U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Options Page: 3 of 27
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1377046 UPDATE-12/03/81
ISSUE DEFINITION
Ample security at acceptable cost is the aim of U.S. strategic re
forces, which are assigned primary responsibility for deterrin
attacks against the United States. That aim stays constant, but
force requirements do not. Nuclear systems needed in one context ar
in others.
Congress, in reviewing proposals, therefore needs some effective
relate retaliatory force requirements with U.S. deterrent strategy b
can accurately assess the adequacy of present and projected postures
This brief, which provides no definitive "answers" and supports n
position, addresses three connected issues:
-- How many U.S. weapon systems are compulsory?
-- Which combination would be most suitable?
-- What force level for each system would serve best?
Assessments stress fundamental differences between functional
Bombers accomplish strategic nuclear missions in ways completely ffo
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which duplicate few
and weaknesses of submarine-launched counterparts (SLBMs) , and
Improved products within each class perform missions bett
predecessors, but in much the same way. Piston-powered aircraft a
for example, both fly from point A to point B. It is fruitless, t
to argue about relative merits of B-1 bombers and MX missiles before
for any bomber or ICBM has been established. Particular makes and m
mentioned only for exemplary purposes.
NOTE: Tables that support this text are not retrievable on the
may be obtained by requesting hard copies.
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIStaliatory
g atomic
essential
e surplus
way to
before it
o special
classes.
reign to
strengths
so on.
er than
nd jets,
therefore,
the need
odels are
OCRT, butHOW MANY U.S. SYSTEMS?
The United States, committed to a second-strike strategy,
retaliatory arms that could accomplish assigned missions after abs4
large-scale attack. In addition, the force should afford flexibil.
forestall technological surprise.
Manned bombers fulfilled those functions until the late 195
Defense Department deployed fixed-site ICBMs in 1959 for a va:
reasons. A triad developed the following year, when Polaris submari
-went to sea. It is important to note, however, that strategic reqi
did not dominate decisions to construct a triad. Service politics si
structure as much as military missions.requires
orbing a
ity, and
Ds. The
riety of
aes first
airements
haped theCRS- 1I
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Collins, John M. & Severns, Elizabeth Ann. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Options, report, December 3, 1981; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs8407/m1/3/?q=%22weapons%20systems%22: accessed April 30, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.