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National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
than a policeman. We need to create an atmosphere where the primary concern is to fix the
problem, not the blame"-an apt characterization for a period of "regulatory reform" in
Congress and fiscal restraint nationwide.88
Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice? The MMS voluntary approach to risk assessment was
met with skepticism by regulators in the North Sea. At a May 1996 industry forum in
Houston, Texas, an official with the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) compared the
two safety regimes in a presentation titled US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or
Poisoned Chalice? "Last year, with the safety cases of most UK rigs already accepted well
ahead of the deadline, IADC [the International Association of Drilling Contractors] told us
they were pleased to be operating a premium fleet in North Sea and that HSE was not to
think of relaxing the safety case requirements." By contrast, he described the voluntary
SEMP scheme as an unrealistic halfway position, while noting that "both the US and the
UK need more time to find out which way provides the best lasting effect."89
Almost a decade later, MMS was no more successful when it tried to resurrect movement
toward even a weakened version of a safety and environmental management rule. In May
2006, when MMS finally proposed a rule on "Safety and Environmental Management
Systems"-the successor to the long-moribund SEMP initiative-its proposed rule was
limited in its reach. The proposal would have required that only 4 of the 12 widely
accepted elements of industrial process safety management be put into place. Industry
opposition even to this watered-down proposal was swift. And, ultimately, it was only
after the Macondo well blowout four years later that the federal agency finalized a more
comprehensive, mandatory SEMP rule.
Other MMS regulatory initiatives critical to safety faced strong and effective opposition.
In 2003, the White House stiffly opposed MMS's efforts to update its requirements for the
reporting of key risk indicators.90 (MMS had proposed that all unintentional gas releases
be reported, because even small gas leaks can lead to explosions.91) "It was like pulling
teeth," one senior MMS official involved with the process told the Commission: "We never
got positive cooperation" from either industry or the Office of Management and Budget.92
The Offshore Operators Committee, an industry association, vehemently objected that the
requirement would be too burdensome and not conducive to safety; MMS disagreed, yet
the final rule in 2006 mandated that a gas release be reported to MMS only if it resulted
in an "equipment or process shut-in," or mechanical closure-a much less complete
standard.93
Safety Regulation on a Starvation Diet
During the 1990s, the resources available to MMS decreased precipitously just as it
faced a dramatic increase in the offshore activity it was charged with overseeing-and
matters only deteriorated thereafter. Perversely, MMS's budget reached its lowest point
in November 1996,94 just as major development activities in deepwater were expanding.
That December, the Houston Chronicle reported with tragic detail an 81 percent increase
in offshore fires, explosions, and blowouts in the Gulf since 1992.95 The oil and gas
industry drilled a record number of Gulf wells in 1997-many in deepwater.96 By 1999,
oil production from deepwater eclipsed production from shallow water for the first
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National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (U.S.). Deep Water: the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, book, January 2011; Washington, D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc123527/m1/88/: accessed April 25, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.