

AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE: CASE STUDIES IN NARCO-TERRORISM

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This study is designed both as a case study and a literature-based policy analysis to assist interested parties in gaining a better understanding of controversial “narco-terrorism” phenomenon. The objectives of this study are to show the existing connection between some terrorist organizations and drug trafficking to provide academic information about and explanations for terrorism and drug trafficking, to critically analyze the biases of many current narco-terrorism doctrines and to offer a comprehensive and neutral typology that elucidates all types of narco-terrorism.

This thesis is presented in four parts. The first part includes an introduction to narco-terrorism and provides a historical background of drug dilemma and terrorism. A number of definitional and conceptual arguments constituting the backbone of the study are laid out in the second part of the study. Third part consists of case studies of three different insurgent groups. An analysis of the information uncovered and presented in previous chapters and a typology of narco-terrorism are provided in the last part. Thesis is concluded with recommendations in an attempt to inspire useful policies for individuals or institutions operating on the field.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Terrorism and the drug problem pose an enormous threat to the stability of the modern world. While both have moved to the forefront of the world's agenda during the early part of the twentieth century, they have each existed in varying forms and degrees throughout history. The drug phenomenon especially has played important part in world politics due to modern advances in international transportation and communication capabilities. A short review of historical development of the drug issue in world politics and a consideration of the enormous economic potential would shed light on the ways in which the drug trade could potentially foster organized crime groups and terrorist organizations.

#### The Drug Problem

Human beings have always consumed drugs for social, curative, holy and dietary purposes. They used wine, tobacco, opium, marijuana, coffee, betel, coca, kava, gat, hallucinogens and many other drugs that predate history to keep themselves awake, lessen pain and increase virility (McAllister, 2000). China and several European countries obtained the drug opium from Western Asia until late pre-modern period. Merchants who traded internationally predominantly carried rare metals, minerals, luxury items, slaves, and exotic crops or products. Among these exotics were rare tree bark and resins, fragrant incense and musk, spices, herbs, and certainly opiate. These exotics were

shipped thousands of miles to lands where they did not grow, their rarity ensuring an extremely high profit margin.

Ironically, the opium was very easy to cultivate and opium was fairly easy to produce. However, the secret of how to grow the poppy plant was very well guarded. As a consequence, countries like China poured an enormous amount of money into the importing of opium until it finally began to produce opium locally around 1820. Britain, however was able to capitalize on the opium market and, as consequence, owes a great deal of its imperial power to the trade of opiates (Trotsky, 1999).

At the beginning of twentieth century, numerous factors brought the drug problem to the attention of the Western Government leaders. Pharmacological improvements led to more powerful drugs, peaking the interest of the commercial industry. However, several grassroots organizations, including many American Protestant groups, moved to ban both recreational drugs and alcohol entirely, claiming that drugs and alcohol use transforms people into violent criminals (McAllister, 2000). However, movements such as the anti-opium campaign in the United States and England at the turn of the twentieth century had the dual effect of discriminating against unwanted Eastern immigrants. Similarly, reform actions within China had ulterior motives as well (McLemore & Rome, 1998; Taylor, 1969).

Developments in agricultural and pharmacological science and a burgeoning global marketplace helped to produce new substances which were widely available. The quick spread of cocaine is a negative result of these positive developments. After coca

leaves' arrival in Europe, still fresh due to efficient shipping techniques, cocaine use for both medical and abusive purposes increased sharply.

Before the early twentieth century, Western nations did not give much thought to drug-related problems. This laissez-faire approach toward drug use enabled drug consumption levels to increase and allowed a rise in the popularity of home-remedies over medical science. However, once the negative affects of the abuse of drugs such as cocaine became apparent, Westerners began to approach the drug problem with concern. The decision to be made was not *whether* to regulate drugs, *rather* how much regulation should there be.

The negative side effects of cocaine and opiate addiction became a hot political topic. Social reform groups took up the cause of drug control both for the sake of eradicating drugs and to further their own agendas, using the drug issue to gain the public ear. Often led by fundamentalist Protestant women, these reform groups touted public heath care, child welfare, social work and self-control. In the early twentieth century, several organizations, both public and private, began to show an open desire to organize a multi-national effort to combat the drug trade (McAllister, 2000).

The first international conference on drugs, The Shanghai Opium Commission (1909) was organized by the United States (US). There are three main reasons the American arranged the Shanghai Opium Commission. First, Americans had never been involved in the opium trade with China mainly due to moral and religious objections. Western missionaries shaped American perception of China. Americans, like many Westerners at the time, understood little about the Chinese customs and thus dismissed

their culture as immoral and inferior. Secondly, Americans hoped that the Chinese government and people would abandon their long-term enemy Europeans and favor the US with profitable trade arrangements like those between China and several Western nations. Lastly Americans were worried about opium because of addiction problems in their Pacific Island colonies, namely the Philippines. Spain, who formerly controlled the Islands, was selling opium to the US islands for revenue as many other European nations, even though Americans were characterized by uprightness by the time (Meyer, and Parssinen, 1998).

Americans were not satisfied with the result of Shanghai Opium Commission due to the failure of the nations to solidify an agreement. This inadequacy gave a birth to The Hague Opium Conference and Convention (1911-1912). Only eight months after the Shanghai Commission met, the US sent invitations for the Hague Conference to the same countries who had been in Shanghai. Americans justified this invitation by stressing their own drug problem and the need for international cooperation to overcome the problem, as no country could overcome it by itself (Taylor, 1969).

After these initial attempts to organize international cooperation to solve the drug dilemma, no significant steps were taken toward an effective multinational effort until after World War II. In the 1960s, the US, now a major world power, and a big portion of the international community realized that there was still no serious and comprehensive multinational plan to squash the drug problem. The United Nations then generated its most famous, and perhaps the most regulatory treaties. The 1961, 1971 and 1988 United Nations conventions were revolutionary developments in the worldwide co-operation



against the drug problem. The 1961 Single Convention intended to eliminate the illegitimate production of drugs. It also sought to regulate the legal production, manufacture, trade, distribution, and consumption of the drugs that are mainly derived from natural plants such as cocaine, heroine and marijuana. The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and 1972 amendment protocol of Single Convention addressed the synthetic substances, creating provisions to regulate their trade, selling, distribution and stocking. Finally, after the efforts of the first two convention proved lackluster, the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances revisited the issue of international regulations. This last convention intended to improve international cooperation and encourage governments to take serious measures against the drug problem. It has since been instrumental in furthering the implementation of programs that effectively combat drug trafficking and abuse, programs that advocate judicial cooperation, the extradition of traffickers, controlled delivery and the action against the laundering of money derived from illicit drug trafficking (INCB Report, 1999).

Despite national and international efforts, drugs use and trafficking still continue to invade everyday life. According to the United Nations some 180 million people globally were consuming drugs in the late 1990s. This number includes 144 million consuming cannabis, 29 million people consuming amphetamines, 14 million people taking cocaine and 13 million people abusing opiates, 9 million of whom were addicted to heroin (Global Illicit Drug Trends, 2001). The United States is the largest single consumer of illicit drugs in the world, with some 12.8 million current drug abusers out of

a total population of 260 million (U.N., 1998). Many millions more take part in the supply side of the drug trade by producing, trafficking, and distributing illicit drugs.

The trade in illegal drugs is a multi-billion dollar global business. The World Drug Report of United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) notes that the total revenue accrued to date in the illicit drug industry ranges from 300 billion to 500 billion dollars, nonetheless, a full eight percent of total international trade. In other words, the drug trade is bigger than international trade of iron, steel and motor vehicles.

This international illicit economy has developed its own underground organizations. The Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice (DEA) indicates that international organized crime organizations from a variety of countries control every stage of illicit drug trade from production to final street-level sale. International terrorist groups also use the structure of these trafficking networks as their organizational model. They control their employees very rigidly, utilizing a highly compartmentalized cell structure that keeps the divide production, shipment, distribution, money laundering, communications, security, and recruitment phases all separate from one another, each cell operating independently with no knowledge of the other cells. Drug trafficking organizations are capable of purchasing the most advanced transportation and communication technologies including sophisticated aircraft, land and water vessels, sonar, and radar. They may also have an arsenal of weapons and soldiers to use them. They have established vast counterintelligence capabilities and transportation networks. Current international crime networks are harder to combat than organized crime syndicates of the past. Today's crime networks have a greater

inclination toward violence and have a more sophisticated operating strategy than past networks. Today's groups often corrupt whole governments in order to utilize entire state institutions. Previously, organized crime groups simply moved to corrupt individuals such as such as police officers and judges (DEA, 2001).

### Terrorism

Terrorism, on the other hand, is a more controversial issue than the drug problem. Its political nature makes it difficult to adequately define. On occasion, an author may attempt to define terrorism. However, such an attempt is often followed by a disclaimer about the possible existence of other definitions. There are hundreds of definitions of terrorism. There is simply no standard. However the following definitions are useful due to their academic and institutional nature. First, Wardlaw (1989, p.16) offers this definition with the belief that a globally accepted definition of terrorism must contain the concept of individual inspiration, social setting, and political rationale as well as general behavioral description:

“Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence, by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.”

This is a very comprehensive definition, but it restricts terrorism to political terrorism.

Other definitions state that terrorism is not a tactic for only insurgencies or revolutionaries but also is a tactic employed by some states. Consider the following definition by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The FBI defines terrorism as,

“The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI, 2001). The institutional perspective of the FBI does not differentiate dramatically from academic perspectives. However, the FBI focuses on the legal and investigative dimensions of the problem while academia concentrates on the political and social consequences of the phenomenon.

Terrorism dates as far back as drug problem. Assassinations were common terrorist acts even in its infancy. The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. can be considered as a terrorist act. Caesar, the Roman emperor, was murdered for political gain. This is terrorism by definition because today’s political scientists take assassination as a terror activity by defining it as the murder of the leader or another administrator of the state individually or as a group (Simonsen, 2000).

The writings of Josephus Flavius provide information about other early organized terrorist groups, namely an extreme Jewish sect the Sicari. The Sicari was arose to action after Roman invasion of Palestine. They used the crowds of religious festivals to camouflage their attacks as they assaulted their rivals with sica, or “short blade” which was placed under their coats. They were active mainly in urban areas, a direct contrast to other zealots who employed guerrilla warfare tactics against the Romans in rural areas. Reportedly, Sicari destroyed the fortress and archives of the Herodian dynasty and killed the renowned priest.

Order of the Assassins was another influential radical terrorist group. Hassan Sabah, the founder of the order, manifested an extreme form of the Ismaili doctrine, an

Islamic faction. Initially, the Assassins were established in mountain fortresses. They began by invading the fortress Alamut in 1090 and went on to many others, eventually expanding their terror to urban areas. They killed many influential enemies, including the Sultan of Baghdad Nazim al Mulq, Count Raymond II of Tripoli in Syria, and the ruler of the Jerusalem Kingdom, Marquis Conrad of Montferrat. They terrorized Persia, Syria and Palestine for a long time. The Order of the Assassins was the first terrorist group in record to utilize disguises and suicide attacks to cripple their opponents.

During the nineteenth century the Napoleonic Wars caused an emergence of guerilla warfare in Spain and Russia. Italian and Irish patriots employed terrorism by their covert societies. In many Balkan states, Turkey and Egypt several groups used terrorism as their primary operational strategy.

Russia is certainly no stranger to terrorist activities. Anarchies and the other opponents of the Russian government used terrorist actions both as a propaganda tool and to reshape the Russian government altogether. The murder of Tsar Alexander II in March 1881 was one of the most important terrorist attacks of the nineteenth century. The assassination was carried out by the Narodya Volya, or “the People’s Will.” Boevaya Organisatsia or “Fighting Organization” was another active Russian terrorist organization.

The twentieth century also witnessed many terrorist organizations and activities. Armenian terrorists carried out a three step terrorist campaign against the Turks, which continued until 1980s. The IMRO, or Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, can be counted as one of the first examples of state sponsored terrorism as it was backed by

Bulgarian Government. The Black Hundred of Russia, Croatian Ustasha and Rumanian Iron Guard are examples that predate World War II. After the war, terrorist activity moved from Europe to Middle East and Asia. Terrorism showed itself as guerilla movements in agrarian cultures, however took place in inner cities in urban societies. Israeli terrorist groups such as the Irgun and Stern Gang, Tuparamos of Uruguay, Red Army of Germany, the Red Brigades of Italy, IRA of Ireland and the ETA of Spain are all examples of twentieth century terrorist organizations.

The growing use and impact of nationally sponsored terrorism sparked endless discussions among European Leftist groups about the validity and morality of terrorism. Many of the chief leftists refused to utilize terrorism preferring open armed force. However, two German philosophers, Karl Heintzen and Johann Most, disagreed. They believed assassinations to be a political must. They both moved to the United States from Germany and continued to be theorists of terrorism. Heintzen saw improved technology and weapons of mass destruction to be the key for achieving revolution. Johann Most in his New York newspaper *Freiheit*, turned out to be the most effective anarchist organ. He also believed in the effectiveness and necessity of violence, advocating the development of mass destruction weapons. *Freiheit* writings were the inspiration for *The Anarchist Cookbook*, published by the American New Left in the 1960s. To this day, the *Cookbook* is the standard text for terrorists (Laqueur, 1999).

#### Drug-Terrorism Nexus

As mentioned earlier, neither the drug phenomenon nor terrorism are new issues. Nevertheless, the drug-terrorism connection, which is the chief matter of this study, is a

fairly new issue. Drug related terrorism, or “narco-terrorism” is usually considered to take one of two forms. First, terrorist organizations may be directly involved in drug related activities by producing, trafficking, and distributing illegal drugs. On the other hand, narco-terrorism may occur when drug trafficking organizations use terrorist tactics, such as assassinations, bombings and kidnappings. In either case, the goal of the narco-terrorist groups is to generate revenue. The only difference between a terrorist-based group and a drug-trafficking based group is their final objective. While terrorist groups seek monetary gains to finance their violent political activities, drug trafficking networks reach their final destination when they exchange their illegal drugs with money. Nonetheless, types of narco-terrorism are not restricted with these two. Further in this paper, a comprehensive typology of narco-terrorism will be provided.

Another important aspect of narco-terrorism is its political nature. While certain organizations are considered “terrorist” by some countries, others name them freedom fighters, guerillas or insurgents. These are purely semantic arguments and complicate efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking and international terrorism. For example, in Turkey, which is a very hot spot for both terrorism and drug trafficking, during the 1980s and 1990s several drug seizures in Turkey and many other European countries pointed toward a connection between the terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and an international drug trafficking ring. It was proven that all of these drug traffickers were PKK militants. Nevertheless, many European governments did not consider the PKK to be a terrorist organization in spite of millions of heroin addicts of their own and clearly verified PKK violence. After tons of heroin and other drugs trafficked into these

respective European countries, after the PKK established its smuggling network in Europe, and after thousands of pages of evidentiary documentation, some European countries finally banded the PKK's activities. Walter Laqueur (1999) notes in his writings that the involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking is unequivocally proven by a substantial amount of evidence before its activities were banned.

The recent terrorist attacks in New York on the World Trade Center and in Washington D.C. against the Pentagon showed that the political agendas of governments that play "Your Terrorist is My Freedom Fighter" game may devastatingly compromise national and international security.

The term "narco-terrorism" is even less well defined than "terrorism." Due to clandestine and illegal nature of narco-terrorist groups, there is little opportunity for academicians to attain information about them. Many authors emphasize this lack of first-hand intelligence, and note that this lack may lead to falsely identifying as narco-terrorist groups that have nothing to do with drug trafficking. They also stress that some governments may have much to gain by falsely accusing such groups.

Because it occurs in a variety of forms, it is difficult to provide a universal definition of narco-terrorism. However, a working definition of narco-terrorism would be helpful to establish a basis for discussion. In that vein, narco-terrorism can be described as simply a group action that combines terrorism with some aspect of the narcotics trade.

Narco-terrorism exists in several forms. It may manifest itself as the direct or indirect involvement of terrorist/insurgent organizations in the illicit drug trade. Narco-



terrorism may consist of the employment of terrorist-like tactics by drug trafficking organizations. Governments can “commit” narco-terrorism by supporting terrorist organizations that smuggle illicit drugs, or by secretly controlling the drug trade through governmental agencies. Governments may even secretly use their own resources to traffic drugs for the purpose of obtaining financial power or destabilizing enemy societies.

## Methodology

### Purpose of This Study and Questions

This study will attempt to provide a comprehensive and neutral typology of narco-terrorism by explaining the characteristics and methods of operation for known narco-terrorist organizations. Narco-terrorism, as a term, was born in Latin America due to allegations that political insurgent groups were participating in illicit drug trafficking. For this reason, a secondary purpose of this study will be to analyze three of the most important Latin American insurgent groups: (a) the Sendero Luminoso (The Shinning Path); (b) the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (the FARC); and (c) the 19<sup>th</sup> of April Movement (the M-19). A basic historical background of these groups, their methods of raising funds, their ideology, their overall strategies and “battlefield” tactics, and the financial structure of their organizations will be explored. The overarching goal of this research is to uncover as much information about narco-terrorism as possible in an effort to understand and explore the various academic and governmental approaches that have been put forth on the topic.

The objectives of this study are to show the existing connection between some terrorist organizations and drug trafficking to provide academic information about and explanations for terrorism and drug trafficking, to critically analyze the biases of many current narco-terrorism doctrines and to offer a comprehensive typology that elucidates all types of narco-terrorism.

There are varieties of matters that need to be clarified in order to obtain a better understanding of political and economic dimensions of narco-terrorism. With this mind, the following research questions are proposed:

1. What is narco-terrorism? Is it a term that was born due to an actual connection between terrorism and drug trafficking? Is it just a myth created by repressive governments to eliminate groups that threaten the existing political system and its institutions?
2. Is there a relationship between terrorism and drug trafficking? If so, to what extent does this interaction occur? What the concrete evidence supports this thesis? Where in the world are narco-terrorism cases monitored intensively?
3. How are revolutionary insurgent groups involved in the illegal drug trade? Despite their official condemnation of it, why do some of those groups still engage in the illicit drug business? Do they only collect taxes for “protecting” drug traffickers or do they go beyond this?
4. Why do some drug trafficking organizations employ terrorist-like violent tactics? Do they have any political agenda? Or do they adopt

terrorist methods simply to deter, terrify and intimidate people who pose a threat to their lucrative business? Should this be called as narco-terrorism?

### Methodology and Methodological Problems

This study is designed both as a case study and a literature-based policy analysis to assist interested parties in gaining a better understanding of a highly controversial “narco-terrorism” phenomenon. Methodological problems that are more effective in studies that focus on politically infected and structurally inconsistent subjects are also common on this study. The concepts of narco-terrorism, drug trafficking and terrorism are more difficult to research in comparison to many other social science matters. Conventional and widely accepted scientific research techniques are not always applicable when searching terrorism and drug trafficking. For surveys, field research, and personal interviews are next to impossible in most instances due the dangerous and secretive nature of the subjects. Because of this dilemma, courageous journalists rather than academicians conduct nearly all of the field research. In general, previous studies have shown that any researcher who wishes to perform academic research on these subjects will confront serious methodological obstacles due to the confidential nature of the cases that may be the subject of study. These difficulties may be manufactured by either the criminals themselves or by state officials who wish to conceal detail of their investigations for security or political reasons. It is very difficult, therefore, to establish valid research methods. However, the effort must be made.

Almost all literature that is reviewed in this study was created by analyzing existing literature or secondary data. This is not because of the researcher's unwillingness to employ other methods; rather because concrete and reliable data on narco-terrorism is practically nonexistent due to the illegal, clandestine and political nature of the phenomenon. Virtually no records are generated during the interaction, transaction, communication, or operation phases of terrorist and drug trafficking organization because of possible legal ramifications. The political nature of narco-terrorism is also a drawback for the researcher. Many books, articles, and reports are written in a biased manner.

Even though accurate data on narco-terrorism is almost nonexistent, there is good amount of information about drug trafficking and terrorism, which are fundamental prerequisites for narco-terrorism. For example, research on the drug trafficking issue may reveal useful data regarding governmental drug seizures, trafficking routes, production and consumption zones, trafficking and abuse trends, arrested drug traffickers, infiltrated trafficking organizations, and so on. Besides a variety of books and articles there are several other sources for this kind of data. Governmental institutions created to combat drug problem usually collect and organize a great deal of useful and reasonably reliable data. The Drug Enforcement Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation are prime examples of this type of agency. This study, when it necessary, will cite data from the publications of both of these agencies. There are also international organizations that possess massive amounts of valuable information on the drug phenomenon. Most prominent among these international organizations are the United Nations Drug Control

Programme (UNDCP), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Interpol, the World Health Organization, and the World Customs Organization. There are also nongovernmental organizations and independent institutes that are engaged in drug-related research, including the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction. Among these sources, for the purpose of this research, UNDCP and INCB data will be preferred.

Data on terrorism, on the other hand, is more qualitative than quantitative. In fact, books and articles on terrorism frequently have plainly evident biases. Moreover, unlike the drug issue, there is no active international organization that may be used as a source of neutral data. However, there are a few national administrations that have valuable data on the issue. Nevertheless, it may not be easy to obtain such information from these national administrations. Most importantly, an enormous amount of scholarly thought on terrorism exists, providing precious information and intellectual explanations of terrorism. The researcher may obtain historical, ideological, philosophical, political, and structural information about terrorism in general or about a terrorist organization in particular. Books used in this study are mainly the books that are considered to be the premier works on the subject of terrorism. The issues within drug trafficking and terrorism will be compared and combined with the intention of gaining an understanding of how the two work together.

Regarding narco-terrorism, there is a great difficulty finding valid sources on the drug-terrorism/insurgency nexus. Because of the political nature of the problem, highest care has been taken regarding the selection of sources. Narco-terrorism has been a

popular and effective propaganda tool for both insurgents and governments. Its subjective nature leaves data about narco-terrorism open for abuse by either side. The data may easily be manipulated to benefit the author's cause. To avoid bias, a cross validation of the literature has been attempted by checking the allegations made in one work with several other sources. This process requires the use of a broad selection of sources, a feat that has been attempted in spite of an extreme deficiency of sources. This study is based on analyzing existent literature or secondary data. I will refer to scholarly articles and books on the subject as well as information compiled by international organizations, national institutions, non-governmental organizations, media organizations, and the Internet.

In this perspective, the research is predominantly library-based. It will entail a comprehensive literature review, which will provide an overview of current viewpoints in this area. This paper will be presented in four chapters. In this, the first chapter, I have introduced narco-terrorism and have attempted to provide a historical background of drug the dilemma and terrorism having set forth two valid definitions of terrorism, one from academia and one from the field. In Chapter Two, a number of definitional and conceptual arguments constituting the backbone of the study will be laid out by presenting and evaluating selected writings on the elemental concepts of the narco-terrorism. Chapter Three will consist of case studies of three different insurgent groups the Sendero Luminoso, the FARC, and the M-19. It has been dedicated that a case study would be the best research method to use due to the elusive and the controversial nature of the subject. An analysis of the information uncovered and presented in the Chapter

Three and the typology of narco-terrorism will be provided in Chapter four. The study will be concluded with recommendations in an attempt to inspire useful policies for individuals or institutions operating on the field. Recommendations are made under the light of ideas and data discussed mainly in second chapter, and with the help of my own experience on the field.

#### Limitations to the Study

The scarce availability of sources not only presents methodological problems, it presents limitations to the scope and depth of the study. Due to the controversial nature of this topic, sources have been chosen with great care and consideration. For example, studies written with for the sake of furthering an ideological agenda had to be eliminated despite the extremely limited amount of sources. The inadequate amount of reliable academic work has necessitated the use of some governmental documents. Occasionally these documents are lacking in scientific validity due to the inclination of some governments to hide real figures in order to present their own interests and accomplishments in a favorable light.

While efforts to combat narco-terrorism are no more successful now than were fifteen years ago, narco-terrorism does not attract researchers anymore. Current articles that slightly mention the drug-terrorism connection are rare. As a consequence the sources for this study are often ten or more years old. The reason narco-terrorism has disappeared the world's agenda despite its still prominent presence will be studied further in this paper.

Another problem to be confronted is the limited amount of academically valid quantitative statistical data. More or less every study in this field is generated by either analyzing preexisting literature or secondary data. A tertiary analysis, then, of these sources poses difficulties when attempting to make constructive comparisons. The ability to create valuable statistical data using these methods is quite limited in comparison to researches techniques that employ field research or surveys.



## CHAPTER 2

### ELEMENTAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONAL DISCUSSIONS

#### Terrorism

There are a variety of studies that attempt to explain matter of terrorism. As mentioned earlier, the definitions of terrorism are as diverse as the authors who attempt to define it. That having been said, Table 1 provides simple, thoughtful and useful definitions of various terrorism types.

Table 1: White's Definition of Terrorism (1991).

<i>Type</i>	<i>Definition</i>
Simple	Violence or threatened violence intended to produce fear and change
Legal	Criminal violence violating legal codes and punishable by the state
Analytical	Specific political and social factors behind individual terrorist attacks
State-sponsored	Terrorist groups used by small states and the Communist Bloc to attack Western interests
State	Power of government used to terrorize its people into submission

Brain Jenkins and Walter Laqueur each present a definition of terrorism. Jenkins describes terrorism as the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about a political change. Laqueur calls terrorism the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted. He adds that terrorism is a form of political or criminal violence that uses with the intent of changing behavior. These definitions

while they do address the problem, are overly broad and do little to shed light on the problem.

Other schools of thought focus on 'legal definition' of terrorism. Legal definitions describe terrorism as a crime, a violation of law, and justify governmental action against terrorists as criminals who violate the law. The legal approach, however, fails to take into consideration the social and political weaknesses inherent in a legal system of governance. What is considered to be legal is often the direct result of which group is in power. Hence, one side has the power to label behavior of its adversaries as illegal. A group may be then named terrorist simply because its opponents are in power. Legal definitions are therefore not valid for every situation related to terrorism (White, 1991).

Alex Schmid (1983) tried to provide a comprehensive definition of terrorism by examining all existing literature that attempts to define terrorism. At the end of his study, he came to the conclusion that there is not a final, distinct, and universal definition of terrorism. A single definition would not be able to encompass all probable uses of the term. However, in spite of this wide variety of definitions, terrorism in all its forms generally contains some common elements. For instance, it is the target population who determines the essence of terrorism. Victims are persons who are chosen for their symbolic value. Violent terrorists use brutality against these victims to create a chronic state of fear among the public. So, not only does the immediate victim suffer, the members of the larger 'target' society experiences negative attitude alterations.

“What the terrorist does is kill, maim, kidnap, and torture.” William J. Casey (1986, p.3) approaches the question with an uninflected description. He continues by stating that anyone can be a victim of terrorism. They do not have to have a particular political identity. Children, civilians, politicians, or diplomats can be attacked and violence is the primary tool that terrorists prefer to use.

Some other scholars propose that revolutionary violence should not be correlated with terrorism. Crenshaw (1983) argues that before calling an event as “terrorism,” the target, the act, and the political success should be examined. According to Crenshaw ‘freedom fighters’ should not be called terrorists because they only fight against despot states. Terrorism is an act that is intended to achieve a psychological effect by using intolerable social and political violence against guiltless emblematic targets. As discussed in the first chapter, this approach results in a “Your terrorist is my freedom fighter” conflict. None of the terrorist groups believe that they are actually terrorists; rather they believe they are revolutionaries or freedom fighters.

Some authors attempt to address the issue of state-sponsored terrorism. Benjamin Netanyahu (1987) calls state-sponsored terrorism an attack on western civilization. He considers it to be a political crime and war against the people, in which society is threatened with chaos and killings. Livingstone (1986) limited Netanyahu’s definition to America. He believes that terrorism is nothing but the method the Warsaw Pact states use to employ terror against America (Livingstone & Arnold, 1986).

The violent applications of repressive governments may also be called terrorism. Herman (1983) considers Latin American governments to be examples of states that use

terrorism to maintain these existing systems. The continuous efforts by these states to pressure the existing political structure strongly resemble the tactics of terrorism. Abusing their power by committing unlawful arrests, murders, and torture these Latin American states acted no different than the insurgents that they call terrorists.

Because there is no consensus over a single conclusive definition of terrorism, some social scientists focus on creating a typology of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson (1974) justifies his efforts to classify terrorism by indicating that terrorism has a dynamic structure and therefore need a situational definition. He divides terrorism into two main categories: criminal and political terrorism. The criminal terrorist seeks either personal psychological satisfaction or monetary success. On the other hand, political terrorism manifests itself in different forms. Political terrorism may be State-sponsored, Repressionist, Nationalist, or Revolutionary. Revolutionary terrorism is generally employed in attempt to establish a new political ideology using violence to change or overthrow the existing political ideology. Some governments use Repressionist policies to terrorize their own citizens in order to gain authority. Others attack other states using terrorist modus operandi. Nationalistic terrorism either seeks political independence from an imperial authority or fights for a change in the ethnic make-up of the existing government.

In his book “Transnational Terror” Bell (1975) provides a comprehensive model that divides terrorism into six parts (Table 2). Bell (1978) mainly focuses on Revolutionary terrorism in his other book “A Time of Terror”. Revolutionary terrorist groups have an organized structure that is intended to maintain discipline among its

members. They frighten group members into obedience and punish their own members when they fail to follow group policies. They have a great desire to maintain public support, so they use tactics that keep their members well under control.

Revolutionary terrorist organizations also employ what Bell (1978) calls “functional” terror to achieve these objectives. Functional terror is used to create the impression that the government is too weak to handle the threat. This functional terror consists of the terrorist organization launching continuous assaults against random or chosen targets. They provoke states to take action that represses the public. These repressive actions, in turn, are seen as justification for their violent attacks against governmental targets. They manipulate every occasion possible to spur dramatic confrontations. “Manipulative” terror involves the use of hostages or assets to gain desired media attention, political power, or physical resources. They intended to force the legal authority into some sort of surrender.

Table 2: Bell’s Typology of Terrorism

<i>Types</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
Psychotic	Psychological Gratification
Criminal	Profit
Vigilante	Retaliation
Endemic	Internal Struggle
Authorized	State Repression
Revolutionary	Behavioral Change Through Fear

Source: Transnational Terror

The practice of attacking targets with no strategic importance or committing an assassination to destroy the fundamental nature of the government are tactics of

“symbolic” terror (Bell, 1978). A completely comprehensive understanding of revolutionary terror will help elucidate describe the character of terrorism.

### Drug Trafficking and Abuse

The drug problem consists of two essential parts: drug abuse and drug trafficking. Unlike terrorism and narco-terrorism, defining the problem is not an issue. There is a common acceptance of what the problem is. However, scholars disagree on how to solve this problem.

Today, the illegal drug trade is a global phenomenon. It is a huge problem that has strong side effects. It has a negative influence on the economics, politics, and social structures of society. In spite of a number of efforts to control it, the international illicit drug market is still growing globally and the numbers of accessible illegal drugs are increasing continuously. It is one of the largest enterprises in the world. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developments reports that Europeans and Americans waste nearly \$122 billion annually on the most commonly used drugs, namely heroin, cocaine and cannabis. Moreover fifty to seventy percent of this money is laundered and diverted to other ventures. If it is assumed that these numbers are accurate, a full three-fourths of the gross national income of the 207 economies of the world is smaller than profit earned through illegal substance trade (Stares, 1996).

From another point of view, Jordan (1999) argues that the drug trade is simply a game governments play to achieve their own ends. In the international arena illicit drug smuggling serves governments in two ways. First, narcotics are used by big powers for

economic and strategic purposes. Second, smaller powers use the trade of illegal substances to fund a stronger defense for their fragile economies.

It is important to consider the fact that while every year, thousands of tons of heroin, cocaine and marijuana, and billions of synthetic drugs are seized by law enforcement agencies of different countries, the overall amount of seized illegal drugs consists of only five percent of the total amount of drugs that move between the continents. The drug enforcement administrations that can seize more than five percent are considered successful. This evaluation may appear illogical, however no country has done better despite the billions of dollars spent to control drug trafficking since the fight began. Moreover, especially in the western, so called “consuming” countries, drug abuse and addiction to hard drugs boosted dramatically after the 1960s. The number of deaths due to overdose, increased significantly. The governments of drug-troubled countries now have to arrange their budgets according to the level of their drug problem. In both rehabilitation and law enforcement phases, billions of dollars have been spent and many billions more will probably be spent in the near future. The traffickers; no matter their nationality or race, will continue to smuggle drugs and distribute them because of the extremely high profit. A kilogram of heroin that can be purchased for fifteen thousand dollars from its source may bring nearly a million dollars in the United States in street level. There is no other business transaction that can make the same revenue. This kind of beneficiary business, legal or illegal, will attract many people and even some countries.

The United States have been major consumers of illicit drugs for quite some time. It forms the largest consumption zone. The National Drug Control Strategy 2001 Annual Report (NDCSAR), is prepared by Office of National Drug Control Policy, and provides an assessment of current drug use and availability, the impact of drug use, and treatment. According to this report, in 1999, an estimated 14.8 million Americans twelve years of age and older were current illicit drug users, meaning they had used an illicit drug during the month prior to interview. This number represents 6.7 percent of the population twelve and older. Drug use reached peak levels in 1979 when 14.1 percent of the population age twelve and over were current users. This figure declined significantly between 1979 and 1992, from 23 million to twelve million. Since 1992 the number of current users has gradually increased, with statistically insignificant changes occurring each year. An estimated 3.6 million people met diagnostic criteria for dependence on illegal drugs in 1999, including 800,000 youths between the ages of twelve and seventeen.

#### Narco-terrorism

Narco-terrorism consists of two provocative and controversial subjects. Drug trafficking and terrorism are heavily affected by the politics of world powers. According to some scholars, simply labeling a group as ‘terrorist’ results in negative and isolating consequences for the group. The term ‘drug trafficker’ has equally negative connotations. To label a group as both terrorist and drug trafficker, then, creates a doubly negative image for the group in the public eye. Some governments will use the label ‘narco-terrorist’ on a group in an attempt to put the group in public disfavor, effectively



neutralizing the group. This action may be pure governmental calumny or the exaggeration of a few incidents (Wardlaw, 1989).

Other authors, however, argue that practices either terrorism or drug trafficking should not be categorized as the victim of a political slander. Exhibiting sympathy for a drug trafficker because he is incorrectly labeled 'narco-terrorist' is simply absurd. To date, intellectual sympathy toward revolutionary or insurgent groups has made many scholars focus on governmental repressions techniques and international imperialistic policies. This focus has put a positive pressure on administrations not to violate basic human rights, it also has resulted in support for terrorism and drug trafficking organizations. Literature on this issue generally emphasizes the political aspects of narco-terrorism. However, the labeling theory debate encourages the reader to look at both sides of the argument.

Miller and Damask (1996) claim that the term 'narco-terrorism' has meaning both implicitly and explicitly. Narco-terrorism has generated connotations beyond its own particularity and operational definitions. Unfortunately, despite the legal magnetism of its two elements, narco-terrorism as a term does not convey a definitive understanding of what exactly it is. Narco-terrorism initially was most likely a myth created by the Reagan administrations in order to serve his own drug policies. Scholarly and popular literature gave it a space and it engaged its own reality. At the beginning of its emergence, narco-terrorism was presented as a simple conspiracy of drug traffickers. The term served the interests of the Reagan organization's foreign policies. The following years witnessed an evaluation of the term narco-terrorism. And it became an applied more often. The failure

of the Reagan and subsequent Bush administrations to overcome narco-terrorism became a useful tool for their Democratic opponents.

A distinctive approach to the narco-terrorism phenomenon is provided by Peter A. Lupsha (1989). He outlines the precise theoretical distinctions inherent in the subject and tries to create a typology of narco-terrorism. Lupsha, like many other scholars, acknowledged the vague and unclear nature of the term narco-terrorism. He writes, “As a concept from which one can develop better models for understanding both drug trafficking and issues of insurgent conflict, ‘narco-terrorism’ is currently a badly defined and politically contaminated term.”

The definition of terrorism by Vice President Bush’s 1986 Task Force on Combating Terrorism constitutes the basis for Lupsha’s *Type-I: True Narco-terrorism*. This definition focuses on the criminality of terrorism and avoids political approaches that make one’s terrorist another’s freedom fighter. True Narco-terrorism consists of the use of violence by drug traders to threaten governmental authority and state institutions. This is the only explanation that fully fits the denotative meaning of the term narco-terrorism.

When tainted governmental bodies, such as the police, military, politicians or bureaucrats perform terrorism to the advantage of drug traffickers, another type of narco-terrorism occurs, *Type Ia: State Surrogate Narco-terrorism*. *Type-Ib: Insurgent Surrogate Narco-terrorism*, occurs when insurgent groups behave as representatives of drug traffickers. When the Colombian insurgent group the M-19 attacked the Colombian Supreme Court and killed eleven judges to stop the extradition of Colombian drug

traffickers to United States, this group engaged in *Type-Ib: Insurgent Surrogate Narco-terrorist*.

*Type II narco-terrorism*, “*Narco-Warfare*” includes the cooperation between peasant cultivator and insurgents to fight against any administration that employs policies that threaten to eliminate or prohibit coca leaf cultivation, paste production, or refining. The last form of narco-terrorism is *Insurgent Narco-terrorism, Type-III*. In this type of narco-terrorism insurgent groups are actually involved in active drug trafficking and they may employ terrorist tactics to protect their interests. They may oversee the manufacture and distribution of cocaine in the areas that are under their control (Lupsha, 1989).

Rachel Ehrenfeld (1990) defines narco-terrorism as “the use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations.” In general, she considers narco-terrorism to be a tactic of anti-capitalistic Marxist-Leninists who target the United States and other non-Marxist, democratic states in the Western hemisphere. She argues that aside from generating revenue, the motivation behind narco-terrorism is the destabilization of Western, democratic society, the US in particular. Ehrenfeld believes that the American administration should view take drug trafficking as a political attack on the Western civilization and should not treat it as an ordinary criminal activity. Her study focuses on the cooperation between the state-sponsored international narcotics traffickers and international terrorist organizations that employ pro-Marxist tactics and strategies to undermine legal democratic states.

James A. Inciardi (1991) addresses some questions that will aid in understanding phenomenon of narco-terrorism: Is narco-terrorism a breed of terrorism or some new

type of political violence? Does it involve any kind of violence regardless of its terrorism tag? Is it a common practice in producer countries or in consumer countries? Can this matter be systematically studied? Lastly and most importantly, is narco-terrorism a political concept or is it an economic concept? Inciardi discusses this last question and concludes that narco-terrorism is an economic concept rather than a political one. His justification for this conclusion offers some explanation of the term. Narco-terrorism is not a new type of terrorism that was developed to counter the illegalization of drugs. On the contrary narco-terrorism is more like a shorthand label that is used to identify the variety of organizations that connects violent terrorist action with the economics of the illicit drug business.

There are two ways in which the drug-terrorism interaction Inciardi proposes are similar to those Lupsha. First, Inciardi notes the violent intimidation techniques used by drug trafficking organizations that are considered narco-terrorism actions by journalists and state officials even though this violence ordinarily would not be considered typical terrorist activity. This definition of narco-terrorism matches Lupsha's *Type I* in which drug traders use violence to threaten governmental authority. The actions of this type of narco-terrorism may include the murder of competing dealers and traffickers, as well as the murder or intimidation of informers or their family members, law enforcement officers, judges, and prosecutors.

Secondly, according to Inciardi, insurgent groups and national governments become involved directly or indirectly with illicit drug trade in order to finance their revolutionary agendas. This view of narco-terrorism strongly resembles Lupsha's *Type*

*Ib: Insurgent Surrogate Narco-terrorism.* These types of groups may extort money from peasants who grow opium poppies or coca leaves, grant protection safety to refining and smuggling organizations, directly produce and traffic illegal drugs, or maintain absolute control over drug-producing zones (Inciardi, 1991; Lupsha, 1989).

MacDonald (1998) defines the drug-insurgency nexus as the formation of political-military territories that are controlled by drug traffickers who are allied with extreme leftist, revolutionary groups. On the other hand, narco-terrorist groups utilize terrorist strategies, including assassinations and hostage-taking to provide protection to drug dealers, producers, and drug traffickers. MacDonald maintains that the drug-insurgency nexus is usually a “marriage of convenience” between drug traffickers and leftist insurgent groups. This alliance does not necessarily mean that drug traffickers and insurgent groups share the same ideology. In fact, while insurgent guerillas advocate radical changes in their society’s social and political structure, drug trafficking organizations generally benefit by maintaining the status quo.

The narco-terrorist organizations in Colombia, however, had more to gain by overthrowing the government. The impact of the illegal drug business on Colombia’s political and socioeconomic system is substantial, because this trade is founded upon a marriage between drug lords and insurgents. Leftists guerillas, who advocate either Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideology worked hand-in-hand with drug barons to their mutual benefits. A statement from the leader of the communist insurgent group M-19 (19<sup>th</sup> of April Movement), according to MacDonald, makes clear the insurgent’s view on drugs. The M-19 leader, Ospina, welcomes drug trafficking money because it can help

the country. Ospina tolerates and supports the drug cartels activities as long as they pose a threat to the imperialistic state. Their alliance with drug cartels also enabled Ospina and the M-19 to gather the financial power necessary to purchase weapons from Cuba and Nicaragua. Moreover, the drug traffickers' violent activities against the state weakened its control over illegal trade, and that resulted in a greater influx of drugs into the United States. By increasing drug use in the US, the groups hope to destabilize the global leader of imperialism. This undermining of the United States would in turn weaken the dependent capitalist government in Colombia, and thereby accelerating revolutionary to allow the guerillas to attain their long awaited triumph (MacDonald, 1998).

The assault on the Palace of Justice in downtown Bogotá in November 1985 brought more attention to the terrorism-drug trafficking linkage. The daring nature of the assault made self-evident the link between the M-19 guerillas and narcotraficantes. Further investigations indicated that this attack was conducted to stop the extradition of drug dealers to the United States. This incident will be examined in greater more detail in the following chapter.

After studying three important Latin American Insurgency Groups, the Cuban and Bulgarian connections, the criminal violence/narco-terrorism interaction, and the effects of intense drug abuse and drug demand on narco-terrorism, Vetter and Perlstein (1991) came up with a definition that divides narco-terrorism into two parts: free-lance and state-sponsored. Free-Lance narco-terrorism indicates that some terrorist organizations, due to its incredible lucrative nature, involve themselves in the illicit drug business to gain

financial power. This capital enables them to purchase guns, bribe government officials, obtain political power, and even take governments under control. The Latin American Insurgent groups The Shinning Path, the FARC, and the M-19 are listed as examples of terrorist organizations that practice these behavior. State sponsored narco-terrorism, on the other hand, usually comes in one of three forms: supporting of revolutionary groups, illegal drug traders, and arms smugglers by the states that seek destabilization and a political system change in a target country.

## CHAPTER 3

### CASE EXAMPLES OF THE DRUG-INSURGENCY NEXUS

Up to this point, this study has focused on theoretical and conceptual discussions and explanations of the drug-terrorism nexus. This chapter, however, will present an in depth focus on three major terrorist/insurgent groups and their alleged involvement in the drug business. These three groups are all based in South America, one in Peru and two in Colombia. Other groups will be discussed in Chapter IV, but a greater emphasis will be placed here on the study of the Sendero Luminoso (The Shinning Path), the FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), and the M-19 (19<sup>th</sup> of April Movement). These three South American insurgent groups were chosen due to the fact that the term narco-terrorism was born in this region. Terrorism has existed there for decades and it remains an extremely active terrorist region. Furthermore, South America place of origin for the majority of the drugs that plague today's societies. Aside from its unique peculiarities, the Latin American drug-insurgency nexus exhibits characteristics that may easily be generalized to other regions that experience drug-terrorism interactions. A short overview of these Latin American insurgencies may help lend a better understanding of the subject.

Latin American political insurgency movements began as early as the 1700s, and were primarily struggles for liberation from Spanish and Portuguese imperialism. Even though Spanish and Portuguese control eventually diminished, the momentum of the



movement lent itself to the development of further movements. For instance, Simon Bolivar, one of the greatest heroes of Latin America, guided many insurrectionist movements that ultimately brought independence to Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Other insurgent movements continued the fight for freedom throughout the nineteenth century, by the end of the Spanish-American War, Latin America freed itself from Iberian colonial control. During that the era followed, independence wars and insurgent movement shifted their focus toward revolutionary resistance based on social and political demands. Frequently insurgent movement would arise in opposition to established governments, the groups that initiated them not bothering to consider legitimate opposition methods. In other cases, insurgent movements would oppose foreign interests that were perceived as harmful. Until the Bolshevik revolution only a few insurgent groups were labeled terrorist due to fact that both leftist and rightist groups employed insurgent and guerilla tactics. (Hoehn & Weiss, 1985).

Taken as a whole, Latin American acceptance of thoughts and ideologies has occurred somewhat sporadically. This acceptance, or lack thereof, has had an important impact on the ideological orientation of political and intellectual leaders. The Latin American states have digested, imitated, or accepted European ideologies unevenly and selectively. Distinct differences among those countries, including differences in their ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and socio-economic makeup, help explain this lack of consistency. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Latin American countries are not only unique as compared with the rest of the world, they are also unique from one another.

Some Latin American countries are ethnically, culturally, and racially homogeneous, consisting of a predominantly European population and strong cultural and political ties with Western Europe or the United States. Countries of this type include Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Argentina. These countries, in turn, may have a strong impact on West European and even American ideological and cultural developments. Furthermore the Uruguayan Tupamaros or Argentine Montoneros were chosen as models by West European or American imitators. Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, and Paraguay, are all countries that have experienced a more ethnically, racially, and culturally mixed society. They were among the last to be influenced by Western thought and developments. Often times it is only the elite in these countries, who become “Westernized.” Most Latin American countries fall somewhere between these two extremes, becoming somewhat Westernized while maintaining some of their own unique attributes (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990).

Following the Bolshevik revolution, Latin American insurgents began identifying themselves with Marxist-Leninist concepts of class and social structure. Now identified as communistic in nature, a great deal of Latin American insurgent activity attracted international attention. Up to this point, insurgent activities were often regarded as the isolated activities of dissatisfied partisans and local governmental forces. The impact of this type of insurgency on international political relations was marginal at best. Today, however, insurgent groups often benefit from extensive and complex international connections. This increased resource base has helped them to evolve. They have evolved into sophisticated political-military operations that enjoy extensive and complex

international connections. Moreover, these new insurgent groups have assumed an ideological character that has an impact on all levels of international affairs (Hoehn & Weiss, 1985).

Most of the Marxist insurgent movement is inspired by the “foco theory” of Che Guevara, the most famous hero of the Cuban revolution. Guevara urged people of diverse political connections to arm themselves against repressive regimes. Foco Theory maintains that in any country where class contradictions are intolerable, it is possible for a small nucleus of well-armed individuals to begin a guerilla campaign. This campaign would serve as vehicle to mobilize the population at large into action, collapsing the existing system.

In Colombia, the country where two of the insurgent groups presented in this study emerged, the first foco-derived movement was the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). MOEC members were veterans of a unique Colombian genocidal cycle known as “la violence” (the violence). They were recruited by Antonio Larotta in 1960. Following the death of Larotta in 1961 the MOEC was disbanded, and three new guerilla movements were born in the rural area of the Colombia: the EPL (Popular Liberation Army), ELN (National Liberation Army) and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). In 1968, due to the enormous amount of violence that took place due to wars with these groups, the Colombian Army was increased threefold. Despite this increase in manpower, the guerilla forces thrived.

After six years of fighting, the situation in Colombia became more complicated when the M-19 (April 19 Movement) was founded by an old FARC member, Jaime

Bateman Canon. During the 1980s amnesty talks between the government and guerillas could not bring about stable peace. In 1985, the M-19 carried out the infamous Palace of Justice operation, leaving more than a hundred dead behind.

Thoumi (1992) argues that the Colombian guerrilla movement was initiated due to justifiable frustration with the Colombian government throughout the twentieth century. In 1953, a military government was founded with overwhelming popular support to end the *La Violencia* period. Two political parties, in fear of losing their power to the military and weakened by a loss of traditional rural support, established this government, calling it the “National Front.” This power-sharing agreement between the two political parties was to last for the next sixteen years. It successfully eliminated the violence between Liberals and Conservatives. However, it totally excluded all other Colombians who supported differing political views.

As part of the National Front agreement, the heads of the two participating parties agreed to divide most government jobs equally between them, going so far as to even alternate the presidency. This application created a sort of “political cartel,” which not only held a monopoly on political power in Colombia, but, simultaneously precluded any new political groups, either from the extreme Right or Left, from taking part in Colombian politics. As a result of their inability to legitimately participate in Colombian politics, these extremist groups organized into guerrilla movements and took over many of the state roles in places where governmental power was tenuous.

In addition to being exclusionary, the Colombian government also took on a certain market-like quality, where government officials often exchanged public

appointments and services for votes. The government developed various new functions and offices as the Colombian economy grew more complex. However, often the criteria for appointing people to these new offices had little to do with merit. As a result, the efficiency of the Colombian government dramatically decreased despite the fact that the number of sworn offices dramatically increased. Consequently, the people of Colombia steadily lost their regard for the law.

As government officials became more inefficient, they became less responsible, and less responsive to the citizens. In both the private and public sectors, corruption progressively increased. In addition, an extensive underground economy developed and thrived. Perhaps most importantly, large areas of the country fell out of governmental control. The growing difference between written law and socially accepted behavior resulted in a near complete delegitimation of the Colombian government.

The loss of legitimation and weakening of the state formed grounds that insurgent guerrilla groups found sufficiently justifiable for initializing their own political and economic plans and policies. The FARC and the M-19 provided alternative solutions for overcoming economical and political obstacles, and these policies received widespread support from struggling parts of the community (Thoumi, 1992).

Today, Colombian guerrillas remain active. However they have moved away from their original spirit that sparked their participation in the revolutionary movement. FARC, the ENL, and EPL are still unable to gain enough of a legitimate following to be able to compete in mainstream politics. Chances are slim that they will ever participate in the electoral process.

In order for three guerilla movements to survive in Colombia, they have allied themselves with drug traffickers. The ELN is estimated to make \$12.5 million through protection of the drug traffickers and kidnapping ransoms. The FARC is still the largest group with seven thousand members. However, little of the original revolutionary idealism remains among the guerillas.

In another Latin American country, Peru, the guerillas aim accomplish their objectives by aligning their movement with the aspirations of the indigenous peasants, helping them recover their land and dignity in exchange for manpower support. The Sendero Luminoso (The Shinning Path), commonly known as the Communist party of Peru, is the major insurgent group in Peru. It first gained the attention of the Peruvians on May 17, 1980, when it declared war against the Peruvian Government. At the beginning Sendero Luminoso seemed as if it were close to accomplish its goals of taking over the government and creating a new democracy for Peru. However, the Sendero has traditionally been associated with unparalleled violence and its complex ideology requires close examination (Castro, 1999).

#### Narco-terrorism Cases in Colombia

Violence in Colombia is almost “traditional.” Its history, political life, and consequent insurgence movements contain numerous outrageously violent events. Terrorism consists of using violence to deter those who support an unwanted agenda, and Colombian political insurgent groups had no difficulties adopting these violent tactics.

“Colombia is a country of contradictions,” states Camilo A. Azcarate (1999). He argues that the Colombian people can be described as intelligent and resourceful, yet they

are also individualistic, rugged and intense. Violence in Colombia is an age-old pattern of interaction between social actors. It can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Colombian history also includes periods of political cleansing such as the period between 1948-1959 in which violent political confrontations left 300,000 civilians dead and created countless widows and orphans. Another point of view indicates that the “La Violencia” era of Colombia began in 1930 when conservatives lost the presidential election because they ran two candidates. This intra-party competition split party voters and gave liberals the presidency by default. La Violencia is usually dated from 1948 to 1960, but Schmidt (1974) argues that it should begin with this election, running then from 1930 to 1964. Between these years 480,600 people were killed due to domestic violence.

Table 3: Colombian Domestic Violence

Years	Casualties
1830 -1854	10,600
1860 -1895	20,000
1899 – 1902	150,000
1948 -1965	300,000
Total	480,600

Source: La Violencia Revisited: The Clientelist Bases of Political Violence in Colombia

In spite of their various origins, Colombia’s guerilla groups have all drawn upon the legacy of “La Violencia.” In fact, many insurgent leaders have acknowledged in interviews that they were influenced by the assassination of populist leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948. The areas where the guerillas are predominantly active today are the same places in which “Lla Violencia” was most active. Furthermore, these two

movements geographically coincide with Revolutionary Liberal Movement and activities of the communist enclaves.

Despite the continuous declaration of peace and solidarity among the political parties, violent uprisings have continued to plague Colombia. This continuation is due in large part to the perception of social inequity and political obstruction among the lower classes. Essentially, this violence continues to persist due to repeated and generally frustrated attempts by the marginalized sectors of society to gather a better share of Colombian affluence. The inability of these social sects to be able to participate legitimately in the legal political arena has led the Colombian underclass to turn to alternative methods, namely violence in the form of revolutionary insurrection and guerilla movements (Boudon, 1996).

Besides its undertone of violence, Colombia has another hazardous characteristic, one capable of creating even bigger conflicts when taken together with political violence. Namely, Colombia has become an epicenter for drug production and, subsequently, drug trafficking. The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of the U.S. State Department (2000) identify Colombia as the biggest producer and distributor of cocaine, its production exceeding that every other country that is involved in the illegal drug trade. In addition, the country is also an important supplier of heroin. The already turbulent Colombian situation has now become even more convoluted due to massive influx of cash generated by the illegal drug business that has fed the violent insurgents. Almost half of Colombia's national territory is controlled by the illegal guerrilla and paramilitary groups. For the most part, these are geographically isolated areas where government



presence has traditionally been weak. These groups tax traffickers in return for the protection of their drug cultivating farms and narcotics laboratories. The strengthening of ties between drug producers and guerrilla forces and their collective attacks on the Colombian government have hindered counter-narcotics operations, especially in the guerrilla-controlled south, but also in the paramilitary-dominated areas in the north.

Colombia produces about eighty percent of world's cocaine. The DEA reports that Colombia is also origin of the sixty percent of all heroin seized in the United States. Most of the cocaine produced in the Andean Region is produced by Colombia. (Table 4 shows a detailed breakdown of illegal crop production in Colombia.) Despite record-high reports of the eradication of illicit crops, illegal drugs production has increased by thirty percent due to the fact that opium fields and coca plantations have doubled in size in the last three years. Moreover, between 1994 and 1998, government corruption and the intensity of armed conflict increased dramatically. Many politicians were bribed with drug money while drug traffickers assaulted those government agents who continued to investigate the illicit drug trade. The Pastrana administration confirmed their renewed promise to end violence and the illegal drug trade. Regardless of this commitment, the administration lost forty percent of its people to guerrillas. The Colombian National Police and the army were not very successful in eradicating the illegal corps due to their inadequate funds (Bibes, 2001).

Despite evidence that indicates the existence of a drug-insurgency interaction, Clawson and Reensselaer (1996) argue that drug traffickers and insurgents often have conflicting interests, and their relations have in large part been hostile, at least since the

Table 4: Illicit Crop Production in Colombia

	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995
<b>COCA</b>						
Potential Harvest (ha)	136,200	122,500	101,800	79,500	67,200	50,900
Eradication (ha)	47,000	43,246	-	19,000	5,600	8,750
Estimated Cultivation (ha)	183,200	-	-	98,500	72,800	59,650
Estimated Cocaine Production(mt)	580	520	435	350	300	230
<b>OPIUM</b>						
Potential Harvest (ha)	-	7,500	6,100	6,600	6,300	6,540
Eradication (ha)	9,254	-	-	6,972	6,028	3,760
Estimated Cultivation (ha)	-	-	-	13,572	12,328	10,300
<b>CANNABIS(*)</b>						
Potential Harvest (ha)	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	4,980	4,986
Eradication (ha)	-	-	-	-	-	20
Estimated Cultivation (ha)	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Potential Yield(mt)	4,150	4,150	4,150	4,150	4,150	4,133

Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2000.

(\*)Reported cannabis cultivation has not been confirmed by USG survey.

mid 1980s. The concerns of wealthy narco-traffickers about the security of their private property have allied them with Colombian elite against leftist guerrillas. For example Pablo Escobar, a well known drug trafficker, characterized himself a “man of investments.” He strictly denied being a member of the guerrillas because of the guerrilla ideology advocates the relinquishment of private property. The decision of the Medellin Cartel to invest much of its cocaine revenues in farms, ranches, and land in moderately unprotected vicinities of Colombia became an important catalyst that incited guerrilla-trafficker resentment. Now that they owned these properties, the drug traffickers became

vulnerable, or their neighbors had been, to extortion by the FARC and other guerrilla groups.

Clawson and Reensselaer (1996) cite the Colombian Paramilitary of the 1980s as another example of conflict between traffickers and guerillas. Armed self-defense organizations were active in Colombia for a while to protect property owners against guerrilla practices, such as extortion and kidnapping. However, the lack of equipment and training in these self-defense groups eventually led landowners to pay taxes to guerrillas (Guerrilla taxes on the Colombian Cocaine and Heroin Industry for 1994 and 1995 are shown in the Table 5). This situation changed as Colombian Cocaine barons invested some of their profits in vast tracts of land in Cordoba, Antioquia, Meta, and other Colombia departments.

Table 5: Guerrilla Taxes on Colombian Cocaine and Heroin Industry 1994-1995

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Tax Amount</b>
Cultivation	10,000 pesos per hectare per month
Processing	5,000 pesos per kilo produced
Export from trafficking zone	20,000 to 30,000 per kilo shipped
Operation of Laboratory	Up to 12 million pesos per month
Use of airstrip	10 million pesos per month
Import chemicals into zone	1,000 pesos per liter
Import gasoline into zone	1,000 per 55-gallon drum

Source: Andean Cocaine Industry.

Consider this example of typical progression. In the Middle Magdalena Valley of Puerto Boyoca, drug trafficking purchases raised the price of a hectare of land from \$100,000 in the early 1980s to \$1 million in 1989. Many of the recently purchased tracts of land lay in red zones, where rapacious guerrillas maintained a strong presence.

Whether their land intended to be used for drug cultivation or legitimate farming, the newly landed narcotraffickers found themselves face to face with guerrillas. The need to combat these guerrillas led the drug lords to fund the revitalization and renovation of the local-self defense forces, or even create forces where they did not exist before. Drug barons assumed the leadership of, and most of the financial responsibility for, these defense forces to combat the guerrillas. This narco-backed self-defense movement has been instrumental in extricating Communist guerrillas from certain regions of Colombia. According to one Colombian official, where the paramilitary who were backed by money from drug trafficking existed, there were no guerrillas. The well-trained, well-paid, blood-thirsty paramilitary groups were respected by guerrillas (Clawson & Rensselaer, 1996).

In his war-system theory, Richani (1997) presents another approach to the matter, an approach similar to one of Clawson and Rensselaer. He maintains that the constant violent conflict in Colombia between the guerrilla and the armed forces has allowed the drug traffickers to thrive. The drug traffickers benefited from the military balance between the guerrilla and the military, which permitted quasi-autonomous territories to be established. Consequently, the traffickers moved into the role of “balancer” between the two opposing forces, contributing some of their own resources to keep either side from victory so that they themselves could maintain their autonomy.

The traffickers negotiated alliances, however temporary, with both sides and used corruption to establish relationships with military officers, guerrillas, and politicians. When the traffickers occasionally allied themselves with insurgents against the army,

their alliance became conflicted by their incompatible manifestos. Also the acts of imposing taxes and protecting peasants by the insurgents make conflict with the traffickers inevitable. The drug traffickers in some areas have even bought large tracts of land and then sought to force out the peasants. The illicit drug smugglers, then reacted to their situation by creating paramilitary groups of their own, calling upon their legally protected right to establish such groups for self-defense.

In essence, the model proposed by Richani emphasizes how ideology and the struggle for resources keep Colombia in a state of perpetual turmoil. The traffickers and the corrupted officers of conservative military share a need to protect their monetary resources and capitalistic ideology. However, the insurgents and the paramilitary forces share the desire to prevent the establishment of a strongly legalistic Westernized state. The constant ebb and flow between these groups has produced a dynamic that allows violence in Colombia not only to perpetuate itself but to flourish and expand. The war system permits the open flow of inputs and outputs through social surroundings, but of course with porous boundaries (Richani, 1997).

According to Ehrenfeld (1990) the narcotics industry could not have grown as it has without one critical factor: the drug traffickers' alliance with the guerrillas of Colombia. That alliance is the basis for narco-terrorism. Without it, narco-terrorism would probably not exist in this hemisphere, at the very least it extremely would be limited in scope. The narco-guerrilla alliance has two fundamental characteristics. First, the economic incentive: Colombia's guerrilla armies have learned through long experience that drug money can provide them critically needed resources to carry out

their revolution. Second, the ideological incentive: there are now direct working links forged between the terrorist-guerrilla groups and the narco-traffickers to carry out acts of terrorism. Their motives may be different, but their common goal is to destabilize and undermine the government. The evidence indicating an alliance between these groups is often scattered and exaggerated. However, clearly visible evidence indicates that their cooperative efforts are deadly and devastating. In the early 1980s, the FARC and the M-19 made agreements with at least several prominent narcotics traffickers. The deal was simple, straightforward, and mutually profitable. In exchange for guerrilla protection, the cartel would allocate a percentage of its drug profits to be spent on arms for the insurgents. Thus, while the drug lords had their gunmen enabling them to carry out their business, the guerrillas used the monies paid by the cartel to escalate their war.

A closer look at some of the insurgent groups that have been involved or allegedly involved with the illegal drug trade will afford a better understanding of narco-terrorism.

#### The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC

The FARC is an insurgent/terrorist group that has plagued Colombian political and social structures for over thirty years. Its militaristic structure, ideology, and conceptualization of violence distinguish it from other guerrilla groups.

The FARC is active in the Colombian Departments of Tolima, Caqueta, Huila, Cauca, Antioquia, Santander, and Boyoca. It was founded as the armed part of the Colombian Communist Party and in May of 1966 when a number of Marulanda Velez's outlaw groups came under the Colombian Communist Party's control. From this point on

the Colombian Communist Party agenda has dictated the general policy and leadership mechanism of the FARC.

The leadership of the FARC is associated with Pedro Antonio Marin, a man who changed his name to Marulanda Velez in tribute to a trade unionist who was killed during protests against Colombian troops' deployment to the Korean War. Velez's chief assistant was Jacobo Arenas. Jaime Guaraca, Alfonso Cano, and Raul Reyes also hold key leadership positions in the FARC organization. Velez was born into a peasant family and had barely any education. He is known as one of Latin America's veteran guerrillas due to his more than thirty-year guerrilla experience. Through the course of these years, he was pronounced dead several times in conflicts with the army. Nevertheless, he kept re-emerging in guerrilla action. He is a member of the Central Committee of the Colombian Communist Party and he announced his intention of entering political arena by joining the parliament in 1984. He is considered by many to be an expert at survival, a brilliant tactician, and a strong-minded commander. He uses moving language and a charismatic demeanor to garner support, touting ideas of justice and freedom. He was personally active in combat and proved a good marksman. For nearly twenty years he exercised control over the FARC and abolished all potential opponents.

Ideologically, the FARC backs the Colombian Communist Party's thirteenth Congress tenets that call for a commitment to the creation of a "broad anti-monopoly and anti-imperialist front." It sees the nationalization of foreign enterprises, primarily financial institutions, as an obligation and shares the main economic objectives of the Colombian Communists. The FARC advocates active solidarity with Cuba, Nicaragua

and all the leftist insurgent movements in Latin America. The FARC's propaganda targets the radicalization of the Colombian peasants. It calls for revolutionary warfare and supports the Colombian Communist Party's ideological positions. The FARC's violence against peasants who refuse to cooperate is unparalleled. The FARC units have systematically killed peasants for helping government forces. Unlike many grass roots militants, the FARC leadership has a clear picture of the basic objectives of the guerrilla fight. It aims to maintain political and social turbulence in order to create a base for a communist-led national anti-governmental action.

International sympathizers have assisted the FARC with their military training. FARC guerrillas are trained primarily in Colombia, but intelligence services have observed at least thirty FARC guerrillas in specialized tactical and weapons camps in both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. After collapse of the Soviet Bloc, Cuba took over as the primary base for the FARC members. FARC recruits generally come from the Trade Union Confederation, which is to a greater extent, under the influence of the Colombian Communist Party. The FARC has generally focused on rural guerrilla strategies, but it also deploys urban tactical operations (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990). Furthermore, from early 1998 to the end of 1999, the FARC has extended its field of operations and the size and scope of those operations, extending military confrontations to several major cities, like Medellin, and over the outskirts of the capital, Bogotá (Petras, 2000).

The Military structure of the FARC is openly presented on the FARC's own web site. The Group described itself as "the FARC-EP [EP meaning Ejercito del pueblo:



Army of the People] [is] the people's army and [has] consolidated as a military-political organization, which is made up of sixty fronts that are present on all [parts of] national territory. It also has urban structures in the cities, which are organized into seven blocks of fronts.” They state that all activity of the FARC-EP is regulated by three codified policies: The statute, the Regulations of the Disciplinary Regime, or the Internal Rules of Command. First, the FARC-EP follows the Statute: The Statute is the ideological foundation of the FARC-EP. The statute outlines the FARC-EP’s organizational structure, its chain of command, the obligations and rights of the combatants by rank, and the basic principles of the revolutionary organization. See Table 6 for a comparison of some FARC-EP ranks with those of a traditional army.

Table 6: Comparison of the ranks in the FARC with those of traditional armies.

TRADITIONAL ARMY	FARC-EP
Sub official	Candidate for Commander
Corporal second class	Squad Deputy
Corporal first class	Squad Commander
Sergeant second class	Guerilla Deputy
Sergeant first class	Guerilla Commander
Sergeant Major	Company Deputy
Sub lieutenant	Company Commander
Lieutenant	Column Deputy
Captain	Column Commander
Major	Front Deputy
Lieutenant Colonel	Front Commander
Colonel	Block Deputy
Brigadier General	Block Commander
General Major	Central High Commander Deputy

Source: <http://www.farc-ep.org/pagina%5Fingles>

Secondly, the FARC-EP proscribes to the Regulations of the Disciplinary Regime. The Regulations of the Disciplinary Regime codify essential matters of military order. Here FARC-EP soldiers and potential soldiers read of the types of behaviors that expected and appropriate.

Finally, The Internal Rules of Command outlines the ordinary duties of each of the different units of the FARC-EP. Like that of most modern armies, the FARC-EP unit structure is complex and hierarchical. The units of the FARC-EP are laid out in Table 7.

Table 7: The FARC-EP Units

1	Squad	The basic unit consisting of 12 combatants
2	Guerilla	Consists of two squads
3	Company	Consists of two guerrillas
4	Column	Consists of two or more companies.
5	Front:	Consists of more than one column.
6	The Central High Command	Designates the highest command of each front.
7	Block of Fronts	Consists of five or more fronts. It co-ordinates and unifies the activity of the fronts in a specific zone of the country.
8	The Central High Command or its secretariat	Designates the High Command of each Block. They coordinate the areas of the respective blocks.
9	Central High Command	The superior organism of direction and command of the FARC-EP. Its agreements, orders and decisions rule over the entire movements and all its members.

Source: <http://www.farc-ep.org/pagina%5Fingles>

The degree to which the FARC is involved with the illicit drug trade is a controversial issue. Some sources claim that the FARC has been active in every phases of the illicit drug business. Others argue that such accusations are the black propaganda of a U.S. backed Colombian government. Radu and Tismaneanu (1990) openly argue that the FARC has been associated with other drug trafficking guerrilla organizations in drug traffic operations when they explain Logistic and Equipment issues of the FARC. Other researchers provide different numbers that indicate that the FARC has generated income from due drug trade, taxation, extortion and kidnapping. The only contention between these authors is over how much income the FARC has generated. It is perhaps impossible, however, to correctly estimate the income of the FARC due to the secretive nature of the business.

A particular case in 1984 brought the guerrilla-narco-trafficker interaction to attention of officials. In this particular case Colombian Police conducted a sting operation on a large cocaine production center that housed seventeen laboratories in Yuri, a place in the eastern lowlands of Tranquilanda. The police met heavy resistance, but government forces took control and seized 12,500 kilograms of cocaine worth of \$1.2 billion. In the buildings there were documents that linked the case to the Medellin Cartel with no doubt. Documents also showed that this cocaine production complex had forty to sixty personnel and they were protected by FARC guerrillas. The connection between guerrillas and drug traffickers, unknown up to this time, was exposed by this operation (MacDonald, 1989).

DEA Administrator Donnie R. Marshall (2000), testified before The House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime on December 13, 2000. In his statement, he asserted that there may be other links between drug traffickers and the terrorists associations beyond the deep-rooted presence of the FARC in the drug cultivation and processing areas. DEA reports and analysis showed several instances of this type of collaboration. Some insurgent units raised funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations. In return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons, the insurgents protected cocaine laboratories in southern Colombia. Some FARC and ELN units, according to Marshall's report, were probably independently involved in limited cocaine laboratory operations. Some insurgent units apparently also assisted drug trafficking groups by transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia. In particular, some insurgent units protected clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia.

Michael A. Sheehan (2000), the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. Department of State, also testified before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime on December 13, 2000. He stated that "Colombia is the strongest example of what is meant by the phrase "narco terrorism," and [is a country] where the drug trade is a major factor. A cycle of terrorism and narco-trafficking has spiraled into a mutually dependent relationship." The terrorists and paramilitaries provide protection for drug traffickers who have, in turn become a financial source for them. The FARC, considered one of the world's deadliest terrorist organizations, has recently made moves to gain full control of the cocaine base across Colombia. There is evidence that indicates the FARC's involvement in cocaine exportation. According to the State Department,

Mexican and Colombian officials have discovered a main connection between the Mexican drug cartel and the FARC. Facts show the FARC provided cocaine to the cartel in exchange for money and probably weapons.

Colombia offers a strong example of the revolutionary and paramilitary forces that depend on drug trafficking for their ability to wage war. The success of the FARC is captivating. It has thrived in spite of the fact that its former sponsor, the sponsor of many Marxist revolutionary groups in the developing world, namely Soviet Union, has collapsed. Against all odds, the FARC's power has remained strong. It is currently active and controls almost forty percent of the country. This supremacy is tremendously sustained by cocaine and opium sales within areas controlled by the FARC. Colombia produces eighty percent of the world's cocaine and a growing proportion of the world's heroin. A majority of these drugs are grown and processed in rebel-controlled land, and most of that land is controlled by the FARC. The power of the FARC has increased since the end of the Cold War, and it now has the Colombian military on the defensive across much of the countryside. Despite enormous investments in drug interdictions by the U.S. government, the FARC expanded its territory and increased the number of its fighters. As long as their plans are supported by extremely profitable illicit actions, it seems that no governmental power will be able to control or stop the FARC. They, and other revolutionary groups like them, can prosper in an age of global pressure and isolation. Consequently, it is not surprising that the FARC earns nearly half a billion dollar a year from drug profits and related kidnapping ransoms. A revolutionary group can maintain a well-equipped military for an indefinite period of time with the vast amounts of money

generated by Colombia's cocaine and opium trade. The FARC no longer must rely on the whim of the Soviets to support their political and military agendas. The enormous profits earned through the production and export of cocaine and opium prove to be much more lucrative (Steinberg, 2000).

In late 1980s, the FARC is one of the guerrilla groups that has refused to demobilize and has found independent financing allowing it to remain in the field and even grow stronger over time. In following years, the FARC developed a strong presence in coca-growing areas, where it charged fees to plantations for 'protection.' Following a disease that shattered almost thirty percent of the coca fields in Peru's upper Huallaga Valley in the mid-1990s, drug traffickers moved to Colombia's jungles and started experimenting with the plants, producing a heartier coca plant hybrid with a higher cocaine yield. Accordingly, Colombians boosted the amount of land being used to grow coca from 20,000 hectares to 120,000 hectares within five years. The FARC took advantage of the situation and became probably the wealthiest insurgent group in history by controlling the crops and increasing its income to more than \$600 million a year. The FARC gained a legitimate social power base due to its control over the coca plantations. This fact became noticeable when coca growers held mass protests against the eradication efforts of the government. These growers were middle-class entrepreneurs from all parts of the country. More than 100,000 growers backed by the FARC, protested for several weeks. The government had to agree to limit its fumigation program to coca plantations smaller than three hectares in order to end the revolt (Pardo, 2000).

In terms of its objectives, it is not clear whether the FARC wants to take part in formulating policies or if the group is content to sustain absolute control over the region they have taken. It is clear that both the FARC and the ELN (National Liberation Army) are well financed. These two guerrilla groups have a collective income of about \$900 million a year. Around \$500 million of this revenue is earned through taxes on coca producers. The remainder is earned through kidnapping and extortion. Even though it would not be entirely correct to liken these insurgent groups to 'ordinary' organized crime ring or drug traffickers, there are strong resemblance between the FARC and the these types of criminals (Shifter, 1999).

Suarez (2000) also provides some numbers concerning the income of Colombian Guerrillas. According to his writings, the estimated income of the Colombian guerrillas may be as high as \$600 million a year or over \$1.5 million a day. FARC gets \$360 million out of this sum. This is revenue bigger than the Banco de Colombia, one of the biggest banks of Colombia. It is twice the size of El Tiempo, Colombia's biggest newspaper and over half the income of Bavaria, a well-known financial group. It exceeds by \$35 million dollars the sales of Celumovil, one of Colombia's largest cellular phone companies. Suarez estimates that forty-eight percent of the FARC's revenues come from its involvement in drug trafficking, thirty six percent from extortion, eight percent from kidnapping, six percent from cattle theft, and the remainder from robbery of financial institutions and other sources.

The FARC's taxation system touches each and every phase of the business, from the entry of processing materials to the transportation of the final product from control

zones to the interior, where it is exported to foreign markets for consumption. The arrival of chemicals used to convert coca into cocaine is controlled through checkpoints on land and water. There are set taxes per ton or gallon of the supplies most broadly used in the refinement process. The number of guerrilla-controlled checkpoints determines the rate of taxation for the materials that must pass through on the way to the labs. FARC charges growers who cultivate plots smaller than four hectares on a sliding scale, exacting fees that are in proportion to the size of their crops. The weight of the product determines the tax that is paid by refineries. Cocaine, the final product, requires higher taxes than products on process. "Gramaje, or grammage" is the name of this particular tax and it is ten percent of the selling price per gram. Land, water or air transportation of the drugs from the control areas is also taxed. The maintenance of laboratories and landing strips, and precursors needed for the conversion that are carried by air are also subject to taxation. Each aircraft pays its fee as it enters or leaves the area. It is estimated that eighty percent of all cocaine production in the country is taxed by the FARC, and this forms the primary source of income of the guerrilla group. The FARC also boosts its income by growing its own coca, using no middlemen, monopolizing coca leaf purchases, constructing landing strips on their own property, and by constructing their own coca paste refineries. In other words, in recent years, the extent of the group's involvement in actions associated with drugs has been dramatically amplified (Suarez, 2000).

Despite the evidence, the FARC and other guerrilla groups deny financing their activities from illegal drug business. Jacobo Arenas, the 1989 political secretary of the



FARC, describe the narco-guerrilla thesis as an international campaign created by the CIA against the revolutionary movement, against democracy, and against the social progress of people. FARC leader Manuel Marulanda also claimed that guerrilla and narcotic traffic had nothing to do with one another, they were something very different (Lee, 1989).

The latest interview with Marulanda's first assistant Raul Reyes shows some difference from those 1989 statements. The following excerpt from this interview provides valuable insight into the current position of the FARC on key issue.

Marin asks: "And what about drugs? Isn't a major source of the FARC's finance from coca and poppy production?"

Reyes: "In Colombia, production undeniably exists, but actual local drug consumption is relatively small. Nor does Colombia produce the chemicals required for extraction and purification of the drugs. What Colombia does, because of the collapse of the rural economy, is to grow poppies and coca. The FARC is in all Colombia, from the Amazon to the borders with Venezuela and the Orinoco River, and to the borders of Ecuador and the Putumayo. Our being in a particular area does not mean we are engaged in growing the crops. On the other hand, the FARC represents a people in arms and has to survive from whatever [it] produces that goes into the overall economy of the country. The FARC is a revolutionary organization that is not in the business of tackling the cultivation of drugs or of fighting the traffickers. That is the responsibility of the state, though we have made proposals for dealing with the problems."

Marin: “You mean to tell me that the relationship between FARC and drug trafficking is limited to occupying territory which happens to have illicit crops?”

Reyes: Exactly. “The FARC is present throughout the country and it needs resources to strengthen its political hold. Therefore it imposes taxes on whatever is grown, whether coca or cattle, soya or sorghum. If, tomorrow, coca was no longer grown, then the FARC would seek taxes on whatever was substituted.” (Marin, 2001).

Petras (2000) also denies the FARC’s interaction with drug trafficking and traffickers. He believes that the FARC’s present position is to end its offensive by negotiating with the Colombian authorities for a peaceful resolution. The FARC has also presented some primary socio-economic reforms that oppose the neoliberal agenda of the current Colombian government and the United States. This agenda opposes that of the Central American guerrillas. These reforms take a righteous position against the drug-corrupted capitalist politicians and military officials. The FARC guards peasants that grow coca and employs taxation on the dealers who buy the leaf in FARC-controlled areas. Furthermore the FARC neither produces nor sells coca or drugs. As clearly declared by the FARC both movements distinguish between coca-growing peasants and drug traffickers. Today associations between the cocaine lords and the ruling class are recognized by the majority of the people. This controlling group funds its political activities with drug money and abuses their impunity while controlling the government.

#### The April 19<sup>th</sup> Movement- M 19

Movimiento 19 de Abril, or the April 19th Movement is another Colombian guerrilla group. The movement takes its name from an election held on April 19, 1970.

The group believes that foul play of the opposing forces led to the ousting of its favored leader, Rojas Panilla. The M-19 first appeared in 1974, when it claimed to be the armed hand of the ANAPO (National Popular Alliance), despite the disavowal of ANAPO leaders. It has nearly 5000 members and operates mainly in Southern and Southwestern Colombia.

Jaime Bateman Cajon was the founder of the M-19 movement. He was a lawyer before he became a professional guerrilla leader. He was killed in an alleged airplane crash in the northeast part of the country in 1983. Intelligence sources indicate that Cajon was originally a member of the FARC but was disappointed with the FARC's failure within the political arena. He therefore founded his own guerrilla movement. He was a charismatic leader, however tented toward violent anarchic action.

Ivan Marino Ospina was another important person who served as leader of the front operating in Caqueta. He joined the M-19 in 1971 and was trained in Cuba and Eastern Europe. He was arrested in March, 1981 and stayed in prison until he was granted amnesty in 1982. Following his release he went back to Cuba and eventually returned as a front leader for M-19. He was killed on August 28, 1985 in fire-fight. Other top leaders of the M-19 include Alvaro Fayad, Carlos Pizarro, Antonio Navarro, and Gustava Arias.

In terms of ideology, the M-19's philosophy unites Rojas Pinilla's quasi-fascist populism with a peculiar socialist, or Marxist, viewpoint. Social justice, equality, and economic democracy were its primary goals early on. M-19 leaders were influenced heavily by Castroism, and consequently wove Cuban Communism into its ideology. The

M-19 is one of the most decidedly Marxist revolutionary group in Colombia, though it claims to be a patriotic, leftist movement. The M-19 was successful in attaining its own impressive financial base through terrorist tactics. It initially used kidnappings and robberies to gain most of its money. However, today the cocaine trade is the main source of its revenue (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990).

The interaction between the M-19 and drug traffickers has been observed in two important cases: The Guillot-Lara episode and bloody Palace of Justice massacre. The Guillot-Lara was an international event in the 1980s that uncovered the many dimensions of narco-terrorism. The episode revealed the strong ties between drug and gun traffickers, the M-19 guerrillas, and the sovereign government of Cuba.

The leader of the M-19, Jaime Bateman, used Jaime Guillot-Lara, a close friend of him, as his main arms provider. Lara acted as a link between the M-19 and the Cubans. Guillot Lara's job was quite simple during the mid-1970s. He would travel from Colombia to Florida, buy guns, and bring them back to Colombia by boat. However, the United States, due to the growing volume of drug trade via the same route, took action to close these easy trafficking routes.

By the end of the 1970s, Cubans began to realize the sheer enormity of the market for cocaine trade in the US. An initial meeting to discuss the strategy for taking advantage of this market took place in Bogotá between Guillot-Lara, Fernandc Ravelo Renedo, the Cuban ambassador plenipotentiary to Colombia, and Gonsalo Bassols Suarez, the Cuban minister counselor to Colombia in 1979. Juan Lazaro 'Johnny' Crump, another drug dealer, organized another meeting for Guillot-Lara at the Cuban

embassy, which was attended by representatives from the Cuban Central Intelligence Directorate in August of same year. In this meeting, the Cubans conditionally agreed to serve as an intermediary transfer point for drugs on their way to the United States from Colombia. Colombians traffickers would pay the Cubans for each shipment that passed through their territorial waters, and than would buy guns for guerrillas from the Cuban government. This deal afforded the narco-terrorists a safe haven within striking distance of the American shore while providing the Cubans with a steady source of much needed foreign exchange.

During their interaction with the Colombians, the Cubans, besides obtaining revenue from drug trafficking, also served as an arm dealer for terrorist organizations. Due to orders from the M-19 national directorate, in January of 1981, Guillot went to Panama and met with Cuban First Secretary, Gonzalez Bassols Suarez, and Jaime Bateman. During the course of the meeting, Bateman stressed the significance of obtaining arms for the M19, and arranged for Guillot himself to receive a shipment delivered to Colombia's Guajira Peninsula. On 15 October Guillot journeyed to Dibulla, a Colombian port where his boat, the *Zar de Honduras*, arrived loaded with arms. The arms were unloaded for distribution among the M-19. In return, Guillot filled the boat with five thousand pounds of Colombian marijuana to be transported to Cuba, and then sold in the United States (Adams, 1986).

In November of 1982 the U.S. government indicted four high-ranking members of the Cuban government for conspiracy to smuggle narcotics into the United States also indicted Jaime Guillot-Lara. The Cuban officials were two members of the Cuban

Communist Party Central Committee, Vice Admiral Aldo Santamaria Cusardo and Rene Rodriguez Cruz, and two members of Cuba's diplomatic mission to Colombia, Ambassador Fernando Ravelo Renedo and Minister-Counselor Gonzalo Bassols Suarez. Along with the Cuban officials, nine Cuban-Americans were indicted. The indictments stated that the Cuban officials conspired with Guillot-Lara to use Cuba as an offloading station for drugs smuggled into the United States. Additionally, the Cuban Navy was to protect, re-supply and refuel Guillot-Lara's ships and to provide him with a competitive advantage by seizing the ships and aircraft of his rivals. Guillot-Lara would provide the Cuban officials with \$800,000 for every vessel they handled. In return, he also agreed to smuggle arms and supplies from Cuba to the M-19 guerillas back in Colombia (Miller and Damask, 1996).

In 1983, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas O. Enders, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, stated that Colombian drug traffickers and communist guerrillas had developed a string alliance. Therefore, that alliance included officials of the Cuban government. Enders states:

“Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian narcotics ring to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas. This narcotics ring was led by Jaimie Guillot Lara, a Colombian drug trafficker now in custody in Mexico. He has admitted to working for Havana in purchasing arms for the M-19. We have information that Guillot traveled twice to Cuba since October 1981 and that on the second visit he received \$700,000 from the Cuban government to purchase arms for the M-19 guerrillas.”

Enders continued by explaining how Guillot-Lara played a leading part in transferring arms via a Colombian plane that the M-19 had hijacked. Five armed M-19 member provided security at the airstrip. In return, Guillot-Lara also supplied the M-19 with cash (Ehrenfeld, 1990, p. 99).

In November of 1985 the M-19 attacked the Palace of Justice, the Supreme Court of Colombia. They killed eleven justices and destroyed the extradition files. They were paid five million dollars and provided by weapons by drug traffickers (Lupsha, 1989). Lupsha called this operation “true narco-terrorism,” and specifically categorized it as “Insurgent Surrogate Narco-terrorism,” that is, narco-terrorism where insurgents act as the surrogates of traffickers.

This invasion of the Palace of Justice took twenty-eight hours. One-hundred people were killed including eleven Supreme Court Justices, thirty-nine other hostages, and seventeen soldiers. The weapons that were used by the M-19 during the attack were recovered. Investigative efforts determined their origin. Some of the weapons were commercially available; others were strictly military weapons. Many of the military weapons were American-made M16s’ and were traced to various places. Interestingly enough, the guns used by M-19 to wage the attack matched the kinds of weapons seized in raids on several drug cartel bases. There were five Belgian 7.62mm FAL rifles and one Israeli 9mm Uzi submachine gun among the recovered guns. State Department intelligence confirmed the purchase and delivery of a shipment of these types of guns from arms dealers in Miami to Guillot-Lara in Colombia (Brito, 1997).

Ehrenfeld (1990) evaluates the case and maintains that there were more important consequences of this attack than the death of eleven justices. As result of the destruction of thousands of records the prosecution of nearly two hundred key drug traffickers became totally impossible. The M-19 had the kind of firepower and tactical skill that the Medellin Cartel did not have. The M-19 terrorists also ruined the Colombian justice system. No justice since has signed a single extradition order of notorious drug traffickers to the United States.

The United States government was able to draw a direct connection between the drug traffickers and the Palace of Justice attack. The U.S. authorities claimed that the attack was possibly financed by the Medellin Cartel because the M-19 primarily destroyed the extradition files of drug traffickers (Craig, 1987).

There are various theories about the involvement of drug traffickers in the Palace of Justice massacre. Some say it was directly financed by traffickers; others claim it was solely an M-19 operation. However, aside from the United States claims that narco-traffickers were involved in the attack, it is simply a logical conclusion that there is a connection between drug traffickers and the M-19 assault. Without Financial incentives, the M-19 would never attempt this type of operation to rescue two hundred drug traffickers from extradition to the United States. If these traffickers had been incarcerated, the M-19 would have lost a substantial source of income.

#### Narco-terrorism Cases in Peru

Peru is another Latin American Country that has both of the elements of narco-terrorism: insurgent/terrorist organizations and illicit drug trade. Peru grows large



quantities of illicit crops in its soil (Table 8 shows the detailed illegal coca production numbers of Peru). Peru remains on the President's list of major drug-producing countries (INCSR, 2000).

In the Latin American cocaine industry Peruvians have supplied raw material in the form of coca leaves and coca paste to Colombians processing labs who then process and distribute the cocaine. Peasant coca growers in Peru sell their coca paste to local gangs that are controlled by Colombian traffickers. In the Huallaga Valley alone, seven or eight Colombian-controlled trafficker groups operate, primarily organizing flights that transfer the paste to drug cartel labs on the Colombian border. It is estimated that between 60,000 and 300,000 peasant families grow coca in the Huallaga Valley, with some other 10,000 to 20,000 farms growing elsewhere. These peasants sell their leaves for only 0.5% of the market value of the final cocaine product (McClintock, 1988).

Table 8: Illegal Coca Production Numbers in Peru 1992-2000

COCA	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995
Net Cultivation (ha)	34,100	38,700	51,000	68,800	94,400	115,300
Eradication (ha)	6,200	13,800	7,825	3,462	1,259	0
Cultivation (ha)	40,200	52,500	58,825	72,262	95,659	115,300
Leaf (Potential Harvest) (ha)	60,975	69,200	95,600	130,600	174,700	183,600
Cocaine (Potential) (mt)	154	175	240	325	435	460

Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2000.

The guerrilla movement began in the early 1960s in Peru. Hugo Blanco, a member of the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party, shot and killed a police officer in a political argument. He lived in the mountains and managed to avoid getting arrested for

months. He also tried to establish a guerillas base on the mountains; however his revolutionary movement was generally not supported by the peasants.

Following Blanco’s capture, at Puerto Maldonado, Special Forces brutally destroyed a group of future guerrillas who were returning from Cuba. Javier Heraud, a famous poet was among the death people. Two years after the killing of Heraud and his friends, the National Liberation Army (ELN) was founded by Hector Bejar, a survivor of the Special Forces attack in Puerto Maldonado. At the same time the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), led by Luis de la Puente, began its own guerrilla campaign against the government. In May, 1965, after spending several months setting up their bases of operation, MIR leaders met with ELN leaders on the barren Andean Plateau of Mesa Pelada in Cusco. They produced a Revolutionary Proclamation that declared the beginning of armed resistance (Castro, 1999).

This marked the first Peruvian guerrilla movement. Political violence, however, escalated dramatically after Sendero Luminoso, or “Shinning Path,” started its armed struggle in the early 1980s. The following figures in Table 9 demonstrate the increasing level of political violence in Peru.

Table 9: Deaths due to political violence in Peru, by year since 1980:

Year	Death	Year	Death
1980	12	1986	1,451
1981	82	1987	1,115
1982	193	1988	1,451
1983	1977	1989	2,881
1984	3,587	1990	3,708
1985	1,476	1991	3,181

Source: Peru, the Drug Business and Shining Path: Between Scylla and Charybdis”

### The Shinning Path-SL (Sendero Luminoso)

Sendero Luminoso (SL) is also known as “Communist Party of Peru on the Shinning Path of the Thought of Jose Carlos Mariategui.” Mariategui (1895-1930), a Marxist writer and political leader, is known as the father of the Peruvian Left. He inspired almost all of the Peru’s Marxist Parties. His major literary work, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peru*, is a Marxist evaluation of the socioeconomic situation in Peru. This work forms the Sendero Luminoso’s perception of Peruvian reality. Mariategui proposes a socioeconomic system in which the elements of the Inca Empire’s social structure and modern socialist economic system are combined. This naturally leads to a system that permits each Peruvian to have a sense of his rights and responsibilities in a collective national economy (Tarazona, 1990).

The Sendero Luminoso is the end result of several splits which have troubled the Peruvian Communist Movement since 1964 (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990). However, the group originates with the reopening of an old university in Ayacucho in 1959. The National University of San Cristobal de Humanga, a colonial university of Ayacucho, was founded in 1677, and it was close due to internal conflicts and reopened after a lapse of almost eighty years (Palmer, 1985). At the time Ayacucho was a place where people believed that they had no social and economic mobility. They were frustrated with their defected economy, permanent shortage of drinking water, limited production of energy, and inadequate means of communication. Due to these deficiencies the university became a fertile ground both for the people, who were eager to learn, and for the Peruvian Communist Party. The party was eager to impose its ideology by way of a group of

professors led by Abimael Guzman Reynoso, the ultimate leader of the Shining Path later known as President Gonzalo (Wit & Gianotten, 1992).

Abimael Guzman wove Mariategui's philosophy into the working doctrine of the Sendero Luminoso by synthesizing it with the thought of Marx, Lenin, and Mao. His new doctrine was designed specifically for Peru's rural and urban classes, the Indians and Mestizos that Mariategui was concerned with. By many, Guzman is considered "the forth sword of Marxism." His ideology is derived from the writings of the foremost communist thinker. He built intellectually upon his Marxist base by studying the writings of Lenin. As Lenin changed his party's name to "communist" from "socialist" Guzman did the same thing to differentiate it from the social democratic strains of Marxism. Nevertheless, he was more greatly influenced by Mao Zedong than any other communist thinker. He observed many similarities between pre-revolutionary China and his own Peru. Namely, he believed Peru and China both had semi-feudal structures, large rural populations, and they both experienced extreme upheaval due to industrialization. The Sendero Luminoso's ideology, strategy of taking power through a "protracted march," and military techniques are largely based on Mao's ideas (Tarazona, 1990).

Within the National University of San Cristobal de Humanga, the National Liberation Front (FLN) led by Guzman formed the nucleus of the Sendero Luminoso. For the first few years following the reopening of the university, Guzman recruited some of his most brilliant students for trips to Cuba and to help teach literacy, farming, and health and nutrition to the people of Ayacucho and the surrounding country side. By 1964 there were about fifty students and faculty members who regularly took part in

these trips. These people eventually emerged as leaders in The Sendero Luminoso's hierarchy. In 1965, the Huamanga command of the FLN split with the national organization due to a disagreement over the issue of opening the guerrilla fronts in the Peruvian highlands. By 1966, Guzman and his followers at Huamanga were part of the Maoist Communist Party of Peru. Between 1968 and 1970 relationship among party center and radicals in Huamanga got very tense because of the removal or withdrawal of Huamanga peripheries. That was the time Guzman and his faction adopted the title of "Communist Party of Peru on the Shinning Path of the Thought of Jose Carlos Mariategui." Subsequently, they were acknowledged as the Sendero Luminoso (Palmer, 1985).

In the first part of the 1970s, most of the teachers and students of the Huamanga University became members of the new party. The Sendero soon moved beyond Huamanga to begin its recruitment efforts among the Indian populations of Ayacucho, soon creating local cells in the surrounding departments of the region. Two factors contributed to the fast, unobserved growth of The Sendero Luminoso in the region: The first contributing factor was the increasing conflict between Ayacucho's strong regional outlook and the perspective of people from the outliving areas. Secondly, the ethnic fabric of the Ayacucho considered primarily of non-Spanish speaking peoples of the highlands. They were frustrated and aggravated by the continued ignorance of the Peruvian mainstream. Many students came from poor peasant families with the hope that they could improve their social and economic situations with a university degree. Often, however, the only job they can get was as a schoolteacher in their own village. All of

their past hopes faded as they realized that they faced the same poverty with their university degree as then had before. They were right back where they started. This inescapable poverty turned them into followers of organization's causes. The Sendero Luminoso believed that their path was the only true path to harmony, and it proposed a new, strictly hierarchical order where students, upon acceptance to the party and its truth, could move from the dirt of the village to the peak of the social pyramid (Degregori, 1999).

Between 1974 and 1977, some of the most radical leaders of the peasant unions of Apurimac Department of Peru joined the party, and in 1977 a decision was made to pursue armed struggle. By 1977, another small, ultra-revolutionary faction of the Bandera Roja Party, the Puka Llacta, also joined the Sendero Luminoso (Radu and Tismaneanu, 1990). The work of the Sendero Luminoso first took public form during the 1980 elections when followers burned ballot boxes in the Indian community market town of Chuschi. They also hung dogs from lampposts in both Ayacucho and Lima. The strategic bombings of public and private buildings in late 1980 and 1981 slowly gave way to attacks on local public figures. Violence on a much larger scale began after a massive raid on the Ayacucho prison in March 1982 (Manwaring, 1995).

The SL is composed of national, regional, and local level organizations. The National Central Committee is composed of Guzman and a few top lieutenants that control and direct the organization. This group determines the ideology, strategy and policy directions for the entire organization. It also oversees the movement's operations the National Committee. The National Committee includes six regional committees that

handle the planning and evaluation of the Sendero Luminoso activities within their individual regions. They, in turn, oversee cells of local partisans and part time activists. Regional commanders are allowed to enjoy significant degree autonomy by The National Committee. This independence is mostly due to geographical limitations that bounds periodic controls over subordinates, and the need to maintain efficient military operations that requires effective leadership. However, ideology and policy decisions are strictly determined by the National Committee. According to Peruvian Police, as of the mid-1990s the Sendero has developed managerial units that help coordinate the regional armies and strengthen communication between the National Central committee and Regional subdivisions. These new units are known as the Department for Organizational Support, Group of Popular Support, Department of Finance, and Department of Internal Relations (Tarazano, 1992).

At its height in mid-1992, it was believed that the Shining Path had between 3,000 and 4,000 armed cadres and 50,000 supporters in various civilian support groups and political cadres. However, this estimate does not include the mobilized population in favor of the Shining Path, like the coca-growing peasants. Table 10 shows the evolution of the estimated number of armed cadres of Shining Path from 1986 to 1997.

The most noticeable ideological characteristic of the Sendero Luminoso is its uncompromising dogmatism. It considers early 1930s' Stalinism, pure Maoism, and Khmer Rouge as the only acceptable social models. The group rejects today's all Marxist regimes as reformist and treasonous, and it reserves its most vituperative attacks for Deng Xiaoping's China. Furthermore, despite its orthodox Marxist manifesto, the SL

unreservedly recognizes the need for certain Castroite rural warfare, including the replacement of the vanguard party with the guerilla nucleus. Nevertheless, this acceptance does not show the willingness of the SL to moderate its “true” Maoist theory and practice.

Table 10: The Shining Path’s Armed Cadres 1986-1997

Year	Cadres	Year	Cadres
1986	Up to 2,000	1992	Up to between 4,000 and 5,000
1987	Up to 2,000	1993	Up to between 4,000 and 5,000
1988	Up to 2,000	1994	Up to 3,000
1989	Up to between 4,000 and 5,000	1995	An estimated 3,000
1990	Up to between 4,000 and 5,000	1996	An estimated 3,000
1991	Up to between 4,000 and 5,000	1997	An estimated 1,500

Source: When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995.

To a large degree, the SL’s ideology is similar to Mao’s throughout the Cultural Revolution and Khmer Rouge’s between 1975 and 1978. The group supports the total destruction of the market economy and the subsequent creation of an exclusively rural, collectivist economy of small cooperative villages. For the Sendero Luminoso, but power, everything is an illusion and this power must be used to establish the fourth stage of Socialism exclusively through armed force (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990).

Four themes are predominant in Guzman’s philosophies: the primacy of class struggle, the absolute need to combat imperialism, the importance of the vanguard party,



and the necessity of violence to be able to overthrow the old system and create a new one (Starn, 1995). In addition, Guzman envisions a five-stage attack plan to successfully empower the people:

- Phase 1: Agitation and propaganda to convert backward areas into advanced and solid bases of revolutionary support,
- Phase 2: Sabotage and guerrilla action to attack bourgeois state and revisionist element symbols,
- Phase 3: Generalized violence and develop guerrilla war tactics,
- Phase 4: Conquest and expansion of support bases
- Phase 5: The fall of the cities and total collapse of the state.

The fourth phase of this popular war program led the Sendero Luminoso to trade of illegal drug to finance its activities. The Sendero Luminoso also had several other reasons to increase its base of revenue. Firstly, the Sendero Luminoso became a massive organization with 3000-6000 active armed militants and a support network of about 50,000 people in the country side and in the urban areas of Peru by the mid 1980s. Secondly, local funds were the primary source for its operations. It strictly stayed away from foreign support bases, but the poor peasant of the region were not sufficient sources of revenue. Lastly, the expansion of Sendero Luminoso operations into urban areas after the preliminary rural campaign required more militants, more support bases and more money (Palmer, 1992).

The Sendero Luminoso's growing need for new financial resources was expanded when the government's military campaign against them was increased. They began to

need more sophisticated equipment than dynamite, their primary weapon poorly trained and equipped local police forces. The Upper Huallaga Valley, one of the richest coca-growing areas in the world, presented the SL the opportunity to solve its financial problems. There the Sendero Luminoso was able to extort money from coca-grower and traffickers. The group earned enough money through this venture to finance its revolutionary efforts at the national level (Dreyfus, 1999).

The Upper Huallaga Valley's financial potential is well summarized by Tarazano. Each hectare of coca planted in the Upper Huallaga Valley produces at least two metric tons of leaves yearly. Growers sell each ton of leaves to middlemen for around 600 dollars. These leaves are then transported to clandestine laboratories for processing into cocaine paste. The Valley covers some 211,000 hectares of coca fields. 200,000 of these fields produce coca for illegal markets. Only twenty-one kilogram of semi-refined cocaine paste is derived from each metric ton of dried coca leaves. Traffickers buy this semi refined cocaine for 890 dollars per kilogram and take it to hidden labs in rain forests of Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil. They then refine it into pure cocaine. One kilogram of pure cocaine requires 3 kilograms of coca paste. Therefore one ton of coca leaves generated only seven kilograms of pure cocaine. When all is said and done, Peruvian coca farms yield an estimated 28 billion dollars in the U.S. market (Tarazano, 1990).

The SL started its political campaign in the Upper Huallaga Valley in 1980. A number of militants went to Puerto Pizana and Aucayacu at that time and settled as coca growers. Their organization expanded when several members joined them a few years

later. The Peruvian Government, however, did not know of the existence of the SL in the area until a joint DEA-Peruvian Police anti-drug operation uncovered the group. During the operation, police discovered the Sendero Luminoso' schools and coca paste laboratories. Consequently, police arrested several members of the organization. After a short time, Tito Jaime, mayor of the place was murdered. He was also the chief organizer of the coca growers. Even though the Sendero Luminoso did not claim responsibility for the killing, it is well known that the Sendero Luminoso had a history of opposing any organization that could challenge its supremacy. Jaime's organization was clearly one of them (Gonzalez, 1992). The guerrillas play on the peasants' hostility toward eradication campaigns financed by the U.S. They also capitalize on their antipathy of drug dealers, who pay the lowest price possible for coca leaves and coca paste. The growers welcomed the Shining Path's offers to protect them from Peru's anti-drug police and to press drug traffickers for higher coca prices on their behalf (Tammen, 1991).

Esperanza states that by the mid 1980s, the Sendero Luminoso had established a reliable financial source through its alliance with drug traffickers. Some estimates indicate that this alliance yields to an annual income of between \$20 and \$50 million (Esperanza, 1992). At the end of 1988, the valley road was controlled by the Sendero Luminoso. The group charged every vehicle a fee to pass. The peasants' support for the SL and its control over the Upper Huallaga Valley was based on the desire to defend and increase coca crops rather than popular support of the political causes of the organization. Despite the lack of ideological support, the Sendero Luminoso has been extremely

profitable in the region due to coca production which is estimated to yield nearly two billion dollars a year (Olarate, 1993).

In 1992, the capture of President Gonzalo revealed some evidence of drug-guerrilla connection. Many terrorists and their records were seized by Peruvian Police. Among the seized records, an “Economic Balance of the Shinning Path” document, dated 1991, was particularly important because it revealed the Sendero Luminoso’s connection to drug trade. The “economic balance” was essentially a detailed ledger of the groups’ income and expenses. It indicated charges of \$3,000 to \$7,000 per flight for drug planes leaving the Valley. During the same period of time, Peru’s most famous drug trafficker Demetrio Limoniel Chavez Penaherrera, also known as Vaticano, was arrested in Colombia and extradited to Peru. Vaticano himself, and the captured terrorists he dealt with who were also in custody stated that Vaticano supplied arms to the Sendero Luminoso and had paid \$5,000 per flight plus a per fee of three dollars for the coca paste transported in the plane (Clawson & Lee, 1996).

Some U.S. reports estimate that the annual revenues gathered by the SL from its activities in the Upper Huallaga Valley range from \$10 million to \$100 million, most of which come from protection services. As mentioned earlier, these fees along with protection fees extorted from coca growers, were the main sources for Sendero Luminoso income (INCSR, 1999).

The budget of the Sendero Luminoso is not used strictly to purchase new equipment. It is also used to fund the group’s domestic operations throughout Peru.

Wages must be paid to militants, monetary support goes to families, and fees are paid to the Sendero Luminoso lawyers.

Besides cash the Sendero Luminoso enjoys advantages by being in touch with drug traffickers. Before its interaction with the drug trade, the Sendero Luminoso was solely dependent on the arms and ammunition that it seized from government forces and dynamite it stole from local mines. The Sendero Luminoso soon discovered that drug traffickers had international links to arms smugglers and could get sophisticated equipment. The group was able to arm its units with better weaponry and execute more violent and successful attacks. From the time it contacted with the drug lords, the SL has been intensely upgraded (Hamack, 1993).

Ever since the SL leader Guzman's arrest in Colombia and subsequent extradition to Peru, the Sendero Luminoso has turned out to be a mere shadow of itself. The group has fallen apart. One of its cells has abandoned armed struggle due to the orders of the arrested Guzman. However, another cell, led by Oscar Alberto Ramirez, also known as President Feliciano, has chosen the hard line and continued to terrorize Peru with money coming mainly from the drug business. Some weapons and communication devices were captured after combat with the Ramirez Fraction in 1994. These items were found to have originated from Waldo Vargas's drug trafficking group. Nevertheless, drug barons did not finance the Sendero Luminoso due to a political interest or sympathy, they did because they were too weak to oppose the Sendero Luminoso and its executions (Clawson, 1996). Tammen (1991) summarizes the Sendero Luminoso's situation by stating that the Sendero Luminoso operated as a ruthless mediator. It imposed control

over growers, Colombian traffickers, and lab operators, insisting that they follow the fixed prices of the Sendero Luminoso organization. In fact, the group infrequently killed traffickers and coca growers who will not follow its price instructions.

Some people disagree with perceptions of a drug-insurgency nexus in Peru. They argue that there has never been enough evidence to substantiate these allegations, stating that too little is known of the Sendero Luminoso to make such assumptions. Rather, such claims are part of a U.S.-backed propaganda campaign to link the Latin American Left to the immoral drug business (MacDonald, 1988). These complaints are very similar to those of the FARC leaders who object the statements connecting their guerrillas with the illegal drug trade. These objections are the by product of a problem that was explained in previous chapters: “your terrorist is my freedom fighter.” No author who is sympathetic to socialist or communist beliefs will accept that a Maoist “guerrilla” would commit such a nefarious act, especially not the Sendero Luminoso who fights the sake of communism to free the people from the tyranny of capitalism.

Nevertheless, there is evidence to support the conviction that the Sendero Luminoso, like the FARC and the M-19, did not miss the opportunity to generate much-needed income by involving itself in the drug business. This involvement allowed the groups to develop a more sophisticated arsenal to conduct a more effective war against its capitalist enemies. However, it is odd that such a devoutly communist guerrilla group was as opportunistic as any capitalist when it came to making money. It is also odd that other notorious acts such as kidnapping, extortion and murder are not considered immoral

by the same people who can not accept the communist Sendero Luminoso's involvement in the illegal drug trade.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSIVE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Other Narco-terrorism Examples

The FARC, the SL and the M-19 are not the only terrorist organizations involved in the illicit drug business. It is likely that terrorist organization that is desperate for immediate financial support would use any means necessary to get the needed revenue. An analysis of two additional “narco-terrorist” organizations will provide the opportunity to compare the three groups examined in Chapter Two with terrorist organizations operating in other parts of the world that are involved in drug trafficking.

#### Other Examples of Narco-Terrorism Cases

##### The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (The LTTE)

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (The LTTE) is a known terrorist organization originated and mostly operating in Sri Lanka. This group has been known to finance its operations by trafficking in drugs, and is therefore considered to be a narco-terrorist group.

The struggle of Tamil dates back to the ninetieth century. Tamils make up eighteen percent of the total population of Sri Lanka, a country formerly known as Ceylon. Following the British invasion of the island in 1815, Britain enacted the tried and true practice of divide and conquer. This policy sowed the seeds of the current problems between the Tamils and the Sinhalese.



During and shortly after the British reign in Sri Lanka, the Tamils were given a disproportionate of upper level jobs within the government. The Sinhalese, though they made up three-fourths of the population, were a political minority. Today, however, the tide has turned. The Sinhalese have become increasingly better educated. As a result, they have gained high ranking jobs and have gained the political majority. Once the Sinhalese got into power, they sought to redress the balance with populist and discriminatory policies against the Tamils. They formulated policies that restricted admission to the university, established a biased system for the recruiting of government jobs, and colonized Tamil areas, thereby creating an army of unemployed and frustrated young Tamil men. Dissatisfied with the non-violent parliamentary approach of their middle class leaders, who generally belonged to the high castes, the Tamil youth chose to blaze their own trail by turning to open violence (Vaidik, 1986).

The starting point of the Tamil Tigers' armed struggle dates back to July 23, 1983; following the killing of thirteen government soldiers in the Tamil stronghold of Jaffna by an ambush; wide-spread anti-Tamil riots across the country caused the deaths of over six hundred people. Since then, Tamil Tigers have waged a guerilla campaign using terrorism as both a prelude to guerilla warfare and a way to support uniformed guerillas in the field (Smith, 1999).

Several factors made illicit drug business possible for the LTTE. The geographic position of the territory where the LTTE operates has played a key role. This area encompasses one of the main drug transit routes leading out of the Golden Triangle. Golden Triangle is perhaps the most prolific heroin-producing region in the world. The

LTTE's region includes this route which extends from the Indian Sea to the inner parts of India where fifty million Tamils live. The LTTE also has naval fleet containing deep sea going vessels that can be used for drug trafficking purposes. The LTTE's drug distribution efforts are also facilitated by the fact that 500,000 Tamil expatriates reside in developed, drug-consuming countries.

The LTTE's involvement in drug trafficking have been carefully observed by several international organizations. Interpol reports that the most financially beneficial activities for the LTTE are drug trafficking, donations, trafficking in refugees, selling of the publications, the Internet, and the extortion of Tamil's expatriates. According to Interpol, among the seizures made in Europe and North America, there have been noteworthy indications that the LTTE is either directly or indirectly involved in illicit drug trade. They at least get a certain proportion of the proceeds from some of the trafficking that occurs (Interpol, 1999). The Drug Enforcement Administration depicts Some reports by Indian police officials in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu that indicate that illicit drug trafficking activities take place among Tamil Refugees living there. They also believe that the LTTE uses drug trafficking to finance its insurgent movement (INCSR, 2000).

The Mackenzie Institute, a non-profit research group based in Toronto, has documented the worldwide arrests of several Tamils with links to the LTTE for drug running since the early 1980s. Among those arrestees, a top the LTTE member, Manoharan was arrested in France for possession of heroin and sentenced to two years imprisonment. When the leader of the LTTE, Prabhakaran authorized the LTTE France

to pay a monthly salary to his family while he was in jail, suspicions that the heroin belonged to the LTTE was raised. The Mackenzie Institute's research revealed that the LTTE raised money by running drugs, particularly heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia. The most profitable LTTE activities have been in the form of heroin trafficking (Chalk, 2000).

The Observatoire Geopolitique Des Drogues (OGD) (1999) maintains that the LTTE traffics drugs with a great deal of caution to avoid accusations from the international community. The arrest of two LTTE militants in Katmandu in 1996 with fake German passports and 500 grams of heroin is an example of that. The seizure of 14.5 kilos of heroin following a Tamil terrorist's arrest after a shoot out in 1999 in New Delhi is considered by OGD to be solid evidence of the link between organized crime and the Tamil guerilla movement.

#### Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

As mentioned in the Chapter One, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) is another narco-terrorist organization. It operates mainly in south-eastern Turkey and has cells and satellite organizations all around the Middle East and Europe. The PKK is one of the most brutal terrorist organizations in existence. During its eighteen-year bloody campaign against Turkey, over 30,000 people were killed.

The founder of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan was a student in the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University. He was inspired by the revolutionary leftist ideas of the Turkish People's Liberation Army and became a member of the left-wing Revolutionary Youth Organization. He soon came to believe, however, that even the leftist exploited

the Kurds in Southern Turkey. Turkish leftists led him to advocate in a “Kurdish National Liberation Movement.” He subsequently abandoned the Turkish leftist movement, starting his own radical movement that called for Kurdish independence and the creation of a completely separate, autonomous Kurdish State (Poulton, 1997).

To be able to establish a political party, Ocalan mostly studied the theories of well-known revolutionary thinkers between 1974 and 1978. Therefore, in 1978, the PKK was formally established to encourage a communist revolution through the use of guerilla warfare. Its goal was to create a separate Kurdish state (Criss, 1995). In November 1978, the PKK was founded by six central committee members, and their undisputed leader Abdullah Ocalan and his wife. The group originated in a village in Diyarbakir, a province of Turkey, and proscribed the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Later in 1979, Ocalan went to Syria to arrange for the preparation of suitable training facilities. As a result PKK recruits were able train in Palestinian camps until their first strike in 1984 (Gunter, 1997).

By the beginning of the 1980s, PKK militants penetrated back into Turkey. However it was in August 1984, when the PKK started its armed terrorist campaign against Turkey, that the Turkish officials realized the real threat of the PKK (Barkey, 1998). Since then, the PKK constitute a growing threat to the state. Vacuum of state power in Northern Iraq due to the Gulf War created a relevant ground for PKK to establish permanent bases there.

A decade after its initial strike, the PKK became one of the most vigorous and massive terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and in many of the European

countries with its active cadres of tens of thousands of guerrillas and several hundred thousand active supporters (Gunter, 1997). This broad offensive campaign required bigger and better financial support. Generally, by looking at the financial sources of terrorist organizations it becomes obvious that some of the terrorist organizations do not hesitate to involve themselves in illicit drug trafficking to finance their activities. The PKK is no exception to this trend. It uses every possible alternative to gain financial power.

The PKK's existing structure allows them to be accurately carried out their armed campaign and traffic in drugs. A range of front organizations, disguised as socio-cultural associations and so-called "information centers" are manipulated and guided by the PKK's popular front. These groups provide the necessary political, moral, and monetary support for the PKK to survive. By the early 1990s, European countries began to sympathize with the Kurds, opening their borders to let many PKK members immigrate to Europe among the thousands of refugees. This created a very useful network for the PKK's drug operations. While armed guerillas cooperated with traffickers along Balkan smuggling route, hundreds of front organizations were flourishing in the drug-consuming European countries (Republic, 1995).

There are several incidents that clearly indicate the PKK's involvement in the illegal drug business. A former PKK leader, Selim Çürükkaya, after being sentenced to death by his own organization, escaped to Germany and stated that he has made a substantial amount of money from the drug business. Frankfurt's Chief Prosecutor declared that eighty percent of the drugs seized in Europe have a PKK connection and

that the money made through drug trafficking was used to obtain weapons (Gunter, 1997). According to Turkish Drug Report, Hakki KITAY, leader of the KITAY drug trafficking network, subsequent to his arrest in 1996, stated that he has smuggled drugs for the PKK and transferred the money to the organization through Selim Çürükkaya, at that time, financial affairs officer of the PKK in Germany. Kitay exposed additional information indicating his connection with the terrorist organization by mentioning that his brother was killed in an armed clash between security forces. His son, after training in the Bekaa Mahsun Korkmaz Training Academy of the PKK, became a member of the ARGK field unit under field commander Mahmut Çürükkaya (brother of Selim Çürükkaya). He joined the meetings of the organization in which they discussed the transport of heroin from Turkey to Europe (Republic, 1998).

A 1999 Turkish Drug Report indicates that “it has been brought to public attention by both the works of the Turkish Narcotic Police within its organization, and joint work with its European counterparts that the PKK organizes illicit drug trafficking.” Furthermore, the Turkish law enforcement agencies successfully proved the link between The PKK and 138 drug cases in which more than twenty tons of illegal drugs were seized.

Comparing the FARC, the SL, the M-19, the LTTE, and the PKK

The FARC, the SL, the M-19, the LTTE, and the PKK are all insurgent/terrorist organizations who have used illegal drugs to finance their terrorist activities. The similarities among these groups reveal some facts that may be helpful to understand the “narco-terrorism” phenomenon. Even though some of them are thousands of miles apart

from each other, they reflect similarities in ideology, organizational structure, types of operations, degrees of cruelty, and methods of making money.

These five insurgent/terrorist organizations follow leftist ideologies. While four of them founded their bases on Marxist-Leninist ideology, the SL strictly sticks with Maoist ideology. Nonetheless, despite those ideologies' opposition to nationalist policies, all of them hold strong nationalist ideas that contradict their original manifesto. In other words, these groups claim to have formed for the purpose of creating a society where everyone is equal, yet they exploit and terrorize those who do not support their ideas of nationalism. Furthermore, it is safe to say that the founders and leaders of these groups chose communist ideologies at least partly because knew that they would get support from some countries and organizations with the same ideology. It is no coincidence that so many twentieth century insurgent movements claimed to be communist.

At this point, it is necessary to discuss the marginalization of some groups by exploiting the term "Marxism." In other words some governments and interest groups abuse the term "Marxism" to distort groups that carry undesired ideologies. According to Marxism, history is seen as basically a series of class struggles. Classes are defined in terms of their relation to the means of production. According to Marx, each period of history has a "dominant" economic class and a developing or "rising" economic class. In time, a conflict breaks out between the dominant and rising classes. This conflict results in the overthrow of the old ruling dominant class and the establishment of the new rising class as the new dominant class.

As a consequence of the industrial revolution, modern times witnessed the replacement of feudalism with capitalism as the dominant class system. Marx maintains that modern societies are now polarized into two classes: the dominant capitalist class, which he named the bourgeoisie, and the rising, working-class, which he called the proletariat. According to Marx, if the working-class could overcome the ruling bourgeoisie to establish a classless, socialist-communist society, this ancient class conflict will come to an end. Eternal justice and peace would exist ever after. This overthrow of the bourgeoisie is the only way to break the vicious cycle of class conflict and the subjugation of the society to the dominant class.

In order to realize this fundamental change in the structure of society, there must be a revolution. The overthrow of the capitalist regime requires an organized rebellion rather than an evolutionary process. In parallel with this mentality, most Marxist groups often translate this idea of rebellion into armed conflict, opting for a campaign of organized violence against capitalist rulers.

It is a fact that there is no consensus on the definition of the word terrorism. It is widely agreed upon, however, that when groups with political aims can not realize their ideals through legitimate channels, they may adopt terrorism as a means to reach their goals. Marxists frequently find that they cannot realize their dream of revolution through legitimate means. For this reason, historically, Marxist groups campaign or propagandize for armed conflict against established capitalist rulers. As a consequence, they are often associated with terrorism.



Taylor and Vanden (1982) argue that there are number of factors that affect the difficulty of describing terrorism. When exploited, these factors have the effect of distorting the truth. Associating certain groups of people with actions or ideologies that are widely presumed to be evil greatly influences public opinion. The public morally and legally objects to those who are labeled as terrorist. Distracted by their disdain, the public then does not realize the real nature of the sovereign's interest in those people. For example, Americans presume that terrorism is an act committed by terrible people. According to Taylor and Vanden, the terms "revolutionary movement," "guerrilla warfare," and "communist-supported terrorism" intensify this ideological opinion. They play to sentiment rather than intellect.

Violence is another commonality among these insurgent/terrorist organizations. The operations that were conducted by these groups left people of all ages, sexes, and nationalities either injured or dead. In fact, violence is the primary strategic tool that terrorist groups prefer. They all illegitimately use force to achieve their political objectives, terrifying and intimidating people who do not support their cause.

Interestingly, these groups all share a common geographical thread. They all operate in places where illegal drug production and trafficking are at their peaks. For example, the FARC and the M-19 operate in Colombia's most active coca cultivating and cocaine producing areas, and the SL operates in the same position in Peru. The LTTE has the advantage of being very close to one of the main heroin producing region of the world, the Golden Triangle between Burma, Laos, and Thailand. The PKK is mainly active in Turkey. Turkey's geographic location makes it a major transit route for the

Southwest Asian heroin that is transported to Europe from the Golden Crescent Region of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Synthetic drugs from Europe also pass through Turkey in route to the Middle East. In essence, all of these groups take advantage of their geographic positions to gain extreme financial power by capitalizing on the already existing illegal drug trade.

The drug trade provides profit to these terrorist groups in more than one way. In addition to simply dealing drugs for money, all of these groups extorted money from established drug traffickers. This money was either paid to buy “protection” or was simply considered to be a tax due to the rightful rulers of the land. In this case, any merchandise that is subject to trade was taxed. Of course, the legality of the trade is not an issue as long as it pays a good amount of tax. Their mutual ideologies, like many other ideologies, oppose drug abuse and see it as a capitalist tactic intended to subjugate opponents. However, the groups have all ignored their ideological objections ironically choosing to earn as much money as possible by continuing their lucrative trade.

Finally, all of these groups have gone to great lengths to cover their involvement in the illegal drug business. Since drug trafficking is considered as a crime against humanity by the international community, these insurgent/terrorist organizations always deny their involvement and condemn such acts. Nevertheless, they lost their credibility within many supportive countries and sympathetic international organizations when these nations and organizations discovered that all these insurgent/terrorist groups involved to some degree in illicit drug trafficking.

## Typology of Narco-terrorism

It is clear that ‘narco-terrorism’ is as controversial as its predecessor ‘terrorism.’ It is also obvious that there is no consensus among academicians or state officials on the issue of defining narco-terrorism. However, some conclusive descriptions can be drawn because the concepts used to define narco-terrorism are not unlimited. Most of these concepts are discussed by the authors cited in this paper. Moreover, there is no need for there to be a ‘one and only one’ definition of a concept, especially if this concept is as multi-dimensional as narco-terrorism. Table 11 provides an organized synopsis of several likely possible existing types of narco-terrorism, their function, and their purpose.

Narco-terrorist activities primarily have two main dimensions: political and economical. In some cases narco-terrorist activity may carry both dimensions. Political narco-terrorism seeks to achieve political ends. In this type of narco-terrorism, the groups that are involved use the monetary power that they gain from the illegal drug business to achieve their political goals. They use the money for propaganda purposes, in elections, for the candidates who support their political agenda, to fund candidates who are secretly one of their own, create cells in different locations, bribe government officials and so on.

The first type of political narco-terrorism is the *actual narco-terrorism*. This type of narco-terrorism, beyond any other types that have been discussed or will be discussed in this paper, is the most common idea people have in mind when they think about “narco-terrorism.” *Actual narco-terrorism* is the direct involvement of terrorist organizations in illegal drug trafficking. This involvement may occur during all or some

Table 11: Narco-terrorism Typology

	Types	Method of Operation	Purpose
Political Narco- terrorism	Actual Narco-terrorism	Direct involvement of terrorist organizations in some or all phases of drug trafficking.	Financing their terrorist activities, purchasing arms and ammunition
	Insurgent Narco-terrorism	1. Providing protection for drug traffickers.	Gaining economic power to lance their political agenda and accumulating the arsenal necessary to fight against existing government
		2. Taxing drug traffickers.	
		3. Actual insurgent engagement in drug producing and trafficking.	
	State-Sponsored Narco-terrorism	Sponsoring terrorist organizations that smuggle illicit drugs.	Destabilizing opponent governments and bringing about a change in the political system.
Myth Narco-terrorism	Exaggerating or making up linkages between insurgent/terrorist groups and the illegal drug business by using political power	Getting domestic and international support for imposing national or foreign policies	
Economic/ Political Narco- terrorism	State-employed Narco-terrorism	Controlling the drug trade through secret governmental agencies or actually using these agencies to traffic drugs	Obtaining financial power for the secret operations that cannot be carried out openly by a state and Destabilizing opponent governments.
Economic Narco- terrorism	Criminal Narco-terrorism	Employment of terrorist-like tactics by drug trafficking organizations	Protecting and increasing interest

phases of this illegal business. Some terrorist organizations control the trade from production to distribution. They engage the production of the crops that make the base material for the actual drug, and then they establish labs to produce the final product. After the drug is ready, they transport or arrange to transport the drugs to consuming areas, finally distributing them by using their members as dealers and their cells as storage.

All of the insurgent/terrorist organizations that have been mentioned in this study have been involved in one or more phases of illicit drug trafficking. For example, the FARC has been active in the coca crop cultivation, lab operations, and exportation of cocaine, providing cocaine to the Mexican cartel in exchange for money and, most likely weapons. The SL has also been heavily involved in coca production in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley. It also would put pressure on growers, Colombian traffickers, and lab operators to follow pre-fixed coca, coca paste, and cocaine prices. The SL would often kill traffickers and coca growers who did not obey its price instructions. The M-19 used its guerillas as drug traffickers in the Guillot-Lara episode. The LTTE trafficked drugs via their shipping fleet, and distributed them by the hand of some of the 500,000 Tamil expatriates residing mainly in the developed drug consuming countries. The PKK was active in almost every phases of illegal drug trafficking. They had labs in Iran, Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey where they converted base-morphine to heroine by using acetic acid anhydride. Then they traffic the resulting heroine using the Balkan Route and any other available route. They used their Diaspora as a distribution network to deal out the drugs.

The next type of narco-terrorism is *Insurgent narco-terrorism*. This type differs from *actual narco-terrorism* in only one way: Insurgent narco-terrorists have grassroots-level political agendas. Groups with insurgent characteristics have a foundation and structure that is different from terrorist organizations. Some insurgent groups may only be involved in the illegal drug business in different levels with an indirect or direct manner. One way of insurgent groups become indirectly involved is by providing security for drug traffickers who are professional criminals. For example, the Medellin Cartel's clandestine laboratories in Yuri, Colombia were guarded by forty to sixty FARC guerillas. When government forces infiltrated, these forces fought to the end.

Insurgent groups may also be indirectly involved with drug trafficking through the taxation of producers and traffickers. The SL taxes everyone who has a business in Upper Huallaga Valley. They get a certain percentage of the value of every smuggled cocaine or cocaine base from the region. Furthermore, some seized documents show that the SL charges three thousand dollars to seven thousand dollars per flight for drug planes leaving the Valley.

*State-sponsored narco-terrorism* is another type of political narco-terrorism. This type of narco-terrorism may occur when some states support and sponsor terrorist organizations that engage in illicit drug trafficking. In this case, the supporting states do not back terrorist organizations due to their involvement in a lucrative business; these states seek a changing in the political system by destabilizing governments in the countries where these narco-terrorist organizations operate. In order to destabilize target countries and bring about a change in their political system, aggressive states often

promote terrorism and illegal drug trafficking. Among their opponents these states create terrorist organizations, support them with every means of transportation and weapons available and have them attack conventional government institutions to undermine the existing system. They also tolerate and even support the involvement of their terrorist organizations in the illegal drug business. They know that by bringing drugs to other nations, they shake the cultural and political foundations of the society.

As discussed in previous chapters, the Cuban government did not hesitate to support almost all of the Marxist-Leninist insurgent/terrorist organizations in Latin America and elsewhere. Havana provided guerilla and political training to these terrorist organizations, and also, as was the case with Guillot-Lara episode, helped them to smuggle arms and drugs to finance their activities. Cuba and its brother communist nations would back communist terrorist organizations regardless of the legality or illegality of their activities. In fact, in recent history they have not been interested in distinctions between the two.

*Myth narco-terrorism* is the last type of political narco-terrorism. This type of narco-terrorism is artificial. *Myth narco-terrorism* occurs when a non-narcotic terrorist group is falsely linked with the drug trade in order to create a negative image of the group. Some states may generate such an artificial situation by exaggerating or making up linkages between insurgent groups and the illegal drug business to generate a domestic and international support for imposing its own policies in the region. In these cases, the conventional belief that illegal drug trafficking as a crime against humanity is taken advantage of by these suppressive states. When a bad reputation is established by such

propaganda, the accused groups generally lose the sympathy and support of the society at large.

Scott (1991), in his book “Cocaine Politics,” argues that narco-terrorism is an artificial term that was created by the Reagan administration in order to restore public support for the Administration’s campaign against Nicaragua, an area believed to be a dangerous base of the communist bloc. The fear of communism in American society however was not prominent as it once was due to the failure of the Vietnam War and growing relations between the United States and many communist countries. The administration then invented narco-terrorism as a propaganda tool, linking two evils of drugs. The term was used by the Reagan administration as a political rather than analytical tool. Both President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz clearly declared that narco-terrorism was the danger most threatening to the Western hemisphere and, it was supported by communist nations. Beyond these political maneuvers, Scott claims that the United States controversially waged a secret war against Nicaragua by generating and sponsoring their own narco-terrorists within the Contras. Following Reagan’s example some right-wing Latin American military forces also used the term ‘narco-terrorism’ as a necessary addition to their national security policy in order to rationalize their oppressive domestic actions.

*State-employed narco-terrorism* has both the political and economic characteristics of narco-terrorism. Similar to *state-sponsored narco-terrorism*, *State-employed narco-terrorism* seeks to make changes in the political system of the target country by destabilizing its conventional institutions by with the help of drug-backed



terrorism. However, *State-employed narco-terrorism* is primarily concerned with the monetary advantages of being affiliated with terrorism and the drug trade. These states secretly use their own governmental agencies to traffic drugs in order to pad the states coffers. The political advantages of bringing drugs to other countries are simply an added bonus. The money they earn is then dedicated to armed struggles, engaging their troops to terrorize their opponents.

Turkey provides an example of the implications of this type of narco-terrorism. Turkey was chosen by the USSR as a prime target for low-intensity warfare in late 1960s. The Soviets chose Turkey for several reasons. Their primary goal was to weaken a major ally of the United States and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) outpost. First, Moscow launched major disinformation operations about Turkey's relations with the West. They used every available means of propaganda, even establishing clandestine radio stations that continuously broadcast against Turkey's existing democratic system. As result of these intensive black propaganda operations to create a chaotic atmosphere, the continual efforts of Moscow and its close ally Bulgaria brought terrorism to its peak at the end of the 1970s. In 1980, an average of 28 people was killed every day. These terrorist campaigns were financed through the trade of arms and ammunition, and drugs. A multipurpose Bulgarian state trading agency, Kintex, was used as a main provider of weapons and necessary funds to support the ongoing terrorism. Bulgarian trucks carried weapons among their legitimate shipments of tomato paste and machinery. These trucks traveled to the Middle East, and brought back illegal drugs originating from sources as distant as the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent (Henze, 1986).

The last type of narco-terrorism is *criminal narco-terrorism*, and it falls under the heading economic narco-terrorism. *Criminal narco-terrorism* is used solely for financial benefits. It occurs when drug trafficking organizations employ terrorist-like tactics to deter, terrify and intimidate states, citizens, and agents who threaten their lucrative business. The first aim of these heinous organizations is to protect and increase their financial interest. The violence they use is no less severe than the violence terrorist use.

Latin American cocaine cartels constitute the best example for this type of narco-terrorism. The Medellin Cartel is the most famous and vicious among them. The Medellin Cartel was formed in 1982 as a response to the kidnapping of a member of the Ochoa family by the M-19 guerrillas. The cocaine smugglers became conscious of their vulnerability to this type of extortion due to their wealth. The traffickers got together and each donated \$7.5 million to the formation of a paramilitary force to fight the guerillas. It was at this time that drug barons started to work together in a more coordinated and cooperative way (Filippone, 1994). Later, this paramilitary force was very often used to assassinate politicians and police and army officers who opposed their illicit drug trafficking. This group did not hesitate to employ terrorist-like tactics, such as bombing, and wide-spread violence.

#### Recommendations

As discussed above narco-terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. The first dimension “narco,” or the illegal drug business, has three sides: production, trafficking, and consumption. Every step of this illegal trade must be studied separately and separate measures should be created for each step. Nevertheless, this separation

should not affect the desired final outcome, namely the elimination of all phases of the illegal drug problem. Every phase should receive the importance and attention it deserves, not one degree more or less.

The production phase is a two-step process: the cultivation of the crops that make the base material for the illegal drug, and the production of illegal drugs by mixing chemicals and the base product in clandestine labs. Eradication is the only way to eliminate illegally cultivated crops. However, the eradication process requires that some attention be paid to developing alternative crop production so that the local people have a legitimate means to reasonably support themselves. Illegal crop production is one of a very few ways to make money in these countries. Conventional governments should offer more to their citizens than criminals do. People within the production zone should be enabled to make similar profits by raising legitimate crops. This, of course, can only come through education and the use of modern developed techniques of cultivation. One look at the production zones in the world reveals that they are all located in underdeveloped countries. Farmers in the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent simply do not have the techniques nor the support from the government to raise legitimate crops that are as lucrative as their opium crops.

Clandestine cocaine or heroine labs will always exist as long as the production of the necessary base materials continues. Morphine base is the natural derivative produced from the opium poppy to make heroin. Cocaine base is also a natural product produced from coca plants to make cocaine. However, these base materials are not the only ingredients needed to produce heroin and cocaine. There are indispensable precursor

chemicals that have to be mixed with the base to produce the actual drug. For example, for heroin it is acetic acid anhydride, which is a precursor that is conventionally used in detergents and similar products. In contrast with morphine base, acetic acid anhydride is mostly produced in developed Western states and trafficked in the opposite direction: from west to east. This creates a controversial situation. While Western states are the biggest consuming countries, they continue to produce chemicals vital for the drugs that threaten their own societies. Even though they are produced for lawful purposes, these chemicals are easily diverted to illegal channels, and consequently smuggled to production zones.

Due to financial concerns, many producing Western countries do not agree with proposals that advocate placing these chemicals under the same level of control as hard drugs. Besides this governmental reluctance, producers of these essential precursors fail to create an effective control mechanism that would allow them to monitor and strictly regulate the purchase, distribution, and use of the precursor chemicals. This situation should be remedied. Every precursor chemical used in the production of illegal drugs should be treated the same way illegal drugs are treated in national and international law. Countries that produce those chemicals should be as sensitive to these chemicals as they are to illegal drugs that have capacity to obliterate their own social institutions.

Successful combat against the trafficking of illegal drugs requires long term commitment, well-organized agencies, and effective cooperation. Long term commitments should consist of long term plans, and should utilize organizations that are capable of carrying out these plans. International drug traffickers, and in some countries,

large-scale local drug dealers are different than regular criminals. Because of the huge profits derived from the sale of drugs, they are able to use every means of technology available, regardless of the cost to avoid police interference. Many law enforcement agencies around the world are provided by technological devices used for surveillance, communication, and combat well after drug traffickers have the same capabilities. In some cases, these agencies will never have comparable technologies simply because it is so difficult to compete with the financial resources of drug traffickers. However, when the future of the country is at stake, every possible means should be used to overcome the problem.

Another obstacle that weakens and even makes it impossible to defeat drug traffickers is the corruption of government officials. This obstruction pollutes the state's own legitimacy. Without legal-rational authority, the state has no foundation to stand upon to fight against outlaws. Corruption, therefore, must be eliminated at every level. This elimination process requires a strict enforcement of the countries laws, vigilant preservation of its institutions, morally upright personal, and of course, financial power.

International cooperation is a vital element in the fight against illicit drug trafficking. Creating an international community that is sensitive to the issue and aware of the seriousness of the problem is the first requirement of this international cooperation. Since drugs are a world-wide problem, no single country can successfully combat the problem without the help of the others. This help may take different forms: information exchange, financial aid, joint operations, international laws, signed treaties, appointed liaison officers, regular meetings and conferences, training, and so on.

Information must be exchanged immediately. Due to long bureaucratic procedures, vital information often arrives well after it is needed. For an effective international cooperation, a rapid information exchange system is critical. States that are willing to cooperate should regulate their internal procedures to avoid bureaucratic obstacles.

As discussed earlier, some countries may have financial difficulties in dealing with illicit drug trafficking. The donation of money, equipment, and training to legitimate law enforcement agencies that are located in crucial positions among drug trafficking networks would benefit everyone. However, strict control of these resources must be maintained to ensure that they are used in the way that they are intended. It is no small task to exercise this control without offending the receiving countries.

Good training programs that are prepared by experienced and financially powerful countries are important instruments in the fight against illicit drug trafficking. These programs give officers around the world the opportunity to share their experiences, learn new techniques, and familiarize themselves with recent developments in equipment technology. The sole purpose of these training programs should be to strengthen cooperation and prepare law enforcement officers to efficiently combat drug trafficking. Host countries should have no ulterior motives. The use of these training programs to advance their own political agendas would only perpetuate division, thereby weakening the allies while strengthening the enemy.

International treaties, such as “The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971” and the “1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances” are the engines that facilitate efficient international cooperation. Although many countries have signed such treaties and manage to have them ratified by their legislatures, there are still states that either have not signed the treaty or have them signed but have not ratified them. The international community should put pressure on such countries to be a part on these crucially important treaties. The countries that have signed the treaties should make necessary regulations in accordance with the responsibilities that are imposed by these treaties.

Since the United States is the only remaining super power in the world, a careful evaluation of its drug policies is necessary. US foreign policy regarding illicit drug-control is a manifestation of its tough national drug-control policy. This national policy encompasses many severe sanctions and zero-tolerance applications, including the use of mandatory minimums and asset forfeiture. The US drug policy is also discriminatory towards racial and ethnic minorities. Since there is no positive evidence that indicates the usefulness, adequacy, or success of this harsh policy, applying this policy internationally would not bring about a different outcome. America has the potential to lead the global community in multinational joint operations, but equal participation is essential in order to achieve success. In these operations, governments and international organizations should determine their goals and criteria for success very clearly before initiating any program concerning the drug dilemma. After an adequate time has passed following the implementation of the program, its outcomes should be closely monitored and evaluated. If the results do not meet the success criteria, these programs or strategies should be changed or abandoned. Furthermore American foreign policy must yield to the wisdom

of other countries' policies and strategies. The US must be especially sensitive to countries containing production and transit zones. Programs there must be analyzed with realistic criteria. Their voluntary cooperation and active participation must be maintained. An equitable, internationally cooperative effort will be the only way to achieve success against drug traffickers.

Consumption is the last part of the narcotics problem. Consumption here refers to the drug abuse problem. New trends in world drug abuse do not promise a drug-free world in the near future. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations published a report detailing the world's drug abuse situation. This report examines data from many countries in an attempt to provide a global picture of new and emerging trends in drug abuse. In 1999, the CND found that thirty-one countries in Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe reported increased abuse of heroin. Heroin abuse appears to have gradually risen in the United States of America since 1992. An increase in the use of non-injecting modes of abuse, including smoking in Europe, and snorting in the United States, have also occurred with these higher levels of heroin abuse. Thirty countries reported the rising abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants. Generally in Southeast Asia, particularly in Thailand, the rising trend in the abuse of methamphetamine formed a source of substantial concern. The growing abuse of amphetamines is also reported in many countries of the European Union.

An increasing number of countries report the existence of intravenous drug use (IDUs) and growing rates of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) among IDUs. The already delicate health and social infrastructures of developing countries have taken



the blunt of this burden, being greatly susceptible to drug abuse. There is the potential for an epidemic of HIV among IDUs in the Russian Federation and surrounding countries. An HIV outbreak is also likely to occur in Central and Eastern Europe as well as various Asian countries. In some countries, Hepatitis C infections among IDUs and drug-related deaths due to drug overdose are also sources of new concerns (CND, 1999).

The CND's report, as disheartening and pessimistic as it may be, serves as a reminder of the urgency with which international cooperation against the drug trade must be undertaken. Nations should not be lost in the debate over whether to prioritize the target against supply or demand. Rather, equal importance should be given to both parts, and intelligent national and international action should be undertaken.

Terrorism, the second dimension of the "narco-terrorism," requires the same commitments that are needed in the fight against illegal drug trafficking. As explained in the previous chapters, there are several similarities between illegal drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations, and sometimes both evils may exist in the same organization, thus creating "narco-terrorism".

Terrorist organizations are not only threats to their own countries, they also constitute a great threat the stability of world peace. Terrorism, therefore, is an international issue. Effective international cooperation is vital to establish national and international security. As with the drug phenomenon, rapid information exchange, financial aid, joint operations, international legislation, regular global meetings and conferences, and quality training efforts are essential to successfully combat terrorism.

However, terrorism is a more political issue than the drug dilemma. Terrorist organizations represent different political ideologies. The all too familiar “your terrorist is my freedom fighter” phenomenon poses a major obstacle to international cooperation. Nevertheless, the recent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. have shown the huge impact that terrorist acts can have on global affairs. The enormous bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians further emphasizes the global impact of terrorism. Nations must find common ground in the fight against terrorism. They must present a worldwide united front to prevent future attacks and save the lives of countless innocent civilians.

Terrorism becomes even more devastating when it is combined with illicit drug trafficking. Because of the giant financial potential of the illegal drug business, terrorist organizations are given the opportunity to equip themselves with more sophisticated and deadly weapons, including nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction. To avoid the unthinkable consequences of such disasters, the bond between terrorist organizations and illegal drugs must be severed. The best way of doing so is totally eliminate both threats; however this is not an easy task and can not be accomplished overnight. Consequently, it is best to go for the singular. Cut the financial power of the terrorists. They simply cannot operate efficiently without money.

Today, almost all terrorist organizations realize that they need support from legitimate states and international organizations to achieve their goals. Hence, they make it highest priority to disguise their politically and socially unacceptable operations. By collecting indisputable evidence that proves their involvement in the illicit drug business,

and subsequently conducting a broad campaign to make their supporters aware of their involvement, these terrorist groups will lose their credibility. In short, evidence can be presented to make supporters aware that “their freedom fighter is my narco-terrorist.”

Lastly, many of the terrorist organizations originate in repressive countries with little or no democracy. The ideology behind their insurrection is closely related to their oppressive governmental policies, restricted freedom, and the inequitable treatment of the people by state agents and agencies. In some cases, terrorist organizations may also be created in democratic countries. These groups take advantage of their freedom and they are frequently supported by governments who oppose their democratic state. Nonetheless, the rise of terrorist groups with democratic countries is rare.

The total elimination of terrorism, an admittedly utopian approach, can only be accomplished by establishing democracy fully in every nation, and overcoming every destructive and malevolent ideology that exist. In order to bring this utopia to reality, together the free counties of the world must wholeheartedly and unabashedly strive to meet ultimate goal of ending violence caused by terrorism and ending enslavement caused by drugs.

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