization?

13. What is the main reason to join this organization?
14. Are there any family members in any terrorist organization?
15. If yes, what is the name of organization?
16. How many siblings do you have?
17. Are your parents alive?
18. What is the economic status of your family?
19. What is your job?
20. What is your family's political aim?
21. Do you have any relation or problem with police and army?

They are not the same questions as DHKP/C asks; however, most of them are very close to DHKP/C questions; therefore, the differences and similarities between two terrorist organizations could be found easily. On the other hand, the motivations and underlying reasons for this terrorist organization will also be found out.

Chapter IV is concerned with data analysis. After getting the copies of the reports and identifying the questions, I created a coding system and entered the information into SPSS.

Chapter V is a discussion of the findings, conclusion and policy applications. In this chapter some parts of the documents are also be translated and put into the findings part. Primarily the answers, which were given to questions that are related to the underlying motivation for joining the group and to the recruitment process, were translated.

## Recruitment Process

To better understand recruitment process, I present an in-depth analysis of the recruitment process and draw a map which would show the recruitment process for three terrorist organizations. It is a fact that a person does not become a terrorist over a day. It takes a long process, and every part of the recruitment process has some underlying reasons.

Based on my experience, I can say that there are four areas that serve as motives for an individual to become a terrorist; therefore, as a result of my findings, I will explain how an individual becomes a terrorist and under what kinds of circumstances, and what kinds of reasons lead people to join terrorist groups.

### *Conceptual Model for Terrorist Recruitment*

Terrorist recruitment has several steps. At the beginning, individuals lose their ties with the society and increase contact with the terrorist organization. After the initial contact, terrorist groups start to brainwash the new members with propaganda methods. And then, terrorist training starts in earnest with political and military training. When the organizations see that the potential members are ready for some terrorist activities, they transfer the potential members to inside the terrorist organization structure. After that point, potential member become a member of organization and start terrorist activities. When the terrorists carry out a terrorist action, the police go after them. In fact, the investigation would be started by counterterrorism divisions. The following duties for law enforcement are arrest, interrogation, and sending the terrorist to court. The last process would be trial and punishment for terrorists. After jail, either they would return to

society or go inside the terrorist organization. During this period of time, there are several points at which we could stop them, or because of knowing the problem and having knowledge about the situation of individual, in every step there may be a chance to stop the individual and help him or her to return to society; therefore, the recruitment map will be helpful for all entities responsible for counterterrorism.

### Limitations

There are limitations to this study. The most prominent limitation of this study will involve the secrecy of the terrorist organizations and the investigation of such groups. The secrecy may result in several limitations. The first one involves the terrorist organization, and the second one involves the government side. On the other hand, the secrecy involves both the structure and the individual members of the organization.

First of all, there will not be enough data regarding a specific terrorist organization and its members. Second, even though information is available, the accuracy of such information may be problematic given the fact that it is very difficult to check the accuracy of the information. The government side also involves secrecy. Sometimes because of the critical nature of an investigation, it may be dangerous to reveal some of the information gathered from an interrogation.

Given the fact that there are a number of countries which have been struggling against terrorism, it is difficult to be comprehensive. Therefore, the focus of the study will involve Turkey. In fact, most of the cases and documents are gathered from the terrorist groups in Turkey; therefore, it would be difficult to generalize the result of the study. In fact, having existing data, questions and answers are not changed. I made my

analysis based on the given answers, so it is also another limitation of this study.

The most obvious value of this study is that the basic reasons why people join terrorist organizations are outlined. If these reasons are presented reliably, then the government and the community can work together to stop the recruitment process. In addition, if the terrorist organizations don't gain new members, they will not survive. Although it may take a long time, this is the best way to stop terrorism.

Even though many studies have been conducted on terrorism; this study is unique because I use reports which have been written by terrorist group's members in order to inform the central committee. For this reason, I believe that this study will be a powerful document in the sense that the data for the research reflects opinions of the members of the terrorist organization. These documents are written by the actual members of these organizations. They also include the detailed explanation of the process through which these individuals became sympathizers and then members of the organization. These "reports" are self-written documents required by the central committee as an internal communication and evaluation system. Since these members write these documents voluntarily, and they are not written under coercion, such as interrogation by the police or any other law enforcement entity, they can be considered as unbiased, which makes the research relatively accurate and unique.

Terrorist groups are far different from other criminal groups in several ways. The most important is that they are well organized and structured to ensure secrecy and anonymity. Thus, it is very difficult to penetrate these groups let alone research them. However, I have spent almost twelve years working, interviewing, observing, and interrogating terrorists.

I also believe that any effort which aims at countering terrorism, should involve both short-term and long-term solutions. Instead of focusing on only reactive strategies, it is critically important that the efforts also focus on proactive strategies. One of the vital aspects of proactive strategies is to focus on the underlying causes of the problem. With respect to terrorism, it is necessary to analyze the causes, incidents, and problems that lead people to become terrorists. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the recruitment process taking place in terrorist organizations.

## CHAPTER IV

### DHKP/C DATA SET ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

Chapter III has three different data sets, gathered from inside the DHKP/C, Turkish Hezbollah, and PKK terrorist organizations. These data sets are very useful in understanding demographics, political affiliation, social status of terrorist members as well as the individual's relation with terrorist organization. All three data sets have more than 20 questions which were posed by terrorist group leaders to their members to answer. The members of terrorist groups wrote the document in their own writing and sent it to the organization. Therefore, it can be safe to say that the data is reliable and has validity.

After analyzing the data, I realized that the PKK data had many missing questions, so it was difficult to compare with the other data, so I chose not to use the data from the PKK terrorist organization: only DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah data sets are discussed in this dissertation. I coded and entered DHK/C data into SPSS, while the second data set was entered by someone else, in order to keep validity and reliability. In this chapter I analyze the DHKP-D data; the following chapter is about Turkish Hezbollah, and chapter VI compares and contrasts the two data sets, showing similarities and differences between the two data sets.

#### Family Background Factors

##### *Family Economic Condition*

As seen in Table 1, organization members tend to come from low-income

families. Almost half of the terrorist's fathers are farmers; only 5% of the fathers are reported as holding an official job, which would be considered as middle class. Also, 10% of the fathers are reported as retired, which accounts for an apparent reduction in the salary. Based upon these findings, I conclude that most of the terrorists come from considerably poor or lower class families.

Table 1

*DHKP/C Respondent: Father's Work Status*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Farmer	28	37.3	46.7	46.7
	Laborer	7	9.3	11.7	58.3
	Officer	4	5.3	6.7	65.0
	Self-employed	12	16.0	20.0	85.0
	Retired	9	12.0	15.0	100
	Total	60	80.0	100	
Missing System		15	20.0		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

Table 2 also confirms that the mother's work status supports this finding as more than 90% of the mothers are reported to be homemakers; therefore, the families in this research clearly lacked a second income from the mothers.

Table 2

*DHKP/C Respondent: Mother's Work Status*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Homemaker	61	81.3	92.4	92.4
	Farmer	1	1.3	1.5	93.9
	Worker	2	2.7	3.0	97.0
	Officer	1	1.3	1.5	98.5
	Self-employed	1	1.3	1.5	100
	Total	66	88	100	
Missing System		9	12		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

The economic status of the families is further constrained by the size of the family. The data in Table 3 shows that over 95% of the families have at least 3 children. Not only do children create economic burdens, but also the number of the children in the family reduces the attention that parents can give each child. The lack of parental control, along with the limited resources for each child, creates stress in the family.

Table 3

*DHKP/C Respondent: Number of Siblings*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
1	1	1.3	1.6	1.6
2	2	2.7	3.3	4.9
3	10	13.3	16.4	21.3
4	9	12.0	14.8	36.1
5	12	16.0	19.7	55.7
Valid 6	12	16.0	6.6	75.4
7	4	5.3	6.6	82.0
8	4	5.3	8.2	88.5
9	5	6.7	3.3	96.7
11	2	2.7	100	100
Total	61	81.3	100	
Missing System	14	18.7		
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

In addition to the work status of the parents and the number of siblings, most of the terrorists who were included in this research did not have financial support. The data indicates that most of the terrorists and their families suffered financial difficulties. With regard to the social classes, as Table 3 shows, 13% of the respondents classified themselves as coming from upper middle class families, while 25% of them come from lower middle class families, and the rest are from lower class families.

Table 4

*DHKP/C Respondent: Family Economic Status*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Upper middle class	9	12.0	13.8	13.8
	Lower middle class	20	26.7	30.8	44.6
	Working class	10	13.3	15.4	60.0
	Working poor	5	6.7	7.7	67.7
	Underclass	21	28.0	32.3	100
Total		65	86.7	100	
Missing System		10	13.3		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

*Political Background of Family*

The majority of terrorists surveyed indicated having leftist backgrounds. In response to the question whether they had any relations with a political party before they became terrorists, almost all of them stated that they had connections with either leftist parties or radical leftist parties. As shown in Table 4, 31 out of 57 stated that they had political affiliation with at least one leftist political party. Another 25 claimed to be affiliated with more radical leftist parties, most of which are the political arms of the terrorist organizations.

Another significant finding relates to the number of the terrorists who have a family member arrested due to terrorism related activities. Thirty-six terrorists out of 59 in Table 5 stated that at least one of their family members was arrested once because of a terrorist activity. This number corresponds to almost 70% of the surveyed terrorists having somebody in their family who had been arrested before (Table 6). This finding shows that there is a strong relationship between the prior arrests of a family member and being a terrorist.

Table 5

*DHKP/C Respondent: Family's Political Party Affiliation*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Left	31	41.3	54.4	54.4
	Right	1	1.3	1.8	56.1
	Radical left	25	33.3	43.9	100
Total		57	76.0	100	
Missing System		18	24		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

Table 6

*DHKP/C Respondent: Family Member Ever Been Arrested or Sentenced*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	36	48.0	61.0	61.0
	No	23	30.7	39.0	100
Total		59	78.7	100	
Missing System		16	21.3		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

Another interesting finding that is consistent with the two observations stated above is the relationship of a terrorist's family with a terrorist organization in Table 7. When the terrorists asked whether their families had any contact with terrorist organizations, more than 60% stated that their families had some connection with a terrorist organization.

Table 7

*DHKP/C Respondent: Family Members Relation with DHKP/C*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	25	33.3	37.3	37.3
	No	42	56.0	62.7	100
Total		67	89.3	100	
Missing System		8	10.7		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

These findings clearly suggest the presence of a strong relationship between becoming a terrorist and each of these factors: political party affiliation, prior arrest or imprisonment of a family member due to terrorist activities, and the families' contact with terrorist organizations. This relationship is strong, over 70%. As a result, it may be safe to say that individuals who have a strong leftist political party affiliation, a prior arrest or sentence in the family, and whose families have a relationship with a terrorist organization are more likely to become leftist terrorists.

### Personal Characteristics of the Respondents

#### *General Information about Respondent*

The average age of those terrorists who participated in the survey is 25 years old based on the date of the report. The terrorists' year of birth ranged from 1952 to 1979. It is interesting that 62.5% of the terrorists were born between 1970 and 1980.

Based upon the data, although the mean of the dates shows that the terrorist age is 29 years, the data was captured more than ten years ago. Therefore, the age of the terrorist recruits is in the mid-20s. With regard to the gender of the possible terrorists, the data shows that 33% of them are female, while 66% of them are male.

Table 8

*DHKP/C Respondent: Year of Birth*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	1952	1	1.3	1.4	1.4
	1953	1	1.3	1.4	2.8
	1954	1	1.3	1.4	4.2
	1956	2	2.7	2.8	6.9
	1957	1	1.3	1.4	8.3
	1962	3	4.0	4.2	12.5

*(table continues)*

Table 8 (continued).

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
1965	1	1.3	1.4	13.9
1966	3	4.0	4.2	18.1
1967	2	2.7	2.8	20.8
1968	1	1.3	1.4	22.2
1969	5	6.7	6.9	29.2
1970	6	8.0	8.3	37.5
1971	3	4.0	4.2	41.7
Valid (cont'd) 1972	12	16.0	16.7	58.3
1973	5	6.7	6.9	65.3
1974	4	5.3	5.6	70.8
1975	5	6.7	6.9	77.8
1976	4	5.3	5.6	83.3
1977	4	5.3	5.6	88.9
1978	6	8.0	8.3	97.2
1979	2	2.7	2.8	100
Total	72	96.0	100	
Missing System	3	4.0		
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

Table 9

*DHKP/C Respondent: Gender*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Male	50	66.7	66.7	66.7
Female	25	33.3	33.3	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	

*Social Situation of Respondent*

The data in Table 10 also shows that the marital status of the potential terrorists has a direct relationship to their becoming terrorists. The data shows that 10% of the respondents were married and one person was divorced. The vast majority of the respondents, 87%, have never been married. Table 11 shows that 94% of the

respondents did not have any children. This finding clearly suggests that most of the respondents did not have family responsibilities; they did not have to take care of spouses or children. Table 12 shows that almost 85% of the parents of the terrorists were alive when they wrote the report to the terrorist organization.

Table 10

*DHKP/C Respondent: Marital Status*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Married	8	10.7	10.7	10.7
Divorced	2	2.7	2.7	13.3
Never married	65	86.7	86.7	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	

Table 11

*DHKP/C Respondent: Number of Children*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
0	70	93.3	93.3	93.3
1	4	5.3	5.3	98.7
2	1	1.3	1.3	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	

Table 12

*DHKP/C Respondent: Parents Alive or Deceased*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Both alive	57	76.0	85.1	85.1
	Father deceased	9	12.0	13.4	98.5
	Mother deceased	1	1.3	1.5	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>89.3</b>	<b>100</b>	
Missing System		8	10.7		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

Table 13 indicates that only 8% of respondents had full-time job, and 5% of them had part-time job. Eighty percent of them were unemployed. The respondents who had jobs were mainly working as physical laborers. Only 30% of them were doing some kind of office work (Table 14).

Table 13

*DHKP/C Respondent: Employment Status*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Working full time	6	8.0	8.1	8.1
Working part time	4	5.3	5.4	13.5
Temporarily not working	22	29.3	29.7	43.2
Unemployed or laid off	38	50.7	51.4	94.6
Student	4	5.3	5.4	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>98.7</b>	<b>100</b>	

Table 14

*DHKP/C Respondent: Type of Job*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Physical labor	29	38.7	69.0	69.0
	Office work	13	17.3	31.0	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>56.0</b>	<b>100</b>	
Missing System		33	44.0		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

*Education*

Table 15 reveals interesting findings concerning the level of education of the respondents. The data suggests that less than 10% of the respondents are university graduates, 21% university dropouts, 23% high school graduates, 14% high school dropouts, 8% middle school graduates, and 12% graduated from primary schools.

Table 15

*DHKP/C Respondent: Highest Level Education Completed*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Primary school dropout	1	1.3	1.4	1.4
Primary school graduate	9	12.0	12.2	13.5
Middle school dropout	8	10.7	10.8	24.3
Middle school graduate	6	8.0	8.1	32.4
High school dropout	10	13.3	13.5	45.9
Valid High school graduate	17	22.7	23.0	68.9
University dropout	16	21.3	21.6	90.5
University graduate	5	6.7	6.8	97.3
Masters	1	1.3	1.4	98.6
Doctor of Philosophy	1	1.3	1.4	100
Total	74	98.7	100	
Missing System	1	1.3		
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		

It is possible that the university dropouts had to drop out because they were arrested due to their affiliation with terrorist organizations. Another important aspect from this data is the fact that only 30% of respondents were able to make it through high school. The rest of them were either dropouts or graduates of middle or primary schools.

#### Relation with Terrorist Organization

Most of the reports were written in 1995 with the ratio of 33%, as seen in Table 16. Seventeen percent of them were written in 1994 and 14% of them were written in 1996. Fourteen percent of them were written between 1991 and 1993. Also, 13% of them were written in 1996. Even though the reports are around 10 years old, the facts studied in this research should not be considered outdated.

Table 16

*Date of DHKP/C Report*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
1991	3	4.0	8.3	8.3
1992	4	5.3	11.1	19.4
1993	5	6.7	13.9	33.3
1994	4	8.0	16.7	50.0
1995	12	16.0	33.3	83.3
1996	5	6.7	13.9	97.2
2002	1	1.3	2.8	100
Total	36	48.0	100.0	
Missing System	39	52.0		
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

The data reveals interesting information about the birthplace of the terrorists in Table 17. Almost half of the terrorists were born either in a village or on a farm; this means that only 15% of the respondents were born in the cities where the amenities are expected to be better when compared with the rest of the respondents.

Table 17

*DHKP/C Respondent: Place of Birth*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Village farm	36	48.0	48.6	48.6
Town	16	21.3	21.6	70.3
City	11	14.7	14.9	85.1
Greater city suburb	11	14.7	14.9	100.0
Total	74	98.7	100.0	
Missing System	1	1.3		
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Another important factor is migration. As seen in Table 18, 60% of the respondents moved from the villages or suburbs to the bigger cities, once in their lives. This migration from the small to larger cities seems to have an effect upon the willingness of the individuals to join terrorist groups. Terrorists can develop easier and

better connections with the people who moved from somewhere else and who are looking for a new social surrounding.

Table 18

*DHKP/C Respondent: Moved Residence*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	45	60.0	61.6	61.6
	No	28	37.3	38.4	100.0
	Total	73	97.3	100.0	
Missing System		2	2.7		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Previous arrest is another important factor in joining terrorist organization, as Table 19 indicates that more than 60% of respondent have previous arrest.

Table 19

*DHKP/C Respondent: Previous Arrests*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	52	69.3	72.2	72.2
	No	20	26.7	27.8	100.0
	Total	72	96.0	100.0	
Missing System		3	4.0		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 20 shows that 69% of the respondents had relation with other terrorist organizations.

Table 20

*DHKP/C Respondent: Contact with Another Terrorist Group*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	49	65.3	69.0	69.0
	No	22	29.3	31.0	100.0
	Total	71	94.7	100.0	
Missing System		4	5.3		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

The data in Table 21 denotes that losing a close personal friend or relative to a terrorist related incident, especially if that person happens to be the terrorist, predisposes emotionally the relatives and friends of the killed terrorists to the terrorist organizations. The data indicates that 40% of the respondents lost somebody to a terrorist related incident where the person they lost happened to be a terrorist. There is a strong relationship between losing a close friend or family member to a terrorist incident and subsequently joining a terrorist organization. The death of a terrorist may bring more members to the terrorist organization due to the emotional condition of his or her close relatives and friends.

Table 21

*DHKP/C Respondent: Loss of Relatives or Close Friends*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	30	40.0	44.1	44.1
	No	38	50.7	55.9	100.0
	Total	68	90.7	100.0	
Missing System		7	9.3		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

With regard to the question about initial contact with the terrorist group in Table 22, 35% responded that their friends dragged them into the terrorist organization. While 25% claimed that it was a relative who introduced him or her to the terrorist organization. Sixteen percent of the terrorists indicated that they were introduced to the terrorist organization through publications by the terrorist organization. Prison related introductions follow the publication. Another important factor was the umbrella associations that were established by the terrorist organizations.

Table 22

*DHKP/C Respondent: Method of Initial Contact with DHKP/C*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Friend	24	32.0	35.3	35.3
	Relative	18	24.0	26.5	61.8
	Prison related	5	6.7	7.4	69.1
	Organization publicity	11	14.7	16.2	85.3
	Demonstration	1	1.3	1.5	86.8
	Loss/arrest of close circle	1	1.3	1.5	88.2
	Organizational association	4	5.3	5.9	94.1
	Social problem, unhealthy mental status	2	2.7	2.9	97.1
	Sympathy or idealism	2	2.7	2.9	100.0
		Total	68	90.7	100.0
Missing System		7	9.3		
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

## CHAPTER V

### TURKISH HEZBOLLAH DATA SET ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

The Turkish Hezbollah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization. It was set up in early 1980s by Huseyin Velioglu. Although the organization was inspired by the 1978 Iran revolution, it does look similar to the other Hezbollah terrorist organizations. The organization had been active since the early 1990s. In 2000, the Turkish National Police started a massive operation against the organization.

Huseyin Velioglu, the founder and leader of the terrorist organization, was killed in a terrorist cell that the organization used as its headquarters. Police were able to gather all the archives of the organization from this site. The data which this researcher is using was collected at that cell. Even though the terrorist organization killed the Chief of Diyarbakir Police, the organization was opened up and all key players were arrested. Like in the previous chapter, the terrorist organization asked its members to write a report about their personal information and their relation with the organization. Therefore, I analyzed the Turkish Hezbollah data. Chapter VI is a comparison of the two data sets.

#### Family Background Factors

##### *Family Economic Conditions*

Table 23 reveals that 12% of the respondents have 6 siblings; 16% have 7, 11% have 8 and 8% have 9 siblings. On the other hand, cumulative percentage values shows that nearly 75% have 5 or more siblings. It is clear that as the number of children

in a family increases, not only does the attention given to individual children decrease, but also this situation becomes an economic burden on the family. The limited resources in the family and the lack of parental control over the children results in increased stress in the family. It is obvious that the number of siblings has no direct impact on someone's being a terrorist, or choosing the Hezbollah in our case. Yet, it is not wrong to say that children in large families are raised in a socially disorganized environment where parental supervision and income are shared much less than they are needed (Berthoud et al., 2006). Individuals raised in a disadvantaged environment become easy targets for terrorist organizations to recruit.

Table 23

*Hezbollah Respondent: Number of Siblings*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
	1	4	2.8	2.9	2.9
	2	13	9.0	9.4	12.3
	3	9	6.3	6.5	18.8
	4	11	7.6	8.0	26.8
	5	14	9.7	10.1	37.0
	6	17	11.8	12.3	49.3
	7	22	15.3	15.9	65.2
Valid	8	16	11.1	11.6	76.8
	9	11	7.6	8.0	84.8
	10	9	6.3	6.5	91.3
	11	4	2.8	2.9	94.2
	12	6	4.2	4.3	98.6
	13	1	0.7	0.7	99.3
	15	1	0.7	0.7	100.0
	Total	138	95.8	100.0	
Missing System		6	4.2		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

### *Political Background of Family*

Table 24 suggests that there is a very strong relationship between becoming a terrorist and the choice of political party affiliation. Forty percent of the terrorists claim that their families have a rightist political party affiliation, while 50% of the terrorists state that their families are radical rightist. The total percentage of terrorists who claim that their families are rightist is over 90%. Thus, we can safely conclude that individuals who have a strong rightist political party affiliation and who have a relationship with a terrorist organization are more likely to become rightist terrorists. This does not necessarily mean that political party affiliation is one of the reasons for individuals to become involved in terrorist organizations. Yet, those standing at the very extreme points, who we call radicals, constitute the at-risk population. Moreover, terrorist organizations try to radicalize the political party affiliates to recruit new members. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that more than half of the respondents come from a family that has radical views (Papastamou et al., 2005)

Table 24

#### *Hezbollah Respondent: Family's Political Party Affiliation*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	NA	1	0.7	0.7	0.7
	Left	4	2.8	2.9	3.6
	Right	58	40.3	42.3	46.0
	Radical Left	1	0.7	0.7	46.7
	Radical Right	73	50.7	53.3	100.0
	Total	137	95.1	100.0	
Missing System		7	4.9		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 25 indicates that 67 terrorists out of 144 stated that at least one of their family members was arrested once because of a terrorist activity. This number corresponds to almost half of the surveyed terrorists having had somebody in their family who had been arrested before. This finding shows that there is a moderate relationship between the prior arrests of a family member and being a terrorist.

Table 25

*Hezbollah Respondent: Family Member Ever Been Arrested or Sentenced*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	67	46.5	46.6	48.6
	No	71	49.3	51.4	100.0
	Total	138	95.8	100.0	
Missing System		6	4.2		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 26 indicates that almost 61% of terrorists stated that their families had some connection with a terrorist organization. This finding suggests that there is a strong relationship between a family's connection with a terrorist organization and becoming a terrorist. Both family arrest and family relationship with a terrorist organization statistics indicate that children who have families with a prior arrest and have relations with a terrorist organization are socialized in an environment where children learn from their family members. In other words, social learning and differential association theories of crime seem to be applicable to the situation at hand. Both of the theories claim that individuals develop a criminal identity in an environment where criminal behaviors are valued by their loved ones (Bandura, 1973).

Table 26

*Hezbollah Respondent: Family Members Relation with Hezbollah*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	53	36.8	39.0	39.0
	No	83	57.6	61.0	100.0
	Total	136	94.4	100.0	
Missing System		8	5.6		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

## Personal Characteristics of Respondents

*General Information about Respondents*

The birthdays of the terrorists range from 1950 to 1980. As shown in Table 27, it is interesting that 65% of the terrorists were born between 1970 and 1980, making them to be about 20 to 30 years of age at the time the reports were found. The Hezbollah terrorist organization was around for at least 10 years before 2000 but probably not more than 15 years. While the reports were not dated, those terrorists whose information was recorded in the reports were about 28.6 years of age as of the year 2000. If it took several years for the organization to recruit some of their members, then many of those individuals would be in their early 20s at the time their recruitment started, perhaps even in their teens.

Table 27

*Hezbollah Respondent: Year of Birth*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	1950	1	0.7	0.7	0.7
	1952	1	0.7	0.7	1.4
	1954	1	0.7	0.7	2.2
	1956	1	0.7	0.7	2.9

*(table continues)*

Table 27 (continued).

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
1960	2	1.4	1.4	4.3
1961	1	0.7	0.7	5.0
1962	3	2.1	2.2	7.2
1963	2	1.4	1.4	8.6
1964	3	2.1	2.2	10.8
1965	4	2.8	2.9	13.7
1966	3	2.1	2.2	15.8
1967	3	2.1	2.2	18.0
1968	10	6.9	7.2	25.2
1969	8	5.6	5.8	30.9
Valid (cont'd) 1970	6	4.2	4.3	35.3
1971	6	4.2	4.3	39.6
1972	11	7.6	7.9	47.5
1973	14	9.7	10.1	57.6
1974	16	11.1	11.5	69.1
1975	12	8.3	8.6	77.7
1976	12	8.3	8.6	86.3
1977	6	4.2	4.3	90.6
1978	7	4.9	5.0	95.7
1979	4	2.8	2.9	98.6
1980	2	1.4	1.4	100.0
Total	139	96.6	100.0	
Missing System	5	3.5		
<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 28 indicates that the Hezbollah Terrorist Organization is a male- dominated terrorist organization. Among all respondents, only one of them is female.

Table 28

*Hezbollah Respondent: Gender*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Male	143	99.3	99.3	99.3
Female	1	0.7	0.7	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	

### *Social Situation of Respondents*

Table 29 presents that the marital status of the potential terrorists has a strong relationship on them becoming terrorists. The data shows that 30% of the respondents were married. The rest of the respondents, or 70%, have never been married. In other words, terrorists have low or no social bonds to conventional institutions, such as marriage, to establish their stake in conformity. As social bonding theory of crime explains, individuals with a low stake in conformity tend to have more favorable behaviors towards crime and violence (Hirshci, 1969).

Table 29

*Hezbollah Respondent: Marital Status*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Married	42	29.2	30.0	30.0
	Never married	98	68.1	70.0	100.0
	Total	140	97.2	100.0	
Missing System		4	2.8		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 30 indicates that of the respondents who are married, 38% did not have any children. Thirty-five percent of the respondents have 1 or 2 children, and 25% of respondents have 3 to 7 children. Nearly 75% had 2 or fewer children. This variable may be highly correlated to the age of respondents; therefore, one can not safely conclude any relationship between the number of children and being in or joining a terrorist organization.

Table 30

*Hezbollah Respondent: Number of Children*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
0	13	9.0	38.2	38.2
1	6	4.2	17.6	55.9
2	6	4.2	17.6	73.5
3	1	0.7	2.9	76.5
5	4	2.8	11.8	88.2
6	1	0.7	2.9	91.2
7	3	2.1	8.8	100.0
Total	34	23.6	100.0	
Missing System	110	76.4		
<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 31 shows that 82% of the parents of the terrorists were alive at the time of the survey, while 17% of either fathers or mothers were deceased. Taken together with the size of the family, Hezbollah members come from large size families in which both parents are alive. Thus, one can conclude that Hezbollah members are more likely to have no family disruption in which one or both of the parents are deceased, but that they come from large sized families in which parental supervision is bound to be insufficient (Papastamou et al., 2005).

Table 31

*Hezbollah Respondent: Parents Alive or Deceased*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Both alive	113	78.5	82.5	82.5
Both deceased	2	1.4	1.5	83.9
Father deceased	16	11.1	11.7	95.6
Mother deceased	6	4.2	4.4	100.0
Total	137	95.1	100.0	
Missing System	7	4.9		
<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 32 indicates that 42% of the respondents were working full time, 7.6 % were working part time, and 41% were unemployed. Of the respondents at the time of the survey, 6.5 % were students. The discrepancy between the national unemployment level (around 6%) and respondents' unemployment level is considerably high (Istihdam report 2000-2005, 2007). This suggests a relationship between unemployment and respondents' preferences for the terrorist organization. The conclusion that a low stake in conformity leads individuals to develop favorable behaviors towards crime and violence is also valid in unemployment because those who have no traditional bonds to the conventional institutions such as occupation are at risk of developing unconventional bonds towards unconventional institutions such as criminal groups (Hircshi, 1969).

Table 32

*Hezbollah Respondent: Employment Status*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Working full time	53	36.8	42.7	42.7
	Working part time	11	7.6	8.9	51.6
	Unemployed/laid off	51	35.4	41.1	92.7
	Student	8	5.6	6.5	99.2
	Other	1	0.7	0.8	100.0
	Total	124	86.1	100.0	
Missing	NAP	1	0.7		
	System	19	13.2		
	Total	20	13.9		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 33 indicates that of the respondents who have jobs, more than half of the terrorists were working in low-income jobs, while 8 % of the terrorists had an official job,

which can be called middle income jobs. Thus it can be claimed that the terrorist organization members tend to have low income families.

Table 33

*Hezbollah Respondent: Type of Job*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Physical labor	47	32.6	51.6	51.6
	Office work	12	8.3	13.2	64.8
	NA	32	22.2	35.2	100.0
Total		91	63.2	100.0	
Missing System		53	36.8		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

### *Education*

Table 34 suggests that 4% of the respondents are university graduates, almost 3% university dropouts, 42% high school graduates, 5% high school dropouts, 11% middle school graduates, almost 23% primary school graduates and 8% did not go to school at all. Ninety-three percent of respondents did not attend a university. Nearly 50% of the terrorists did not graduate from high school. Eighty-five percent of those who did graduate from high school did not go to college, a fact that reveals the underlying reason for many of them being either unemployed or having a low-income job.

Table 34

*Hezbollah Respondent: Highest Level Education Completed*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	NA	12	8.3	8.5	8.5
	Primary school dropout	1	0.7	0.7	9.2
	Primary school graduate	33	22.9	23.4	32.6
	Middle school dropout	1	0.7	0.7	33.3
	Middle school graduate	16	11.1	11.3	44.7

*(table continues)*

Table 34 (continued).

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid (cont'd.)	High school dropout	8	5.6	5.7	50.4
	High school graduate	60	41.7	42.6	92.9
	University dropout	4	2.8	2.8	95.7
	University graduate	6	4.2	4.3	100.0
Total		141	97.9	100.0	
Missing System		3	2.1		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

### Respondents Relation with Terrorist Organization

Table 35 indicates that 54% of the terrorists were born either in a village or on a farm. Another 24% were born in towns. Twenty percent of them were born in cities while 1% of the respondents were born in greater city suburbs. This means that only 22% of the respondents were born in the cities where public services are expected to be better when compared to the rural areas. The place where respondents were born also indicates why most Hezbollah members have low education.

Table 35

#### *Hezbollah Respondent: Place of Birth*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Village or farm	77	53.5	53.5	53.5
Town	34	23.6	23.6	77.1
City	30	20.8	20.8	97.9
Greater city suburbs	2	1.4	1.4	99.3
NA	1	0.7	0.7	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 36 shows that 59% of the respondents moved to another city, mostly from the villages or suburbs to the bigger cities, once in their life. This migration from the small to larger cities seems to have an effect upon the willingness of the individuals to

join terrorist groups. It may be safe to assume that the terrorists can develop easier and better connections with the people who moved from somewhere else and who are looking for a new social surrounding. Those who emigrated from rural places to greater cities tend to live in socially disorganized neighborhoods where most of the inhabitants know each other. However, knowing each other turns out to be a disadvantage in such neighborhoods where inhabitants have insufficient adaptation to the social environment of big cities and thus develop their own culture. This then renders these neighborhoods potential targets of terrorist recruitment (Gurr, 1970).

Table 36

*Hezbollah Respondent: Moved Residence*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	84	58.3	59.2	59.2
	No	57	39.6	40.1	99.3
	3 times	1	0.7	0.7	100.0
Total		142	98.6	100.0	
Missing System		2	1.4		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 37 indicates that 67 terrorists out of 144 stated that they were arrested at least once – almost half of those surveyed. The magnitude of recidivism among terrorists is considerably high because offenses or terrorist activities are practiced repeatedly. There are a couple of reasons for this:

- Arrest or conviction does not cure the underlying causes of terrorism.
- Terrorist organizations maintain their activities within prisons. A convicted terrorist has no chance to be imprisoned separately without his or her will.
- Once a person is legally labeled as a terrorist, his or her prospect after prison is blocked for security reasons and that person is imprisoned into this specific identity (Yayla, 2005).

Table 37

*Hezbollah Respondent: Previous Arrests*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	67	46.5	48.6	48.6
	No	71	49.3	51.4	100.0
	Total	138	95.8	100.0	
Missing System		6	4.2		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 38 indicates that 91% of terrorists did not have a relationship with a terrorist group before they joined the Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organization, while 9% of the respondents claimed an earlier relationship with another terrorist organization.

Table 38

*Hezbollah Respondent: Contact with Another Terrorist Group*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	No	130	90.3	90.9	90.9
	Yes	13	9.0	9.1	100.0
	Total	143	99.3	100.0	
Missing System		1	0.7		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 39 indicates that 66% of the terrorists joined the organization between 1989 and 1992 when Hezbollah appeared first as a terrorist organization in technical terms. Before the 1990s, Hezbollah was a marginal extreme rightist group with almost no prior attack on any well-known target.

Table 39

*Year Respondent Joined Hezbollah Organization*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
1978	1	0.7	0.7	0.7
1979	1	0.7	0.7	1.5
1983	2	1.4	1.5	2.9
1984	3	2.1	2.2	5.1
1986	3	2.1	2.2	7.4
1987	3	2.1	2.2	9.6
1988	9	6.3	6.6	16.2
Valid 1989	17	11.8	12.5	28.7
1990	16	11.1	11.8	40.4
1991	32	22.2	23.5	64.0
1992	25	17.4	18.4	82.4
1993	10	6.9	7.4	89.7
1994	10	6.9	7.4	97.1
1995	4	2.8	2.9	100.0
Total	136	94.4	100.0	
Missing System	8	5.6		
<b>Total</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 40 presents that 16% of the respondents has lost one or more of their relatives or close friends in a terror related incident, less than those of leftist groups. Yet, Hezbollah began to fight with state forces after the 1990s. Before that time, Hezbollah had not been involved in any armed strike. TKP/ML-TIKKO, an extreme leftist terrorist group with a moderate size, has over 400 losses in its battles with the Turkish state. This specific reason only motivates many who lost their loved ones towards the ideology of that group.

Table 40

*Hezbollah Respondent: Loss of Relatives or Close Friends*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Yes	23	16.0	16.3	16.3
	No	118	81.9	83.7	100.0
	Total	141	97.9	100.0	
Missing System		3	2.1		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 41 indicates the primary reasons for sympathizers to establish contact. Having a friend or relative with prior arrest history is the primary agitator for someone to adopt the ideology of a terrorist organization, because this is one of the most influential ways of creating propaganda (Teymur, 2004). This is a general tactic not only specific to Hezbollah but also generalizable to all other terrorist organizations.

Table 41

*Hezbollah Respondent: Method of Initial Contact with Hezbollah*

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Valid	Friend	51	35.4	36.7	36.7
	Relative	49	34.0	35.3	71.9
	Prison related	1	0.7	0.7	72.7
	Organizational Publicity	28	19.4	20.1	92.8
	Demonstration	1	0.7	0.7	93.5
	Organizational Association	2	1.4	1.4	95.0
	Social Problems/unhealthy mental state	3	2.1	2.2	97.1
	Migration	2	1.4	1.4	98.6
	Other	2	1.4	1.4	100.0
Total		139	96.5	100.0	
Missing System		5	3.5		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

Table 42 presents that almost 50% of the respondents claimed that the underlying reason to become a terrorist is their political closeness to the ideology of the terrorist organization. Only 8% claimed that injustice is the most important factor and 4% said that imprisonment of people close to them was the effective factor. It seems that political closeness to the ideology of the terrorist organization is highly effective in becoming a terrorist. These two variables in fact seem to be highly correlated. Political affiliation to a leftist party does not automatically direct someone to an extreme leftist terrorist group. Yet, it is not wrong to state that those who hold radical views within a specific political party become potential targets for extremists. Individuals can be split up into two different groups in terms of their political views. Those, the majority, hold the idea that democracy is the only means to make a change within the existing system while others find the democracy too lenient to realize an end. As stated earlier, terrorist organizations specifically focus on those radicals to recruit.

Table 42

*Hezbollah Respondent: Most Important Factor for Joining*

	Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Injustice	12	8.3	8.6	8.6
Loss, arrest or imprisonment of close associates	6	4.2	4.6	12.9
Military oppression	1	0.7	0.7	13.7
Detention	1	0.7	0.7	14.4
Family problems	7	4.9	5.0	19.4
Political closeness	69	47.9	49.6	69.1
Educational problems	6	8.3	4.3	73.4
Combination of at least 2 of the above	12	17.4	8.6	82.0
NA	25	96.5	18.0	100.0
Total	139		100.0	

*(table continues)*

Table 42 (continued).

		Freq	%	Valid %	Cum %
Missing	9	2	1.4		
	System	3	2.1		
	Total	5	3.5		
<b>Total</b>		<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>		

## CHAPTER VI

### COMPARISON OF DATA SETS

In this chapter the two data sets were combined so as to compare related variables. Both data sets compare and contrast each other. Although most of the questions are similar, there are several differences between the two data sets, so different questions were clarified. The similarities and differences will be explained. The findings will be covered in chapter VII.

#### Family Background Factors

##### *Family Economic Condition*

Even though information about father and mother work status on Turkish Hezbollah members is not available, data already presented in chapter IV (Table 4) show that DHKP/C members come from low income families. However, data regarding economic condition of Hezbollah members indicate that respondents from both data sets come from low income families.

When we compare the number of brothers and sisters of Hezbollah and DHKP/C members, we realize that there are major differences. These differences become significant when we consider the relationship between the number of children in a household and its socio-economic status. Although still radically above the average of Turkey's fertility rate of 1.94 in 2005, (CIA World Fact Book) on average, DHKP/C members had 5.3 brothers and sisters compared to 6.4 brothers and sisters for Hezbollah members. The percentage of DHKP/C members with more than 6 brothers and sisters is 20% compared to 48.7% of Hezbollah members. No DHKP/C members

had more than 11 brothers and sisters, while 5.6% (8 out of 138 respondents) Hezbollah members had more than 11 brothers and sisters.

From a sociological perspective, these numbers give us some clues about the family structures, socialization processes of members, and their socio-economic backgrounds. Both of the terrorist organizations have members coming from families that are well above the national averages in size. From this fact, although not proven yet, we could infer that the number of children and the probability of being a member of either DHKP/C or Hezbollah have a positive relationship. This might be due to the existence of an inverse relationship between parental control and the number of children in a family.

Table 43  
*Comparison: Number of Siblings*

	Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
	D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
1	1	4	1.3	2.8	1.6	2.9	1.6	2.9
2	2	13	2.7	9.0	3.3	9.4	4.9	12.3
3	10	9	13.3	6.3	16.4	6.5	21.3	18.8
4	9	11	12.0	7.6	14.8	8.0	36.1	26.8
5	12	14	16.0	9.7	19.7	10.1	55.7	37.0
6	12	17	16.0	11.8	19.7	12.3	75.4	49.3
7	4	22	5.3	15.3	6.6	15.9	82.0	65.2
Valid 8	4	16	5.3	11.1	6.6	11.6	88.5	76.8
9	5	11	6.7	7.6	8.2	8.0	96.7	84.8
10		9		6.3		6.5		91.3
11	2	4	2.7	2.8	3.3	2.9	100.0	94.2
12		6		4.2		4.3		98.6
13		1		0.7		0.7		99.3
15		1		0.7		0.7		100.0
Total	61	138	81.3	95.8	100.0	100.0		
Missing System	14	6	18.7	4.2				
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah.

### *Political Background of Family*

During the cold war era, Turkey stayed between the NATO and Warsaw pacts. While Communist Russia was trying to get Turkey under their communist system, the United States and its allies were trying to keep Turkey in a position to be the front line of NATO. Both sides were trying to create support for their causes inside Turkey. In fact, while the Russians ran and supported Bizim Radyo, a radio channel broadcast from Russian in the Turkish language, the USA ran another radio channel, the Voice of America.

Russia had a big influence on university students. There were many student organizations founded by university students who believed in and supported communism. After the 1978 Iranian revolution, a new group of people appeared in Turkey, who were inspired by the revolution in Iran. Indeed, after the revolution Iran opened cultural centers in Turkey to sell their ideologies to Turkish citizens. People who supported and believed communism also supported radical leftist parties, while the opposite group supported radical right wing parties.

Currently in Turkey there are two dominant, mainstream parties: one left- and the other right wing. The data suggests that the DHKP/C recruits people mainly with a left-wing political ideology, while Turkish Hezbollah looks for recruitment among either the right wing or the radical right wing.

Table 44

*Comparison: Family's Political Party Affiliation*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	NA		1		0.7		0.7		0.7
	Left	31	4	41.3	2.8	54.4	2.9	54.4	3.6
	Right	1	58	1.3	40.3	1.8	42.3	56.1	46.0
	Radical Left	25	1	33.3	0.7	43.9	0.7	100.0	46.7
	Radical Right		72		50.7		53.3		100.0
	Total	57	137	76.0	95.1	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		18	7	24.0	4.9				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

As both data sets suggest, at least half of all terrorists know of one or more family members who have been involved in some criminal activities in their life. It is very high in the first data set because DHKP/C is an older terrorist organization compared with Turkish Hezbollah. More than 60% of DHKP/C members' family or relatives had been arrested or sentenced. Although it is lower for the other terrorist organization, half of Hezbollah members had family and relatives who had been arrested or sentenced. Therefore, they may have learned or been influenced by their relatives and families. This might be explained by the social learning theory of crime. They may have copied their relatives and family members' actions and behaviors or at least been influenced by them. Another possible explanation to this is that terrorists may have animosity against government since they think the government arrested their loved ones unfairly and that this may have given them a negative stimulus in the sense of retaliating against the government (Agnew, 1992).

Table 45

*Comparison: Family Members Ever Arrested or Sentenced*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	Yes	36	67	48.0	46.5	61.0	48.9	61.0	48.9
	No	23	71	30.7	49.3	39.0	51.8	100.0	100.7
	Total	59	138	78.7	95.8	100.0	100.7		
Missing System		16	6	21.3	4.2				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

Both data sets show that if somebody's father or mother or another family member has had a relationship with a terrorist organization, the terrorist may have been influenced by their family member's political ideas and behaviors. Terrorist groups use friends and relatives to recruit new members; therefore it may be safe to say that if one family member joined and had developed a relationship with the terrorist organization, then people in close relations with that person are in the recruitment pool of the terrorist organization. There may be two methods at work here. One, people in the terrorist organization create propaganda and attempt to recruit eligible individuals who possess political ideals that are close to the terrorist organization's own ideals. Two, a potential terrorist may be influenced by his or her relatives, family members, and friends; or he or she may copy the behaviors of their terrorist family member. For those reasons, more than 60% of DHKP members' family had relationships with a terrorist organization. The number in Turkish Hezbollah is lower than DHKP because the Turkish Hezbollah was a newer organization in comparison. However, at least 50% of Turkish Hezbollah members have at least one family member who has had prior relationships with a terrorist organization.

Table 46

*Comparison: Family Members Relation with Terrorist Organization*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	No	25	53	33.3	36.8	37.3	39.0	37.3	39.0
	Yes	42	83	56.0	57.6	62.7	61.0	100.0	100.0
	Total	67	136	89.3	94.4	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		8	8	10.7	5.6				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

### Personal Characteristics of Respondents

#### *General Information*

As the data show, the Turkish Hezbollah is a male-dominated terrorist organization: almost all of Turkish Hezbollah members are male. There are two reasons. First, the organization is a rural area based organization and they are active in the east part of Turkey where females are not active outside of the family. Second, females are usually working in the home or on the farm. However, although more than 60% of in DHKP/C members are males, there are more than 30% that are female. In short, Hezbollah is a male dominated terrorist organization, but DHKP/C has more gender equality.

A couple of explanations can be considered as to why Hezbollah is a male-dominant terrorist organization as opposed to DHKP/C, which equally welcomes both males and females. First, unlike Turkish Hezbollah, DHKP/C is a secular terrorist organization, which makes it possible for the leadership to deploy male and female cadres in the same terrorist cells. This is very unlikely for a terrorist organization like Hezbollah because they are not secular and the only correct form of relationship

between females and males is marriage. This is also why left-wings terrorist organizations have special agendas for women and are structured accordingly. On the other hand, Turkish Hezbollah does not include specific texts for women in their charters, nor are they structured accordingly. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the Turkish Hezbollah does not let women participate in terrorist activities. The organization utilizes married couples when needed. A terrorist cell which is composed of married couples take less attention since they appear to be a normal family at an initial look.

Table 47

*Comparison: Gender*

	Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
	D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Male	50	143	66.7	99.3	66.7	99.3	66.7	99.3
Female	25	1	33.3	0.7	33.3	0.7	100.0	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

*Social Situation of Respondents*

There are a couple of reasons why marriage level is low among terrorist organizations. First, terrorist organizations force their members to cut their bonds with society because the more one develops social bonds with traditional institutions, the more he or she will stake in conformity with the society (Hirschi, 1969). Therefore, people with no social responsibilities are open targets for a terrorist organization to recruit. Second, the ages of terrorists range from 17 to 25, which is below the mean age of marriage in Turkey, which is 25. Therefore, among the members of both terrorist organizations, the marriage rate is relatively low. The marriage rate of DHKP/C is lower

than Turkish Hezbollah because the members of DHKP/C are relatively younger than the members of Turkish Hezbollah. Furthermore, even though Turkish Hezbollah supports marriage among members, DHKP/C does not. This does not necessarily mean that DHKP/C is entirely against marriage, rather, the organization see itself as a front and picks its members among those who have no social bonds with the traditional institutions of the society. Having no social bonds or responsibilities is considered as the core element of a professional terrorist life among Marxist-Leninist groups. That is why only 10% of DHKP/C members are married compared to a 30% marriage rate among Hezbollah members.

Table 48

*Comparison: Marital Status*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	Married	8	42	10.7	29.2	10.7	30.0	10.7	30.0
	Divorced	2		2.7		2.7		13.3	
	Never married	65	98	86.7	68.1	86.7	70.0	100.0	100.0
Total		75	140	100.0	97.2	100.0	100.0		
Missing System			4		2.8				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

Again, the discussion which is presented for the marriage is also valid for the number of children. Most of the DHKP/C members live away from their families. Although its political members are in the society and leading a regular life like other citizens, the military wing of the organization lives undercover and hidden inside of the society. To be a part of terrorist cell and in the active military wing of the organization, the member has to separate from their families and live only in the terrorist cell.

Therefore, terrorist members tend to have few children. However, Turkish Hezbollah is a more social organization, so the number of children per respondent is higher than that of the DHKP/C.

Table 49

*Comparison: Number of Children*

	Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
	D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
0	70	13	93.3	9.0	93.3	38.2	93.3	38.2
1	4	6	5.3	4.2	5.3	17.6	98.7	55.9
2	1	6	1.3	4.2	1.3	17.6	100.0	73.5
3		1		0.7		2.9		76.5
4		4		2.8		11.8		88.2
6		1		0.7		2.9		91.2
7		3		2.1		8.8		100.0
Total	75	34	100.0	23.6	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		110		76.4				
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

More than 80% of parents of both terrorist organizations are alive. It would be wrong to argue that terrorists are by-products of broken families. The average terrorist is the offspring of a family who has a political affiliation with the ideology, if not the strategy, of certain extremist groups who blame the government for their socio-economic status and for not being able to have an equal share in the distribution of wealth, health, justice, and education, all of which are sociological or socio-psychological variables. In the case of DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah, psychological factors, such as a deceased parent, seem to have little or no effect on one's decision to join in terrorist activities.

Table 50

*Comparison: Parents Alive or Deceased*

	Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
	D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Both alive	57	113	76.0	78.5	85.1	82.5	85.1	82.5
Both deceased		2		1.4		1.5	98.5	83.9
Valid	Father deceased	9	16	12.0	11.1	13.4	11.7	95.6
	Mother deceased	1	6	1.3	4.2	1.5	4.4	100.0
	Total	67	137	89.3	95.1	100.0	100.0	
Missing System		8	7	10.7	4.9			
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>			

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

More than 80% of DHKP/C members are either unemployed/laid off or temporarily not working; the rate is lower among Hezbollah members, with only 41% unemployed. Unemployed people frequently use the time on their hands to become involved with terrorist organizations. It is important to note that unemployment and lay offs may result from an arrest of a person for his or her terrorist activities. Because this data is cross-sectional, a causal relationship between terrorism and unemployment cannot be established because a time order cannot be determined.

Table 51

*Comparison: Employment Status*

	Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
	D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Working full time	6	53	8.0	36.8	8.1	42.7	8.1	42.7
Working part time	4	11	5.3	7.6	5.4	8.9	13.5	51.6
Temp. not working	22		29.3		29.7		43.2	
Valid	Unemployed or laid off	38	51	50.7	35.4	51.4	41.1	94.6
	Student	4	8	5.3	5.6	5.4	6.5	100.0
	Other		1		0.7		0.8	100.0
	Total	74	124	98.7	86.1	100.0	100.0	

(table continues)

Table 51 (continued).

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Missing	NAP		1		0.7				
	System		19		13.2				
Total		1	20	1.3	13.9				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

Even though the unemployment rate is very high among both groups, neither group has professionals in their membership. Almost 70% of DHKP/C members are working in the physical labor job market while only 30% are working in offices. In contrast, 80% of Turkish Hezbollah members who have a job are working in the physical labor force, and 20% are working in office jobs. Two assumptions can be made: (1) they may earn a lot of money and therefore may not be rich; and (2) they can be more easily provoked to go against authority because they are working hard and getting less. Terrorist organizations use social problems such as inequality, injustice, and the gap between poor and rich to recruit new members.

The difference between DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah in terms of member's job status points to two conclusions. First, DHKP/C is a professional terrorist organization and its members have almost no job other than terrorist activities, which is often emphasized and even manifested in its charter. Since the members of DHKP/C have no regular income, the group must commit some criminal acts to obtain money, such as bank robbery. DHKP/C members also run some legal activities such as fund raising on behalf of DHKP/C in some European countries. Turkish Hezbollah, on the other hand, is more unprofessional and loosely organized relative to DHKP/C. Most of its members

are married and have regular jobs. Turkish Hezbollah finances its activities mostly from the money they obtain from their members.

Table 52

*Comparison: Type of Job*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	Physical labor	29	47	38.7	32.6	69.0	51.6	69.0	51.6
	Office Work	13	12	17.3	8.3	31.0	13.2	100.0	64.8
	NA		32		22.2		35.2		100.0
Total		42	91	56.0	63.2	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		33	53	44.0	36.8				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

### *Education*

Education constitutes a significant part of a human's life. Some of the variables analyzed in this data set are directly related to education, such as respondent's job status and socio-economic status. Educational background of DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members as presented in this data can be analyzed from two different angles. First, by educational achievements and second by the frustration that results from dropping out of school. Either way, education seems to have a significant effect on their choice of terrorism.

When educational achievement is considered, only a few terrorists, either from DHKP/C or Turkish Hezbollah, have an undergraduate degree. Most of the terrorists hold a high school degree, which is not sufficient for them to find a high-level job. That is why most of the working terrorists work in the labor force. On the other hand, dropping out could be a motivation for some terrorists when one considers the fact that half of

DHKP/C terrorists drop out of schools. The reasons for dropping out may vary, but in either situation it may also push someone to join or stay in a terrorist organization.

As the data indicates, only 8% of DHKP/C members graduated from a university. Also, while 21% are university dropouts, only 23% graduated from high school. In fact, 13% are high school dropouts, 10% are middle school dropout, 21% are university dropouts. Turkish Hezbollah members are living in the rural areas and in the eastern part of Turkey. When compared with the western part of Turkey, the university graduation rate is very low. Only 4% of Turkish Hezbollah members graduated from a university, while 42% graduated from high school. Only 10% graduated from middle school, and 23% graduated from primary school.

Table 53

*Comparison: Highest Level Education Completed*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	NA		12		8.3		8.5		8.5
	Primary school dropout	1	1	1.3	0.7	1.4	0.7	1.4	9.2
	Primary school graduate	9	33	12.0	22.9	12.2	23.4	13.5	32.6
	Middle school dropout	8	1	10.7	0.7	10.8	0.7	24.3	33.3
	Middle school graduate	6	16	8.0	11.1	8.1	11.3	32.4	44.7
	High school dropout	10	8	13.3	5.6	13.5	5.7	45.9	50.4
	High school graduate	17	60	22.7	41.7	23.0	42.6	68.9	92.9
	University dropout	16	4	21.3	2.8	21.6	2.8	90.5	95.7
	University graduate	5	6	6.7	4.2	6.8	4.3	97.3	100.0
	Masters	1		1.3		1.4		98.6	
	Doctor of Philosophy	1		1.3		1.4		100.0	
	Total		74	141	98.7	97.9	100.0	100.0	
Missing System		1	3	1.3	2.1				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

## Respondents Relation to Terrorist Organizations

More than 53% of Turkish Hezbollah members were born in small villages or on farms compared to 48% of DHKP/C members. On the other hand, while 30% of DHKP/C members were born in city and large metropolitan areas, only 20% of Turkish Hezbollah members were. In fact, around 20% of both respondent groups were born in towns.

Table 54

*Comparison: Place of Birth*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	Village of farm	36	77	48.0	53.1	48.6	53.5	48.6	53.5
	Town	16	34	21.3	23.4	21.6	23.6	70.3	77.1
	City	11	30	14.7	20.7	14.9	20.8	85.1	97.9
	Greater city suburbs	11	2	14.7	1.4	14.9	1.4	100.0	99.3
	NA		1		0.7		0.7		100.0
Total		74	144	98.7	99.3	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		1	1	1.3	0.7				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

Members of both terrorist groups have moved to a new residence sometime in their life, around 60% each. It is a fact that when people move from their old home they will lose the social connections and friends they had there. It is very important where they move and whom they meet.

Table 55

*Comparison: Moved Residence*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	Yes	45	84	60.0	58.3	61.6	59.2	61.6	59.2
	No	28	57	37.3	39.6	38.4	40.1	100.0	99.3
	NA		1		0.7		0.7		100.0
Total		73	142	97.3	98.6	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		2	2	2.7	1.4				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

The DHKP/C terrorist organization was founded in 1978, while the Hezbollah terror organization initiated its first attacks 10 years later. Thus, DHKP/C members have had more time to be involved in more terrorist activities than the members of Turkish Hezbollah. Previous arrests are higher in DHKP/C (72%), when compared to Turkish Hezbollah members (48%).

Table 56

*Comparison: Previous Arrests*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	Yes	52	67	69.3	46.5	72.2	48.9	72.2	48.9
	No	20	71	26.7	49.3	27.8	51.8	100.0	100.0
	Total	72	138	96.0	95.8	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		3	6	4.0	4.2				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

There are several Marxist-Leninist terrorist organizations in Turkey. Although the PKK is the largest terrorist organization in Turkey, it is a separatist, ethnic, terrorist organization. It accepts the Marxist-Leninist ideology. All Marxist-Leninist terrorist

organizations tend to cooperate with each other easily. This is the reason that 69% of DHKP/C terrorist organization members have had relations with other terrorist groups prior to joining DHKP/C. Even though there are several small religiously inspired terrorist organizations, Hezbollah is the biggest in all of Turkey. Thus, they do not cooperate with the other terrorist organizations; therefore the relation of Hezbollah members with other terrorist organization is relatively lower.

Table 57

*Comparison: Contact with Another Terrorist Group*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	Yes	49	13	65.3	9.0	69.0	9.1	69.0	9.1
	No	22	130	29.3	90.3	31.0	90.9	100.0	100.0
	Total	71	143	94.7	99.3	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		4	1	5.3	0.7				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

DHKP/C was founded by Dursun Karatas and his friends in 1978. Since then, it has been a very active terrorist organization in Turkey and in Europe. The organization has carried out more than 250 deadly attacks. They have killed many police officers and army members, along with civilians. On the other hand, the organization has lost many members in police operations or during their terrorist attacks. This is the main reason behind the high number of losses of friends and relatives in DHKP/C terrorist organization.

The number of losses of friends and relatives among Turkish Hezbollah members was 16% compared to 44% of DHKP/C members. Turkish Hezbollah initiated

their terror activities in 1988, compared to 1978 for DHKP/C – this time span is one explanation for the difference in losses.

Table 58

*Comparison: Loss of Relatives or Close Friends*

		Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
		D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Valid	Yes	30	23	40.0	16.0	44.1	16.3	44.1	16.3
	No	38	118	50.7	81.9	55.9	83.7	100.0	100.0
	Total	68	141	90.7	97.9	100.0	100.0		
Missing System		7	3	9.3	2.1				
<b>Total</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

It is clear that terrorist organizations use their members to reach other people and recruit them. They also want to carry out this process in a safe and secret way. Younger generations are easily influenced by peer groups and relatives. Therefore, terrorist organizations initially try to reach new candidates from the closer circle of relatives and friends. Another aspect of the same phenomenon is that the individual learns and imitates the behaviors of his/her relative or friend.

As both data sets indicate, the most important factor for initial contact is friends. More than 35% of the respondents stated that they were contacted by their friends to join the terrorist organizations. Around 35% of Turkish Hezbollah members stated that their initial contact was through their friends while around 25% of DHKP/C members stated the same. Another important factor in initial contact is the publications of terrorist organizations. Around 16% of DHKP/C members had their initial contact through reading the publications of the organization whereas around 21% of Turkish Hezbollah members stated having a similar experience.

Table 59

*Comparison: Method of Initial Contact with Terrorist Organization*

	Freq		%		Valid %		Cum %	
	D	H	D	H	D	H	D	H
Friend	24	51	32.0	35.4	35.3	36.7	35.3	38.7
Relative	18	49	24.0	34.0	26.5	35.3	61.8	71.9
Prison related	5	1	6.7	0.7	7.4	0.7	69.1	72.7
Organizational publication	11	28	14.7	19.4	16.2	20.1	85.3	92.8
Demonstration	1	1	1.3	0.7	1.5	0.7	86.8	93.5
Loss/arrest of close circle	1		1.3		1.5		88.2	
Valid Organizational association	4	2	5.3	1.4	5.9	1.4	94.1	95.0
Social problem, unhealthy mental state	2	3	2.7	2.1	2.9	2.2	97.1	97.1
Sympathy or idealism	2		2.7		2.9		100.0	
Migration		2		1.4		1.4		98.6
Other		2		1.4		1.4		100.0
	Total		68	139	90.7	96.5	100.0	100.0
Missing System	7	5	9.3	3.5				
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>				

Note. D = DHKP/C; H = Hezbollah

## CHAPTER VII

### DISCUSSION

Terrorism is a historical phenomenon; however, today terrorism is the most dangerous problem which threatens world peace and security (Friendlader, 1983). No nation can be safe from this problem (Yayla, 2005). There are several reasons that make terrorism the most important and hot issue in the world. Terrorist organizations are acting globally. They use high technology to send their messages beyond national borders to sell their ideology and recruit new members. In other words, communication devices give them the opportunity to cooperate not only with each other but also with other criminal groups, mostly with other terrorist organizations and organized crime groups. Unfortunately, the technological opportunities also provide them safe connection channels without interruption and detection by the authorities.

On top of this, there are significant problems which are present all around the world that are still unsolved. In addition, wars, conflicts, as well as social, economic, and political problems have been inhibiting world peace. Those problems are exploited by terrorist organizations to justify their actions. As well as being exploited, those problems, most of the times, become efficient propaganda tools for terrorist organizations to recruit new members and justify their horrendous actions on national and international levels. On the contrary, if people are oppressed and suppressed by authorities, they would easily be provoked against them by terrorist organizations. Consequently, perpetuating those problems mentioned above will maintain the environment which fosters terrorism. This argument especially holds true in oppressive governments, where people are not allowed to express their grievances and opinions freely. In other words, if authorities do

not produce effective democratic solutions to problems, people might turn to other alternatives, such as terrorism, which produces solutions but not necessarily democratic ones. At that point, terrorist groups offer terrorism as the remedy for the ongoing problems and make new recruitments. As Crenshaw (1992) explains, terrorism has six dimensions; ideology, leadership, organization, logistics, recruitment pool, and propaganda. In order to survive and heal the wounds resulted from losses from police operations, arrests, imprisonments, and because of the members who choose not to continue to participate anymore, each terrorist organization needs to have a continuing and healthy recruitment channel. Therefore, stopping recruitment will result in long term solutions against terrorism. As a matter of fact, by using first hand field data, this study so far dealt with understanding of the recruitment processes of two different terrorist organizations, which are DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah.

### Summary and Importance of the Study

This study begins with the statement of the problem and the significance of the study. Scholars and researchers have been studying the terrorism problem since the early 70's; some institutions and government organizations, such as US State Department, collect information on all terrorism cases. Considerable research has been done to see the patterns of terrorism and make future predictions. Every country has passed new legislation on the issue; however, the problem has not been understood very well due to certain difficulties such as:

- The structure of terrorist organizations
- Reluctance of law enforcement forces to share information with the researchers

➤ Difficulties of field studies

According to Yayla (2005), terrorist organizations create a hierarchical and secret structure to manage and protect the organization from police interruption and operation. Undercover agents and informants are highly valuable tools for law enforcement to gather information from inside criminal organizations. In this method, police infiltrate the criminal organizations, especially organized crime and street gangs, to learn what they are planning, who they are, and what kind of crime they are planning to carry out, who the organization leader is. However, terrorist organizations have an internal investigation organization to find out who is working with police and has suspicious behavior. When they recognize some of the terrorist organizations' members are working with police, they will kill him or her as soon as they realize it. Therefore, even though undercover agents and informants are significant in police tactics, it is difficult to use this method in terrorism cases. In addition, there are few studies which have been conducted by academicians inside criminal groups, so it is difficult find enough studies that have been conducted about terrorist or terrorist organizations. Although some organizations obtain data from terrorist organizations by using different methods and technologies, because of the importance and secrecy of that information they are reluctant to share the information with researchers. It is a fact that if you do not understand the problem or illness, you can not recommend a cure for patient. Sometimes administering treatment without understanding the real problem may make the problem more complicated than before. As a result, it is safe to say that because of lack of field studies, terrorism is still a poorly understood phenomenon (Hofman, 2004). On the other hand, I have spent 13 years in the counter-terrorism division in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey. I initially worked as a counter-terrorism team leader and have

been promoted to deputy chief of the counter-terrorism department. During this time period, I also worked as an investigator, interrogator, and operation team leader. Furthermore I trained police officers, counter-terrorism experts, private security guards, and correction officers on terror case investigations. Thus, my field experience and the unique data set used in this study makes this research invaluable and significant.

In this study four different terrorism theories or approaches were applied: (i) integrate/multi-causal; (ii) organizational; (iii) physiological approach; and (iv) strategic choice/political approach. Two first-hand field data sets were analyzed – DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front) and Turkish Hezbollah – to find answers to the research questions and determine the turning points in the recruitment process for the individual:

1. Cooperation with parents
2. Leaving terrorist candidates to their families
3. Professional approach of police acting as deterrent while suspect in custody

### Research Questions

Terrorist organizations continue their existence through recruitment of new members for the organization. Today, intelligence and counterterrorism units spend all their effort to arrest and bring the terrorist group members to justice. Although it is important to struggle against terrorism after the terrorist attacks, a better way of struggle is “proactive,” i.e., stop the recruitment process. Therefore, the most important question of this study is: How can an individual be prevented from joining a group or carrying out terrorist activities?

In order to find answers for this question, I analyzed two different data sets regarding two different terrorist organizations for responses to the following four research questions:

1. What factors are correlated with joining a terrorist organization?
2. What are the recruitment processes of the DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah?
3. Is there any common process of being a member of these two terrorist organizations?
4. What are the similarities and differences of these terrorist organizations?

## Findings and Discussion

### *Economic Problems*

Existing literature and findings of this study proved that economic problems are among the major determinants of the likelihood of becoming a member of terror organizations. People coming from economically challenged families tend to be more vulnerable than the ones with relatively well-to-do families. The reason why these people accept the call of terrorist organizations is that these people are hopeless for their future life and terrorist organizations offer them a bright future with their propaganda, in fact not. As literature suggests, it is easier to exploit people's mind that they are hopeless for their future life like unemployed people. Terrorist organizations usually use this sort of techniques to lure people into their organizations. For this reason, the methods of terrorist organizations should be well identified and the way they use to attract people should be blocked by taking into account effective struggling methods.

### *Number of Siblings*

Data suggest that the members of DHKP/C and Hezbollah terror organizations have significantly higher numbers of siblings especially brothers and sisters.

Sociologically speaking the amount of quality time spent with children has significant impact on socialization process of those children. In other words, if parents spent sufficient time with their children to transmit societal values, norms, and sanctions, their children become members that society needs. On the other hand, if the time spent with children is reduced in quantity or quality due to having other children or siblings, then these children become available for exploitation of external groups. Moreover, terrorist organizations have special strategies to better identify, target, and recruit those children. This fact is supported by the data used in this study.

### *Political Party Affiliation and Background*

Since most terrorist organizations have radical political agendas, claiming that political perspectives are fundamentally important would be valid. And if one digs deep enough to unearth the major sources of these radical political perspectives, it will be clear that most of them come from the inequalities embedded within the maintained and protected structure and lifestyle of society. If legal bodies with power and authority do not address those sources of inequalities in a more open and positive way, then terror organizations will exploit that reality to draw the attentions of the ones who are being disadvantaged, and/or discriminated against. Actually, after realizing the existence of some groups who are willing to deal with those problems, people start developing some

sort of respect and approval towards them. As a matter of fact, it is that moment they become real targets for recruiting purposes.

### *Arrest and Sentence Family Members*

People with previously arrested family members tend to have less approval towards legal structures. This holds true especially for people with relatives arrested and sentenced for political reasons. Those people who have feelings of vengeance against the system become politically marginalized, which also makes them very valuable and easy targets for terror organizations. To stop this process, the state need to develop programs or support NGO's to fulfill the needs of those members with arrested relatives.

### Family Member's Relation with Terrorist Organization

Another major factor is having a family member who has been engaged in terrorist activities. This is true especially for children, whose attachment to family members is so high that could easily impede the process of identifying and seeing the evil actions done by family members. It would be nearly impossible for a child whose father is a terrorist to say that his or her father is a terrorist and a bad person. Again, if we go back to socialization process, we realize that the family is the first institution with the specific task to socialize new members, which are their children. Children see their parents and assume their normality; as a result, the children will also develop attachment to the organizations and social networks of their parents. Unfortunately, that would make their likelihood of becoming a terrorist higher than the children with no

terrorist family members. That's why I have already suggested in several parts of this study that states should build stronger bonds and ties with these children to prevent them from sharing similar fates with their family members who are/were terrorists.

### *Personal and Social Characteristics of Respondents*

So far, I have drawn readers' attention to demographic characteristics of people in their choices of becoming a member of a terror organization. The following characteristics are deemed as major ones.

#### Age

The data supports existing literature claiming that the younger individuals tend to have weaker social ties to prevent them from becoming a terrorist. Knowing this, terrorist organizations tend to target younger individuals who lack the ability to make educated judgments about the arguments presented to them by those organizations. Lacking strong social bonds, and having no influential individual or institutions, due to many reasons stated above, those children at risk had to rely on their own judgment ability about the perspectives of terror organizations. Unfortunately, often those children lose control and fall for the false promises of these organizations.

#### Gender

If we examine the data, we receive mixed messages about these characteristics. We realize that Turkish Hezbollah is a male dominated organization with almost 100%

male members, DHKP/C on the contrary, while still being dominated by males, tend to have higher female members. In sum, we still could easily claim that the majority of the members of terror organization becomes males. However, each terror organizations tend to have their own perspectives about female members. Some are more lenient and equal in nature towards females, some others, due to their religious or political preferences, could be less tolerant.

### Marital Status of Respondents

Marital status is one of the major determinants. People with families and children feel a different bond with society. In my opinion, this comes from the belief that society offers resources not only for themselves but also to their families as well. Those resources could easily be jobs, shelter, or food. That belief enforces people to comply with the societal norms, even if they do not believe in them. This does not necessarily mean that we cannot see any married terrorists. Nonetheless, statistically speaking, the majority of terrorists are unmarried, without children, young, and possess weak societal ties.

### Respondents' Number of Children

This characteristic is strongly tied with the previous one. Having children not only encourages parents to participate in social rituals, such as having a job, attending societal activities, but also enforces them to do so. In sum, it is the people without children who are among major targets for terror organizations.

## Parents Alive or Deceased

For children who are still living with their parent/s, parental control is one of the major sources of energy that could be used against terrorist organizations. Parental control does not mean total domination. It does not rely on the brute force of the parents; on the contrary, it must depend on mutual understanding, quality time and a sufficient amount of time spent with children. Children raised in an environment with weak parental control are more likely to become potential future recruits of terrorist organizations.

## Respondents' Employment Status and Type of Job

Employment status and the kind of employment have tremendous impact on individuals' state of mind. As stated earlier, economic concerns are being dramatically exploited by terrorist organizations. Those who are unemployed or in a dead-end-job, have a more depressed sense and can easily be swayed to become new members with the promise of better employment or economic gain. Although the organizations' ideas may seem strange, they may see terrorism as a well paying career, which they want to be a part of.

## Education of Respondents

Years spent in educational system creates and strengthens ties and bonds with society. Formal education, after the family, is deemed as the second major force in the process of socialization of children. Therefore, it is safe to argue that children with less or no years in that system will lack those social bonds. That situation could easily be

turned against the society because, it will leave an empty place in the personalities of these children. Terrorist organizations will abuse this and offer something to fill that gap.

#### Birth Place of Respondent

It is no secret that each terrorist group has a definite birth place. Usually, the location is the place where the leader was born or where the leader spent time to create and organize that group. The children who live in those areas and hold the aforementioned risk characteristics have relatively higher chances of becoming a terrorist than the ones with similar characteristic but living in geographically remote areas. The conclusion needs to be drawn from this challenging statement need not be to discard those areas at all, but developing new social policies and programs specifically designed for those areas would be highly effective in the fight against terrorism.

#### Moved Residence

Rapid changing in a society may cause unbalanced economic growth and communication structures. For instance, with rapid economic growth, many people migrate to urban areas in order to work in industrial sector. However, city life requires higher standards, and new immigrants can not afford it; thus, they inhabit the outskirts of Turkish cities, which are usually ghetto areas, to meet their basic requirements. This rapid changing also brings certain vulnerabilities. People, especially the younger generation, who are used to the social life in their former rural homes, try to find the same environment. However, the city life, in particularly ghettos, rarely offers the same

social interaction. Hence, people become alienated in their new environment. In these areas, people are prone to accept terrorist campaigns, which offer them group solidarity and strong social interaction/bonds, which people used to before. The data suggests this theoretical background.

### *Respondents' Relation with Terrorist Organization*

We cannot label people as terrorists without strong evidence; in research, we need to distinguish sympathizers from hard-core terrorists. However, due to the lack of a comprehensive definition of these members, no line could be drawn between the sympathizers who were not actively involved in any of the actions and the active members of terrorist organizations. To better unearth the real importance of respondents' relationship with terrorist organizations, we need to talk about the following as independent indicators.

#### Previous Arrests of Respondents

Just like regular crimes, recidivism rates increases dramatically after an arrest for any types of terrorist activity. Relatively higher sentences do not prevent this fact. After serving time in correctional facilities, people face the similar fates of ex-criminals. Employers become unwilling to hire those people because of the known reasons. Therefore, the type of job they could get after the release from prison becomes insufficient to support and maintain a decent life. This sole fact, on most of the cases becomes sufficient cause for them to go back to their careers as terrorist, since economical considerations were mostly taken care of in those terrorist organizations.

Readily available tools, such as access to weapons, make even regular crimes yield more money with less effort. These crimes include extortion, ransom, and robbery. This, in turn, helps create a vicious cycle which is almost impossible to break.

#### Time Period in the Terrorist Organization

Time spent in terror organizations solidifies socialization process and makes it really hard to go back to normal lives. One of the biggest challenges faced by ex-terrorists is the resocialization process. In other words, making peace with the society and societal norms and values after having fought against them for extended periods of times. This stands as a huge barrier in the way for many terrorists and simply because they cannot dare to face this fact, they choose to stay in the organizations. As society and societal institutions, especially criminal justice system, we need to treat those people differently, and separate them from regular ex-criminals. NGO's could also play key and crucial roles within that regard.

#### Loss of Relative and Close Friends in Terror-Related Cases

Dramatic events happened during life times could cause many unexpected developments, and no dramatic event could cause those types of unexpected or unintended events as losing a relative or a close friend. Especially, if the loss is due to an unjust governmental affair, or could be perceived or distorted as so, the consequences become dramatic. When the developments meet with proper texture, this loss may easily end up with being a new recruit of a terrorist organization. As a solution, state and society need to develop ways to deal with these types of dramatic events

discreetly in order not to let any misinterpretations and loopholes that could be exploited by terrorist organizations.

### Initial Contact with the Terrorist Organization

The social context and boundaries of initial contact is very important. The first impressions left on the candidate will ease the way of becoming a full-fledged member in the future. And researches done proved that each organization has a distinct way to approach candidates. Knowing those ways will give the society and law enforcement an upper hand in identifying not only the vulnerable segment of the society, but also the environment that will be used as a recruitment places. Studies proved that disrupted initial contacts result in failure on the part of terrorist organizations. Therefore, to be able to disrupt this process effectively, states need to know terrorist organizations, their political agendas, which demographics they are after in a candidate, and the environment.

### *Recruitment*

To have a better understanding of the recruitment pattern for terrorist organizations, I created a recruitment map. The map is composed of two main parts, one of which is covers initial contact and the other, the results of the initial contact. The first part covers three different phenomena, which make a person a potential target for a terrorist organization (Fig. 1, top). Those three components are the family situation, (social and environmental condition), and (political situation) of the country where they live.




Figure 1. Proposed recruitment map to becoming a terrorist.

The first phenomenon involves the family. Many crime theorists think of family as the most influential factor in the individuals becoming a criminal in his life. The living conditions of a family have a great impact, as well as the education level and ideological background of the parents. As we can infer from the data, children of poor, large families are more likely to engage in terrorist activities. Destitution of a family can make the children ordinary criminals such as burglars; however, in the case of terrorism, the young people who have an ideological background from their parents tend to become involved with ideological groups to fight for their destiny. Marxism teaches people to fight for social justice and change. Marx, in his doctrine, urges people to organize and fight with their so-called enemies, which happens to be the current authorities most of the time.

Another variable in the data is the size of family. Children who grow up in a large family with low socio-economic status may lack parental supervision not necessarily because of an intentional ignorance, but because of the stress, which is created by the families. Another variable is uneducated parents. Although the data doesn't indicate the educational background of parents, two other different variables seem to show that parents of the terrorist are uneducated. The father work status shows that 60% of the fathers are farmers and laborers. In Turkey, approximately 85% of the farmers and laborers have less than a primary school education. Similarly, 92% of mothers are housewives. Ninety percent of the housewives in Turkey have less than a primary school education. Uneducated parents puritanically transfer their opinions to their children, which make them ideologically ready for certain groups. The last and the most important variable is the ideological background of the parents, which come from either

a close relationship with someone who is a member of terrorist group or ideological an ideology akin to that of tendency to the terrorist group.

The social conditions of potential terrorists are not different from their family conditions. Terrorists come from similar social environment. In this environment, people have nearly identical family conditions and ideological backgrounds. This environment creates a subculture, which affects its members and facilitates the manipulation of this sub-group by terrorist leaders. Terrorists like this kind of environment and set up legal organizations to organize their potential supporters. Solidarity associations, prisoners' family organizations, and legitimate publication offices are some of the organizations terrorists use to further their goals. The data shows that the total impact of friends, relatives, and organizational association is 62%. These components constitute the social environment of the recruit.

The last phenomenon is the political conditions of the country. A lack of democracy, injustice, a gap between rich and poor, and oppressive or discriminatory acts of government may cause grievances in the public sector. A social state is expected to provide education, health-care, security, and employment. In addition to this, the wrongdoings of the government in anti-terrorism activities may further provoke the victims to rebel against the authorities. Those victims are families, relatives, and close friends, as well as victim himself. If a government cannot meet public expectations and maintains wrong policies in anti-terrorism, the public becomes unhappy and even angry with the authorities. Discontentment, unhappiness, and anger on the part of citizens are not direct causes for terrorism; however, terrorist groups are very skilled and capable of manipulating those situations. In other words, not everybody who is

discontent and angry at the authorities seeks an alternative authority. In fact, legitimate authorities may be open to discussion and solve the problem publicly while staying within the rules of the system. However, terrorists do not want to lose these opportunities; thus, they try to manipulate those situations to reach their goals are unwilling to compromise with authorities; instead, they always refer to their ideology as an alternative. Terrorists puritanically believe their ideology will become a reality someday, and they voluntarily become warriors for this end. This war is a kind of sacred war, which needs dedication and sacrifice even though they will not see the day they hope for. One of the respondents explains the situation as follows:

In my opinion revolution is the honor, life, culture and with its ethic of life style, it is the biggest value of the society. I have become a revolutionary because of the fact that a class in the society is recognized as upper class and this causes to loss of lower class where you have no honor left. I have become a revolutionary to end this and to distribute everything in the nature to everybody in the community.

Another respondent explain his views:

To me revolutionist means to fight against all kinds of injustices. I am a person that is against all injustice and I cannot accept it. I am in favor of a socialist revolution in Turkey because I cannot condone the government harming innocent people.

These kinds of feelings can cause a loss of social bonds and consequently, making people a potential target for the terrorist recruitment. Hirschi, one of the most famous control theorists of crime, claims that the people who lose their social bonds, such as family, are more likely to become criminals. That is, if people do not have strong social bonds, which bind them to their family, society, and even the government, they easily become a potential target for terrorist groups. However, in the case of

terrorism, besides the individual himself, terrorists ask, even force, their sympathizer to cut their conventional bonds. One of respondents explains his situation as follows:

I left school due to economic reasons. After my mother died, my father got married with another woman; therefore, family problems have occurred, and I started to live far from my family. I was alone and frustrated. When I heard some thing about DHKP/C I decided to join them.

Three of our respondents, who are the only ones married of all 75 respondents, indicated that they were not ready for the fight and wanted to leave the DHKP/C. These three also have children. From the data, we can infer that their social bonds are a strong motivation for wanting to leave the terrorist group.

The factors we mentioned above make people vulnerable and potential targets for recruitment by a terrorist group. In this stage (Fig 1, bottom), terrorists use propaganda to convince them to join. At the very beginning, the potential target (or recruit) is passive. Terrorists wisely activate this passive potential by using propaganda. They use political problems in their propaganda such as injustice, lack of opportunity, the gap between rich and poor, lack of freedom, lack of democracy, unemployment, and difficult workplace situations. In addition to political problems, they use other problems which stem from anti-terrorism, such as arrest, imprisonment, human rights, searches, police operations, and casualties of police operations. As solutions, they offer to fight the authorities, which they condemn as solely responsible for those problems. For example, Al-Qaida terrorists use casualties as a propaganda tool via media and call for additional recruits to fight under their leadership against the occupation forces.

In fact, initial contact begins with propaganda. Terrorist organizations employ their legitimate figures in their propaganda. The reason for this is the need to keep the secrecy against law enforcement. That is why terrorist organizations use family

members, friends, or relatives; because those are the most innocent characters which a terrorist organization can employ to disguise their illegitimacy. On the other hand, people trust those figures more than others. Terrorists organizations use different propaganda techniques to persuade their targets, potential recruits, to join them

## Propaganda

Propaganda is a psychological process which influences the beliefs of the people. Using the mass media, or one-way communication, terrorist organizations always take advantage of propaganda to make an impression on the potential targets of their ideology. Since many terrorist organizations accept and even encourage violence as a means of struggle, they need to justify their actions. In that regard, propaganda is the best way to justify the violent actions of terrorist groups who seek public support and new recruits.

Terrorists use different techniques of propaganda to attract the attention of the public. Those techniques include the psychological impressions of people using some innocent figures. For example, a picture of child who suffers from starvation is published in the press in order to create a sympathetic image in the minds of people and, thus, in the minds of the potential recruits with the hope of making them susceptible to the terrorist group's philosophy and proposed violent solutions. Asking too many *why* questions, terrorists aim to disturb the minds of people and to make them worry about the answers of those questions. If a target is begin to accept it as a fact under the influence of that propaganda for a long time, he will probably be confused and finally find himself in the arms of terrorists.

Another technique, which terrorist called armed propaganda, is quite different from the first one. In this case, terrorists assassinate publicly known persons, police officers, or military personnel, to motivate their sympathizers and to create sensation. Armed propaganda is a means to appease the resentments of terrorists and their supporters, which they cannot achieve in another way.

### Friendship

People are easily influenced by their friends. In fact, most people want to be with others who have some opinions as themselves. Terrorist organizations benefit from friendship by using it as a recruitment tool, and they follow a process. In the first step, terrorists set up a good relationship with a target and do not mention the terrorist organization or their opinions. They just try to create a good trusting relationship. In the second step, they mention problems which are common in the society, such as a lack of education, injustice, corruption, and the gap between rich and poor people. In fact, after the second step, if the target sympathizes with their opinions, they will start to talk about the terrorist organization and how the organization could find a solution for those problems. Moreover, after first step, they may share publications, which have been published by some terrorist organization. In the last step, terrorists invite people to their legal organizations such as student associations, bars, and bookstores. Similarly, they introduce the new members to some high level terrorists.

In addition, most of the terrorist organizations have a place where they educate people about their beliefs. For example, Al Qaide has a kind of school in Pakistan. They educate people in their beliefs. The best opportunity for recruiting new terrorists is close friendship. People, especially teenagers, easily trust their peers. In short, people;

especially disadvantaged youths trust their friends. Knowing that, terrorist organizations use friendship as a means of recruitment.

### Close Family Circle

Family members may also influence each other easily. On the other hand, if people have grown up in the same environment, they may have a lot of the same opinions and problems. In fact, they have probably been subjected to the same information and political opinions. Similarly, people tend to trust their family members and want their approval; especially younger people try to emulate their older brothers and sisters. If some of their family members join a terrorist organization, they will be likely to join the same terrorist organization.

This influence of the family upon its members has been used by terrorist organizations for a long time. They benefit from a close family circle in order to make new recruits.

### Publications and Communication Technology

All terrorist organizations around the world have a political agenda. They want to spread their ideals to other peoples. In their publications and on their Internet sites, they emphasize problems, which are common to all the countries, and regions of the world. Also, they try to manipulate people into thinking that the only solution for those problems is to fight their enemies. They define their enemies as being their governments, occupations, and the corruptions, or dictator leaders. If a country doesn't have a true democracy, people in those countries are not typically happy, so they will more easily

become an enemy of their government. Terrorist organizations thrive on social economic problems; some people will believe their propaganda and join them in fighting their enemies.

In addition, the media helps them to influence other people. Although most of the terrorist organizations don't have their own television channels, they use the Internet. Almost all terrorist organizations have their own Website; therefore, they can easily manipulate people into joining them. For example, Al-Qaide urges people to fight against the U.S forces by publishing many sad stories and showing photos of innocent casualties in Iraq. When people see those pictures on the internet, they become angry with the U.S. In fact, some of those angry people become eager to join those terrorist groups and to fight the enemy.

Although governments benefit from technology, terrorist organizations can also benefit by using technology to recruit people. Terrorist groups observe the situation; if they find a negative image or an unacceptable situation, they use these as a tool for recruitment. Therefore, to stop recruitment, the governments should find a solution their social economic problems. In fact, they have to eliminate these problems to stop recruitment.

#### Through Schools and Universities

Students have to face a new situation and environment when they attend college. To attend a university, most students have to move to a different place and leave their families. According to Robertson (1991) if people leave their environment, they suffer from culture shock, a feeling of disorientation or confusion that often occurs when a

person leaves a familiar place and moves to an unfamiliar one. Most University students, like other new residents, feel stress and loneliness. Terrorist organizations know that, and they use this situation to recruit new members. They open student registration help desks and establish friendships with new students; eventually these new students may be introduced to the terrorist organization.

#### Imprisonment and Loss of Close Friends or Relatives

People have emotional relationships with their friends and relatives. If a friend or a family member dies or is imprisoned, their relatives and friends would be deeply influenced. It is a fact that if some one joins a terrorist group, he or she would be face to face with those situations. The organization tries to recruit family members or friends by establishing a relationship with them. For example, DHKP/C has a legal organization, which is called TAYAT (an association to help prisoners and their families). The real purpose of TAYAT is to make new recruits. Similarly, terrorists are dedicated people; they believe what they have done is right, so they don't see themselves as naive criminals. Instead, they see themselves as heroes. Therefore, they also influence their relatives to join the terrorist organization.

In addition, most of the terrorist organizations exercise prison as a training facility. They educate people in the prison. For example, Devrimci Sol has made significant recruitment in the prison between 1983 and 1999. Likewise, if people lose their relatives, they will become an enemy of government, and they will be more eager to join terrorist organization and kill someone.

When people become involved after propaganda, terrorist organization gives them an intense training. Training consists two separate parts: the first is political education and the second is military training. Political training aims to win political background and understanding of their ideology, purpose, and justification of their methods. Political education is very important in terms of gaining an unshakable faith to their organization. After this education, they become conscious and true believers. At this stage, individuals join demonstrations, confront police, and protest authority. If they are arrested at this phase, turning back becomes harder. Arrest, search, detention, and imprisonment create a hate and they become more irritated against authority. Terrorist organizations use some symbolic figures such as casualties, funerals, and wrongdoings of government to make demonstration and to make their people confront with the authority. Once they arrested, they are labeled and loose their conventional and legal opportunities.

Political education provides a test to select the most eager individuals to transfer military wing. At the military education they learn how to use certain weapons, how to make explosives, intelligence, how to escape from police pursuits, and what to do under police detention and prison.

In conclusion, this map is composed of mainly two parts. The first part addresses the underlying reasons, which influence individuals towards terrorism. When family, social, and political reasons pressures people, they become angry, unhappy, and discontent. This process makes the individuals potential targets for the terrorist organization. At this point, terrorists use propaganda by employing the most affective figures on the individuals. Friends, family members, and relatives are the most effective

propagandists of terrorist organizations. Once the individuals are convinced, they are taken into training program, which is broken down two different parts. The first and the very effective is the political training in which the individuals practice some illegitimate acts and confront with police. At this point, the likelihood of being arrested and imprisonment is very high. These experiences provide individual a prestige in the organization and make him appointed to some significant positions in the organization. Terrorist organizations want to utilize from those individuals in their military wing and take them into military training programs. They train their members on how to use certain weapons and how to maintain a professional terrorist life.

This map clarifies the recruitment process of terrorist organization and provides us an insight on how to develop a policy implication to stop this process. It also facilitates to draw a counter-terrorism plan in which the certain responsibilities of agencies, families, and other social institutions are crystallized.

#### Future Research Opportunities

Recruitment process starts with social, economical, and political problems. They may be different from region to region, and country by country. Also, it may be different among different terrorist organizations. Therefore, researchers will conduct research about social, political and economical problems to stop terrorism.

As data shows that most of the terrorists do not have job and family attachment as well as social bonds with social and moral entities. Researcher will conduct research to find out what governments will do to provide some opportunities for people who are on the target potential recruitment pool of terrorist organization to get job and to be a members of social entities.

Initial contact is significantly important. Terrorist organizations reach their targets by using friend, relatives and terrorist publications. There is a big opportunity for researcher to carry out research about initial contact to find out who will be the targets for terrorist organization and how, when, where, and with whom terrorist organizations reach their targets.

It is a fact that terrorist organization use technology not only plan and carry out terrorist attacks, but also they use technology to make new recruits. In fact, today, they use the Internet and Websites to reach their potential members. Thus, these are good research areas for researchers to find out how terrorist organizations use the Internet to reach potential members. Also, it would be valuable to conduct research to find out the way of communication and hat kinds of technology terrorist organization use to communicate.

As Figure 1 shows, each social and governments entities has the responsibility to stop the individual before joining the terrorist organization; therefore, there are several research opportunities for scholars to find out what could family, school, social and moral organizations do to stop individuals to become a member of terrorist organizations.

### Policy Recommendations

1. Governments should find solutions for social and economical problems.
2. Create new job opportunities for people who are in the target group of terrorist organizations
3. Government should fight corruption and inequality
4. Governments set up opportunities for the public to explain their opinions and find solutions for their problems in democratic society

5. Early prevention programs set up for target population
6. Schools will create systems to teach students how they prevent themselves from becoming susceptible to terrorist organizations. Also, schools and family should work cooperatively to see unexpected behaviors of their children to stop recruitments
7. People should freely express their opinion and government respect for their demands
8. As data shows that 50% of respondents had been arrested before the last arrest, law enforcement should act professionally and respect human right. Also, government must not use any unlawful things.
9. After the prison, government should create program for inmates to return society not terrorist organization
10. With the movements from small places to big city create new environments for immigrants. Governments should work on those places to help immigrant to be apart of the city life. Also, governments should open social environment for newcomers' such as sport centers and library to make those place to welcome those people.

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