The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, Eighteenth Congress, First Session, [Volume 2] Page: 1,801
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1801
HISTORY OF CONGRESS.
1802
March, 1824.
Massachusetts Contested Election.
H. op R,
quotation from Jacob is still more vague. These
authorities prove nothing.
The constitution of Massachusetts is quoted in
the report, as declaring, that a person shall be con-
sidered as an inhabitant "where he dwelleth or
hath his home." This the committee consider as
" settling conclusively" the meaning of the word.
Persons acquainted with the civil concerns of the
State well know, that, that definition is held as
leaving the question as doubtful as it found it. So
far is it from settling the question conclusively in
favor of the rigid doctrine of the report, that the
whole practice of that State proves the reverse.
The decisions of the highest judicial tribunal of
the State, as well as its legislative proceedings,
prove that the word inhabitant, in that State, does
not mean, as this report contends, barely residence
in a place, but refers to a person as a member of
the political community. The qualification of a
voter for Governor and Senators is inhabitancy,
without using at all the word citizen or citizen-
ship! And yet (see Mass. Reports, vol. 2, p. 245,
263, and vol. 7, p. 523) the question respecting a
right to vote, is invariably considered as involving
the question of citizenship. Numerous cases also
in its legislative history show, that inhabitancy is
retained, without actual residence. Besid.es, the
terms citizen and inhabitant are used in the con-
stitution of the State without any apparent dis-
tinction.
If, therefore, we take the use of the term inhab
itancy in Massachusetts, as the test of the legality
of the election in question, it is most unquestion-
ably legal. Every authority is in its favor. And
this use, probably, ought to be the test. When
the Constitution of the United States says, that a
member of this House must, at the time of his
election, be an inhabitant of the State in which
he is chosen, it probably leaves to each State to
determine what shall be its own terms of inhabi-
tancy. If, however, we take the other ground,
and consider the question as one to be determined
solely by the Constitution of the United States,
without reference to the State authorities, it has
already been shown, that the framers of the Con-
stitution, as admitted by the committee themselves,
had a different understanding of the meaning of
the word inhabitant from that contended for in
this report.
It is also stated in the report, that the constitu-
tions of Delaware, Georgia, and Ohio, have a sav-
ing clause in favor of persons absent from those
States; and this saving clause is given as proof,
that absence destroys inhabitancy. It might have
been slated, that not only these three States, but
nearly all the States in the Union, acknowledge
the same principle in favor of their citizens, when
absent in the service of their State, or of the Uni-
ted States. The constitution of Kentucky, for
instance, has the following provision : " Absence
cn the business of this State, or the United States,
shall not forfeit a residence once obtained." The
same principle, to a greater or less extent, is re-
cognised by the constitutions of twelve out of the
eighteen States, whose constitutions have been
formed since that of the United States. And Vir-
ginia, in her general election law, adds also her
example to the list. Instead of inferring from
these facts, as this report infers, that mere absence
destroys inhabitancy, I infer, and confidently infer,
the very reverse. This general concurrence of the
voice of the nation, in favor of persons in public
employment, proves that the principle is founded
deeply in the common sense of mankind. It proves
that it is an essential principle in our free institu-
tions, that absence on public employment shall
not diminish the rights of the person so employed.
The report cites the act of March, 1790, for
taking the first census, as proof of the correctness
of its own definition of the word inhabitant. We
know very well, that laws are often passed, with-
out much regard to critical verbal accuracy. In
most cases, the language is such as happens to be
reported by a committee; and I am not at all in-
clined to support the infallibility of committees.
But suppose the word inhabitant is used in this
law with entire accuracy ; even this proves noth-
ing. It does not prove that the first Congress
meant to exclude from the enumeration persons
who were temporarily absent from their original
permanent homes. It therefore proves nothing.
Nor does the judiciary law of 1789, cited in the
report, prove any thing. In the whole of that
long act, the word inhabitant appears to be used
but twice; in the 11th and in the 27th sections.
And in neither case does the use of the word give
the slightest sanction to the doctrine advanced in
this report.
In reply to the almost irresistible argument ia
my favor drawn from the numerous instances in
which persons have enjoyed the privilege of in-
habitants, while absent in public employment, the
report contends, that such instances cannot be
properly adduced as precedents, where the ques-
tion was not formally agitated and decided. This
doctrine I venture to say is unsound. Whatever
may be its correctness as applied, in the strict
practice of courts of law, to principles, it cannot
be true as applied to the meaning of a word. Lan- .
guage, we all know, is perfectly arbitrary. The
meaning of a word is determined wholly by its
use. If the people of a country, by common con-
sent, consider a person as an inhabitant of a State,
though he is temporarily absent in public employ-
ment, this must be received as the true meaning
of the word, even if there were not a single formal
decision on the point. Such general practice
shows what is the common-senseinterpietation of
the word; and is conclusive of the question.
We might go further than this. Even if it
were proved that the framers of the Constitution
understood the word in the same sense as is con-
tended for in the report, (though we have seen
distinctly that they did not,) yet, if it"were also
proved, that, for thirty years past, the uniform
understanding of the people of this country has
been different, and their uniform practice different,
it would be wrong to reject this uniform under-
standing and practice, and revive the obsolete use
of the word. Language is ever fluctuating. The
title of one of the most ingenious treatises on
philology ever presented to the world, very aptly
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Gales and Seaton. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, Eighteenth Congress, First Session, [Volume 2], book, 1856; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc30369/m1/55/: accessed April 23, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.