FCC Record, Volume 5, No. 3, Pages 556 to 796, January 29 - February 9, 1990 Page: 596
xiv, 556-796 p. ; 28 cm.View a full description of this book.
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Federal Communications Commission Record
5 FCC Red No. 3
contrast, the ship exemptions granted herein apply only to
those particular entities before us. While the policy determinations
underlying our grant of the exemptions herein
may be applied in future cases, we will continue to act on
a case-by-case basis. Thus, under our decision today, no
ship operator is required to operate under an exemption
nor is it necessarily entitled to an exemption if it requests
one. In these circumstances, no broad, prospective, general
policy that imposes new requirements on a broad
class of regulated entities within an industry is being
adopted. Therefore, these cases are distinguishable and do
not require a rule making in this instance.
15. ROU/ARA's argument that we have made the exception
the rule, abandoning the radiotelegraphy distress
and safety system contrary to the Communications Act
and the Safety Convention and forcing the maritime industry
to adopt the GMDSS ahead of schedule, is especially
lacking in merit. Our actions have been taken
within the framework of the Communications Act and
Safety Convention, which specifically permit exemptions
on a case-by case basis. 3 Without an exemption a ship is
required to carry manual Morse radiotelegraph equipment.
With an exemption a ship is required to carry
equipment that will receive and send the distress signals
required by alternative, and we believe more reliable,
systems. No ship is required to operate under an exemption
or to carry any satellite or other modern equipment
required for an exemption, and we have made no decisions
here that bind us in future cases.
B. National Security
16. ROU/ARA continue to try to read the April 22,
1988, letter, supra, from the Chief of Naval Operations
stating that the Navy had "no objection" to granting exemptions
as saying the opposite. Further, they attempt to
interpret a May 6, 1988, letter from his subordinate,
Admiral Layman, to support their argument that ship
exemptions undermine national security. ROU/ARA,
16-20. These arguments are completely without merit. We
note that ROU/ARA does not refer to a subsequent letter
from Admiral Layman confirming that his May 6 letter
"does not alter nor supersede the . . . position [of the
Chief of Naval Operations stated in his April 22 letter]."
Letter from Admiral Lawrence Layman to Mr. R.H. McNamara
(June 3, 1988).
17. ROU/ARA state that every time the Commission
exempts a ship, the number of jobs for radio officers
decreases and some leave the profession, thus diminishing
the pool available for national defense purposes.
ROU/ARA 20. Whether our actions are likely to decrease
the number of radio officers available is open to question
as it does not appear likely that these waivers will significantly
affect the employment prospects of radio officers.
We have received informal complaints from ship operators
that there is a severe shortage of radio officers. We
also received comments to this effect in our rule making
proceeding in Gen. Docket No. 88-37 concerning ship
radio officers. See Report and Order, 3 FCC Rcd 63 61,
6366 n. 8 (1988). We have not received complaints from
radio officers that they are unable to find work, and in
light of the foregoing it is unlikely that these waivers will
significantly affect their ability to do so. In short,
ROU/ARA's argument that the number of qualified radio
officers available will be depleted and the national security
will be affected is unpersuasive.18. ROU/ARA also argue that radio officers are needed
on board ships for national security purposes because they
are the only personnel on merchant ships who are trained
to communicate with military vessels in time of war or
crisis. ROU/ARA, 19. The ROU/ARA suggestion that only
licensed radio officers can be trained in special procedures
for communication with Navy ships is simplistic.
The Navy does not use manual Morse telegraphy for
communications with merchant ships. Thus, a number of
crew members could be trained in the necessary procedures
in accord with changing circumstances. Additionally,
and most important, the Navy has no objection to
our exemptions on national security or any other
grounds. Therefore, ROU/ARA's arguments concerning
national security can be given little weight.
C. Safety
19. ROU/ARA state that the purpose of the law requiring
all U.S. cargo ships of 1600 gross tons or more to be
equipped with a radiotelegraph station and radio officers
is to provide a pool of mutual assistance by the use of
radiotelegraphy so that ships can communicate directly
with each other so that each may act as a potential
lifeboat for other ships. Each time a ship is exempted
from the radiotelegraph requirements, they say, the effectiveness
of the existing system is weakened because fewer
ships participate in the pool. ROU/ARA, 6-7, 12. We
addressed this argument at length in Ship Exemptions, 1,
supra, 2102-3. In short, because of the diversity of modern
equipment the ships will carry and because of decline in
use of radiotelegraphy by ships of leading maritime nations,
neither their safety nor the safety of ships that may
need to communicate with them in distress situations will
be diminished. The pool of mutual assistance will not be
weakened.
20. ROU/ARA argue that the Order failed to discuss
some specific arguments they raised concerning safety.
For example they state that the Order did not discuss with
sufficient specificity their point that the COVE LEADER
is 30 years old. ROU/ARA Reply, 4. ROU/ARA did not,
however, explain why the age of the COVE LEADER
should disqualify it for an exemption. Further. the Order
discussed that argument, in para. 9, by saying that the
possibility that the ships requesting exemptions may encounter
distress situations is not a sound argument against
granting the exemptions because the equipment they will
carry will provide communications reliability equal or
superior to radiotelegraphy.
21. ROU/ARA had provided charts to illustrate areas
where the ships' routes would carry them out of the range
of VHF and MF coast stations, but, they state, the Order
brushed this concern off by stating that the ships would
carry a variety of equipment and not rely solely on the
MF distress and calling frequency 2182 MHz. This is
insufficient, ROU/ARA argue, because other types of
equipment operate on HF frequencies and are not reliable
in all circumstances in that HF propagation conditions
vary. According to ROU/ARA, the special skills of
radiotelegraph operators are needed to transmit and respond
to distress communications quickly. ROU/ARA,
14-15. ROU/ARA is apparently referring to the fact that
the various HF bands vary in their propagation as to
whether it is day or night, or over the longer term, in
response to sunspot activity. Any operator, however,
whether a licensed radio officer or not, becomes familiarwith HF propagation through experience and knows
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United States. Federal Communications Commission. FCC Record, Volume 5, No. 3, Pages 556 to 796, January 29 - February 9, 1990, book, February 1990; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1659/m1/58/: accessed April 25, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.