Deep Water: the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling Page: 78
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National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
accepting gifts from oil and gas companies was prevalent throughout the MMS Lake
Charles[, Louisiana] office." "[A] number of MMS employees at th[at] district office
admitted to attending sporting events prior to 2007 in which oil and gas production
companies sponsored teams, as well as receiving lunches and accepting gifts." The
investigation found that one employee had conducted inspections on a company's oil
platforms while in the process of negotiating (and later accepting employment) with
the company.123 Here again, the actions of a few damaged the reputation of the agency
as a whole, and demoralized the vast majority of MMS employees who avoided such
conflicts.124 In January 2009, only days after taking office, Secretary Salazar met with
MMS employees and announced an ethics reform initiative in response to the problems
identified at MMS and elsewhere in the agency.125
Mismanagement and Misdirection
Perhaps because of the cumulative lack of adequate resources, absence of a sustained
agency mission, or sheer erosion of professional culture within some offices, MMS
came progressively to suffer from serious deficiencies of organization and management:
the fundamental traits of any effective institution. According to the Outer Continental
Shelf Safety Oversight Board,* MMS lacks "a formal, bureau-wide compilation of rules,
regulations, policies, or practices pertinent to inspections, nor does it have a comprehensive
handbook addressing inspector roles and responsibilities." As a result, the Board concluded,
"policies and enforcement mechanisms vary among the [Gulf of Mexico] districts and
the regions, and there is no formal process to promote standardization, consistency, and
operational efficiency."126
The Safety Oversight Board singled out MMS's handling of inspections for pointed
criticism. For example, management promoted inspections by single inspectors in order
to increase the total number of inspections, even though "most inspectors interviewed
said that two-person teams would increase efficiencies, eliminate reliance on an operator
representative for observations on safety tests, improve the thoroughness of the inspection,
and reduce the ability of operators to successfully pressure an inspector not to issue [a
citation]." The Board's interviews revealed "staff concerns regarding a perceived emphasis
on the quantity rather than quality of inspection."127
The agency's management shortcomings were underscored, and compounded, by lack of
communication and inconsistencies among its three regional offices for the Gulf of Mexico,
the Pacific, and Alaska. The directors of each regional office naturally adapted practices
to best suit the specific characteristics and needs of the region. But by acting in parallel
fashion, with little coordination in decisionmaking and resource allocation, program
implementation, regulatory interpretation, and enforcement policies became inconsistent,
undermining the integrity of MMS's work.128 For example, the Safety Oversight Board
found that "the Pacific Region employs 5 inspectors to inspect 23 production facilities-a
ratio of 1 inspector for every 5 facilities. By contrast, the [Gulf of Mexico Region] employs
55 inspectors to inspect about 3,000 facilities-a ratio of 1 inspector for every 54
facilities." 129
* Secretary Salazar created the Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board in the immediate aftermath of the Macondo well blowout and charged the Board with
reviewing the effectiveness of MMS's management. The Board issued its report on September 1, 2010.
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National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (U.S.). Deep Water: the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, book, January 2011; Washington, D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc123527/m1/94/: accessed April 23, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.